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Abstract 
The study focuses on superpower relations with the Maghreb from indepen-
dence until 1985. It contains eight chapters and conclusion together with a bibli-
ography. 
The introduction defines the scope and objectives of the study, as well as 
discussing the methodology and techniques employed in the research. Chapter 
two gives a historical background to European relations with the Maghreb states 
and explains how the Maghreb became part of European political, economic and 
strategic objectives in the European multipolar system. Chapter three presents 
a theoretical basis for superpower relations with the Third World. Chapter four 
examines the historical relations between the Maghreb and the superpowers until 
the independence, and the role of the superpowers in Maghreb independence. 
Chapter five deals with political relations between the Maghreb and the super-
powers and chapter six examines the economic relations between the superpowers 
and the Maghreb states. Chapter seven deals with superpower strategic relations 
with the Maghreb focusing on Mediterranean security, arms transfers, military 
bases and intelligence cooperation. Chapter eight examines superpower behaviour 
toward regional conflict and stability in the Maghreb. The final chapter contains a 
summary and conclusion and future prospects for superpowers relations with the 
Maghreb and the role of the EC in future relations. 
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"There are three wasps' nests besides the Balkans: Morocco and the Mediter-
ranean, the Persian Gulf and the American Monroe Doctrine: God grant that we 
may never fall into one of them". Otto von Bismarck, quoted in Sarbadhikari, 
P. "The UAE in international relations" The Indian Journal of Political Science, 
vol.38, 1977, p. 143. 
"If Germany were to allow France to create 'a new, great, and valuable colo-
nial territory [in Morocco] ... , our credit in the world, not only for the moment, 
but also for all future international actions, suffers an intolerate blow". Alfred 
kiderlen, German Foreign Minister during the Second Moroccan crisis, quoted in 
Ima Barlow, The Agadir Crisis, Chapell Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1940, p. 266. 
"The American-Soviet relationship is a classic historical conflict between two 
major powers. But it is more than merely a national conflict. It is also a struggle 
between two imperial systems. And it involves -for the first time in history- a two-
nation contest for nothing less than global predominance". Zbignew Brzezinski, 
the former National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter 1977-1981, Game 
Plan: A Geostrategic Jilrame Work for the Conduct of the U.S-Soviet Contest, New 
York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1986, p. 8. 
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
1.1 The Issue: 
Over the past two decades, many books and articles have been published about 
the states of North Africa: Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, and Mauritania. 
Most of these publications have dealt with political and economic development in 
the Maghreb states, and they have examined the superpowers' relationship with 
the Arab Maghreb states either briefly or not at all. Some political scientists, 
for example, William Zartman, John Damis, John Entelis, Lisa Anderson, John 
Waterbury and others have written on the foreign policy of the Maghreb states, 
but little attention has been focused on relations between the two superpowers and 
the Maghreb states.1 One exception is John Damis who has written on superpower 
policies toward the conflict in the Western Sahara. 2 
Only two French works have been published about Soviet-Maghreb rela-
tions. They have dealt with political analysis only briefly: one author focuses 
on Moroccan-Soviet relations until 1970, whilst the other gives a general histor-
ical background to relations between the Maghreb and Soviet Union until Alge-
ria's independence in 1962. Both of these publications are more descriptive than 
analytical. 3 
Since independence, Morocco has been associated with the US in providing 
military facilities. In 1982 the US and Morocco signed a use agreement in connec-
tion with Rapid Development Forces (RDF) for the Middle East which, since 1983, 
1 
has been called 'United States Central Command' (U.S.CENTCOM).4 Tunisia has 
no such agreement with the US. However, the US has been extending security 
guarantee to Thnisia, most notably in the 1980s, when Thnisia was infiltrated by 
subversive groups from Libya, particularly during the Bourguiba era. Morocco and 
Tunisia have weaker economic links with the US. Their attachment to the US has 
been primarily political and ideological and has involved attaching themselves to 
the Western capitalist bloc. 
Algeria and Libya are revolutionary states with a pan-Arab ideology. They 
have, in theory, a political and ideological orientation toward the Soviet Union 
and they maintain an arms trade with the Soviet Union. However, both also 
maintain strong economic links with Western Europe and with the US, especially 
regarding oil and natural gas. 
The Libyan leader, Mammer al-Qaddafi shares political and strategic objectives 
with the Soviet Union, but is strongly opposed to communism and communists. 
Qaddafi views the US as the most aggressive, imperialist state in the world. Amer-
ican officials view Libya as a terrorist and a pariah state, and Qaddafi as a "mad 
dog". In reality, the conflict between the US and Libya is influenced by Ameri-
can interests and Libyan regional politics in Northern Africa and the Middle East 
rather than by international terrorism. The Soviet Union has never come to the aid 
of Qaddafi against the US despite Soviet rhetoric, condemnations and lip-service 
support. Libya maintains active trade relations with West Germany, Italy, France 
and other European countries. American oil companies have worked in Libya since 
the 1950s, until the Reagan administration's economic sanctions against Libya in 
1986. Even despite sanctions, the US oil companies continue to operate in Libya 
through the use of European-based companies. American oil technicians and other 
2 
personnel also work in Libya. 
Algeria, as a Non-Aligned state with a revolutionary reputation in the Third 
World, has political and ideological attitudes which differ markedly from those 
of the US. Nevertheless, Algeria conducts a significant volume of economic trade 
with the US. Natural gas is a major element in the Algerian national income and 
it has been particularly important in Algeria's trade with the US. In 1984, the US 
purchased about $3.6 billion from Algeria, whilst Algerian imports from US in the 
same year came only to $520 million. 
On the other hand, Morocco, more allied to the West, maintains economic 
relations with the Soviet Union. Soviet economic ties with Morocco were strength-
ened in March 1978 by the signing of a phosphate agreement, a principal Moroccan 
export and income. The two states also signed a fishing agreement in April 1978. 
The phosphate agreement, described as the "Contract of the Century" 5, was the 
largest commercial agreement the Soviet Union had ever concluded with a Third 
World country. Morocco and the Soviet Union also signed an agreement of cultural 
co-operation. 
It is ironic that, whilst Morocco and Tunisia have legal communist parties, 
despite their economic and political orientations, the communist party in Algeria 
was illegal until September 1989 when Algeria has adopted a multiparty system.6 
There is no official political activity in Libya, and all political parties have been 
banned. It is significant that thousands of Algerian and Libyan students studied 
and graduated in the US, particularly in technological and scientific training. 
The two superpowers have different political and ideological systems. From 
1945 until the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the system of international re-
3 
lations, could be described as a bipolar system. Such a system raises important 
questions. How, if at all, did the respective political ideologies of the superpowers 
determine their foreign policy relations with the Maghreb? To what extent have 
their respective national interests formulated their international behaviour toward 
Maghreb, despite their ideological differences? 
1.2 Objectives of the study: 
Since 1945 the two superpowers have involved themselves in Third World pol-
itics. They both denounced colonialism but used different means and tactics to 
achieve their respective objectives in Third World countries. During the cold war 
era, Third World countries became the most dangerous and volatile area of super-
power confrontation. 
It is the objective of this study to analyse the behaviour of the superpowers in 
the Maghreb States from their independence until1985. 1985 is the turning point 
in superpower behaviour because when Gorbachev came to power, a new era was 
born in the Soviet Union. New Soviet objectives and priorities in its foreign pol-
icy toward the Third World were formulated and ideological rhetoric disappeared 
from the Soviet-Third World relations. He pursued detente with the West more 
actively than Leonid Brezhnev because of the priority he gave to economic reform 
(perestroika). On the other hand, in his second term, Reagan was preoccupied with 
the Iran-Contra Affairs, the hostage crisis, and arms control agreements with the 
Soviet Union rather than involved in confrontation with the Soviet in the Third 
World. Accordingly, the Gorbachev era is not included in this study. Although the 
period covered by the thesis ends in 1985, the present tense is employed in much 
of the thesis. The focus of this thesis is the superpowers' objectives and activities 
4 
in the Maghreb as a case study of superpower behaviour in a theatre beyond their 
direct influence. During this period, Latin America and Eastern Europe were the-
atres within the spheres of influence of the United States and the Soviet Union 
respectively. 
After independence, the Maghreb states remained, if indirectly, within the 
sphere of influence of Western Europe, particularly of France, for geostrategic 
and economic reasons. This thesis attempts to offer an explanation for US and 
Soviet relations in what is a grey area of a sub-division within the Middle East 
subsystem (North Africa). The Middle East subsystem has been subject to the 
political influence of the superpowers since 1945. The Gulf, Iraq, Iran and Thrkey 
had all been part of the Western area of influence, especially of the United States 
and Great Britain. North Africa is the only part of the Middle East now within 
the French sphere of influence. Historically, Lebanon was under French cultural 
influence, especially the Maronites. 
Cultural diplomacy has become an important factor in foreign relations. Most 
of the Maghreb elites use the French language and French is still competing for 
importance with the Arabic language in North Africa. Cultural relations are im-
portant in strengthening political relations between nations and Hans Morgenthau 
even describes cultural imperialism as the most successful of imperialist policies. 7 
Foreign culture creates a "fifth column" in most Third World countries, be it Rus-
sian culture, American culture, the British or French legacy in their colonies. In 
developing societies, and particularly in Africa, most of the elites in power have 
been influenced by their state's cultural experience during the colonial era. 
This thesis has been guided by the following hypotheses: 1. The conflict 
5 
and rivalry between USA and the Soviet Union is not caused so much by different 
political cultures as factors embedded in their respective system by their geographic 
location. As Brzezinski puts it, "Soviet-American relations is a classic historical 
conflict between two major powers... a struggle between two imperial systems ... 
for nothing less than global dominance." 8 
2. In the world of "realpolitik", the geopolitics of small states plays a major role in 
their relations with great powers and the Maghreb has played a significant part in 
European rivalry during the 19th and 20th centuries. It is important to examine 
to what extent this factor influenced superpower behaviour towards the Maghreb 
States. 
3. Despite the emphasis on ideological aspects of the superpowers' international 
behaviour, the realist school of international politics argues that states act in world 
politics according to their national interests rather than according to ideology. Ide-
ology is an inadequate explanation of alliance formation in Third World relations 
with the great powers and the superpowers. 
4. Colonial powers had influenced the superpowers' behaviour in the Third world. 
For example, when superpower interests lay with France, they ignored French 
colonial policy in the Maghreb. The superpowers preferred to maintain existing 
relations with former colonial powers, rather than confuse matters by dealing with 
the grey area of the Third World. 
5. The superpowers preferred stability in the grey areas of the Third World, rather 
than revolutionary change, to protect their national interests. The superpowers 
used military force and military intervention within their spheres of direct influence 
in the Third World, rather than in the grey areas outside their spheres of direct 
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influence. 
1.3 Definition of terms: 
The term Maghreb is used here as it is used in the Arabic literature. Eu-
ropean and American scholars tend to use the term North Africa (French often 
use Maghreb). This latter can be misleading because some authors include Egypt 
and Sudan in North Africa, whereas others do not. Northern Africa9 includes 
Egypt and Sudan and other Maghreb States, but here we use Maghreb or Greater 
Maghreb in this thesis as North Africa. The Maghreb is a division of the Middle 
East subsystem. In this thesis the terms subsystem, Middle East subsystem and 
Maghreb States are defined as below. 
!.International system, subsystem 
Among the terms in use today are system, subsystem and international system. 
These terms have been over used and their meaning has lost precision. However, 
for analytical purposes it is useful to work with a more precise definition. The 
idea of a system was first used with respect to Natural Sciences in describing the 
relationships between the particular elements in a complex whole such as the solar 
system. The term was not applied to the study of society until the 19th century. 
Historians often speak of diplomatic systems, such as Metternich's or Bismarck's, 
by which they mean a combination of forces intended to guarantee the triumph of 
a state on a political principle which safeguards the interests of state. In this study 
the term 'system' is used as follows: "a network of relationships ... connected to 
its environment by 'inputs' and 'outputs'. It means a set of interacting parts." 10 
Also, we define the international system as "the total view of all action and 
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interaction taking place at all levels from the micronational components of foreign 
policy process to the supranational character of the United Nations." 11 The inter-
national system is also divided into sub-systems. The Maghreb states have been 
active members of international system and subsystems such as the United N a-
tions, Non-Aligned movements, 77's group, Organisation of African Unity, Islamic 
Conference Organisation and Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organisation. 
Subsystems (often called subordinate systems) are usually delineated geograph-
ically, proximity being the important element. However, functional elements are 
also important. Functional elements are based primarily on the points of interac-
tion between states, and their importance varies with the intensity of the inter-
action. One needs, therefore, to take into account such components as the social, 
economic, political, military and cultural relations of the system. There are coun-
tries which belong geographically to a specific region, but as a result of the pattern 
and intensity of the relations of that country, are identified as belonging to an 
alternative subsystem, and may in fact be relatively isolated, in terms of interac-
tion from the subsystem to which they should belong on geographical criteria, for 
example, Israel in the Middle East subsystem. The Maghreb states are members 
of the Arab League. Tunisia was the headquarters of the League for eleven years 
until its removal to Cairo in 1991. Algeria and Libya are members of OPEC and 
OAPEC. They are also members of the African Petroleum Producers Association. 
According to its geographical and functional elements, the Middle East forms 
a sub-system. Scholars differ in their concept of what constitutes the boundaries 
of the subsystem.12 American scholars define the Middle East as Egypt and other 
Arab eastern states. Israeli scholars define the boundaries of the Middle East as 
Egypt and eastern Arab states, and add Ethiopia, Turkey and Iran. The Israeli 
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definition has been influenced by the Israeli military concept of the Peripheral 
doctrine. This doctrine lays emphasis on the regional balance of power, that non-
Arab states such as Iran, Turkey, and Ethiopia would play a significant role on 
the fragmentation of Arab power by creating other regional conflicts instead of 
concentrating on the Israeli front. This argument helps to explain Israeli behaviour 
in the Iran-Iraq war and the Horn of Africa conflicts which absorbed Arab resources 
on other fronts. 13 
In this study the Middle East is defined as stretching from Morocco in the west 
to Afghanistan in the east, and the Arab-Islamic region, culturally, geographically 
and historically. This definition of the Middle East has been adopted by the Middle 
East Centre of the University of Durham. The Middle East has been sub-divided: 
North Africa (Maghreb) or Greater Arab Maghreb; Nile Valley (Egypt and Sudan); 
the Fertile Crescent; Arabian Peninsula and Muslim non-Arab countries such as 
Turkey and Iran. 
Table 1:1 Maghreb Population (millions) Present and Future 
State 1990 2000 2010 
Libya 4.5 6.3 8.4 
Tunisia 8.3 10.6 13.1 
Algeria 25.3 33.2 40.2 
Morocco 25.2 31.8 38.7 
Mauritania 2.2 2.9 4.00 
Source: OAPEC Monthly Bulletin, August-September 1989, p. 20. 
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2- Arab Maghreb:-
Arab historians and geographers speak of the Maghreb usually as part of Is-
lamic Northern Africa to the west of Egypt. This has been clear ever since the 
ninth century. The term Maghreb simply means the western part of Islamic world, 
as distinct from the eastern part (Mashrig). In certain instances the term Maghreb 
was used in a political sense, e.g. for the area under the rule of the Fatimids in 
the second half of the tenth century. 
Arab names of the regions, which have in modern times come to include the 
countries of Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania, were originally ap-
plied to the cities of Tripoli, Thnis, Aljazair and Marakesh. The Maghreb was a 
peripheral area of Islamic Caliphate in Damascus, Baghdad, Cairo and Istanbul, 
each of which were the centre in different periods. 
Using functional elements and geographical proximity the Maghreb is part 
of the Middle East sub-system. 14 The Maghreb is religiously coherent, with the 
Malikite rite of Sunni Islam predominating. There are no indigenous Christian 
minorities, and only two Islamic sects: the Kharijites of Jerba, and the Mzabites 
of Algeria. Indigenous Jews constitute an insignificant and steadily diminishing 
minority. Because of this uniformity, North African, or Maghreb, Islam serves as 
an important common denominator, transcending and mitigating the differences 
of tribe, language and life style. Unlike other historical or contemporary forces, 
Islam remains paramount in all Maghreb countries, not withstanding the different 
policies towards religion and religious practice adopted by the various political 
leaders of the Maghreb.15 In this study we do not include Mauritania because it is 
such a poor country and so dependent on France on security and economic issues 
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Table 1:2 Maghreb States 
States land area ( sq km) length of coastal line(km) GNP-Capital $ 
Libya 1,775,550 1,685 5,410 
Tunisia 163,610 1,028 1,230 
Algeria 2,381,741 1,104 2,760 
Morocco 710,8501 2,1772 750 
Mauritania 1,030,700 666 480 
1- This area includes the disputed territory of Western Sahara which covers 
252,120 sq km; 2- Both on Mediterranean and the Atlantic coasts. Source: The 
Europa World Yearbook 1990, London, Europa Publication Limited; Encyclopedia 
of the Third World, third edition, 1987. 
that the superpowers have paid little attention to it. 
3- Geopolitics and Geostrategic are used to convey the following meanmg: 
Geopolitics reflects the combination of geographic and political factors deter-
mining the conditions of a state or region and emphasised the relation of inter-
national political power to the geographical setting; and geostrategic merges 
strategic considerations with geopolitical ones. 
4- Corsairing and piracy: Corsairing was a system in which the governments or-
ganised fleets to attack the merchant shipping of other states with the purpose 
of raising revenue or for political motives. The proper distinction between 
corsairing and piracy is a legal one, the corsair had a commission from a gov-
ernment or a recognised authority against a designed enemy. The pirate had 
no commission and attacked any one. 
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1.4 The Methodological Parameters: 
The historical approach has been chosen, particularly in explaining early rela-
tions between the two superpowers and the Maghreb states. Comparative analysis 
has also been used. In examining economic relations between the superpowers and 
the Maghreb, the analysis is supported with statistical and tabular information 
to compare the Maghreb states' economic relations with the superpowers with the 
Maghreb states' economic relations with various European states. Official decla-
rations and documents, material from joint visits and announcements by officials 
of Maghreb states has been subjected to a content analysis. 
The historical evolution of US relations with the Maghreb is important in un-
derstanding US interests in the region.16 In most cases, US involvement in the 
region was dictated by economic interests. The Soviet Union also has an historical 
relationship with the region, particularly with Morocco. In many cases content 
analysis and a cognitive approach helps to understand official behaviour toward 
other states. The French decision-makers' perception of the American and Soviet 
presence in the Maghreb influenced French reaction to the policies of the super-
powers in North Africa, and this in turn affected the policies of the decision makers 
of both superpowers toward the Maghreb states. Comparative analysis of the two 
superpowers' political, economic and strategic behaviour can be used to explain 
Soviet and American behaviour in the Maghreb. 
1.5 Literature Review: 
Maghreb states have been studied from different perspectives. There is much 
economic and political development literature on the Arab Maghreb. Authors 
such as R. Lawless {1984); H. Baraket {1985); R. Parker (1984), John Damis and 
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Lisa Anderson(1986)18 have written on political and economic development. Lisa 
Anderson has concentrated on Libya and Tunisia. Whilst William Zartman has 
written widely on Moroccan affairs since the 1960s, his contribution with others in 
1982 has been one of the most important publications on North African political 
development and the elites in Maghreb States. John Entelis in 1980 wrote on 
comparative politics in the Maghreb States, and in 1986 published a general study 
about Algeria. Most of these publications fail to address in any kind of detail 
Maghreb relations with the superpowers. 
Rachid Tlemcani (1986) applied a Marxist political economy approach in his 
analysis of the Algerian economy. M. Bennoune {1988) also emphasised Algerian 
economic development from the Ben Bella regime to Chadli Benjadid, but failed to 
discuss Algerian foreign policy or the superpowers' relations with Algeria. William 
Zartman {1987) contributed with others in special study on the Moroccan political 
economy. John Damis has repeated his argument on the superpowers and the 
Western Sahara conflict, and its influence on Morocco's regional policy. 
Much attention has been focused on Tunisia because of its internal upheaval 
after the 1986 arrest of the Islamic fundamentalists. The successionist crisis in 
Tunisia was an important factor in accounting for this attention. Since President 
Ben Ali took power in Tunisia in a peaceful coup in November 1987, the spotlight 
has turned to Tunisian stability. Kenneth Perkin (1986) has written about Tunisia 
from an historical perspective. He is a historian, and has published general works 
on Tunisia. Norma Salem (1984) has also contributed, with her work on the 
Bourguiba phenomena in Tunisia, but her argument does not go beyond the role 
of Bourguiba in Tunisian political development, and the role of a charismatic leader 
in a traditional society. 
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The 1980s may be described as the "Libyan decade" in English publication, 
because of the tension in United States-Libyan relations. The US accusation of 
Libyan involvement in international terrorism has created much debate over Libya 
serving as a proxy for the Soviet Union, or even as a puppet regime in the hand 
of the Soviets. E. Haly (1984) has contributed work on Libyan-USA relations, but 
his work is mostly descriptive rather than analytical. Harris (1986) published a 
general work on Libya and its revolution. El-Hawis (1986) presents the opposition 
point of view on Qaddafi, rather than a systematic and objective analysis of Libyan 
foreign relations. Only one Russian book has been published about Libya-USSR 
relations.17 
In general, the literature on Libya and the Maghreb States could be sum-
marised as projecting the line held by American scholars, that if a state holds 
international political views which differ from those of the US, that state is la-
belled a Soviet puppet, or a Soviet proxy, and represents a threat to US interests. 
In the late 1980s, two studies were published by North African scholars about 
US relations with the Maghreb states. They concentrate on applying foreign policy 
theories, especially using a cognitive approach, to US policy towards Libya. El-
Warfally (1988) has focused on American perspectives of Libya. His study is 
short on analysis, and is more a theoretical rather than a comprehensive analysis. 
He ignores early contact between Qaddafi and the US. Layachi (1990) applies a 
cognitive approach to the study of elite images in foreign policymaking process. 
He focuses on two relatively narrow case studies. The first issue analysed is a 
proposed arms sale to Morocco in 1979; the second issue is a natural gas contract 
between Algeria and the United States in 1981. The study does not constitute a 
comprehensive analysis of US relations with North Africa.18 
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During the cold war era, US scholars tended to describe most Non-Aligned 
states as Soviet clients and therefore as against the US in the world arena. Ac-
cording to the realist school of international politics, states have always acted on 
behalf of their national interest in world politics. Ideology, according to this school, 
has less influence on foreign policy if the ideology contradicts national interests.19 
In the Maghreb, revolutionary states maintain economic relations with the 
capitalist US and EC. Algeria condemned US policy on the Third World, but still 
maintains economic relations with the US. Libya has greater economic ties with 
the West and the EC than with the Soviet Union, despite the Libyan claim they 
have relations with the Soviet Union. Whilst conservative, capitalist states, such as 
Morocco and Thnisia, maintain economic relations with the EC, Morocco was the 
first state to supply the Soviets with phosphate. It is important to analyse these 
kinds of relations and alliances, and not be beguiled by ideological differences. 20 
1.6 Organisational Framework: 
This study contains eight chapters. The second chapter discusses both the 
historical background of European rivalry in Maghreb from 1815 to 1945, and how 
North Africa became part of European diplomacy and colonial competition. The 
geopolitics of the Maghreb and European colonialism is also analysed. 
The third chapter deals with the involvement of the superpowers in Third 
World countries from 1945 to 1985. It is a theoretical study of the superpowers' 
behaviour in the Third World. In the fourth chapter, the focus narrows to historical 
relations between the superpowers and the Maghreb states until North African 
States independence in the 1950s. The behaviour of the superpowers towards the 
independence of the Maghreb states is analysed, as well as superpower involvement 
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with African trade unions supporting Maghreb independence through international 
trade unions. 
Chapter five deals with superpower political relations with the individual 
Maghreb states with regard to their political objectives and means, and their cul-
tural relations. In chapter six, superpower economic relations with North Africa 
are analysed, focusing on the direction of exports and imports, and on economic 
co-operation. Emphasis is laid on European economic relations with the Maghreb, 
and how these affect superpower economic relations with the Maghreb. 
Chapter seven focuses on superpower strategic relations with the Mahgreb 
states. Five themes of strategic relations are analysed: military bases; arms trad-
ing; Mediterranean security; military intervention; and intelligence co-operation. 
In chapter eight, superpower behaviour towards regional stability in North Africa is 
examined, and the superpowers' reactions to regional conflicts. The Arab-African 
Union, the Western Sahara conflict and the civil war in Chad, are also considered 
in this chapter. 
In the conclusion, analysis of superpower behaviour toward Maghreb states is 
generalised. The superpower behavioural model in a third party area of influence 
is explained. The conclusion also deals with future prospects for superpower re-
lations in a new multi-polar system which has been characterised as economically 
multipolar. In terms of economic competition, the strengthening European eco-
nomic presence in North Africa is anticipated, and it is suggested that this will 
lead to US-European competition in North Africa after the decline of the Soviet 
Union as a superpower/economic competitor to the US, Europe and Japan. 
The bibliography includes primary and secondary resources. 
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1.7 Field Flesearch 
This thesis is a result of many years of monitoring events in North Africa and 
the behaviour of the superpowers. The author spent five years in North Africa 
notably Morocco, followed by many years in the US, researching and reporting 
international affairs for various Arab newspapers and magazines. Over this ten 
year period, he has collected interviews and conducted library research. The author 
has also contacted many policy makers in the Arab World and in the US, Middle 
East experts, former officials and Arab journalists familiar with the US, Soviet 
Union, and the Arab World. Most of the interviewees remain anonymous and 
unidentifiable. Exceptionally, there are a few interviewees who placed no restriction 
on their words. The author uses Arab, French, American and Russian newspapers. 
In the case of the Soviet newspapers the author depends on Current Digest of Soviet 
Press (CDSP) and the Soviet Union and the Third World which translate major 
events in the Soviet newspapers and monitor Soviet publications. This thesis is a 
result of professional experience, fieldwork and academic research. 
1. 8 Sources of information: 
This thesis utilises information drawn from a variety of sources. Whilst pre-
senting a variety of historical, theoretical, comparative and analytical approaches, 
emphasis is placed on primary sources, which were considerable in number: 
1. Official documents of the US, the Soviet Union and the Maghreb states. Most 
of these documents have been published by governments of the respective 
states. 
2. US congressional hearings also serve as a source for US official policy towards 
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Maghreb. 
3. Memoirs, diaries and biographies of foreign policy decision makers in past or 
present administrations of all states under research. Extensive use is made of 
government publications, official statements, records and interviews of foreign 
policy decision makers. 
4. Published material. All published books and articles that deal with the topic of 
this thesis and were available to the writer have been utilised, they constitute 
the majority of the sources. 
5. Unpublished material. This includes M.A. and Ph.D theses, and unpublished 
diaries and memoirs. 
6. Newspapers and magazines in English, Arabic, French and Russian. 
Notes 
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and also, Hadhri, M. L'URSS ET LE Maghreb: De la Revolution d'Octobre 
a ['independence de l'Algerie 1917- 1962, Paris: Editions l'Harmattan.1985. 
4. RDF was formed during the Carter years in the White House particularly after 
events of 1979; Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Iranian revolution and Mecca 
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Chapter II 
Maghreb in World Politics: 
From European Multipolar System to a Bipolar System, 
1815-1945 
2.1 Introduction 
The period of European history from 1815 to 1945 was the 'Golden Age' for 
diplomacy, balance of power and alliances. The age of one empire dominating 
European politics was gone and many European nations had emerged to shape 
European politics. In this period, the international system has been described by 
scholars of international politics as a multipolar system. The multipolar system 
survived until 1945, when it was destroyed by World War II and a new bipolar 
system emerged. The world divided into two ideological blocs: the US as capitalist 
leader, and the Soviet Union as leader of the socialist world. 
The Ottoman Empire was a non-European state, but had helped to shape 
European and Mediterranean politics from the 16th century until WWl. North 
Africa, what is called the Arab Maghreb, was part of the Ottoman Empire, with 
the exception of Morocco which was outside Ottoman control and domination. 
Governments in other parts of North Africa were semi-autonomous in their internal, 
and, to a lesser extent, in their external affairs. As the Ottoman Empire weakened 
during the 18th and 19th centuries, its presence in Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli 
became more symbolic than real, until it was completely destroyed by European 
states. 
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This chapter examines the historical relationship between the Maghreb and 
Europe. From the 16th century until World War II, North Africa was important 
to European diplomacy. This chapter investigates why the European countries 
were interested in the Maghreb, and whether the geopolitics of Maghreb affected 
European politics. 
2.2 Maghreb Geopolitics and Corsairing 
Three factors influenced Maghreb relations with Europe. First, its geographical 
continuity, and the location of the Maghreb on the Mediterranean. The Maghreb 
had been used as a bridge between Europe and Africa for trade and raw materials, 
and the Maghreb coasts were used by European navies during their journeys to 
the Atlantic or to the Far East. 
Second, the Arab invasion of Spain in 7111 had created an historical linkage 
between the Maghreb and Europe. Spain was ruled by Arabs for several centuries 
until1492. Spain involved in war with Muslims with the help of the Holy Roman 
Empire under Charles V (1519-1556) one of the greatest kings of Spain and of the 
Holy Roman Empire who was the last Emperor to attempt to realise the mediaeval 
idea of a united Empire embracing the entire Christian world. The war between 
Muslim and Christian Spaniards led to expulsion of many Muslims from Spain to 
the Maghreb. The Muslim refugees who left Spain for the Maghreb were involved 
in corsairing against Spanish and European trade in the Mediterranean and it 
became a serious issue with regard to the shaping of Maghreb-European relations. 
Corsairing, the third factor to affect Europe-Maghreb relations up to the 19th 
century, was a geopolitical struggle to dominate the Mediterranean. The Mus-
lims who had been driven out of Spain were impelled by hope of revenge and 
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by economic necessity to attack Spanish shipping, but the attack extended beyond 
Spanish shipping, to European shipping as a whole, and to US trade in the Mediter-
ranean. Malta was a strong base for christian corsairs, and in 1798 Napoleon, on 
his way to Egypt he freed the 2,000 Turkish and North African slaves still held in 
Malta, and abolished the corso. 2 
Despite the perpetual hostility between Spanish Christians and Muslims in the 
Maghreb, there was a type of co-operation between some European countries and 
the Maghreb. Britain was one such country and its policies were shaped by British 
national interests. 
However, the conflict of interest between European countries motivated some 
European nations, such as Britain, to ally with Morocco for economic and strategic 
reasons. For example, in 1661 British forces captured Tangier from Portugal, and 
in 1684 returned Tangier to Sultan Ismael of Morocco. For this action, Britain 
gained, during the 18th century, the friendship of Morocco, the latter offering 
substantial assistance to Britain during the Anglo-French wars {1689-1763).3 The 
Moors aided Britain in the capture of Gibraltar in 1704 and profitable commerce 
developed between Gibraltar and Morocco. The British control of the strategic 
post of Gibraltar added a new dimension in European diplomacy towards the 
Maghreb, not only in the 18th and 19th centuries, but also during modern times. 
With the creation of the nation states in the 19th century, Europe became the 
centre of world politics until the Second World War. The international system be-
tween 1815 and 1945 has been described as a European multipolar system 4. The 
United States of America was isolated in the western hemisphere, in accord with 
the Monroe Doctrine of 1823. The Doctrine was directed mainly towards prevent-
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ing a European presence in, never mind the development of interests in, Central 
and Latin America. Moreover, during the 19th century, Europe had been deeply 
affected by the spread of nationalism and the industrial revolution, in addition to 
the ideas of the French Revolution. These factors had contributed to the 19th and 
20th century disputes and bloody conflicts in Europe.5 
Before 1870 the two chief Mediterranean powers were Britain and France. Af-
ter the Napoleonic defeat in Egypt in 1801, Britain had become the master of 
sea power. Despite British naval power, the continued rivalry between these two 
European powers had spread along the Mediterranean and into the Far East. 6 
When Charles of France occupied Algeria in 1830, he was influenced by domes-
tic considerations and internal conditions at home. The French interest in Algeria 
was shaped by the British control of India and the control of the sea routes to 
Africa and the Indian Ocean. 7 Despite British and French competition during that 
period, British interests were threatened by Russian ambition in the Ottoman Em-
pire and the Russian search for warm water in the south. This ambition was one 
of the causes of British and French war with Russia in the Crimea in 1854. War 
between the latter and the Ottoman Empire occurred on the Black Sea.8 
The reasons for the competition between the European powers for colonies in 
the 19th century was that they perceived colonies and spheres of influence as a 
normal and necessary part of world politics. Colonies were perceived economi-
cally, as sources of raw material and markets, and the development of standing 
armies and navies was undertaken in order to protect and exploit the colonies by 
enhancing the military status of the nations. From a European perspective, colo-
nial possession was a clear indication that a state had defined its national interests 
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in a global manner, and that it would fight to protect such interests. The severe 
conflicts of interest between European powers after 1870 had both created and 
dissolved alliances. It was believed that alliances with other powers were essential 
to protect national interests, and they were felt likely to prevent the outbreak of 
war. 
2.3 The Maghreb in European Diplomacy and Alliances 
The Maghreb had become a bargaining item between European rivals and, to 
some extent, this had led to the creation of European alliances. When France 
occupied Algeria in 1831, there was implicit approval from Britain and Spain for 
the French invasion, but that approval was limited to some parts of Algeria, and 
did not extend to Morocco or Tunisia. The British Foreign Minister declared in 
1854 that 
"the British government would not permit the temporary or permanent occu-
pation of any port or point in the territory of Morocco by any foreign government." 9 
The British had economic and strategic interests in Morocco. There was 
indeed a strong possibility that, in the event of war, the Maghreb, and particularly 
Morocco, might become the sole convenient source of supplies to Gibraltar and to 
other armed forces stationed in the Mediterranean or other parts of the region. 10 
Spain also declared that she had a vital interest in the Maghreb, and especially 
in Morocco. The Spanish Minister at Tangier from 1860-1874 revealed that: 
"neither politically nor economically could Spain live if France or England 
should take possession of Morocco. Morocco must some day belong to Spain ... 
the question of Morocco with that of Portugal and Gibraltar comprises the whole 
international policy of Spain." 11 
In addition to Britain, Spain and France, Italy and Germany also became 
involved in Maghreb affairs in the 19th century. They saw the Maghreb as an im-
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portant region for their economic and strategic interests, and Tunisia had become 
the principal focus of Italian and French competition in North Africa. 
Strategically, Tunisia was the meeting place of the interests of three major 
powers. Italy is close physically to Tunisia and, after Italian unification, Italy was 
searching for a place as a great power in Europe and the Mediterranean. Tunisia 
is the mid-point of the whole Mediterranean between Gibraltar and Suez. The 
British interest in Tunisia was geostrategic, particularly after the unification of 
Italy, and the apparent defeat of France in the Franco-German war. Britain felt 
that it might be preferable to have two different powers rather than a single power 
in control of the opposite side of the Sicilian strait. 12 
During the Berlin Congress of 1878, Britain indicated her willingness to see 
France in Tunisia, in exchange for an acceptance of Britain's role in Egypt. Britain 
was interested in Egypt to protect its maritime route to India, the Jewel of the 
British Empire. There was also the strategic importance of Egypt and the Suez 
Canal, the British being the principal users of the Canal. In 1881, the situation 
in Europe was ripe for France to occupy Tunisia, and the weak Ottoman Empire 
accepted French control of Tunisia at the Treaty of Bardo (Cassar Saiid), 12 May 
1881. France then abolished the system of international control over Tunisia in 
1884, and abrogated the extra territorial rights of other European nations.13 
From the German perspective, the French conquest of Tunisia served to raise 
an issue between Italy and France. After three years of French occupation of 
Tunisia, in 1884, Bismarck explained his encouragement of French occupation of 
Tunisia as being part of German strategy in the Mediterranean: 
"What I want is to establish a sort of equilibrium on the sea, France has a great 
role to play on this side if she will enter into our views." 14 
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Bismarck delighted in creating a rift between Italy and France over Tunisia 
while Germany was competing with British naval power in the Mediterranean. 
German annexation of Alsace-Lorraine created a feeling inside France of the need 
for an alternative to increase her power and prestige both inside and outside France. 
After the French defeat, the French Prime Minister, Leon Gambetta remarked, 
"because the old Continent is stifling. Outlets such as Tunisia are needed." 15 
Kenneth Waltz, a neo-realist political scientist, explained French occupation 
of Tunisia in terms of the balance of power. He wrote that France acted as a search 
for the power alternative 
"It might strengthen France for another round in the French-German contest.'116 
After the defeat of France by Germany, French military leaders realised that 
not only would Tunisia be vital for French national security, but so would the whole 
of the Maghreb in general and Morocco in particular. No potential enemy should 
be allowed to establish itself in Morocco and thus endanger France by encouraging 
a Muslim Holy Crusade in North Africa. In the event of war, French troops would 
have to withdraw to Europe. 17 
From the Italian perspective, the French occupation of Tunisia disturbed the 
balance of power in the Mediterranean and endangered the fate of Tripoli. Italy 
was keen for support against France by means of an agreement with the central 
powers, Germany and Austria-Hungary and in May, 1882, Italy signed the Triple 
Alliance agreement. According to Salvenini, 
"Italian adherence to the Triple Alliance depended on the threat of France to 
disturb the status quo in North Africa." 18 
Austria and Germany had seen that the strength of this Triple Alliance would 
be affected by a weakening of Italian forces in the event of war because France con-
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trolled all of North Africa. It is interesting to note that Britain, France and Russia 
had formed a Triple Entente to balance the Triple Alliance. Correspondingly, 
Austria and Germany had to support and strengthen Italian demands in North 
Africa in order to balance the Triple Entente. The Maghreb became part of secret 
European diplomacy between 1887 and 1912. Italy engaged in secret, separate 
negotiations with France over Tripoli (Libya) and Morocco and signed a treaty 
with France in 1902. The two countries agreed on Libya and Morocco, the former 
to be under Italian occupation and the latter under French protection. The Italian 
rapprochement with France suggested that by the 1890s, Italy had come to feel 
that completely loyal membership in the Triple Alliance was less advantageous to 
her than a policy of better relations with France. Better relations with France 
could end the Franco-Italian tariff problem. It could also do more to advance her 
Mediterranean ambitions than could the connection with Austria and Germany. 
While France and Italy had their secret deal, Italy, Spain, France and Britain 
had become involved in the Mediterranean agreements which included North 
Africa. Italy looked to Britain in 1887 and negotiated with her to protect the 
status quo in the Mediterranean and she promised to support Britain in Egypt, 
while Britain supported Italy in Tripoli. 
Spain identified Morocco as an area vital to Spanish interests and so ap-
proached and reached an agreement with Italy. This agreement assigned Tripoli to 
Italy and Morocco to Spain. In 1887, Spain, Britain and Italy arrived at a Mediter-
ranean agreement, called by the French ambassador in Spain, Theodore Roustan, 
the "Moroccan Triple Alliance." 19 The results of all this secret diplomatic negoti-
ating were two principal agreements. First, in April 1904, France and Britain had 
resolved their colonial dispute with France accepting British hegemony in Egypt 
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and Britain agreeing to French predominance in Morocco. However, the Anglo-
French agreement respected the Spanish interest in Northern Morocco. Strate-
gically, Britain was interested in keeping France away from Gibraltar. Second, 
towards the end of 1904, France reached an agreement with Spain over Morocco 
and the Western Sahara. 20 
Germany shifted towards a colonial policy outside Europe, particularly after 
Bismarck left power in 1890. During the Bismarck era, Germany had concentrated 
on Europe. For Germany a new era had emerged and Morocco and Tripoli became 
the centre of European competition in North Africa. German involvement had led 
to two European crises over Morocco, in 1906 and 1911. The first Moroccan crisis 
did, in fact, bring Europe uncomfortably close to war.21 
2.4 European states and the two Moroccan Crises 
In 1880, the European nations held an International Conference in Madrid. 
The objective of the conference was to discuss the sovereignty of Morocco. The US 
participated in the conference and all the participants of the Conference agreed 
to preserve Moroccan sovereignty. Despite the Madrid Treaty, France violated 
Moroccan sovereignty by intervening in Moroccan internal affairs. 
Morocco became a second "Eastern question", similar to the first "Eastern 
question", the Ottoman Empire. The great powers were waiting to control or 
partition it, but none wanted to put it down. The great powers used the Moroccan 
question to settle their differences in Europe and to change the balance of power 
on the Continent more than to protect Moroccan interests. The two Moroccan 
crises were in reality a consequence of European alliances. 
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2.4.1 Algeciras Conference, 1906, and the First Moroccan Crisis 
Germany raised the Moroccan question and the French violation of the Madrid 
Treaty for four principal reasons. The first was economic; Germany was interested 
in Morocco as a market for German goods and as a source of raw materials, and 
to have a strategic presence in Moroccan ports. Germany was looking for an open 
door policy, that Morocco should be open without restriction to all European 
and American economic investments and trade. Kaiser Wilhelm of Germany told 
his minister that "Morocco was unimportant as long as there was an open door 
policy. '122 
The second objective was to destroy the Anglo-French Entente. The Anglo-
French Entente of 1904 raised the spectre of Britain joining the Franco-Russian Al-
liance against Germany. It was this fear that prompted desperate German leaders 
to provoke a confrontation with France. Germany was encouraged by the removal 
of fear of Russian intervention in the event of a Franco-German war because Russia 
was preoccupied by war with Japan, 1904-1905. 
The third objective Germany hoped to exploit was the division of opinion in 
France with respect to the Entente to bring about the fall of Delacasse, the French 
Foreign Minister, and an architect of Anglo-French understanding. Moreover, the 
German Kaiser was also motivated by the goal of achieving a Continental League: 
an alliance of France, Italy, Austria-Hungary and Russia led by Germany and 
directed against Britain and the British Empire. Germany was concerned to change 
the balance of power in Germany's favour. 23 
The fourth German objective was the humiliation of France and for the sake of 
German prestige in Europe more than for the sake of Moroccan interests. Within 
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its own confines, Morocco was little more than another imperial problem. What 
gave it greater importance was the fact that it was the occasion for a major Eu-
ropean powers crisis. No one wanted war over Morocco, and most policy makers 
assumed that diplomacy would resolve the crisis. Some accommodation could and 
would be found, so Germany asked for an international conference, 
The conference was held on 16 January 1906 at Algeciras. Germany had 
miscalculated European support, and so was faced with defeat from the outset. It 
was well known to the British that the German objective was to have a port on the 
Moroccan coast, but the British strongly opposed even the possibility of Germany 
establishing a base in Morocco. As a naval power, Britain did not wish to have 
Germany as a strong power on the opposite side of Gibraltar. The Conference 
was attended by thirteen states including delegations from Morocco, the US and 
Russia. According to the Algeciras Treaty, all states supported "economic liberty 
without inequality in Morocco. "24 The establishment of French protectorate over 
Morocco was agreed upon by all signatories to the treaty produced by the Algeciras 
conference except the US, which withheld recognition until it entered World War 
One in 1917. 
The Conference also supported French interests in Morocco and recognised 
Franco-Spanish control over Morocco's police, and the establishment of a Moroc-
can State Bank. This was financed by the European powers, but was dominated 
by France because she provided one third of the capital. 25 Despite the Algeci-
ras Treaty, France continued the policy of the gradual colonisation and peaceful 
penetration of Morocco. The Algeciras Conference did not satisfy the ambition 
of Germany which was supported only by Austria-Hungary and Morocco. This 
led to the second Moroccan crisis in 1911, and the Italian invasion of Tripoli in 
32 
September 1911. 
2.4.2 The Second Moroccan Crisis and Diplomacy of Compensation 
As France and Germany continued to compete in Morocco, Germany was not 
only losing commercial interests in Morocco, but also prestige in Europe as a great 
power. France violated the 1906 Treaty of Algeciras. 
The German right wing press criticised the German government for its failure 
to achieve its objective of colonising Morocco. Germany used "gun-boat diplomacy" 
when France reacted to the Moroccan Revolt in Fez in 1911. Despite such "diplo-
macy" in Agadir, the German Kaiser was looking for compensation elsewhere.26 
Germany knew that nothing could be done in Morocco without the consent of the 
British. The crisis receded because of prevailing international conditions. Russia 
did not wish to be drawn into war over Morocco. Britain and Germany were dis-
cussing a general political understanding: such a settlement could be at France's 
expense. It was clear to France that a bilateral agreement with Germany had to 
be reached, and used "quid pro quo" diplomacy to compensate German demands, 
offering part of the French Congo to Germany. 27 
After the German-French agreement, France took advantage of the internal 
situation in Morocco to dominate the country. Until1894, Morocco remained sta-
ble under the rule of a strong and effective Sultan, Moulay Hassan (1873-1894). He 
maintained internal order and financial stability as well as encouraging Moroccan 
exports. Moreover, Moulay Hassan, obtained the diplomatic assistance of Great 
Britain to preserve Moroccan sovereignty from French and Spainish ambitions. 
After Moulay Hassan's death, his young son, Moulay Abd al-Aziz (1894-
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1908) proved to be corrupt and without political experience. During his reign, 
Morocco borrowed large sum, from France and with the decline of the Moroccan 
economy, Moulay Abd al-Aziz was removed, being accused of abandoning Morocco 
to foreigners. His brother Moulay Hafid replaced him. 
In 1910, the Sultan had to negotiate a further loan of FF100 million to pay 
off debts contracted in the previous reign, to cover work carried out by French 
companies in Morocco, and to compensate Europeans in Casablanca for losses 
sustained in the disturbances of 1907. This time, the Moroccan Treasury got 
nothing. The next year, Moulay Hafid was besieged in Fez by the tribes. He 
appealed to France for help and the result was the French intervention. At Fez, 
on 30 March 1912, France and Morocco signed the Protectorate Treaty, making 
Morocco a French Protectorate. 28 
2.4.3 Italy and the Occupation of Tripoli (Libya) 
In September 1911, reacting to the Franco-German crisis, Italy occupied 
Libya. This was motivated by Italian nationalism, and the desire to assert Italy's 
status as a great power and not to be left by Britain and France without a posi-
tion in North Africa. Italy had signed the Triple Alliance, and had negotiated with 
France and Spain over Libya and other parts of North Africa. With the gradual 
strengthening of the French presence in Morocco, and the Italian bilateral agree-
ment with Germany, Italy found herself ready to attack Tripoli. The attack came 
in 1911, despite Libyan and Ottoman protest and resistance. Italy then encour-
aged Italians to settle in Tripoli. By the end of the First World War, the whole 
of North Africa was under European colonialism. Italy was in Libya. Tunisia and 
Algeria were under French colonial rule. Spain occupied Northern Morocco, Ifni, 
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the Western Sahara, the Canary Islands, Ceuta and Melilla (claimed by Morocco). 
France was in the other areas of Morocco and in Mauritania. 
A new era of Maghreb history emerged: the struggle for independence and 
liberation. It is interesting to note here that in North Africa, financial debt and 
loans had been used as an excuse for direct European intervention in Egypt, Libya, 
Thnisia, Morocco and Algeria (France refused to pay for Algerian wheat). 
2.5 Maghreb between the two World Wars, 1919-1945 
After the First World War, many world events had their effect on North 
Africa: the Russian Revolution; the defeat of Germany; US President Wilson's 
Principles; the end of the Ottoman Empire and the fall of the Arab world under 
British and French colonial rule; the involvement of the US and Japan in world 
politics. 
The Wilson Principles and the Russian revolution gave hope for a new ide-
ology to protest against the policy of colonialism and towards self-determination, 
(see below). The Ottoman and German defeat in WWI led to frustration among 
North African nationalists and they looked to Wilson as a hope for their national 
aspiration. 
2.5.1 Competition between the Great Powers 
The economic interests of the great European powers in North Africa played 
a considerable role in Maghreb independence, particularly after the Second World 
War. This was because the Europeans and Americans were both interested in 
an open market which should not be controlled economically by one state. The 
history of the European struggle over the Maghreb is demonstrated by the open 
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door policy. 
Despite the Treaties of Madrid (1880) and Algeciras (1906), France dominated 
the Moroccan economy and monopolised trade. In the mid 1930s, Morocco became 
an important market for Japanese textile goods. Accordingly, France applied for a 
system of quotas in the French Protectorate, but such action was refused and op-
posed by the US, Japan and Britain. According to previous international treaties, 
Morocco in particular was an open door for all nations29 (Table 2:1). 
Table 2.1: Average Imports of Cotton into Morocco by main Countries 
State Rank Average Imports 1925-35 % 
UK 1 39. 90 
Japan 2 19. 19 
France 3 15. 49 
Italy 4 14. 62 
Others 5 10. 80 
Total - 100% 
Source: Hiroshi Shimizi, Anglo-Japanese Trade Rivalry in the Middle East 
in Interwars Period, London: Ithaca Press, 1986, p. 178. 
The French policy led eventually to the submission of the Moroccan case to 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) during the conflict between the US and 
France over the Moroccan market. The verdict of the court, on 27 August 1952, 
upheld the American claim to economic liberty without any inequality based on the 
treaty of 1836, and the Act of Algeciras. According to the ICJ decision, Morocco 
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remained a sovereign state under the 1912 Treaty of Fez despite being a French 
Protectorate. 
Between 1934-38, during the Spanish protectorate of Rif, iron ore exports to 
Germany and Italy increased respectively from 21 percent and 5 percent to 52 
percent and 10 percent of the protectorate's average annual iron ore export. On 
the other hand, by 1939, iron ore export to Britain and France dropped noticeably. 
Britain imported on average 19 percent of total exports for the period 1934-1938, 
but only 12 percent in 1939. France imported 6 percent for the period 1934-
1938, and less than half of 1 percent during 1939 period. The figures reflect the 
European political alliances during the era between the two world wars. Moreover 
the German Nazis tried to contact the leaders of the national movements in the 
Maghreb and the king of Morocco.30 
2.5.2 Maghreb National Movements 
After World War One, the new world powers (the US and the fledgling Soviet 
Union) developed relations with the young nationalist movements of the Maghreb. 
This affected relations between the new powers and the European colonial powers. 
Accordingly, some national movements felt an ideological affiliation with the new 
powers. 
The national movements in the Maghreb emerged as a consequence of many 
powerful forces: 
1- Maghreb nationalism began as a direct reaction to Western colonial rule. 
2- Arab nationalism, particularly in the Arab east, affected the Maghreb Na-
tional Movement with the spread of Islamic reformism throughout parts of 
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the Arab world, particularly in Egypt. 
3- President Wilson's Principles for self-determination encouraged many nation-
alists to attend the Paris Conference in 1919 to persuade the international 
community to take account of their demand for independence and their just 
cause. In 1919, Tunisian leaders were one of the Arab groups attending in 
Paris. 
4- The spread of liberal ideas and socialist attitudes in Europe affected Maghreb 
nationalists. This encouraged them to participate in socialist and workers 
organisations to win their independence. 
Algeria: When, in 1830, the French began to settle in Algeria, they encountered 
stiff resistance from the Algerian leader Abd al-Kadir al-Jazauri who led the strug-
gle from 1832-1847. Britain was unhappy about the new French foothold on the 
coast of North Africa, and was determined to prevent French expansion in Morocco. 
In order to gain political support and secure weapons against French occupation, 
Abd al-Kadir had written to the British and to the Americans to draw their at-
tention to the French occupation of Algeria, and to Algerian resistance to France. 
In January, 1836, Abd al-Kadir wrote to the British consul in Tangier, Drummond 
Hay, and also to the British monarch, William IV, to canvas British support. Abd 
al-Kadir somehow obtained British arms imported by way of Morocco, or supplied 
by the Sultan, or bought by Abd al-Kadir's agents in Tangier. French newspapers 
accused the British of supplying weapons to Abd al-Kadir. After his exile in Syria 
(Damascus) and, during a visit in 1856 to Jerusalem, Abd al-Kadir confirmed to 
the British Consul there, James Finn, that he had obtained large supplies of arms 
and munitions from Britain. In April 1836, Abd al-Kadir also wrote to the Amer-
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ican Consul in Tangier, James R. Leib. He offered the Algerian Coast to the US 
if the Americans would assist him against France. Despite his resistance, French 
captured Abd al-Kadir in 1847, and he was sent to France. He was released from 
prison in 1852, and went into exile in Syria until his death in Damascus in 1883.31 
Resistance continued in Algeria. After World War One, there was a new 
dimension to the national movement. It arose within France, despite its Algerian 
roots in traditional Islamic society. In 1926 the North African workers in that 
country established a nationalist movement with a socialist orientation. Messali 
al-Haj emerged as a charismatic nationalist leader. He organised the Etoile Nord 
Africaine {ENA) "North African Star" in 1927 which had contact with the French 
Communist Party. When it was banned in 1937, he moved to Algeria and organized 
the Algerian People's Party which called for total independence for Algeria. As 
well as his geographical move, Messali shifted ideologically: from socialism to an 
Islamic and anti-communist ideology. He was influenced by Amir Chekib Arslan, 
a Syrian Islamic reformist. 
In 1935, the Algerian Communist Party was formed, independent from the 
French Communist Party but was politically ineffective because most of its mem-
bers were French settlers and Jews. 
The most powerful group in Algeria was the Islamic reformist movement, 
under the leadership of Ben Badis who stressed the Islamic-Arab character of 
Algeria, together with the Islamic education system and traditional schooling as a 
challenge to French cultural hegemony in Algeria. Ben Badis represented the Pan-
Islamic Salafiyya which saw Islam and the memory of Abd al-Kadir as the principal 
motivating forces of Algerian nationalism. In 1931 he formed the Association of 
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Algerian Muslim Ulama. 
After the death of Ben Badis in 1940, the Association of Algerian Ulama en-
tered a new phase in the 1940s and 1950s. Under new circumstances, the Associa-
tion gave the leadership ofthe movement in exile to Bashir al-Ibrahimi (1889-1965). 
Al-Ibrahimi was educated in Mecca and Syria, where he witnessed the Arab revolt 
against the Turks in 1916. When he returned to Algeria in 1945, he continued his 
reformist work and became a leading figure in the movement. The destruction of 
the mosques, the French attack on Islam, and forcing Algerians to become French 
citizens, all led to the view among Algerian Uluma that the French were just like 
the crusaders, and therefore "the enemy of Islam".32 
Apart from the traditional Salafiyya school in Algerian resistance to French 
occupation, other Algerian intellectuals looked to France as an ideological model. 
Farhat Abbas who called for self-determination within an entirely French frame-
work. In 1936, denying that Algeria had a separate identity, he called for an 
assimilationist approach. The French refusal of the Algerian demand led Abbas to 
shift ground from a position of full integration with France to the development of 
a Muslim Algeria, with close French associations, but a separate identity. In 1946 
he formed the Democratic Union of Algerian Manifesto, promoting the idea of a 
free, secular and republican Algeria loosely federated with France. Farhat Abbas 
later formed the first Algerian Provisional Government in 1958. 
Messali al-Haj, having been released from house arrest in 1946, formed a new 
party the "Mouvement Pour le Triomphe des Libertes Democratiques" {MTLD) to 
replace the Parti de Peuple Algerien. 
Despite all Algerian attempts to compromise with the French, there was no 
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solution to the Algerian problem. The rejection by France of Algerian national 
aspirations; the opposition of the French settlers to any concessions to Muslim 
demands, the ruthless suppression of Algerian riots and the subsequent arrest of 
Algerian national leaders, all led to the belief that political means seemed inef-
fective. The Algerian nationalists, impressed by the successful use of force and 
violence in other countries, themselves turned to extreme means: the armed strug-
gle, and the Algerian Revolution of 1954.33 
Tunisia: Thnisia was the first Arab Maghreb country to be influenced by modern 
nationalism. In 1905 the Young Tunisian Movement - a new Tunisian national 
organisation - copied the experience of other movements such as the Young Ital-
ian, and the Young Thrk Movements. The Young Thnisians accepted the French 
protectorate, and admired the French system as a model. Before the end of World 
War One, the Young Thnisians exercised considerable influence. They attended 
the Paris Conference in 1919 to win support for Thnisian self-determination but 
failed in their attempt. Despite the Young Thnisians struggle they failed to win 
support for their reforms from the older Thnisian generation, that is until France 
tried to transfer large areas of Muslim land, the endowment "Habous" land, from 
Muslim religious groups to European farmers. This attempt led the old Tunisian 
generation to join the Young Thnisians in confronting the French actions. France 
was seeking to pursue its colonial economic aims and to recover from the frightful 
losses sustained during the First World War. 
In 1920, the Constitutional Party was founded in Thnisia, in Arabic, 'Hizb 
al-Destour'. Sheikh Abd al-Aziz al-Thaalibi, a Zitouna sheikh, was its founder. 
Although a Muslim reformist in the Egyptian Salafiyyah tradition, unlike most 
of the more conservative 'funis Ulama, he was more liberal and when in Paris he 
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published his famous book "Thnisie Martye" in 1920. 
The Destour was known more as a party for urbane conversation than for 
mass activities. The failure of the party in 1925 to support the first Thnisian trade 
union movement and to recruit the masses into the party led to the unpopularity 
of the party, and to the struggle inside it. Between 1920 and 1934, the Destourian 
nationalists called for a self-governing constitutional regime with a legislative as-
sembly. 
In 1934, an internal dispute among the old and new generations in the party 
prompted The Young Thnisians to form a Neo Destour party. The Neo Destour 
group was more westernised than the Destour aristocrats, and represented people 
from humbler backgrounds. Habib Bourguiba emerged as the leader of the Neo 
Destour party. Bourguiba managed to mobilise the Tunisian people by manipu-
lating the religious symbols of the old society in their revolutionary spirit rather 
than in accordance with the rhetorical, orderly style of mediaeval tradition. The 
party emphasised economic issues among peasants. The party was a secular move-
ment, separating religion from politics in Thnisian political life. Although many 
Ulama, such as Sheikh Taher Ben Achour, participated in the struggle, the secular 
nationalists held power after independence. 
While Thnisia was under German occupation between November 1942 and 
May 1943, the nationalists enjoyed little freedom. The Nazis tried to use the 
Tunisian nationalists for German objectives. Bourguiba, who was in prison in 
France, was released upon the intervention of the Germans and returned to Thnisia. 
The nationalist movement broadcast anti-French nationalist propaganda on the 
Thnisian radio, but when the Allies ejected the Germans from Thnisia in May 
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1943 the French resumed control over Tunisia and the nationalist parties were 
once again declared illegal. The French also ousted the popular reigning sovereign, 
Moncef Bey, because of his sympathies with Axis forces and his favourable attitude 
towards Tunisian nationalism. Moreover, France accused Bourguiba and the Neo-
Destour of collaborating with Nazis and Fascists. Bourguiba used the Italian 'Bari 
Radio' to broadcast an anti-French speech. He went to Cairo, and in 1946 visited 
the US, to win support for the Tunisian cause. He also petitioned the United 
Nations for support.34 
Morocco: Of the Maghreb states, only in Morocco can a continuity of resistance 
be identified. Tribes of the Rif Mountains rejected Spanish and French colonial 
occupation under the leadership of Abd al-Karim al-Katabi. In 1922 al-Katabi 
founded the Rif Republic, the first central government that much of the region had 
known for centuries. France and Spain sent in 400,000 troops to defeat al-Katabi 
and to end the Rif Republic. 
Al-Katabi surrendered to the French in 1926, and was sent into exile on La 
Reunion {Indian Ocean) until1947. There was much speculation that he would get 
help from Russia and from the British zone in Gibraltar, through the international 
zone of Tangier. When the traditional tribal battles and countryside war ended 
in the north, another urbanised version of the nationalist resistance immediately 
emerged. The goal of the new resistance was the freedom of Morocco. The Moroc-
cans were frustrated by the French presence, particularly with the Berber Dahir 
in 1930. 
The national movement in Morocco during 1930s was comprised of two ide-
ological schools. The traditional, religious Salafiyya school was influenced by the 
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Qayrawaiyin University in Fez. The other school was of French educated students 
who were influenced by western political thought and fought for their freedom. 
Moroccan students in Paris such as Mohammed al-Ouazzani, Ahmed Balafrej and 
others, formed the Young Moroccans, and in July 1932 published in Paris the 
newspaper Maghreb. It lasted until May 1934 when it was outlawed by the French 
authorities. The struggle between the two schools was fundamental and presented 
a handicap to organisational activities in Morocco. It did not, however, prevent 
joint action vis-a-vis France when a crisis occurred, as after the Berber Decree.35 
In 1934, the Comite d'Action Moroccaine was set up and represented the first na-
tionalist party in the country. On the French dissolution ofthe Comite in 1937, the 
Comite continued the struggle through a new political organisation (the National-
ist party) until the formation of the Istiqlal party in January 1944. The Istiqlal was 
the first national party with popular support, and it was based on the alliance of 
three elements which all belonged to the most sophisticated segment of the urban 
elite: the traditional bourgeoisie of northern towns, particularly Fez, represented 
by Allal al-Fasi from the traditional school; the modern sector of big business such 
as Omar ben Abd al-Jallil and Ahmed Balafrej, representing European culture, 
more dynamic, but angered at being kept apart from the management of economic 
renewal to which it aspired; young, left-wing intellectuals, of less important bour-
geois origin, with westernised education, such as Mehdi ben Barka, Abd el-Rrahim 
Bouabid and Abd al-llah Ibrahim. 
Sultan Mohammed V was convinced that independence from France was a 
legitimate and attainable objective. The Sultan's objective coincided with the 
nationalist objective. The first contact between the Sultan and the nationalists 
started in 1934 when the Sultan visited Fez and saw the public support for his 
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throne. For many years, the French tried to isolate the Sultan from the national-
ists. The contact between the Sultan and the leaders of nationalist movement had 
secretly continued until the Istiqlal-Throne alliance was publicly formed in 1947 
(Tangier Speech), and it increased pressure on France.36 
Istiqlal and the Sultan tried to mobilise the internal front within Morocco, to 
confront France after World War Two. They also tried to benefit from American-
Moroccan relations which were developed during World War Two as a result of US 
forces landing in North Africa. The Moroccan Nationalist leaders approached the 
Arab League in Cairo and also tried to win British support in the United Nations. 
Egypt was the centre of Maghreb nationalist activities during and after World War 
Two, and the British were sympathetic to their objectives.37 
Libya: The traditional Sanusi movement was the strongest movement in Libya. It 
resisted the Italian occupation during World War One: the Sanusi leader, Sayyid 
Ahmed al-Sharif, decided to ally with Thrkey and Germany, so the Sanusi fought 
against British and Italians. In 1915, the Germans encouraged the Sanusi to launch 
an attack on British positions in Egypt in the western desert. After the defeat of 
the Turks and Germans, Sayyed Ahmed al-Sharif, in 1916, relinquished his position 
to his cousin Sayyid Mohammed ldris, who later made peace with Britain. The 
British Authorities in Egypt established amicable relations with Sayyid ldris in 
the hope that they would not need to make another military diversion westwards. 
They made concessions in order to strengthen the hand of Sayyid Idris against the 
pro-Ottoman party in Cyrenaica, and the British acted as mediators between the 
Sanusis and the Italians. 38 
In Tripolitania, Abd al-Rahman Azzam (an Egyptian Arab Nationalist and 
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the future first Secretary-General of the Arab League) had been trying to create a 
centralised authority since 1916. After Thrkey surrendered, Azzaro tried to create 
a united Tripolitanian front; he succeeded at the al-Qasabat Conference on 18 
November 1918 to proclaim the foundation of a Tripolitanian Republic. It was in 
fact a coalition of notables rather than a state. The republic did not last long and 
dissolved in 1922. With the traditional tribal rivalries in Tripolitania, there was 
no united front to resist the Italians. In 1922 at the Sirta Conference, Sayyid Idris 
was announced as the leader of Libya. He went into exile in Egypt and led the 
anti-Italian resistance from there. 
Omar al-Mukhtar, one of the Zawias religious leaders fought a guerrilla war 
against the Italians in Libya which prompted the Italians to build a 200-mile 
barbed wire fence along the border with Egypt to stop Libyans escaping into the 
Egyptian western desert. Libyan tribes were forced to flee into Chad. Al-Mukhtar 
had fought the Italians until he was captured by Italian forces in September 1931, 
and was executed. 
After the execution of al-Mukhtar the Italians controlled Libya until World 
War Two. During the war the British backed the exiled Idris and a new phase 
of the struggle emerged. The French forces were in Fezzan in 1943, France was 
anxious to protect its central and West African interests and was keen to stay in 
southern Fazzan. The American Air Force took over Mellela base (later Wheelus) 
east of Tripoli in 1943. 
By 1949, the Italians were in Tripolitania (according to Bevin-Sforza plan 
which had been turned down by the UN General Assembly, 17 May, 1949), the 
British were in Cyrenaica, and the French were in Fezzan. Despite its struggle, 
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Libya was the only Maghreb state to win its independence under the United Na-
tions Charter. 39 
The Maghreb national movements co-operated with each other, and they used 
a variety of means to carry their cause to other European states. They played on 
European interests to limit French influence in their region. However, another issue 
also affected the Maghreb Nationalist struggle: the French and Italian settlement 
policy. 
France had encouraged French and other European nationals to settle in 
Tunisia in the name of France, granted them favours, and eventually (1923) French 
citizenship. The largest group of nationals to accept the offer were Italian. The 
Italian immigrants came chiefly from Sicily and Sardinia, and were similar to the 
majority of the French nationals, most of whom were from Corsica. 
At the outbreak of World War Two, the European population in Tunisia 
totalled 240,000. Of these, 160,000 were French, another 80,000 had retained 
Italian citizenship. There were also some 6,000 Maltese.40 European immigrants 
controlled the fertile land and left the Tunisian peasants without much on which 
to live. 
In Algeria, before the revolution of 1954, Europeans owned approximately 
one-third of cultivable land, and nearly all the best land. The average European 
holding amounted to roughly 124 hectares, compared to the Muslim holding of 11 
hectares: an 11 to 1 ratio. A French official source published in 1955 placed the 
ratio at 17 to 1 in favour of the Europeans. By 1954, 90 percent of the unemployed 
in Algeria were Muslims. The settlers had the privileges of land and jobs, and the 
native Algerian was forced off the land facing only poverty. There were 1.5 million 
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French and European immigrants in Algeria. The Jewish community in Algeria, 
and in other Maghreb states, was granted French citizenship. 
In Morocco the situation was little better than in Algeria and Tunisia. French 
immigrants were estimated to total 425,000 in 1953, with thousands more Spanish 
and Portuguese nationals. Again,. the immigrants controlled the fertile land. 
The French policy of agriculture and land distribution exerted a deleterious 
effected on the Maghreb.41 The policy of land holdings was guided by General 
Bugeaud in 1841, when he stated French policy in Algeria. 
"Wherever the water supply is good and the land fertile, there we must place 
colonists without worrying about previous owners. We must distribute the lands in 
full title to the colonists."42 
The French settlers were the cause of much strife inside France during the 
Algerian revolution, because the French right wing would not accept compromise 
on the Algerian problem. France was close to civil war itself over Algeria, particu-
larly, after the formation of the Organization Armee Secrete ( OAS) by right wing 
officers in French-Algeria.43 
The Italians adopted the French settlement policy. In 1938 Libya had a pop-
ulation of just over 880,000 of which 10 percent (89,000) were Italians and about 
86 percent (763,000) Libyan Muslims. Italian settlers controlled the fertile lands 
in the coastal areas. 44 
The policy of colonialism had pushed the leaders of the national movements 
to seek assistance from many directions: from the British, the Americans and to 
some extent to be in sympathy with the Axis powers. 
We have concentrated here on Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. Mau-
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ritania was part of Greater Morocco, and throughout the sixteenth, seventeenth, 
and eighteenth centuries the tribes of Mauritania, H ass ani, participated in Mo-
roccan Sherifian expeditions as far as Tindouf, Teghaza, and Toudeni, beyond the 
present Mauritanian boundaries, in successive efforts to keep Maghrebi trade car-
avan routes open. Various alliances between different tribes of Hassani and the 
Moroccan government were limited to enterprises of common interest. 
On 27 June 1900, Spain and France signed a treaty in Paris in which Maurita-
nia was to be under French control, and Spain would control Spanish Sahara, the 
region now called Western Sahara and now under Moroccan control. This treaty 
was confirmed by the Franco-Spanish Treaty of 3 October 1904. Mauritania won 
its independence from France on 28 November 1960, and joined the U.N. on 27 
October 1961.45 
2.6 Conclusion 
The main theme of this chapter is that the Maghreb was a factor in European 
diplomacy for the following reasons: 
1- Britain was interested in the Maghreb for strategic reasons. North Africa was 
vital to British interests in order to protect its trade routes, and to protect the 
strategically important Strait of Gibraltar. Spain also had the same interest. 
Germany asked for a port on the Maghreb coast in order to reach the Atlantic. 
Italy was interested in the security of its southern border, the balance of power 
and the status quo in the Mediterranean area. These geostrategic objectives 
were a major factor in European competition in the Maghreb. 
2- There were economic factors. There was a struggle between the European 
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nations over the Maghreb for an open door policy. The US pushed hard to 
protect its economic interest in the region. Germany was also motivated by 
economic interests for an open door policy. When France violated interna-
tional treaties, it was condemned by both the US and Germany. 
3- The Maghreb was also used to settle the European balance of power and to 
break Alliances. For example, the German action in the two Moroccan crises 
was motivated to isolate Britain and to destroy the Anglo-French Entente. 
Moreover, the Maghreb was made use of by the foreign policies of certain 
European countries, such as France and Germany, in order to satisfy domestic 
demands. 
4- On the other side of the coin, individual Maghreb governments tried to use 
European competition to protect themselves and to win their independence 
and sovereignty. In Algeria, Amir Abd al-Kadir asked the US to help him 
against France, and offered the US privileges on the Maghreb coasts. Also 
in the Rif war, Amir Abd al-karim looked forward to Britain and Russia 
balancing France and Spain's presence in Morocco during his war with these 
two countries. 
5- Maghreb leaders tried to benefit from two new ideological principles to sup-
port their struggle. They looked to US President Wilson's Principles and to 
the values of international communism. Both ideologies condemned colonial-
ism. The US and the Soviet Union declared their respectives policies towards 
colonialism and called for the decolonisation of the Third World. 
The Europeans were affected by strategic, economic and political factors in 
their presence in and competition for the Maghreb. To what extent had the super-
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powers been affected by these three factors, and did the ideological factor influence 
their policies in the Maghreb? Did the two superpowers differ in their means and 
objectives? 
The ensuing chapters examine the superpowers' political relations with the 
Maghreb. As a case study for superpower behaviour towards Third World coun-
tries, did they try to replace European colonialism? What did they offer the 
Maghreb in place of the European powers? Did they win much influence in the 
Maghreb? 
It is necessary, first, to discuss the superpowers' relations with the Third 
World. 
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Chapter III 
Superpowers and the Third World: 
From Decolonisation Policy to Military Intervention 
3.1 Introduction 
Since World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union have been locked 
in a struggle for political influence, economic and ideological advantage, and mil-
itary security. There were many factors influencing the Soviet-American struggle 
over the Third World, some of which were domestic and related to the conduct of 
foreign policy, others which were related to the regional and international milieu. 
The USSR was preoccupied during Stalin's era with the institutionalisation of 
the Soviet political system, and the strengthening of communist power inside the 
Soviet Union. In addition, Stalin was struggling to strengthen Soviet influence in 
Germany and Eastern Europe, and supporting the coming to power of communist 
China. The Third World was less important or attractive to Stalin because of 
the presence of the colonial powers domination and his distrust of the bourgeoisie 
class. 
In the United States, the globalist politicians had succeeded in pushing the 
USA into world affairs after the victory in World War II. As a leader of the free 
world, with unrivalled economic power and the monopoly of nuclear weapons, the 
USA had won a military superiority in the world and as the dominant power in 
the western hemisphere. 1 
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The United States was concerned about the collapse of the European 
economies and of the whole of the European colonial system, the domestic problems 
of the USSR and later on the breaking of the US nuclear weapon monopoly. The 
United States developed the Marshall Plan2 in order to build a solid economic bloc 
to stop the spread of communism in Europe and to encourage the anti-communist 
element inside Europe and the Soviet Union. 
Europe was -and still is- the geographical focus of superpower struggle to 
dominate the continents, because of its geostrategic value for both superpowers, 
and the balance of power in Europe. But despite the longstanding the struggle in 
Europe and later competition over South East Asia, the two superpowers devoted 
an increasingly large share of their attention and resources to other areas in the 
Third World. 
The United States had been involved in the Third World, particularly the 
Middle East, before the USSR. After World War II, the USA had engaged in polit-
ical and economic competition with Britain over the Middle East's oil, particularly 
in Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia and the United States was determined to keep an 
open door to the Middle East's oil. The head of the Near Eastern Office in the 
State Department wrote in November 1945: 
" We have no intention of becoming again a mere passive spectator in the Near 
East. We have been supporting the policy of open door in the Near East with regard 
to Investments and Commerce." 3 
Moreover the USA had participated in political competition with Britain over 
Syria and Egypt.4 
Decolonisation, the polarisation of regional politics in the Third World, the 
rejection of capitalism in newly independent Third World countries, and the at-
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titude of the superpowers towards the Third World national bourgeoisie were all 
elements affecting superpower behaviour towards the developing world. 
This chapter focuses on superpower involvement in the Third World from 
decolonisation policy to military intervention. We examine the conduct of foreign 
policy by the superpowers and how it affected relations with the Third World. 
As the two superpowers have confronted each other ideologically we examine the 
role of their ideology in Third World politics and its pragmatic effect on how 
they have used ideology to legitimise their behaviour in the Third World. The 
superpowers have both encouraged the independence of Third World countries, but 
to what extent have they supported the National Liberation movements? With 
the emergence of the Non-Aligned movement, why they supported Non-Alignment 
and why did the USA attack Non-Alignment as immoral? We also examine the 
superpowers' relations with the military in the Third World, to see to what extent 
the superpowers have seen the military as a tool for furthering their influence 
in the Third World. 5 We examine all these factors from the perspective of the 
superpowers' relationship with the Arab Maghreb States: how the decision making 
processes, ideology, National Liberation Movements, Non-aligned Movement and 
the relationship with the military have affected the Superpowers' relations with 
the Maghreb. 
3.2 The Evolution of Superpower involvement in the Third World 
Superpower involvement in the Third World has passed through many phases. 
After World War II, the superpower priority was to establish the security of Europe 
and the Far East. From the Soviet perspective, East Europe and South East Asia 
were more important than the other new states in the Middle East, Africa, and 
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Latin America. The USA was more interested in the Middle East because of the 
strategic importance and oil. The superpowers became gradually involved in the 
Third World, until they felt military intervention was necessary to protect their 
interests. The Truman Doctrine focused on Thrkey and Greece, and the US was 
ready to use military force to block Soviet communist influence there. 
3.2.1 Phase One: 1950-1965: the Cold War Era 
During the 1950s_ the United States dominated Third World affairs and 
strongly influenced Third World politics. The US also experienced the influence of 
and competition from the USSR. The American role was encouraged by the decline 
of Europe and the USA's monopoly of nuclear weapons; Third World states had 
turned to the US for help in their efforts towards independence.6 
When Eisenhower came to office, he set out the USA's policy of employing 
military force against communism in the Middle East. According to Eisenhower's 
doctrine, the President was authorised to assist the Middle East region economi-
cally as well as with armed forces to secure and protect the territorial integrity of 
any nation requesting help. During Eisenhower's years, the USA took on the role 
of self-appointed policeman and patron of the Middle East. 7 Eisenhower's admin-
istration had also begun to build a series of Alliance Systems'8 which could form 
a barrier against the extension of communism, according to the "domino theory" , 
and provide a form of global containment.9 
The United States, as a nation without experience or previous record of impe-
rialism, had become more attractive to the Third World than any other European 
nation. American policy during the Suez Crisis, and its anti-aggression reaction, 
was part of the USA's effort to prevent Soviet exploitation of the conflict to en-
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hance Soviet influence in the Middle East. The USA also sought to loosen Nasser's 
link with the Soviet Union by opposing the Anglo-French policy.10 
When John Kennedy became President, he criticised Eisenhower's policy in 
the Third World for failing to align America with Nationalist movements and not 
acting to meet the real problems of the developing world. Kennedy supported 
freedom everywhere to Africa, Asia and Latin America, and was on record as 
opposing colonialism in Africa before he came to power. He viewed American 
foreign policy as mistaken in its dealings with the Middle East and other Third 
World countries in the context of the East-West struggle. Moreover, he criticised 
President Eisenhower for a military cost-cutting programme that "left America 
unprepared to fight limited wars in grey areas" 11 of the Third World. Kennedy 
did not neglect the use of military force to protect American interests within the 
Third World, but he used a different approach to strengthen America's influence. 
He understood that nationalism, economic development, Arab refugees and local 
political instabilities were factors shaping Soviet influence in the Third World. 
Military force was not the only way to protect the Third World from communism. 
"It offers guns and money but guns and money are not the Middle East's basic 
guide." 12 
Kennedy had far stronger sympathies with Third World nationalism than 
Eisenhower had. Kennedy was also even more committed to preserving the West-
ern position through military force. North Africa had won strong support from 
Kennedy both as a Senator and later as President of the United States. 
The Soviet Union started to support indirectly arms and economic aid to the 
Third World countries, as in the case of the Egypt-Czechoslovakian arms deal of 
July 1955. The Soviet Union tried a policy of keeping a low profile to avoid con-
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frontation with Western powers. The Soviet Union had influence through peace-
ful coexistence, being more interested in the northern tier of Turkey, Iran and 
Afghanistan.13 Moreover the Soviet Union had lost some prestige and allies, in-
cluding China and Third World countries such as Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Tunisia and 
Algeria, that suppressed communist parties. Prestige was also lost in the inter-
national community and with military coups in Africa, the Soviet Union lost the 
friendship of Ghana (1966), Mali (1968)14 and Algeria (1965). 
3.2.2 Phase two: 1965-1975 
This decade has been described as a transition period in Soviet and American 
relations with the Third World. Soviet influence in Third World countries had 
increased during this era, encouraged by many international and regional devel-
opments. At the international level, the Soviet Union moved towards strategic 
parity with the United States in nuclear power. It had become more involved 
in the United Nations and had also benefited from the detente and arms control 
agreements (SALT 1).15 The Soviet economy had become more relaxed and self 
confident than in the 1950s. The development of the Non- Aligned group, and 
American involvement in Vietnam and support for Third World liberation had 
advanced the Soviet penetration of the Third World. The Arab-Israeli conflict in 
1967 was one important active factor in advancing Soviet strength in the Third 
World, particularly in the Middle East. The Arab defeat increased their reliance 
on the Soviet Union for weapons. Soviet experience had led to the avoidance of 
Khrushchev's mistakes in Cuba, and the gaining of more friends during the 1960s 
and early 1970s. 
The Soviet Union had increased its military and economic aid. Between 1955 
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and 1965. The Kremlin extended over $2 billion in economic aid and $4.5 billion in 
military assistance to Third World countries. These figures climb respectively to 
$9 billion and $9.2 billion during the following decade (1965-1975). 16 But despite 
Soviet progress in this area there were a series of setbacks in the Third World, such 
as in Egypt during the Sadat era. 
On the other hand, the USA experienced a decline in its presence in the Third 
World during this period. Its involvement in Vietnam and the bombing of civil-
ians led to Third World condemnation. Inside the USA, its foreign policy was 
handicapped by the Watergate scandal and congressional restrictions on CIA ac-
tivities and covert action abroad. American public psychology had been affected 
by the Vietnam defeat.17 American relations with Western Europe entered a sensi-
tive stage, because of the US nuclear strategy in Europe over the flexible response 
doctrine and General de Gaulle's suspicion of America's nuclear commitment to 
Europe. 
The growth of the European economies had led to more economic competition 
between Europe and America, particularly in the former colonies in Asia and 
Africa.18 American economic aid declined in this decade. In 1965 the USA spent 
$3 billion (about 0.5% of the USA GNP), whilst in 1975 it spent $2 billion on aid 
to the Third World( in 1961 dollars).19 The Arab-Israeli war in 1967 had affected 
USA-Arab relations because the USA supported Israel. Many Arab countries had 
broken relations with the USA as a result of increasing Soviet influence. 
The US view of colonialism had dominated America's relations with the Third 
World. But the American perspective on the Third World was shaped by East-
West tension. 
"Nixon-Kissinger strategy of Detente sought to entice Moscow into a web of 
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economic ties that would deepen the USSR material stake in continued detente with 
the United States." 20 
American experiences in Vietnam forced the USA to turn more of its Third 
World burden over to friends and allies. President Nixon and his Secretary of 
State Henry Kissinger focused on the role of regional middle powers. In that 
sense he adopted a Two Pillars' policy in the Middle East, using proxy forces 
such as Iran and Saudi Arabia to further American interests. This was later to be 
termed the Nixon Doctrine. In non-nuclear conflict the United States would furnish 
economic aid and military assistance in accordance with its military commitments. 
The American military supplies were the linchpin of the twin pillars'. As Henry 
Kissinger explained 
"The Iranian armament drive accorded with US global strategy. Owing to the 
Vietnam trauma the United States could not play a balancing role in the Indian Ocean 
and the Persian Gulf. But by arming Iran, Washington would enable a regional power 
to do what America could not do. 21 
In sum, this period witnessed the increase of Soviet influence and the decline 
of the USA's influence in the Third World. 
3.2.3 Third Phase: 1975-1980 
The Soviet Union had engaged in arms control talks with the USA {SALT II), 
and the Soviets for the first time extended the Brezhnev Doctrine to neighbouring 
countries such as Afghanistan. The Soviet Union was also involved in Angola and 
other Third World countries and enjoyed strategic influence in Ethiopia. In this 
phase, Soviet economic aid to Third World countries reached $9.9 billion between 
1976 and 1980, and the arms deliveries to Third World states totalled $33 billion 
for the same period. 22 
65 
The Soviet Union also concluded seven treaties of friendship and cooper a-
tion with Third World states, including Vietnam. Between 1971 and 1972 USSR 
had concluded four treaties with Third World states. 23 Moreover the USSR had 
encouraged the participation of Eastern Europe and Cuban advisors with Third 
World countries. Although America accused Cuba of acting as a proxy force for 
the Soviet Union, in reality Cuba's close relations with the Soviet Union were not 
quite so simple. In one scholar's view, 
"The Cubans were not mere proxies for the Soviets. They act on their own, 
while consulting and collaborating with their allies in Moscow.24 
Meanwhile, the Americans suffered a setback during this phase. President 
Carter developed a new approach to American foreign policy. He shifted the Amer-
ican policy on Third World countries to a more regional approach. He was com-
mitted to building a relationship with Third World countries which was based on 
a greater sympathy for their political and economic aspirations and was designed 
to reduce the potential for Soviet influence in the Third World. Carter's foreign 
policy approach emphasised the economic factor in the age of interdependence, 
and also raised Human Rights issues and called for World Order Politics. During 
his time as President, many Third World dictators had been thrown out of power, 
such as the Shah in Iran and Somoza in Nicaragua. 25 After the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan and the fall of the Shah of Iran, Carter adopted a policy of more direct 
intervention in the Third World, particularly in the Persian Gulf. He announced 
the formation of American Rapid Deployment Forces in 1980. 26He also supported 
his National Security advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski's argument for linking Soviet-
American Arms Control talks (SALT II) to Third World countries. According to 
Brzezinski, "the SALT negotiation was buried in Ogedon. "27 The United States 
connected the progress in arms control with superpower co-operation in regional 
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conflicts. 
Before 1975, the USA was more inclined to responses military than the Soviet 
Union but, in 1975 and after, the Soviet Union moved to more military means. 
After the invasion of Afghanistan (December 1979), the United States shifted to a 
new political-military strategy (offensive and strength) This policy was motivated 
by the American hostage crises in Iran, the US economy, the US military build up, 
the formation of American Deployment Forces and the new US Strategic Forces 
(MX) missiles. 
3.2.4 Phase Four: 1980-1985 
When Reagan came to power in the USA, he adopted a realist approach to 
foreign policy, emphasising an American globalist approach which related Third 
World problems to the East-West conflict. He also developed the Reagan Doctrine' 
which was a roll back strategy, designed to limit and eliminate the Soviet presence 
in the Third World. He linked arms control and improved relations between the 
USA and the Soviet Union to Third World issues. During his first term, Reagan 
supported the Afghanistan Resistance with weapons, and also created and encour-
aged the Contras in Nicaragua. 28 He adopted a more interventionist approach to 
Central America, the Middle East and Africa. The USA supported UNITA with 
weapons and invited Zavimbi to the United States. The CIA also worked directly 
with UNITA. The United States invaded Grenada in October 1983, and sent troops 
into the Lebanon. Reagan's policy was influenced by American antagonism to the 
1970s, wishing to change the American image after the legacy of Vietnam, and he 
was influenced by the American Cold War era. 
During Reagan's years, the US ignored Human Rights issues in foreign policy, 
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and concentrated on the overthrow of anti-American and radical regimes in the 
Third World. The USA had looked for military bases in the Third World, especially 
in Egypt, Somalia, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kenya, and Transit in Morocco. They 
had also engaged twice in military confrontation with Libya, in 1982 and 1986. 
Reagan was more realistic in using military force in its foreign policy to achieve 
political objectives. He tried to persuade American public opinion in the aftermath 
of the Vietnam War,29 that the United States had the capability to counter com-
munist expansion. 
Meanwhile, the Soviet Union pursued a more moderate policy towards the 
Third World after 1980. The USSR was criticised by the Third World countries for 
its intervention in Afghanistan. Moreover, the USSR faced a succession of problems 
after the death of three Soviet leaders between November 1982 and March 1985. It 
also faced economic problems which reduced the Soviet capacity to send economic 
aid to the Third World. Despite the growth of military strength and military aid, 
especially after 1985, the USSR has become less attractive to, and lost the interest 
of, the Third World.30 Gorbachev's new thinking had led the USSR to emphasise 
its domestic problems and economic recovery rather than its competition with the 
West in the Third World. His strategy focused on Soviet security in Europe, the 
Far East and America more than Soviet adventures in the Third World. 
3.3 US-USSR Political Systems, Foreign Policy and Third World 
The political systems of states greatly influence their conduct of foreign policy. 
There are important links between domestic policies and foreign policy. The two 
Superpowers have different political systems, so their conduct of foreign policy is 
significantly different in style. 
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States with democratic systems have complicated foreign policy processes, 
which makes it more difficult to formulate coherent and consistent policies. Au-
thoritarian state conducts its foreign policy according to their leadership's objec-
tives and perception. The next section analyses the impact of democratic and 
authoritarian systems on foreign policy, particularly toward the Third World. 31 
3.3.1 Soviet Political System, Foreign Policy and The Third World 
The USSR has an authoritarian system, and its foreign policy has been con-
ducted by the Politburo and the General Secretary of the Communist Party has 
been the chief person responsible for foreign policy. 
In authoritarian regimes, the personality of the leadership has much effect on 
the foreign policy of the regime. In this sense, Stalin's cult of personality and his 
charismatic style dominated Soviet foreign policy. Stalin could effectively ignore 
public opinion in making the Soviet Union's foreign policy. He was more interested 
in Soviet relations with Europe and concentrated on Soviet control of Eastern 
Europe. He adopted a continental approach in his foreign policy and his relations 
with developing nations were less effective, except in the USSR involvement with 
China, Thrkey and Iran. Stalin did not trust the national bourgeoisie in Third 
World states, and he suspected the new independent states of being puppets in 
the hands of colonial powers. 32 
After Stalin's death in 1953, the Soviet Union had a short period of collective 
leadership. After a brief power struggle between Molotov and Khrushchev, Molotov 
was ousted. Khrushchev strengthened his power and held the USSR foreign policy 
under his direct control. The Cuban missile crisis provides an example of such a 
concentration of decision making authority in a circle even smaller than the Party's 
69 
Politburo.33 During Khrushchev's time in power, the military were involved in 
foreign policy to the extent that the political leader would seek their advice but 
their role was more effective in defence policy than in foreign policy or in military 
aspects with the Third World. After Khrushchev's era, the military had much more 
influence in the Politburo and as a lobby, particularly when the Communist Party 
invited the soldiers to participate in decision making on foreign policy issues. The 
promotion of Marshall Andrey Grechko (1973) to full membership of the Politburo 
was naturally significant, as this gave the military access to key decision makers. 
They worked as professional advisors to the political leaders. 34 
During Brezhnev's era, Soviet foreign policy was under Politburo control de-
spite military influence in the Party itself. To some extent Soviet decision makers 
no longer have quite the same free hand in foreign policy affairs as their predeces-
sors such as Stalin. As Adam Ulam has argued, foreign policy successes are for 
the Soviet elite a principal means of legitimising their political system.35 But it 
remains true that the Politburo has the deciding say in determining foreign pol-
icy in all major issues including Third World countries. 36 General Yurii Lebedev, 
Deputy Chief of Soviet General Staff, in 1984, explained the relation between the 
military and civilian politicians as follows: 
"Those who refer to a so called militacy lobby in the USSR are deliberately 
lying or know nothing about my Countcy's political organisation and structure. The 
militacy, however high their rank, are placed under the permanent control of state 
and party organs. If, to take a pure hypothesis, there were some deviation, believe 
me it would be very quickly crushed." 37 
In any event, foreign policy making in the Soviet Union has been described as 
centrally controlled in the hand of the Politburo, and despite expert or professional 
advice, has been seen as one of the major factors behind Soviet failure in the Third 
World. Foreign policy making is centralised and highly controlled from above in a 
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routine manner. As Khrushchev observed about Foreign Minister, Gromyko's role 
in Soviet foreign policy: 
"Gromyko only says what we tell him to. At the next Geneva meeting he will 
repeat what he has already told you. If he does not, we'll fire him and get someone 
who does." 38 
Under Brezhnev, the International Department (ID) of the Central Commitee 
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union ( CPSU) had played a large role in con-
trolling the Soviet foreign policy towards the Third World. But under Gorbachev, 
the role of the International Department has been declining and the Foreign Min-
istry under Shevardnadze has held the power and been with Gorbachev, in control 
of foreign policy. 
3.3.2 The American Political System, Foreign Policy and The Third World 
The United States has a democratic system with two main political parties 
competing for power. Despite the influence of an international system and envi-
ronment on American foreign policy, domestic factors have played a great role in 
determining foreign policy particularly toward Third World countries. Within the 
United States, there are three factors to consider in the foreign policy process. (i) 
The relation between the Congress and the executive branch of government; (ii) 
bureaucratic policies and politics within the executive branch of government; and 
(iii) the nature of public opinion with its attendant effects on foreign policy. There 
are also special interest groups and important elites exercising a powerful role over 
certain aspects of foreign policy such as Think Tanks and the media. 39 
1. The Congress and US Foreign Policy: 
One of the oldest conflicts in the American political system is that between 
Congress and the President of the United States as the head of the Executive 
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branch, over the right to formulate and implement foreign policy. The struggle for 
control over foreign policy came to the fore in the twentieth century, with Amer-
ica's reluctant entry into world affairs. After World War II, the US has become 
more active in world politics. It functioned in a bipolar system facing the com-
munist bloc and the struggle for influence over the Third World. Foreign policy 
had become more difficult for the Congress and the US government in a situation 
of international interdependence. The role of Congress increased in foreign policy 
but, since Vietnam, Congress has become even more assertive in American for-
eign policy. The war was a watershed in the American executive's relation with 
Congress. 40 
The 1970s were marked by Congressionally initiated foreign policy legislation 
that limited the President's range of options on a number of issues such as arms 
sale, human rights, trade, economic and military aid, CIA intervention and covert 
action, and dispatching American troops abroad in crisis. 
The President's freedom of action was restricted and limited by a series of 
legislative Amendments. For example, the Hickenlooper Amendment passed by 
Congress directed the USA government to terminate aid programmes to any coun-
try that nationalised American owned property without fair compensation.41 
In 1974, the Nelson Bingham Amendment to the Arms Export Control Act 
(PL.93-559) required the President to give advance notice to Congress of any offer 
to sell to foreign countries defence weapons valued at $25.00 million or more. The 
Congress has rejected many times arms sales to Third World countries, such as 
the selling of AWACS to Saudi Arabia in 1980, or HAWK missiles to Jordan, or 
the Thrkish arms embargo of 1974 after the Thrkish invasion of Cyprus, and arms 
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sales to Morocco in 1979. Another major area of congressional intervention was a 
series of anti- war amendments. The Congress forced the US government to early 
withdrawal of American forces from South East Asia and cutting American aid 
to Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. The most important act in Congress during 
the 1970s was the War Powers Act {PL.93-148) of 1973.42 The Act grew out of 
Congress's frustration with the war in Vietnam and its desire to prevent such 
a situation from ever happening again. The Act probably influenced President 
Nixon's decision to formulate the Nixon doctrine to use regional powers as proxy 
forces in regional conflict or upheaval to protect American interests, such as the 
role of the Shah of Iran in the 1970s, and the policing of the Gulf. 
Congress also restricted CIA activities abroad, the Church Committee {1975-
1976) and the Hughes-Ryan Amendment of 1974 prohibited any CIA activities 
without Congress knowledge. During the years 1974-1976 Congress enacted a 
series of measures restricting military, economic and financial assistance to gross 
violators of human rights and humanitarian affairs, and established in the State 
Department a new bureau of human rights headed by the Assistant Secretary of 
State. During Reagan's era, Congress's restriction on arms shipment and delivery 
to the Contras in Nicaragua helped create the Iran-Contra scandal.43 
Finally, Congress has played a major role in the restriction of American in-
volvement in Third World countries, particularly military intervention, and created 
a situation where American foreign policy makers have to depend on foreign coun-
tries to use forces for the sake of American interests, such as Morocco's intervention 
in Zaire in 1977, and Egyptian forces creating regional alliances to protect unpop-
ular regimes in Third World countries such as GCC after the Iranian revolution. 
The United States appproached Jordan to create Jordanian Rapid deployment 
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force to be used in the Gulf States instead of direct American forces.44 
n. Bureaucratic policies: 
The American administration has several voices speaking on foreign policy, 
and sometimes they contradict each other. The State Department is the main 
responsible body regarding foreign policy, but inside the department itself there 
are conflicts of ideas on foreign policy, particularly in regional policies. In the 
1950s, the struggle inside the State Department on foreign policy issues was clearly 
between the globalists and regionalists. For example, to avoid alienating North 
Atlantic Alliances (NATO), the State Department Bureau of European Affairs 
opposed the use of pressure on European states, especially France, in respect of 
decolonisation policy, while the Bureau of Near Eastern South Asia and African 
Affairs on its part favoured using American influence to further decolonisation such 
as in North Africa. The African Affairs of the Commerce Department supported 
the open door policy. 
"They accepted the view that open door was mutually beneficial for the host 
country and the United States." 45 
On the other hand, the Departments of State and Commerce were divided 
largely on geographical and functional lines. Not only were there disputes in many 
cases between the Departments of States and Commerce, but also between Defence 
and State over foreign policy. Moreover, the National Security Council has been 
involved in conflicts over foreign policy, as in the case between Cyrus Vance, the 
Secretary of State during the Carter era, and Zbigniew Brzezinski, the National 
Security Advisor to President Carter over intervention in Iran during the Iranian 
revolution in 1979. 
When Morocco asked President Carter's administration for arms in 1979, the 
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USA administration was divided on the issue. Cyrus Vance, USA Secretary of 
State, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, sought to distance the US 
from the Moroccan invasion of Western Sahara, because they did not like to alienate 
Algeria, or to encourage Soviet arms sales to Libya and Algeria by supporting 
Morocco with arms. Within the State Department, the Near East Bureau was 
strongly in favour of meeting King Hassan's demand for arms because of the peace 
process in the Middle East and King Hassan's role in it, and the African Bureau in 
the State Department advised against arms to Morocco from a regional perspective, 
( because of Algeria and other African neighbours of Morocco). On the other 
hand, President Carter and the Secretary of Defence, Brown, and Chief of Staff 
and National Security Advisor Z. Brzezinski, supported Hassan to prevent another 
Iran. The Congress was similarly divided on the Moroccan issue, Stephen Solarz, 
Chair of the Subcommittee on Africa for the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 
argued against arms to Morocco while other members of the Congress and Senate 
supported Morocco's request. 
The major conflicts in American foreign policy during the 1980s were Iran-
gate and Contragate during the Reagan era. The case reflected the deep division 
amongst the bureaucratic foreign policy makers, while the Secretary of Defence, 
Caspar Weinberger, and Secretary of State George Schulz, had refused in principle 
to participate in Iranian-American arms deals for hostages. The CIA and National 
Security Council had carried out the mission. The personality of the President 
and his knowledge of and involvement with foreign policy played a great role in 
the control of the bureaucratic conflict and the decision making process. 
Moreover, the other major contradiction in opinion towards foreign policy 
estimation has come from the intelligence community. While the United States 
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has numerous intelligence organisations, the CIA has played a major role in foreign 
affairs. The CIA has assessed the stability of regimes and advised in respect of 
King Hassan of Morocco that his regime was too weak to survive. Despite the 
Intelligence community role as providing information rather than intervening in 
politics, the CIA Director is close to the President and plays a great role in decision 
making. William Casey's relations with Reagan appear to have influenced US 
foreign policy decisions. The Bush administration has tried to put a limit to the 
CIA involvement in decision making, putting the main emphasis on its duty to 
supply information.46 
m. Public Opinion: 
The American public is poorly informed about foreign policy and world affairs 
but public opinion has a powerful influence on American decision makers. The 
United States has an open society and its government responds to public opinion. 
The American public are against any kind of military commitment which 
would involve American troops in a way such as that which took 50,000 American 
lives in the jungles of South East Asia. It is axiomatic in American politics that 
the American people want no more Vietnams'.47 In some cases, American public 
opinion determined US action in Third World countries, for example, 24 hours after 
the American Marines were bombed in Beirut, Lebanon in October 1983, when 
143 Americans were killed, US troops invaded Grenada. The deaths of servicemen 
were a personal blow to President Reagan, who was keenly aware of his role as 
Commander in Chief. So many men had not been lost since Vietnam. He had to 
shift public attention from Lebanon to Grenada. The invasion of Grenada was a 
public relations coup for the White House and distracted attention from the Beirut 
76 
tragedy. 
Moreover, America's act against Libya, in April1986, was part of an attempt 
to appease American public opinion following American failure to counter anti-
American terrorism. An important factor shaping American action is electoral 
considerations. Presidency elections handicap the President in foreign policy issues 
and many Congressmen and Senators support Israel to win the Jewish lobby's 
support in elections.48 
1v. Interest Groups: 
In a democratic society with private businesses, interest groups play an active 
role to protect their interests, particularly in the Third World where American 
companies are seeking economic projects, oil, raw materials and markets. 
Some interest groups have been powerful to the degree that they influence 
the decision makers in many cases, or they cooperate with government agencies in 
covert action in the Third World. American businesses in the 1950s had pressed the 
US government to act against France because of French restrictions on American 
businesses in Morocco. On the other hand France also complained that Moroccan 
Nationalists in the United States solicited money from businessmen and others 
to buy arms. Among backers of Moroccan nationalists were Coca-Cola company 
representatives, James Hall and Kenneth Pendar, a former American auxiliary vice-
consul at Casablanca, who had been involved in intelligence activities in Morocco 
during the Second World War. Also, American oil companies had supported the 
independence of Libya, and many oil companies had been involved with the politics 
of the Middle East.49 
American multi-national companies have cooperated with the American gov-
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ernment and CIA covert action when it is in their interests. The CIA cooperated 
in 1973 with the company International Telephone and Telegrams (ITT) to help 
overthrow Allende in Chile. Also, several American firms opposed the embargo of 
high technology trade with the USSR that President Carter imposed in retaliation 
for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Some have equated America's national 
interests with American corporate interests: 
"What is good for General Motors is good for America. 50 
In addition, there is the proliferation of new single interest lobbies that are 
often able to hamstring foreign policy. There are many and various religious groups, 
the human rights lobbies, the nationality groups and the political action commitees. 
More recently, when the State Department proposed to cut Morocco's foreign 
aid for 1990, Morocco hired Mill & Co., a Washington lobbying firm. It recruited 
Senator Robert Kasten, an Appropriations Committee member, who got $8 million 
restored. To do so, Kasten enlisted the support of Senator Daniel Inouye, another 
Committee member, in exchange for Kasten supporting $30 million for Inouye's pet 
country, Thnisia. Inouye in turn got White House backing for Thnisia in exchange 
for his earmarking $20.00 million extra that President Bush wanted for Jordan. 51 
v. The Media : 
The media has been playing an increasing role in foreign policy. It can be 
accurately termed the Fourth Estate'. The causes of this new media involvement 
are principally money, power, or the desire for it. The United States are more 
vulnerable to the influence of the media than any other state, because it is an open 
society and the media is owned by private companies or rich families or groups. 
The American constitution protects the freedom of the press. President Nixon had 
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resigned from office after the press uncovered the Watergate scandal. American 
public opinion reaction to America's involvement in Vietnam was strongly anti-
USA policy after the media coverage of the mass killing in Vietnam. The media 
coverage of the hostage crisis during 1979 generated a negative view of Carter 
during the 1980 election. Moreover, the human rights abuse in most Third World 
countries and the media coverage of this had a strong effect on USA foreign policy 
towards such areas, and affected American military and economic aid. The media 
coverage of terrorists in the 1980s during Reagan's era led to many confrontations 
with Third World countries such as Iran, Libya and Syria. The USA attacked 
Libya in 1986 largely as the result of American failure to combat terrorism in 
other areas and media coverage of Libya involvement. 52 
vi. Think Tanks: 
In democratic societies the government may be advised on policy problems 
by bodies of individuals not part of government. Think Tanks play a great role in 
USA foreign policy as external advisory bodies to the government. Think Tanks 
could be reasonably referred to as the Fifth Estate. 53 
There are several means by which the Think Tank can influence foreign policy. 
Most of the Think Tank experts have moved between government institutions and 
the Think Tank, and most of the Think Tanks have been preparing studies for the 
government organisations on foreign policy issues, or by influencing Congress with 
background papers on foreign policy issues. 
The Rand Corporation has been the most influential private organisation on 
Defence policy since the 1950s.54 In 1989, Rand had a $95.5 million annual budget, 
78% of which comes from the USA military branches. 56 Moreover, the Brookings 
79 
Institute has much influence over Democratic policy makers, especially during the 
Carter era. Brookings had prepared the Carter Middle East proposal. Z. Brzezin-
ski and William Quandt were affiliated to Brookings before they joined Carter's 
administration. The Heritage Foundation has much influence in Republican party 
circles, particularly during the Reagan era. As a conservative Think Tank, the 
Heritage Foundation had argued that the Reagan Administration should support 
Morocco in the Western Sahara and argued that the USA government should offer 
military and economic aid to Morocco. On the other hand, the Foundation argued 
that the USA government should use military force and sanctions against Libya 
and had labelled Libya as a terrorist state'. 56 
Moreover, the Think Tanks have strong relations with academic institutions, 
and they have been involved with the preparation of major studies and hold con-
ferences with the support of the US government to discuss major issues. Rand 
Corporation studies in terrorism and Soviet Third World policy have been widely 
distributed. Harvard University also held a conference on Islamic Fundamental-
ism which was sponsored by the CIA; the Defence Intelligence Agency supported 
studies on Islamic organisation in the Third World. One important study was pre-
pared by Samuel Huntington and Richard Bett, which focuses on the dictators and 
authoritarian regimes in the Third World and the instability of their countries in 
case of sudden death and disappearance. 57 The United States have tried to avoid 
Iranian mishandling of 1979, and had adopted a policy of easing out dictators, as 
in the case of the Philippines (1985), Tunisia {1987) and others in Third World 
countries. 
In general, the democratic states have more complicated foreign policy pro-
cesses than totalitarian states. The United States has a crisis management and 
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crisis foreign policy rather than a systematic foreign policy. The democratic state's 
foreign policy is less effective because of conservative paralysis and a correspond-
ing inability to deal with pressing problems. In authoritarian regimes and closed 
societies such as the Soviet Union, they have less difficulty in pursuing their for-
eign policy because of the reduced influence of public opinion or bureaucratic or 
interest groups. They have a more systematic policy because the foreign policy is 
concentrated in the hands of the leadership. 
3.4 Superpowers, Ideology and Foreign Policy 
After the Second World War, the world had been divided ideologically into 
two blocs. The United States has represented the capitalist world, and the Soviet 
Union dominated the Eastern bloc. 
Ideology was a major factor in the Cold War, despite the revisionist school's 
emphasis on American economic interests as a main cause of the Cold War. Ide-
ology could not be seperated from the economy, because the economic system is 
founded upon ideology. With the spread of the Cold War and ideological conflict, 
the United States has adopted the Containment Policy to control the spread of 
communist ideology to Europe or Euro-Asia. 58 
Hans Morgenthau, one of the realist school theorists, has explained the way 
ideology tends to change the international system. Ideology not only contributes 
to the development of unlimited national objectives, but it also eventually creates 
states whose goal is to overthrow the existing international system. 59 Historically, 
the new revolutionary states in the grip of fundamental ideological principles have 
tried to change the international and regional system. Revolutionary Iran in 1979 
tried to change the regional system, while revolutionary Russia in 1917 tried to 
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change the whole international system. 
But despite concern with the emphasis of the role of ideology in the policies of 
the superpowers, reality suggests other factors predominate in the relations with 
the Third World. Ideology might explain some aspects of Soviet foreign policy, 
particularly in the early days of communist revolution, but not every action of 
Soviet foreign policy. Lenin had concentrated on building an ideological state, 
but the ideas of Marx and Lenin were not the only influences affecting the Soviet 
diplomats' perspectives on international affairs. 
There has been a long evolutionary process, as a result of which the perceived 
national interests of the USSR superseded the ideological dimension of Soviet poli-
tics. The Brest-Litovsk Treaty of 1918 between Germany and Russia, the entry into 
the League of Nations; the Hitler-Stalin pact {1939), the 20th Communist Party 
Congress, and the Sino-Soviet split are taken as landmarks that demonstrate the 
increasingly deep contradiction between national and state interests and ideology 
in Soviet international behaviour. 60 There has therefore been a tension between 
ideology and pragmatism in Soviet behaviour toward the Third World countries. 
Soviet leaders have closed their eyes to the oppression of local Communist 
Parties in the Third World while engaging in cooperation with the ruling circles 
in the Third World. The Communist Parties in most of the Arab countries have 
been banned, oppressed, jailed and executed, while the Soviet Union has kept 
full political and economic relations and has given military and weapon support. 
Iraq has arrested Communist Party members on many occasions, Tunisia banned 
the Communist Party, Algeria limited its political activities and, in the Sudan, a 
Communist Party leader was executed. The failure of the Communist Parties in 
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the Arab world, and as small parties with little support from the Arab masses, has 
led the Soviets to build a two way contract with Arab regimes, one with communist 
parties, the other with the official channels of Arab governments. In this regard, 
ideology has less influence in Soviet relations with the Arab world than the links 
with the ruling classes in the Arab regimes. Moreover, the Soviet Union stands by 
when Marxist regimes are being crushed in many Third World countries such as 
Chile and Guatemala. 
From a historical perspective, the Soviet Union was more ideological in its 
foreign policy orientation towards the Third World during the Stalinist period. 
When Krushchev held power in the USSR, he developed a peaceful coexistence 
ideology to legitimise policies of cooperation with the USA and other national-
bourgoisies in Third World countries. Robert Thcker has described the Soviet 
ideological behaviour as follows: 
"Its leadership remains ideologically committed to the goal of a world wide com-
munist revolution, but the pattern of Soviet conduct in world affairs has increasingly 
become that of a status quo power rather than a revolutionary power."61 
The post Stalinist leaders give little evidence of being radical in their outlook. 
The Soviet Union can no longer be accurately described as a revolutionary power 
because revolutionary organization is not central to Soviet policy in the Third 
World. The Soviet Union was attractive to the Third World ideologically, but the 
USSR also had the advantage of being a new major power on the Third World 
scene. It came with clean hands, unburdened by a colonial past in the Arab world, 
South Asia, Africa and Latin America.62 
The ideological split between Moscow and Peking meant that there was com-
petition between China and the Soviet Union in influencing Third World states. 
China was seen by some Third World countries as a true communist state while 
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the Soviet Union tilted toward peaceful coexistance with the capitalist world. But 
because of the Soviet Union power and military and economic aid most of the 
Third World built strong relations with the Soviets. China was not a member of 
the UN, was preoccupied with its internal cultural revolution and too poor to offer 
much aid or political support in the UN to the Third World. 
In sum, whereas ideological disposition was the measure of an ally in the 
past, economic imperatives make relations with the bigger capitalist orientated 
states more attractive because the economic imperatives offer great opportunities 
for direct trade and better returns on Soviet investments. Soviet foreign policy 
makers sought therefore to expand its ties with the newly industrialised economies 
of South East Asia, Brazil, Indonesia and Nigeria. 
When the Soviet Union moved towards supporting Third World countries 
in the 1970s, it was Soviet military power and the ideological orientation towards 
detente that encouraged Brezhnev to do so. It should be said that, with Soviet for-
eign policy in the Third World, the ends justify the means, and that manoeuvring, 
flexibility, pragmatism and opportunism are thought necessary in Third World 
relations. The new Soviet leadership no longer seeks to revise the international 
order in accordance with the principles of world communism, but rather to join 
the international system in pursuit of more conventionally defined Soviet national 
interests. The Soviet Union has withdrawn from Ethiopia and Angola, has also 
established diplomatic relations with the conservative Arab Gulf states, and has 
sought economic relations with the Iranian fundamentalist state. The Soviet Union 
has moved to a pragmatic de-ideologised foreign policy in search of a permanent 
position in international society. 63 
84 
Ideologically, the United States has adopted two approaches in foreign policy 
towards the Third World. One approach focused on US ideological confrontation 
with the Soviet Union, and tried to eliminate any Soviet ideological influence in the 
Third World. The second approach, in practice, involves the United States ignoring 
the Third World problem, has worked to support dictators and oppressive regimes 
as long as they have served American interests, despite a rhetoric of political 
modernisation and democratic values. 
In confronting the Soviet Union ideologically, the US policy has been influ-
enced by George Kennan's argument in his article on Foreign Affairs The Sources 
of Soviet Conduct in 1947.64 Kennan alerted American officials to the danger of 
Soviet ideological expansion in the Third World, particularly the Euro-Asia belt 
surrounding the Soviet Union. 
On the other hand, the spread of nationalism and the liberation movements in 
the 1950s, along with the anti-colonialism of the Third World, created a vacuum of 
power in the Third World. The colonial experience had led Third World peoples to 
look to communist, socialist and American values as an alternative to the European 
colonial legacy. 65 
In the case of the Muslim world, which represents a large part of the Third 
World, the defeat of Islamic political power, the Ottoman Empire in the First 
World War and the abolition of the Islamic Caliphate (which represented the cen-
tral authority of Islam as a sign of unity) in 1924, had led to a psychological defeat 
among the Muslim elites, and they had turned to socialist and Western capitalist 
values as a way of life to follow in the industrialised and civilised world. Histori-
cally, the conquered nations adopted the values of the victors. Moreover, we have 
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to note here that the new communist regime in Russia in 1917 had withdrawn 
from the First World War. The new revolutionary regime in Russia uncovered 
secret negotiations between France and Britain to divide the Ottoman Empire and 
condemned these secret plans of colonising the Muslim world. Hence the Third 
World was ready to absorb the new ideological values of communist Russia.66 
The United States had encouraged and participated in the Alliance system 
to counter Soviet influence in the Middle East and South East Asia, despite the 
ideological rhetoric of its foreign policy. By 1951, two western allies - Britain and 
America - were at odds not only in South Asia but also in the Middle East. The 
Baghdad Pact was more a product of Anglo-American rivalry for supremacy than 
a well considered military strategy to bolster Middle Eastern and South Asian 
defences against a Soviet threat. The US attended the Baghdad pact merely as 
an observer, not as a member in the pact. It was intended to be a political 
and ideological screen behind which to preserve pro-western ruling groups in the 
member states. After the July 1958 military coup in Baghdad, Iraq left the pact 
which was then renamed the Central Treaty Organisation (CENT0).67 
During the Nixon era, the US showed little concern for the Third World from 
an ideological perspective. The Nixon administration was preoccupied with the 
Vietnam war and took strong action in the Indo-Pakistan situation, and the Octo-
ber war in 1973 between the Arabs and Israelis. Nixon was also occupied with the 
US-Soviet detente and rapprochement with China. Nixon and Kissinger adopted 
a geopolitical approach in dealing with Third World countries, being interested in 
states which were strategically valuable to the USA. Under Carter, human rights 
issues began to play a significant role in foreign policy. Despite this, Carter used 
the theme of self-determination and human rights to advance his own crusade 
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against the Kremlin's strategy of expansion and its repressive practices at home. 
The US supports democracy in the Third World countries but, if democracy 
contradicted American national interests in the Third World, the United States 
often preferred to pursue its interests rather than promote democracy. The USA 
has supported repressive regimes in the Third World i.e Philippines, Indonesia, 
Guatemala and Korea because of perceived US national interests. George Bush 
praised the Philippine dictator F. Marcos before he was ousted 
"We stand with you sir ... We love your adherence to democratic principles (sic] 
and to the Democratic processes. And we will not leave you in isolation." 68 
Later, America was involved in his removal because of American experiences in 
Iran, and to avoid the upheaval before it occurred. The USA adopted a preemptive 
removal strategy to protect American interests from democratic regimes opposed 
to American domination. In some cases American policy makers did not support 
the desires of the Third World people, and reacted to events with a military coup 
to prevent a democratic government from holding power. As with Chile, Kissinger 
stated clearly 
"I don't see why we have to stand back and watch a country go communist 
because of the irresponsibility of its own people." 69 
During the Reagan era Jean Kirkpatrick stated that Third World peoples are 
not ready for democracy, and she criticised Carter's human rights approach in the 
Third World because it did not protect American interests. 
"Because of the miseries of traditional life are familiar, they are bearable to 
ordinary people who are growing up in society, learn to cope, as children born to un-
touchables in India acquire skills and attitudes necessary for survival in the miserable 
roles they are destined to fil1." 70 
In foreign aid, the US is more ideologised than the Soviet Union. The United 
States has been reluctant to give dollars to any nation that could not support 
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American policy. When Jordan adopted an independent position during the Gulf 
crisis, August 1990 because of Jordanian national interests, the United States 
stopped aid to Jordan. When Jordan accepted the James Baker peace plan to the 
Arab-Israeli conflict June 1991, the United States released economic aid to Jordan. 
As John Spanier put it, 
"If countries wanted US money surely the last thing they could do was to stand 
up and be counted." 71 
In the case of morality in US foreign policy towards the Third World, President 
Kennedy pledged that the US would pay any price, bear any burden, meet any 
hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and 
success of liberty, but in practice the US has not always supported the values of 
liberty and freedom inside Third World countries. 72 The US has adopted the realist 
approach in its foreign policy and has abandoned democracy when it opposes or 
threatens the US national interests in the Third World. George Schultz describes 
USA foreign policy as 
"A foreign policy based on realism, therefore cannot ignore the importance of 
either ideology or morality. But realism does require that we avoid foreign policies 
based exclusively on moral absolutes divorced from political reality. Hans Morgenthau 
was right to warn against the dangers of such moral crusades or escapism." 73 
George Schultz's argument supports the idea that US presidents, who largely 
formulate US foreign policy, are not over concerned about social justice in Central 
America or other Third World areas. The White House is willing to tolerate 
a variety of Central American governments if they are supportive of American 
national interests. Dictators are easier to do business with and American presidents 
regularly clamp down on popular rebellions. 74 Practically, the USA supported 
the regimes sympathetic to USA foreign policy and opposed to the Soviet Union. 
Despite the rhetoric about liberalism in the US foreign policy, US administrations 
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have approached issues from the position of the US interests. Kissinger emphasised 
this when he described US foreign policy after World War II: 
"If you look at the entire American post war foreign policy, you will find 
that changes in the major directions of foreign policy have not been all that sig-
nificant. What is different between various presidents is the style, the method of 
doing business."75 
The two superpowers had approached the Third World in the 1950s from an 
ideological perspective, but in the next decades the realist approach has dominated 
their relations in this area. It does not seem that ideology has played any significant 
role in Soviet Third World policy in the last three decades. For example, Third 
World communists were always dispensable if they became an obstacle to Soviet 
interests. 76 Although the realist and geostrategic perspectives have dominated USA 
foreign policy, to some extent American administrations have been more ideological 
in their foreign economic and military aid and political support to Third World 
countries than Soviet administrations have been. 77 
3.5 Superpowers and Third World Liberation Movements 
The superpowers have supported national liberation movements from two 
perspectives; ideology and national interests. 
Ideologically, the Soviet Union as a Marxist-Leninist power has supported 
anti-colonialism, anti-feudalism and anti-imperialism, and it has encouraged the 
revolutionary struggle in the Third World, particularly since Khrushchev. The 
Soviet Union encouraged nationalism, and supported Arab nationalism because it 
was anti-colonial. The Soviets also encouraged national liberation movements be-
cause it saw political and economic independence and social revolution as leading 
ultimately to socialism. The USSR has accepted the use of violence as a legiti-
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mate means of liberation, in order to achieve the political and social objectives 
of nationalist movements in the Third World. In Pravda on 28 June 1965 Soviet 
officials explained the Soviet approach to national liberation movements as anti-
imperialist struggles by any means, 
"The Soviet Union advocates the use of every form of struggle for national lib-
eration. The people's right to freedom and independence, whether established by 
peaceful means or in armed struggle, is sacred. The Soviet Union gives comprehen-
sive assistance to the people fighting with weapons in hand against imperialism and 
colonialism." 78 
From an ideological perspective, the Soviet Union has seen the revolutionary 
struggle against capitalism in global terms, and national liberation as wars of the 
oppressed classes against the oppressing classes. 
From the perspective of national interests, the USSR has seen the liberation 
movements as a chance to eliminate western influence in the Third World. The 
Soviet purpose in supporting the national liberation movements was to overthrow 
an indigenous orientated anti-Soviet leadership, as in their support of the Dhofar 
in Oman. The Soviet Union has supported anti-western movements in Central 
America such as the left wing organisation in Salvador, and had helped Castro to 
hold power in Cuba~ In Africa, the Soviet Union supported the African National 
Congress (ANC) in South Africa, and the People's Movement for the Liberation 
of Angola (MPLA) group holding power in Angola in 1975. The Soviet Union has 
also supported the national movement in the Horn of Africa, and has helped the 
Southern Yemen Socialist Movement to win in South Yemen. The Soviet Union's 
strategic considerations such as in the Middle East and South East Asia stimulated 
efforts to eliminate any western presence which threatened Soviet national security, 
regardless of the ideological differences between movements. 79 Also, in supporting 
Third World countries in their revolutionary struggles, the Soviets calculated that 
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the nationalisation of national resources in the Third World would cut Europe off 
from raw materials and economic advantage there. Economically, the Soviet Union 
was interested in weakening the western countries' economic relations with the new 
Third World countries. 
Moreover, the Soviet Union supported the national liberation movements to 
counter Chinese influence in Third World countries, and to limit the Chinese ide-
ological challenge to the Soviet Union as a more radically socialist state than the 
Soviet Union itself. The USSR had sought prestige in international politics and 
world affairs, particularly among new Third World countries and the Non-Aligned 
movement, and with the anti-war groups in the west. 
Despite the Soviet support for national liberation, they have adopted a cau-
tious approach to avoid military confrontation with the West. 80 In the late 1960s 
and 1970s, the Soviet Union had moved to more direct involvement in Third World 
liberation movements. The Detente and Soviet nuclear parity with the USA had 
encouraged the Soviet Union to move from an indirect approach to a more direct 
policy of military and economic aid in Africa and Asia. Brezhnev's view of peace-
ful coexistence was similar to Krushchev's, but Brezhnev had come into a more 
relaxed international environment. In 1966 Brezhnev declared that 
"There can be no peaceful coexistence when it comes to the internal process of 
national liberation struggle."81 
Although it has never experienced colonialism, the US President Wilson ar-
gued in 1919 for self-determination for the peoples of Asia, Europe and Africa 
which were under European colonialism. The US, from an ideological and cultural 
point of view, has been more familiar with the concept of self-determination than 
that of liberation in the Third World. The US also opposed the use of violence to 
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gain economic independence and social revolution. As a global power after World 
War II, the US has shifted to a global policy with global interests in economic and 
strategic directions. 
The US found itself obliged to support the national liberation ambitions of 
the Third World because of its interest in limiting Soviet influence in new Third 
World independent states. But the USA regards radicalism of any sort as coun-
terproductive and as an invitation to communism. Eisenhower's administration 
supported North African independence politically, and asked for an open door pol-
icy. He used the communist threat as an excuse to oblige France to withdraw 
from North Africa.82 The USA has used double standards with regard to libera-
tion movements and terrorism: if the liberation movement is loyal to the Soviet 
Union or at least does not cooperate with the United States, then US officials label 
the movement radical, violent and terrorist, such as the Palestine Liberation Or-
ganisation. If the movement serves US interests, then it is a liberation movement 
involving freedom fighters' such as Mujahedin in Afghanistan. The US hopes to 
use anti-communist national liberation groups as instruments of leverage to force 
Soviet clients to moderate their behaviour, but also the US has sold out on move-
ments such as those supporting the Kurds in Iraq. After the Algerian agreement 
in 1975 between the Shah of Iran and Iraq, the US stopped the support which it 
had been offering to the Kurds, despite the USA's direct involvement. The CIA 
has had direct relations with many liberation movements, and in many cases the 
US has used its influence to limit the radicalisation of the movement's attitude 
and to stop its activities when the US prefers to deal with another party. Hence 
the US used its relations as a containment of revolutionary attitudes, such as in 
Afghanistan and with Savimbi's U nita in Angola, or in Central America. 83 
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The superpowers supported national liberation but with different concepts 
and objectives to replace European colonialism and to counter each other's influ-
ence. Despite their ideological orientations, the two superpowers stopped their 
support for national liberation movements when it clashed with their national in-
terests. The US supported Algeria indirectly to keep its relations with France as 
a member of NATO and the Soviet Union supported Algeria in the last phase of 
the liberation movement so as not to disrupt its relations with France because the 
Soviet Union had tried to isolate France from NATO. The US has also seen liber-
ation from political points of view and has denied its economic and social aspects, 
while the Soviet Union has seen liberation movements from a Marxist perspective 
as part of a social revolution.84 
3.6 Superpowers and the Non-Aligned Movement 
The two superpowers had reacted to the Non-Aligned movement from differ-
ent perspectives, ideologically and according to national interests. In 1955, the 
Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian states was the first gathering in the Third 
World. The gathering was a result of the Cold War between East and West. The 
29 nations which attended the conference addressed many issues, denouncing colo-
nialism, speaking with urgency of the need to promote economic development in 
the Third World and calling for friendly cooperation and peaceful coexistence. 
It was not until 1961 that a major international conference brought together the 
leaders of Third World countries in their first Non-Aligned conference in Belgrade. 
Morocco and Tunisia attended the conference along with 25 other nations, and 
Algeria attended as a revolutionary movement before its independence. 
The Soviet Union reacted positively to the Non-Aligned movement, because 
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the Soviet strategy of military denial in the Third World was originally designed to 
hamper the creation of new alliance systems by the West in the 1950s and to pre-
vent military links between the newly independent states and the Western powers. 
Also the Soviet Union tried to isolate the USA and Western Europe through the 
nationalisation of foreign holdings in the Third World, which led to contradictions 
between the capitalist states because the area open to alleged exploitation had 
been reduced and the struggle between the capitalist states for markets and areas 
of investment was intensified. The Soviet Union also calculated that Non-Aligned 
states might adopt the Soviet Union as a model for rapid industrialisation and mod-
ernisation, which would create conditions ripe for the development of communist 
parties. The Soviet Union further sought to obtain the support of neutral states 
for specific proposals in the United Nations, or at least neutralist abstention and 
the acceptance of Soviet foreign policies such as general and total disarmament, 
and the reduction of nuclear weapons.85 
The four criteria of the Non-Aligned movement: an independent foreign policy 
devoted to peaceful coexistence, the support of national liberation movements, non-
participation in military pacts, and unwillingness to grant military bases to great 
powers, were all acceptable to the Soviet Union.86 
The Soviet Union reacted favourably because peaceful coexistence had become 
the cornerstone of Khrushchev's foreign policy. The Chinese were less in favour 
of this, but praised the Non-Aligned movement while warning against the illusion 
of peaceful coexistence with imperialism. Ray Allison stated the objective of the 
Soviet Union toward the Non-Aligned movement in the 1950s and 1960s as a hope 
for close relations with the socialist bloc anti the West. 
"Soviet officials, at least until the late 1970s, considered non-alignment ideally 
as a policy of short-term military and political denial to the West which prefigured a 
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longer term tendency common to the Third World as a whole of increasing political 
and possibly military integration with the Eastern system of states." 87 
The evolution of Non-Alignment has not been as complete as the Soviet Union 
expected. The first decade of its policies were defined by the Cold War conflict 
between East and West, and in this decade the Soviet Union's objectives had been 
achieved. In the second decade of its existence, its policies were defined largely by 
the members' grievances against the West alone; the Algerian summit in 1973 had 
condemned the economic domination of the Western world and argued for a new 
international economic order in favour of Third World countries. After the Ha-
vana summit in 1979, its policies and politics have been determined by interaction 
with both of the world's power blocs, and this is more complex than that which 
characterised the movement's first two decades. It has become more heterogeneous 
with conservative, radical and moderate elements, and the issues raised reflect the 
South-North relationship more than decolonisation, and the movement has been 
penetrated by the superpower clients.88 Egypt became closer to the United States 
with Cuba supporting the Soviet Union. 
In the case of the United States, when the Non-Aligned movement was formed 
the US tended to ignore it because the combined political, economic and military 
power of its members was so negligible. In the 1950s US foreign policy had been 
hostile towards neutralism and John Foster Dulles had a strictly bipolar vision 
of world politics, black and white, and there was no in-between. The weight of 
Bandung's anti- colonialism, and economic development principles, had seemed to 
be directed against the West. Dulles persisted throughout the decade to denounce 
the principle of neutrality as immoral and short-sighted. 
During the 1960s and after, the US had begun to moderate its policy toward 
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the Non-Aligned movement. It was no longer openly antagonistic towards either 
neutralism or non-alignment. The moderate reaction of the US was a result of many 
factors. First, the size and influence of the neutralist camp had grown; second, 
American experience with Egypt in 1956 and the cut off Aswan Dam funding had 
not changed Egypt's foreign policy. President Kennedy noted in November 1963 
that the withdrawal of American aid to Egypt had not induced Egypt to follow the 
US, and in fact produced the opposite result. Third, the US received diplomatic 
support from the NATO members and the Non-Aligned movement during the 
Cuban crisis. The Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, said in 1965 
"US also received powedulsupport, much in private behind the scenes from the 
non-aligned countries who wishes the US well in coming through in a way satisfactory 
to the free world." 89 
Fourth, Afro-Asian nationalism provided a far better barrier against commu-
nism for the free world than Western sponsored alliances like the Baghdad Pact 
and SEATO. Fifth, the US welcomed the concern and interest of neutralists be-
cause the initiative of the Non-Aligned movement brought the idea of peace and 
cooperation. Sixth, the Non-Aligned states had been used as mediators between 
the superpowers, for example Indian mediation during the Vietnam conflict. More-
over, the US was satisfied that communism was not attractive to the Third World. 
As Kennedy said, no nation from the fifty in the United Nations had succumbed 
to communism. 
The Maghreb states, as members of the Non-Aligned movement, had played 
a great role in the movement, particularly in Algeria. In 1973, the Algiers Non-
aligned Summit effectively adopted the economic platform of the group of 77.90 
The group of 77 had been set up at the first United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development in 1964, as a kind of Third World lobby on economic issues. 
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The Soviet Union hoped to direct Third World radicalism over economic issues 
against the Western states, but had to overcome the suspicions of Non-Aligned 
states through the policy of detente. The Soviet Union was seen as cooperating 
with the West to the economic detriment of the Third World. 
In their message to the conference, Podgorny and Kosygin noted that detente 
opened up favourable prospects for reducing military expenditure and increasing 
allocations of aid to developing countries. These assurances notwithstanding, Al-
geria brought economic issues to the forefront of the agenda of the Non-Aligned 
states. The summit called for a new international economic order, and demanded 
the convention of a special session of the UN General Assembly to discuss it. In 
the following year (1974) the Algerian President, Houari Boumedienne, addressed 
the General Assembly. But it is interesting to note that during the Algiers sum-
mit, Algeria and Libya adopted the theory of"two imperialisms", the Soviet Union 
and the USA. Brezhnev's letter to the conference on 5 September 1973 criticised 
the theory and said there were differences between socialism and imperialism and 
that the summit should side with the socialist camp. Fiedel Castro of Cuba, who 
attended the summit the first time, also opposed Algeria's and Libya's theory.91 
In general terms, the Non-Aligned movement itself could be categorised into 
three groups: those of socialist orientation (Algeria, Yemen, Libya, Syria), the 
pro-Western orientation (Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Tunisia, Zaire, Zambia) and the 
legitimately centrist group which supported the first principle of the Non-Aligned 
movement in the 1950s and 1960s (India, Yugoslavia). But the problem of this 
category is the unstable situation in Third World countries, from pro-Soviet to 
pro-West. For example, since independence in 1960 Somalia followed first a Non-
Aligned policy, then a pro-Soviet one, and now a pro-Western foreign policy; Libya 
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was anti-Soviet in the 1960s and early 1970s, then pro-Soviet, at least politically.92 
The two Superpowers have penetrated the Non-Alignment movement, and 
the concept itself has become more confused. Some states have American mili-
tary bases, such as the Philippines, and security cooperation with the USA, such 
as Morocco. Cuba has a strong ideological relationship with the Soviet Union. 
The weight of the movement in the United Nations and other international or-
ganisations has led the superpowers to give considerable political value to the 
non-alignment movement. 
When the United Nations General Assembly voted 113 to 18 to call for So-
viet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Third World states comprised the bulk of the 
majority. 93 
Maghreb states, particularly Algeria, as representatives of non- alignment, 
had become attractive not only to both superpowers but to France as a gate to the 
Third World. The superpowers, with cooperation from their friends in the Non-
Aligned movement, have been trying to contain Third World radicalism in their 
political and economic policies, hoping to guide them to more moderate policies 
with the West, and it seems they have been successful in this. 
3. 7 Superpowers, Military Coups and the Third World 
The superpowers have paid much attention to the military in the Third World. 
During the past three decades the military in the Third World has played a great 
role in intervention in internal politics and government. A number of studies 
have pointed out the importance of the military, and it is the strongest and most 
powerful institution in society. The military has power to be well organised and 
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compared to politicians they often appear to be less corrupt, so they determined 
the leadership and foreign policy orientation of the country, the military being able 
to intervene successfully against other groups. 
Western political scientists, such as Samuel Huntington, have discussed the 
importance of the military and the best way to deal with it. It has been thought 
that only a military regime can have the power to prevail against communist par-
ties. Others believe that military regimes can and will be more effective than polit-
ical parties in modernising their societies. According to Keith Hopkins, politicians 
in the Third World lacked an appreciation of, or had neglected, modernisation, 
and the military was the group most likely to favour modernisation. 94 
The US have supported the military in Third World countries, and focused 
on the military in the 1950s, leading many military coups in the Third World 
through covert action. The US has realised the importance of the military in 
the Third World for many reasons: first, according to Rand's 1959 conference 
on the Military, the military alone in the Third World possessed the technical 
and administrative proficiency essential for more rapid modernisation and was in 
fact the leading carrier of industrial and secular values. 95 Second, modernisation 
theorists, particularly in the USA, added that civilian institutions could not direct 
or control civilian demands but the military's efficiency, honesty and nationalism 
could do more for the country. Third, the low political participation by civilians 
in government in states where coups occur. Fourth, absence of a strong sense of 
legitimacy of the existing government also increases the likelihood of a coup. The 
US had removed many Third World leaders after their political legitimacy had 
come under question, as in the Philippines, Haiti and Tunisia. Fifth, despite the 
rise of nationalism, most Third World states have very low levels of meaningful 
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participation in politics. 
The US has used different means to penetrate the Third World military. The 
US government has offered a police training programme which operated under 
American international development. It opened American police training schools 
in both Panama and Washington, as well as in Liberia (Africa). By 1968, the 
USA had 458 US police experts in 34 countries, and by 1973, it had trained over 
7300 foreign police in the USA alone. Many Third World leaders had trained in 
the USA, including former President of the Sudan, Nimeri and the President of 
Thnisia, Ben Ali. 
The US has successfully overthrown regimes hostile to US interests and re-
placed them with a pro-American leadership, also defending a sympathetic regime 
from a coup in the case of Ethiopia in December of 1960. The US was also sym-
pathetic to Mousadeq's demand for a greater Iranian share of oil revenues and 
recognised that Mousadeq was not a communist. The US supported the Egyp-
tian revolution in 1952, and encouraged Nasser. According to the late Egyptian 
president Anwar Sadat, 
"We were sitting with an American Ambassador while the British Ambassador 
was looking for the identity of the Coup's leaders."96 
In 1962 the USA National Security Council approved a national policy on a 
grant strategy towards the Third World. The National Security Council favoured a 
greater readiness to act even when there was no direct Russian or Chinese involve-
ment, but when they might objectively form other types of subversion inimical to 
USA interests. 
In class terms, both superpowers were interested in middle class officers be-
cause they are thought to be more loyal. Most Middle Eastern officials were from 
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middle class backgrounds and deeply linked to it. The middle class in the Middle 
East is more loyal to the army, on which they depend completely for their income. 
Other classes are less dependable and less loyal to the army. Most officers in Libya, 
Algeria, Tunisia, Iraq, Syria and Egypt have come from the middle classes. In the 
sense of interest, organisation, power and loyalty, the armies in the Third World 
are fertile for US penetration. So US policy has been that it is better to deal with 
the military than with the civilian government. The former American National 
Security advisor, Walt Rostow, stated that the United States supported the coups 
when it is in the American interest to have military in power, 
"it is USA policy when it is in the USA's interest."97 
The Soviet Union approached the Third World military organisations after 
the United States. The first time, the Soviet Union was suspicious of the military 
in a new independent state as a legacy of colonial power. M. Heikal described the 
Soviet position during the first phase: 
"Their thinking has been largely influenced by the long history of right-wing 
military coups organised by the armed forces in Latin America, and by the early 
armed coups in Syria, which they regarded, with a good deal of reason, as being 
the outcome of rivalries between the big British and American oil companies in the 
era." 98 
The Soviet Union was suspicious of the bourgeoisie and despite approaches 
to this group in the time of Khrushchev, the Soviets still did not trust them. For 
example, they persisted in seeing Jamal Abd al-Nasser as simply a pawn in the 
struggle between the colonial rivalries of Britain and America in the Middle East. 
Even after the Bandung Conference of 1955, the Soviet radio continued to describe 
Nasser as a tool of imperialism. 99 
In the 1960s and after, Soviet ideas about armies in the Third World began to 
change. The Soviets realised the power of the military and that this was the only 
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group organised enough to hold power in the absence of vanguard parties. But 
they also emphasised the class element of the military, preferring the military of 
the lower class, and accused the military of being a bourgeois tool of colonial power. 
Soviet Izvestia, 15 January 1965, supported this argument in Latin America: 
"In Latin America military coups occur in countries with strongly pronounced 
class divisions in society. Coups as a rule are designed to strengthen the authority 
of the capitalist landowner clique which is closely connected with foreign monopolies 
and relies on the support of foreign powers." 100 
Also, the Soviet Union had seen the army as alternative to class; in the Soviet 
concept, when classes in the modern sense are embryonic, weak and unorganised 
in the newly emerging states in the Third World, the army can act objectively 
as the most important stable, broad and independent organisation. According to 
Lenin the army is not a class by itself, or a supra-class force; rather it is a tool in 
the hands of a certain class, 
"In every class society, the oppressing class is always armed." 101 
Despite the Soviet emphasis on the role of the military in the Third World, 
they have realised the weakness of the military without a vanguard party. In 
the Soviet view, if the victory of a revolution is to be made secure and a new 
society is to be built, there must be a party that reflects the ideology of the 
working class and bases its activities on a knowledge of the objective laws of social 
development. Moreover, an army lacking social and ideological unity will find itself 
split into two opposing camps as soon as it comes to choosing the road to national 
development. 102 Vanguard parties would strengthen regimes against coups through 
their centralisation of power, politicisation of the military and mobilisation of the 
masses in support of the existing pro-Soviet regimes. Vanguard parties may also 
have facilitated the backing of a Soviet coup. Despite all Soviet efforts, its influence 
has only increased after coups with the military, as in Benin in 1972, Ethiopia 
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1974-1977, Afghanistan 1978, Southern Yemen in 1978 and Grenada 1979. 
In Arab Maghreb states, as in other Third World countries, the military has 
emerged from the middle or lower classes. The military is the only organised and 
powerful group in the society, but the Maghreb states also have trade and labour 
unions which go back to the French colonial era. These were part of French unions 
but, despite them, the military has a powerful role. Most African military officers, 
particularly in Thnisia and Morocco, trained at French academic schools or had 
worked with the French before they joined the national armies after independence. 
The lack of confidence and trust in political parties in Maghreb states has given 
the military a potential role in the future. 
In four out of the five states in Maghreb (Libya, Thnisia, Algeria and Mauri-
tania), the military has been in power. Only Morocco has a civilian government 
with a King in control; but, despite this, the Moroccan military has been involved 
in many attempted coups. 
Libya witnessed its first military coup in September of 1969, led by the present 
head of the Libyan government, al-Qaddafi, originally from the nomadic tribes of 
Libya, which are of the middle rather than lower classes of the country. There 
was much debate about the role of external powers in the Libyan coup. According 
to American and British sources, Libya's internal situation before 1969 was ripe 
for such a coup and political change, and the army was the only organised and 
powerful enough organisation to overthrow King Idris of Libya. The decline of 
King ldris's popularity and the presence of foreign military bases because of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict put the monarchical regime in danger. 
The former American Ambassador to Libya, David Newsom, until shortly 
103 
before the coup in 1969, stated that there had been widespread rumours about a 
military coup. But, according to other reports, US officials knew ten years before 
that the King was unpopular. In a Presidential Committee study, March 1959, it 
suggested 
"the possibilty of grooming a reliable military elite for a future governing role 
merits thoughtful consideration. The creation of a national staff unifying the various 
forces at the top level may prove desirable as step toward facilitating the transfer of 
political power."103 
According to the US sources the United States had seen the Military as a 
solution to the succession problem, national unity and the stability of Libya. Other 
reports to the White House from the National Security Council on 17 June 1967 
stated the possibility of Nasser influencing Libya and thus putting pressure on 
Thnisia, which had a conservative pro-West government. Abd al-Hamid Bakoush, 
former Libyan Prime Minister and then a Libyan Ambassador in France, confirmed 
that Americans knew of the coup because he was told by the CIA station chief 
during a visit to the American Embassy in Paris two months before the coup. Mr. 
Bakoush later led an anti-Qaddafi group, with the support of the CIA and the 
Egyptian government .104 
Despite American denials of knowledge of the Libyan coup, it has been stated 
by Colonel Ted Lough, the head of the British military mission in Libya 1960-
1966, that a lot of Libyan officers were pro-Nasser, anti-Western and particularly 
anti-American. Colonel Lough also stated that the British and American claims 
of ignorance were incredible. The British had a record on Qaddafi dating back 
to 1966 when he was under training in Britain. Wilbur Eveland, a former CIA 
officer who was involved in the Libyan affairs emphasised American Knowledge 
of the political situation inside Libya, and both the American oil companies and 
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American officials in Washington were well informed about the Libyan political 
upheaval. 105 
Despite all these arguments, the Libyan army was only 5,000 strong, the USA 
and UK had military bases and an intelligence station in Libya. They had received 
reports of growing disturbances and popular unrest, so in this case the external 
factor played an important part in the Libyan military coup (see chapter five). 
In Algeria, the FLN was the only organised group. Algerians had fought for 
their independence, and the FLN has been in power since independence in 1962. 
So the military operated through the legal powerful political organisation (FLN) 
until1988 when the Algerian government allowed a multi-party system. 
Since Algeria won its independence from France, President Ben Bella of Alge-
ria was engaged in a power struggle with the army Chief of Staff, Colonel Boume-
dienne. Ben Bella's support came largely from local political leaders and from 
their guerrilla forces, while Boumedienne's strength was drawn from the regular 
army. When Ben Bella attempted to supplant the role of the army by creating a 
people's militia composed of guerrilla troops loyal to him, Boumedienne replaced 
Ben Bella as the head of state in a military coup in June 1965. The Soviet Union 
played no role in the coup, but they were affected by its consequences. While the 
removal of Ben Bella did not result in Algeria adopting a pro-Western stance, the 
strength of Algeria's Soviet alignment was diminished and Moscow had lost one of 
its earliest and closest friends in the Third World. 
The US knew of the military coup before it occurred. On 24 November 1963, 
a CIA memorandum predicted a coup in Algeria and named Houari Boumedienne 
as its likely leader. The document outlined the kind of policy he was likely to 
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pursue.106 One American source told the author that he had been informed of the 
coup when he was working as a consultant to American oil companies in Algeria in 
1964. Whatever American knowledge of Algeria was, the Americans had evaluated 
the situation and the political struggle, and Boumedienne was not seen as pro-
Soviet and thought to be easier to deal with than Ben Bella.l07 But it does not 
mean that the American had supported the coup. The American found themselves 
in position of being unable to stop internal struggle in Algeria. 
In Thnisia the army had been isolated from politics during Habib Bourgiba's 
era, but had been brought in when there was political unrest. The rise of Islamic 
Fundamentalism in Thnisia, the struggle between trade unions and the conflict 
among the opposition groups had led to a reevaluation of the role of the army in 
Thnisia. In 1986, a study was released by MaxAir Force Base in the USA which 
focused on the role of the military in Thnisia after Bourguiba. In November 1987, 
Ben Ali ousted Bourgiba in a palace coup. Many sources confirmed Ben Ali's 
connection with America; when he held the presidency of Thnisia the military 
entered political life for the first time, and Ben Ali himself has worked all his 
career as a military man, trained in the US and France. Vernon Walters, after a 
trip to Thnisia in spring 1987, reported to the US government that Ben Ali and 
the military were the only force capable of holding power in Tunisia.108 
In Morocco, the military, despite its isolation from politics, had been involved 
in two military coups against King Hassan. The military played a complicated role 
in Moroccan politics after the two attempted coups and the war in the Western 
Sahara. The corruption inside the government, the frustration of the people with 
the political parties, and the military relationship between the King and external 
influences will be discussed in the following chapters.109 
106 
3.8 Conclusion 
The superpowers have used different means to penetrate the Third World 
countries and to extend their influence. At the same time, they try to limit or 
eliminate each other's influence. The Third World has become during the last 
three decades part of the superpowers grand strategy. In this chapter we have seen 
that; 
1. The United States' grand strategy in the Third World started directly after 
World War II. The US adopted its global approach and left its isolationist 
policy. It has sought to dominate the world as a global power economically, 
politically and militarily. During the first phase in the 1950s, the US was 
influenced by its strategy of containment in the Euro-Asia belt. On the other 
hand, the Soviet Union's policies evolved later and in reaction to the United 
States, and the Soviets have attempted to undermine the US containment 
policy, particularly in the Arc of Crisis, to reduce the Western presence in 
the area surrounding the Soviet Union, and to weaken the Alliance system 
which was formed by Western powers to control Soviet ideological and military 
penetration of the Northern belt. The Soviets adopted a cautious approach 
to the Third World and they have benefited from a stepping stone theory of 
expansion of their presence in the Third World, firstly in South East Asia, 
the Northern belt of the Middle East, and then in Africa and Latin America. 
11. The two superpowers have been influenced in their foreign policy towards the 
Third World countries by the nature of their political systems. While Soviet 
decision making is more centralised and concentrated in the hands of the 
Politburo, practically eliminating the pressure of public opinion, the US has 
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a complicated decision making process which limits US action in the Third 
World. Congress, public opinion, the media and the Think Tanks have much 
influence on the foreign policy-making networks. Congressional restrictions 
on US foreign policy has led to many scandals and covert action to avoid 
public disapproval and congressional constraints. 
m. The two superpowers have used ideology to legitimise their intervention and 
policy in the Third World. Although the Soviet Union has allied itself with 
leftist regimes and the US has not, neither superpower has insisted that its 
allies follow domestic policies similar to its own. The superpowers appear 
not to care very much about internal ideology or democratic values inside 
Third World countries. Superpowers are more pragmatic and realistic about 
achieving their interests, despite oppression and dictatorship. The USSR has 
ignored the communist parties in Third World countries when it has come to 
its own interests, and it has built relations with governments to protect these 
interests. The US has been more ideological in its aid to the Third World in 
many cases. 
IV. The two superpowers approached the Third World with new ideological per-
spectives after WWII, condemning European colonialism, and trying to re-
place Europe in the Third World. They have used their ideological perspec-
tives as non- imperialist states, to attract the new independent states to their 
side. The two superpowers have supported national liberation movements 
with different concepts to liberation. The US concept of liberation is limited 
to self-determination and to political parties. The Soviet Union has a broad 
concept of liberation as being economic, social and political. The USSR has 
supported violence as a legitimate means to liberation. Theoretically, the 
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US has supported non-violence to achieve independence, but even so the US 
has encouraged the use of violence when it has been in its own interests. 
It has armed the Contras of Nicaragua, Unita in Angola, and Mujahedin in 
Afghanistan with weapons. The US displays inconsistant standards in its 
attitude to liberation movements. 
v. The two superpowers have approached the Non-Aligned movement with dif-
ferent perceptions. In the first phase of the movement, the US condemned 
the Non-Aligned movement and neutrality as immoral, then in the 1960s and 
after, the US supported non-alignment and has built up a relationship with 
Third World states which have potential and practical influence in the move-
ment, and it has also encouraged its client states to join the movement. The 
US has penetrated the movement and has restrained its radicalism, and di-
rected it towards a more conservative, moderate line. In 1979, the Havana 
Summit failed to side with the Soviet Union in spite of the Cuban proposal. In 
the case of the Soviet Union, it has supported non-alignment from the begin-
ning because it has served USSR objectives, at least to limit Western influence, 
presence and military bases in the Third World. The USSR has supported 
non-alignment principles despite its disappointment with the movement's be-
haviour in the 1980s. The USSR has encouraged non-alignment to be neutral 
in East-West conflict if they do not wish to support the socialist camp. 
v1. The two superpowers have realised the value of the role of the military in 
the Third World. Soviet support for military regimes and coups in the Third 
World has been characterised as selective and it has been seen from a perspec-
tive of class struggle. In the case of the US, it has adopted the military coup 
as its strategy as a means to protect US interests. The 1960s were called the 
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Decade of the Generals because of the USA's leading role in the military coups 
in the Third World. From 1945 to mid 1985, there have been 183 successful 
and 174 unsuccessful coups in the Third World. The US strategy in these 
coups has been to overthrow regimes hostile to US interests, and to defend 
regimes from coups if this is in US's interest. The USA has trusted the mili-
tary regimes in the Third World as more powerful, stable and easy to deal with 
than civilian governments, and moreover the military are more supportive to 
modernisation and to American secular values than other governments. 
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Chapter IV 
Maghreb relations with the US and Soviet Union: 
From World War One to Independence. 
4.1 Introduction 
Maghreb relations with US and Russia reach back to the eighteenth century, 
when the US attempted to protect its shipping from piracy in the Mediterranean. 
As Russian shipping was also affected by piracy, Tsar Alexander, threatened to 
send Russian ships to North African coasts to protect American and European 
ships. Russia had built up commercial relations with North Africa and assigned a 
British merchant James Simpson as a Russian Consul in Tangier. Russia was also 
concerned to protect its routes to the Atlantic. 
Maghreb relations with Russia were affected by Turkish-Russian relations 
because the North Africans states, with the exception of Morocco, were part of 
the Ottoman Empire. North Africans fought alongside Turkish Muslims against 
Russia, and many North African sea captains had answered the call of the Grand 
Sultan during his war with Russian in the Black Sea.1 
This chapter focuses on Maghreb relations with the US and the Soviet Union 
between the two world wars; on the role of the US and the Soviet Union in the 
movement for the independence of the North African states; and the superpowers 
objectives and means during this period. 
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4.2 Maghreb-US relations 
Before North African states independence, Maghreb relations with the US 
can be divided into two phases: first, prior to World War Two; second, during 
World War Two. The second phase is a turning point in the US-Maghreb relation 
because of American landing forces in North Africa. The North Africans saw the 
United States as a great power and had much influence over France after the latter 
defeat in the war. On the other hand, the United States started to perceive the 
Maghreb from new American global strategic interests. 
4.2.1 Maghreb-US relations prior to World War Two 
The first US contact with the Maghreb was the establishment of diplomatic 
relations and a permanent consulate in Morocco in June 1786 for the protection 
of commercial interests and the safety of American citizens. In 1785, Morocco had 
almost entirely given up sea raiding; but Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli continued to 
send out their armed cruisers in the Mediterranean. Most of the Christian nations 
were quite willing to pay cash or its equivalent for the privilege of having their ships 
trade in the Mediterranean unmolested. The US paid North African principalities 
for the safety of its ships, and sometimes it engaged in hostilities to protect its 
citizens and ships. It finally signed a treaty of friendship with Algiers in September 
1795, with Tripoli (Libya) in November 1796, and with Tunisia in August 1797.2 
While the Monroe Doctrine restrained the US from pursuing an active role in the 
Maghreb, there was another important factor exercising a restraining influence 
on US-Maghreb relations. It was the special diplomatic relations with France, in 
contrast with other European powers.3 Until the Second World War, and even 
until now, the "French element" in the Maghreb has required special attention 
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in the formulation of US foreign policy in the Maghreb. 4 
When the French began to settle in Algeria, they were confronted with strong 
resistance by the Algerian leader Abd al-Kadir al-Jazauri. In order to gain political 
support and secure weapons against French occupation, Abd al-Kadir offered the 
US the Algerian coast if it would assist him against France. The US, unwilling 
to antagonise France and unconcerned about European affairs in the Maghreb, 
refused to assist Abd al-Kadir in his resistance against the French occupation.5 
Morocco took a positive attitude towards the US. As expressed by an Amer-
ican consul, the US was in Moroccan eyes 
"about the only nation that attends to its own business and that acts upon just 
and bilateral principles.6 " 
In deterring European intervention, Morocco continuously and forcefully 
fought to win American support. During the 1849 crisis over French rights in 
Morocco, the Moroccan sultan tried to submit the dispute to American arbitra-
tion, but France rejected arbitration and demanded direct negotiations. 7 
In 1871, Sultan Sidi Mohammed appealed to the new American consul in 
Tangier for greater American support for Morocco. He went as far as requesting 
that the US bring Morocco under its direct protection. The US government de-
clined to make such a commitment. In 1904, the Moroccan government turned 
to the US and Germany to obtain loans, both of which rejected the Moroccan 
request.8 When French ambitions in Morocco were being realised, Sultan Abd al-
Aziz of Morocco wrote a letter in 1906 to President Theodore Roosevelt indicating 
that 
"we also confidently hope that your good offices and those of your great nation 
will be vouchsafed to this Moroccan Empire in accordance with the traditional pure 
love which has always existed between your most exalted nation and our ancestors 
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and our Shereefian Empire and thus shall the existing state of affairs be improved 
and the empire of Morocco shall realise its fondest hopes." 9 
In the closing decades of the 19th century, American public opinion and Amer-
ican officialdom perceived Germany's aim in Europe and elsewhere to be disruptive 
to the political balance of power of the world system. The US supported France 
(the second state to have recognised the US after Morocco) in its ambitions in 
Morocco. However, the US supported the open door policy in Morocco. It is inter-
esting to note that America was the first to popularise this policy when Secretary 
of State, John Hay tried to get the European nations to agree to the principle of 
an open door policy for China in 1898. 
After WWI the United States focussed on its commercial interests in North 
Africa and its trade relations with the region. The United States adopted an of-
ficial neutral position on the Riffian war between Amir Abd al-Karim and Spain 
despite Amir Abd al-Karim's appeal to the American Charged' Affaire in London, 
he sent two letters to the latter, the first one, was in January 1922, it recited a 
long list of grievance which had implied to the Riffians, but the only aid to the 
Riffians came from an American volunteer organization, the "American Friends of 
the Riff" which established the America's Commission for the Rif. The Commis-
sion's objective was to secure justice and autonomy for unconquerable people. The 
Commission also condemned Spain for its graft, inefficiency, and exploitation.10 
4.2.2 US-Maghreb Relations during World War Two 
The international system changed during World War Two. Many factors 
influenced this change. These factors also affected the Maghreb: the defeat of 
France in 1940; the Atlantic Charter of August 1941; the landing of American 
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forces in the Maghreb 1942; the Casablanca (Anfa) Conference of January 1943; 
and the Tehran Conference later in 1943. 
When France was defeated in 1940, the defeat shook President Franklin Roo-
sevelt's confidence in France and influenced his attitude about Morocco's future 
relations with France. In August 1941 in his eighth point of the Atlantic Char-
ter, Roosevelt promised decolonisation and freedom of all colonies under Euro-
pean power. He emphasised decolonisation for all countries, European and non-
European, and stressed self-determination for all countries. 11 
The landing of American forces in Casablanca, Oran and Algiers, in November 
1942 added another card to the hand of Maghreb national movements which they 
could use to try to win their independence from France. This was the beginning of 
operation Torch, the American portion of the combined Anglo-American operation 
to drive Rommel and the Axis Forces out of Northern Africa. By April 1943, 
400,000 American troops were in the Maghreb, and by the end of that year the 
operation had been brought to a successful conclusion. The American presence 
had a substantial psychological and social effect on the nationalist movements. 
Farhat Abbas, the Algerian nationalist, sent on 20 December 1942 (just six weeks 
after the American landing) a "Message of the Muslim Algerian Representatives" 
to the responsible authorities, the Anglo-American landing forces. This was the 
first time Americans were mentioned in the nationalists' petitions. By the end 
of 1943, the Moroccan nationalists had collected signatures for an independence 
manifesto which was presented on 11 January 1944 to the embassies in Cairo of 
the governments of France, US, Britain and Soviet Union. 12 The North African 
nationalists perceived the American presence as having the capability of bring 
about fundamental change in the status of their countries because they became 
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aware that France was no longer the power it had been. 
Roosevelt tried to create a favourable atmosphere for the alliance forces in 
the Maghreb by promising independence for the Maghreb states. During the 
Casablanca Conference of January 1943, President Franklin Roosevelt and the 
British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill met with the Sultan of Morocco, sepa-
rately from the French authorities. According to the Sultan's conversation with the 
President, he believed that the US would support Moroccan and Algerian demands 
for independence. Both the Algerian and Tunisian nationalists also contacted Roo-
sevelt in Casablanca in order to win American support for their nationalist cause.13 
It is interesting to note that the Maghreb soldiers in the French army had fought 
together with the Allied forces against the German forces. Moreover, the Sultan 
himself refused the German and Vichy government demands to attack the Moroc-
can Jews. Some leaders of Maghreb nationalist movements visited Germany, such 
as Balafrej and Taqi Adden al-Helali from Morocco; al-Hamami from Algeria; Abd 
al-Rahman Yaseen from Tunisia. However, there were no serious promises from 
Germany except for a hint that, were the Axis Forces victorious, Italy would re-
place France in North Africa. Accordingly, the Maghreb nationalists ignored Hitler 
and Germany's request for co-operation. The Sultan of Morocco refused to receive 
the German representative in Morocco, pledging support for the Allies, despite the 
French collapse and defeat.14 
General Franco of Spain had sympathy with Hitler during World War Two, 
and the Allies tried to put pressure on Spain from bases in the northern part of 
Morocco. In 1947 France, for its own interests, tried to bring back Amir Abd 
al-Karim al-Katabi (the Amir of the Rif, see chapter two) from exile in Reunion 
Island. The French objective was to lean on the Sultan of Morocco because of his 
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Alliance with the Moroccan National Movement against France, and threatened 
him with being replaced by al-Katabi. The US had different objectives from those 
of France. The Americans tried to use al-Katabi as a card against Spain in North-
ern Morocco that the historical leader of the Riff might encourage the Riffi.an to 
revolt against Spain. It seems, however, that Britain was cleverer than either, for 
when the news reached Cairo, the leaders of the Maghreb nationalist movements, 
who were in exile in Egypt, arranged for al-Katabi to land in Egypt during his 
passage from the Suez Canal. This was without the knowledge of France. It is 
hard to believe that the plan, which was approved by King Farouq of Egypt, was 
without the knowledge and approval of Britain. The British tried to influence the 
Maghreb nationalist movements by allowing them to use Cairo as a centre for their 
activities against the French, and as a place for exile. Britain also attempted to 
increase her popularity in North Africa in general, and in Morocco in particular, 
because of British and Spanish conflict over Gibraltar.l5 
It is perhaps surprising that despite the depths of the Maghreb's co-operation 
with the Allies and to the cause of Free France during the war, France ignored 
North Africans efforts and their achievement in the war and refused to give in-
dependence to the Maghreb states. The blow to North African aspirations came 
out of Brazzaville Conference, 30 January 1944, when General de Gaulle pledged 
that France would lead the colonial people in Africa down the road to integra-
tion in the French community. General de Gaulle refused the United States and 
Britain's request to send Allal al-Fasi back to Morocco with his endorsement of 
Moroccan independence. It was a sign to the North Africans that despite their 
support for the Allies and their fighting against the Axis Forces, there was no hope 
of independence for them.16. 
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The most important change after the war was that the American attitude 
in favour of decolonisation hardened. The US clashed with France and Britain 
over Morocco and Libya respectively. This clash was part of the American global 
strategy after World War Two as a leading world power to replace the European 
allies in their colonies. 17 
At the Tehran Conference in 1943, the US and the Soviet Union reached a 
preliminary agreement on the need for decolonisation to continue after the war. 
The US, with the world economy in mind, had encountered many obstacles to 
its economic and commercial interests in the restraints and protection of colonial 
areas. The American experience with French economic restrictions was well known, 
and according to French scholars, the Americans challenged the French in North 
Africa, 
"The Franco-Moroccan conflict may be considered as having begun on 22 Jan-
uary 1943 with the meeting at Anfa between Sultan Mohammed ben Youse£ and 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt." 18 
The US perceived Morocco as a strategic and economic asset after the war. 
The US urged the Maghreb towards independence. King Hassan II of Morocco 
(then Crown Prince) described President Franklin D. Roosevelt's position regard-
ing Morocco: 
"If he had not died, the US would not have failed to accelerate the process of 
liberation of Morocco." 19 
The most serious crisis between France and the US over Morocco came when 
France issued a decree on 30 December 1948, restricting imports from outside the 
French zone by imposing a special licensing control for such imports, at the same 
time exempting France and other parts of the French union. The US protested 
at the French restriction, and American businessmen appealed to Congress. They 
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succeeded in attacking the Hickenlooper amendment to the French economic aid 
bill in 1951. 20 
According to the Hickenlooper amendment, economic aid would be withheld 
from France if it failed to comply with the existing treaties of Madrid (1880) and 
Algeciras {1906). When the US government submitted the case to the International 
Court of Justice, the Court's decision was in favour of the US government. The 
decision stated that the 1948 decree by the French authorities in Morocco was a 
clear violation of the Algeciras Treaty. The US saw the Maghreb as part of its 
global strategy after the Second World War. 21 
The effects of World War Two on Libya were significant: 1. Italian colonial 
rule had been brought to an end by the Allies, after the Italian and German defeat 
in North Africa. 2. The war created a limited alliance between Amir Sayyid 
Idris (then Amir of Cyrenaican and the head of Sanusi order who was in exile in 
Egypt and later on the King of Libya until1969) and the British. Idris succeeded 
in dominating those of his countrymen who were alarmed about the dangers of 
antagonising the Italians, and he resisted the approaches of those who argued that 
the alliance should be made only on the basis of a promise of independence. 3. 
Under British organisation and command, a Sanusi Force was recruited, eventually 
numbering some 10,000 men, to take part in the Libyan Campaign, and to embrace 
those Libyans who deserted from the Italian Army. 4. On the defeat of the Axis 
armies, Libya was placed under British and French military administration, the 
British responsible for Cyrenaica and Tripoltania, the French for Fezzan. 22 
When the peace treaty with Italy was signed in 1947, Italy renounced all 
claims to its colonies, and the allies agreed that the problem of Libya should be 
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taken to the General Assembly of United Nations if no settlement were agreed. 
Libyans were opposed to the partitioning of their country. Moreover, British in-
terests appeared secure, reinforced by the continuing alliance with ldris which 
produced an agreement for Cyrenaican independence shortly before the UN vote 
of October 1949. In November, a U.N resolution was proposed calling for the es-
tablishment of Libya as a sovereign state no later than January 1952, with the 
assistance of the U.N Commissioner. The resolution was upheld by a vote of 48:1 
with 9 abstentions. Rivalry between the European partners had prevented an im-
perial division of Libya under the guise of trusteeship. On 24 December 1951, the 
Kingdom of Libya was proclaimed and diplomatic relations established between 
Libya and the United Kingdom and the United States of America.23 
Regarding the Libyan question, the US had denounced in 1949 the proposal 
for the partition of Libya between the British, French and Italians. The US saw this 
partition of Libya as an imperialist method of control, and the US supported self-
determination for Libya and the unity of the country. The Americans had pushed 
for the independence of Libya as a part of the grand design of American strategy 
towards the Maghreb and the whole of the Middle East. American reaction in Libya 
it was hoped would affect the French position in Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. 
W.R. Louis explained the American support of Libya in terms of the American 
desire for independence for the Maghreb. He stated that 
"the State Department continued to press the idea of Libyan independence in 
the hope that the pressure on the French might force them to move in the same 
direction in Tunisia, Morocco and even in Algeria."24 
After Libya won its independence, the Americans and British built their mil-
itary bases in Libya for strategic reasons connected with the Mediterranean area. 
In the assessment by the British Chief of Staff, they regarded Libya as the future 
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pillar of British strategy, because it might affect the strategic balance of power 
in North Africa and the Mediterranean.25 A major advantage for Britain was the 
siting of alternative bases to the Suez base in Egypt as a route to East Africa and 
the Far East. 
The US was successful in negotiating the continuation of the lease of its base 
at Wheelus Field, for which a payment of $42 million over the period 1954-1971 
was agreed, together with immediate aid in the form of wheat valued at $3 mil-
lion. During the Libyan monarchy the US maintained close relations with King 
Idris until his overthrow on 1 September 1969. In the 1950s, Libya welcomed the 
Eisenhower doctrine and received visits from Vice-President Richard Nixon and 
Eisenhower's special representative, James P. Richards. 
The discovery of oil in Libya added a new dimension to the strategic value of 
Libya, and American oil companies were encouraged in Libya. In November 1955, 
the first concessions were granted to American oil companies. 26 It is interesting 
to note that France was unsuccessful in its attempts to secure military bases in 
Libya. The US was strongly against French bases anywhere in Libya, because of the 
French presence in Algeria. By the end of 1956, all French troops were withdrawn 
from Fezzan.27 During the Algerian war of liberation against France 1954-1962, 
Libya became a supply route for arms coming from Egypt through Libyan desert 
to Algeria. Libya and Egypt were strong supporters of Algerian independence. 
4.3 Maghreb Independence and International Trade Unions. 
The US was unable to announce directly and unequivocally its support for 
Maghreb states' independence. This was for strategic and political reasons on the 
eve of the cold war. US relations with France took precedence over the indepen-
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dence of the Maghreb. The French role in NATO was vital to the US strategic 
interests in Europe. The Americans used two approaches to avoid French criticism 
of American official support for Maghreb: first, the US government encouraged 
American trade unions to push for Maghreb independence through international 
trade unions. Second, it built direct contacts with the leaders of the Maghreb 
labour unions. During the Tangier Conference of American Consular officials in 
North Africa, in June 1949, the conference suggested to the State Department that 
it appoint a regional labour attache for Morocco, Thnisia and Algeria. According 
to the official report 
"It was unanimously agreed that the labour attache and political officers should 
co-operate intimately in view of the obvious close connections between labour prob-
lems, politics and more particularly communism." 28 
American relations with Maghreb labour unions would prevent communist 
influence on one hand, and avoid the disruption of American relations with France. 
The American behaviour was influenced by the cold war and possible communist 
influence in North Africa and Franco-American relations in NATO. 
4.3.1 Superpowers and International Trade Unions 
International trade unions played a major role in superpower relations with 
Third World countries, particularly with the Maghreb states. They supported the 
struggle of the Third World trade unions for independence, decolonisation and 
national aspirations. Neither superpower wanted to disrupt their relations with 
Western Europe. In the 1950s and early 1960s, the two superpowers used the 
international trade union movement to support the Third World indirectly. The 
Soviet Union used the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) to penetrate 
the trade unions of Western Europe and Third World countries, whilst the US 
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controlled the Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). The US had used 
ICFTU as a tool of influence in American relations with the Third World trade 
unions and national liberation movements. Since WWII the United States, had 
become seriously interested in foreign labor as part of its global concern. Reflecting 
this new interests the States Department in 1944 created the post of labor attache, 
a position often staffed by men with the American Federation of Labour ( AFL) or 
the US Congress of Industrial Organisations (CIO) connections.29 
4.3.2 The Creation of the World Federation of Trade Union 
At a congress held in London and Paris in 1945, the British Trades Union 
Congress, the French Confederation of Labour, the Soviet Trade Unions and the 
US Congress of Industrial Organisations ( CIO) combined to form a new organi-
sation the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). Its headquarters were in 
Paris. The new organisation had a wide programme of construction, social reform, 
and political independence and economic development for Third World countries. 
During the first two years of its existence, the WFTU made rapid progress and 
began to exercise influence in the construction of Western Europe and in the Trade 
Union movements in Asia, Africa, Latin America and in the United Nations. 
After World War Two, there were sharp political differences inside the WFTU 
because the world had become ideologically split into two camps. Moreover, there 
were other factors which had led to the division of the world labour movement. 
The opposition of the Soviet Union to the Marshall Plan of 1947 had shocked the 
leaders of the labour unions of Western Europe and the US. The active role of 
American Federation of Labour (AFL) inhibited co-operation with Soviet Trade 
Unions or with their allies in other countries. Failure to compromise on political 
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and ideological issues led to split in the WFTU, in 1949, and to the creation of new 
international Labour Unions. After the split, the WFTU underwent a change in 
its composition, structure and character: about 90% of its eighty million members 
were now in the Eastern Bloc. 30 
It is interesting to note that the Soviets did not create the WFTU, but cap-
tured it after it was established and had had a good start. In the 1950s, the 
WFTU had had affiliates in the Middle East such as in Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco 
and Sudan, but it did not win much support in the Maghreb states, especially after 
independence, except in Algeria. 
4.3.3 International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). 
The Soviet domination of WFTU led to the creation of a new International 
Federation. The British Trades Union Congress and the central labour organisa-
tions of several other western European countries and the US Congress of Indus-
trial Organisations (CIO) broke with the WFTU and in December 1949 created 
the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. The US dominated the 
new Federation behind the scenes. The American Labour Movement took positive 
stands on foreign aid, nuclear armaments, totalitarianism, colonialism, the Hun-
garian revolt, the Berlin wall, and other big issues of the post-war period. Labour 
formulated these stands largely within the context of the cold war which remained 
a dominant consideration in the American Labour movement's foreign relations, 
particularly with North African Labour movements. 
The ICFTU was the first international labour organisation to be accepted as 
the sole representative of free world trade and labour unions. It was an American 
tool to penetrate the Third World. The CIA and State Department used it as 
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a cover for their activities in Third World countries. The CIA also dominated 
the regional branches of the ICFTU. The US government's objectives were to use 
the ICFTU to oppose communism, to adopt a strong anti-colonial position and to 
provide aid directly to international areas through the ICFTU. 31 
4.3.4 WFTU, ICFTU and the Maghreb Labour Unions 
The Maghreb Labour Unions from its foundation were part of French Trade 
Unions, except in Libya which was under Italian control. During the period be-
tween the two world wars, the Maghreb Labour Unions in Tunisia, Algeria and 
Morocco formed independent labour unions, and tried to contact international 
labour unions to win support for their national cause. 
1. Tunisia and American Labour Movements: 
The Tunisian Labour Union was part of the French Confideration Generale 
du Travail (CGT). On 20 January 1946, in response to the broadening of Tunisian 
nationalist aspirations, the Union Generale Tunisiene du Travail (UGTT) was 
established as an autonomous organisation and split from its parent organisation, 
the CGT. In the meantime, there was another small group, which had also broken 
away from the French CGT, such as the Union des Syndicats des Travailleurs de 
Tunisie (USTT) which had also raised the nationalist issue. The latter (USTT) was 
dominated by the communists, and sought unification with the UGTT, but without 
success. Finally, in 1956 it dissolved itself and its members sought admission on an 
individual basis to the UGTT which became the strongest trade union in Tunisia. 
When the UGTT applied to join WFTU in 1946, the WFTU sent a team to in-
vestigate the UGTT's qualifications for affiliation. However, the WFTU approved 
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the communist-oriented USTT in 1947 instead, rejecting the UGTT application. 
After a hard struggle inside WFTU, and when the non-communist unions walked 
out of WFTU Executive Bureau session in Paris, January 1949, the UGTT were 
finally admitted into the WFTU. The failure of the WFTU to support Thnisian 
nationalist aspirations led the UGTT to renounce its affiliation to WFTU in July 
1951. The UGTT decision was taken under the pressure of US Consul General 
John Jernegan in Thnisia.32 
The Tunisian Neo-Destour party and UGTT had cooperated in the fight for 
Thnisian independence. In December 1946 Bourguiba, the leader of Neo-Destour, 
visited the US to win American support. He returned home frustrated. The cool 
American reaction to Tunisian demands was due to a number of factors. First, 
the ignorance of American public opinion about North African issues. Second, 
the effectiveness of French propaganda there regarding the Maghreb. However, 
Thnisia did win strong support for its cause from the American Federation of 
Labour {AFL). The AFL protested strongly to the French authorities for using 
force against Thnisian strikers. In 1951, when the UGTT applied for membership 
of the ICFTU, the AFL supported its application, and a very close relationship 
developed between the UGTT and the American controlled ICFTU.33 
The UGTT's link with the ICFTU and American labour groups secured in-
ternational support for both the Union and the Neo-Destour party. In addition to 
funds, the Union gained many contacts outside Thnisia. Irving Brown of the AFL 
in Europe, who had connections with the CIA and US State Department invited 
Ferhat Hached, the General Secretary of UGTT, and Habib Bourguiba, of Neo-
Destour, to attend the 1951 AFL Convention in San Francisco, arranging for them 
to meet State Department and other government officials. Brown also arranged for 
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Bourguiba to broadcast his criticism of French colonialism on the Voice of America 
(VOA) radio.34 
When the Neo-Destour party leaders were arrested in January 1952, Hached 
assumed an enlarged role in the Neo-Destour party. The Sub-Committee of the 
ICFTU Executive Board in emergency session in March, 1952, condemned the 
measures taken by the French authorities against the arrest and the freedom of 
speech in Tunisia. Moreover, the ICFTU protested directly to the French author-
ities, when the later subjected Hached to search on his return from an ICFTU 
meeting in Brussels. In February, 1952, the AFL Executive Council passed a 
resolution favouring immediate Tunisian internal autonomy and negotiations be-
tween the French and the Neo-Destour to prepare for full national independence. 
The French authorities were aware of Hached's relationship with the ICFTU and 
AFL and this led to his assassination in December 1952 by the French settlers in 
Tunisia. In July 1953, with AFL support, the Third ICFTU Congress adopted a 
strong anti-colonial position, the AFL support for Tunisian national cause contin-
ued until Tunisia won its independence in March 1956.35 
The US won Tunisia in terms of the cold war, because the outcome of the 
ICFTU-WFTU conflict in Tunisia was obviously in favour of ICFTU. During the 
early 1950s, there was a struggle over the policy of the Neo-Destour party towards 
France. Bourguiba favoured a compromise with the French over Tunisian inde-
pendence. Bourguiba's policy toward France was influenced by his personal and 
cultural relations with France. He married a French woman, was affiliated with 
French culture, and was awarded a degree in French law. Saleh ben Youssef, who 
was the general-secretary and controlled the Neo-Destour party in Bourguiba's ab-
sence in 1945-1949, took a strong line against the French. This political difference 
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led to confrontation between Bourguiba and Ben Youssef over control of the Neo-
Destour.36 Saleh ben Youssef was more orientated towards Arab nationalism and 
the Thnisian role in the Arab world. He built up a warm relationship with Nasser 
of Egypt, and when he was ousted from Neo-Destour in October 1955, he left to 
live in exile in Cairo, from where he plotted to overthrow the Bourguiba regime in 
Tunisia until he was assassinated in Frankfurt, August, 1961. 
In summary, the ICFTU gave strong support to the Thnisian independence 
movement; the UGTT in turn became one of the ICFTU's strongest supporters. 
Ahmed Talili, the new secretary general of the UGTT, became a member the 
ICFTU's executive board. The ICFTU itself held its fifth World Congress in 
Thnis in 1957, the first time it had been held outside Europe. The UGTT played 
a major role in Africa against the WFTU, and was used as a tool to strengthen 
the ICFTU in Africa.37 
2. US and Morocco's independence: 
The Moroccan Thade Union movement began in the 1930s, when Moroccans 
had been forced off the land to work in the colonial economy. The French policy 
toward Moroccan workers led the workers to establish a secret organisation and 
anti-colonial movement. After the Allied Forces landed in Morocco in Novem-
ber 1942, the Moroccan workers began to rebuild the Unions mostly under the 
sponsorship of the Confederation Generale du Travail CGT, because the French 
authorities had refused to recognise autonomous Moroccan unions. In May 1951, 
the Moroccan workers staged a large demonstration against the French. They also 
protested in December 1952 at the assassination by the French of Ferhat Hached, 
the Secretary General of the UGTT in Tunisia. In late 1951, the Moroccan workers 
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elected Taib Bouazza the first Secretary General of the Moroccan trade union, be-
fore it formally announced in 1955. The election came as a challenge to the French 
authorities, who were still refusing to recognise the Moroccan trade unions. On 20 
March 1955, the Union Moroccaine du Travail (UMT) was formally established, 
and was closely allied with the Istiqlal party in its struggle for independence. 
Mahjoub Ben Seddiq was elected as the Secretary General with strong support 
from the Istiqlal party. 38 
The Americans used a different approach to strengthen their position in Mo-
rocco. Through the AFL and ICFTU, they offered training and support for Moroc-
can nationalists and trade unions. Irving Brown, head of the AFL's office in Europe 
who acted as unofficial agent to the State Department and George Meany the head 
of the AFL, helped Moroccan nationalists to open an office in New York. They 
also offered financial aid to Moroccan Trade Unions and African national move-
ments. As in the case of the Thnisian UGTT, the AFL and ICFTU supported the 
Moroccan UMT in the UN, and put pressure on the French to offer independence 
to Morocco. At the same time as Irving Brown was arranging American support, 
he was also used as a cover for the CIA and US St"ate Department connections 
with Morocco.39 
After World War Two, the US used an unofficial approach to influence events 
in Morocco. In 194 7, the leaders of the Moroccan nationalist movement opened an 
office in New York with Mehdi Banounni as its head. The Moroccans tried to win 
support in the UN and draw in American public opinion. Banounni described his 
relation with the Americans in Tangier and in the US as a competition between the 
Americans and French. For instance, the American Consul in Tangier, Edwin Plitt, 
had issued a travel document to Banounni to travel to New York. According to 
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Banounni's account, he was helped by a CIA official, W.M. Hamilton who argued 
with the Consul to help Banounni because Banounni's passport would not be valid 
in the US. Rom Landau, an American Jew, had also connections with Moroccan 
nationalist leaders such as Ben Barka and the American, Benjamin Rivin of New 
York University, was a strong supporter of the Maghreb, particularly Morocco. He 
used his academic skills to encourage American public to support the Maghreb 
cause. 
On the other hands, the Moroccan nationalists sought to broaden their con-
tacts with the Americans. Abd al-Latif Sbihi, editor of La Voix Nationale in 
Morocco, formed the Roosevelt Club in the summer of 1943, which lasted un-
til Morocco's independence in 1956. The Club was a place where social contact 
between the Moroccan elites and American political and military officials could 
take place. Thus the Americans were in contact with Moroccan nationalists with-
out antagonising the French and, they also tried to influence the Moroccan elites. 
Its members for the most part became political independents, few of them joined 
the Istiqlal party, and others, have dominated the Moroccan government, such as 
Ahmed Reda Guedira, who is now the Special Advisor to the King of Morocco.40 
When the French ousted Sultan Mohammed V in August 1953 sending him 
to live in exile in Madagascar (Malagashi) and replaced him with a puppet Sul-
tan Ben Arafa, the Americans, in spite of their quiet diplomacy, put pressure on 
France to return the deposed Sultan from exile. Nationalist Moroccans formed 
the Liberation Army and carried out a liberation war against the French. The 
Atlas mountains and the Rif, under Spanish control, were where the Liberation 
Army had its strength. Spain under General Franco did not recognise the new 
Sultan, and allowed the Moroccans to broadcast anti-French propaganda from Rif 
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Radio. However, Americans played great role to Moroccan cause through clandes-
tine relations between the CIA (formerly the OSS and after 1947, the CIA) and 
the nationalists, by use of the AFL and its influence in ICFTU, and through the 
General Assembly and the Security Council of the UN. The US also used Latin 
American votes in the UN to support North African independence.41 
3. US and Algerian Independence: 
The American Federation of Labour was less active in Algeria before 1956. 
The only reported case was in November 1953, when the US Consul in Algiers, 
Leon Dorros learnt that the AFL's European Office gave the Mouvement Pour le 
Triomphe des Libirtes Democratiques (MTLD }, $90,000 for a new printing press 
that was used to publish the MTLD's weekly newspaper L 'Algerie Libre. The 
MTLD was a middle class organisation it was formed when Messali al-Haj trans-
formed the Parti de Peuple Algerien into the MTLD which also transformed in 
1955 into the Mouvement National Algerien (MNA). The MTLD was not a trade 
union, it was formed as a political party to work for the Algerian cause, but af-
ter the creation of the FLN, the MTLD in its new form MN A entered in serious 
conflict with the FLN which led to the domination of FLN over political struggle 
against France. 42 
In 1956, the Algerian trade union, the Union Generate du Travailleurs Alge-
riens (UGTA) was created, when the FLN ordered Algerian to leave the French 
trade unions. The UGTA claimed 150,000 members and it joined the ICFTU 
in 1956 with active support of the American labour movements. The Ameri-
cans used the ICFTU as a channel of communication with Algerian nationalists 
through UGTA, and in 1957, the Algerian issue was dominant at the ICFTU's 
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Fifth Congress in Tunisia. The ICFTU's position on Algeria was based on recog-
nition of the right of the Algerian people to self-determination. The ICFTU sent 
a mission to Algeria, led by Irving Brown. The mission was banned from entering 
Algeria by Governor General Roberte Lacoste, who accused Brown of planning 
to give a million US dollars of AFL-CIO Funds to Algerian fighters. Governor 
Lacoste also repressed the UGTA, which moved from Algeria to Tunisia where the 
AFL-CIO supplied it with facilities and training.43 
When the Algerians declared the war of independence in 1954, the US was 
handicapped by the French role in NATO and cold war issues. France insisted 
that the issue in Algeria was a Communist attempt to take North Africa. The 
French government tried to use the communist threat to win domestic support in-
side France to its policy in Algeria. Also, this ploy by France was intended to force 
NATO members to support the French position. The major issue was whether 
NATO forces should be used only inside NATO, rather than outside NATO as 
preferred by the French. The shift in American policy came after Senator John 
Kennedy (later President Kennedy) delivered a major speech on African indepen-
dence, particularly focusing on Algeria.44 In 1957, at a Congressional meeting John 
Kennedy criticised Eisenhower's policy towards North Africa, particularly towards 
the Algerian revolution, he stated 
"The President and Secretary of State ... hereby are strongly encouraged to 
place the influence of US behind efforts, either through the North Atlantic Treaty Or-
ganisation or through the good offices of the Prime Minister of Tunisia and the Sultan 
of Morocco, to achieve a solution which will recognise the independent personality of 
Algeria and establish the basis for a settlement interdependent with France and the 
neighbouring nations; and be it further resolved, that, if no substantial progress has 
been noted by the time of the next United Nations General Assembly Session the 
United States support an international effort to derive for Algeria the basis for an 
orderly achievement of independence." 45 
Senator Kennedy feared alienating Third World nationalist movements, which 
152 
could push them towards the communist world. Kennedy recognised that Algeria 
was no longer solely a French problem in a cold war era. 
Despite criticism by US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, of Senator 
Kennedy's speech, Dulles still used the speech to put pressure on France. Thnisia 
asked the US for weapons, threatening that if he did not receive Western support, 
Bourguiba might turn to the Soviet Union. There were rumours that Russian 
weapons had reached Algeria through Egypt. It was clear that the French partic-
ipated in the Suez Crisis of 1956, partly because of Nasser's support for the FLN. 
When the FLN announced the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic in 
Cairo, it was recognised by Thnis and Rabat. The US did not recognise it because 
of French influence. 
When Kennedy was elected US President in 1960, the French were aware of his 
attitude towards the Algerian Revolution. During 1961 a coup was attempted and 
rumours spread in France about American involvement in the attempt against de 
Gaulle. In practical term, President Kennedy proved considerably more restrained 
on the Algerian issue than Senator Kennedy indicated he might be. Kennedy was 
acutely conscious of the French role in NATO, and despite his sympathy with 
Algerian nationalism, he stressed American support for France in Algeria, even 
while trying to find a political solution to the Algerian crisis. President Kennedy 
tried to keep France in NATO to strengthen Western Europe defence against the 
Soviet Union. It seems that there was contradiction in the US foreign policy toward 
the Algerian issue, but the American interests in NATO were more important 
than Algeria. Kennedy also used unofficial channels to support Algeria through 
American labour movements. After De Gaulle announced the French desire to 
negotiate with Algeria, then President Kennedy felt free to announce American 
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support to Algerian independence. At that point the official American contact 
with FLN began. On 17 October, 1961, the first high level talks with the FLN 
were started with the American Ambassador in Tunisia. 
The US applied double standards in its policy towards North Africa. While 
publicly announcing US support for France through diplomatic channels and public 
statements, the US encouraged North African nationalists to achieve their inde-
pendence. The US had been using American Trade Unions and their influence in 
international trade unions to support North African independence. Moreover, the 
American officials went further to support North African nationalists with infor-
mation on the French labour movement. The American Consular officials in North 
Africa suggested that, 
"the Office of Intelligence Research could usefully supply the North African 
posts with any studies prepared on the French labour movement and more specifically 
on the present status of French labour organisations and their inter-relationships."46 
Between 1958 and 1962, the CIA took an important step for helping the 
Algerian cause and it organised secretly vouchered educational grants for Algerian 
students who were expelled from French universities because of their nationalist 
activities. The CIA also helped a leading literary opponent of French colonialism, 
Franz Fanon to an extent that apparently annoyed de Gaulle . 
"while the State Department had cordial relations with government of France, 
the CIA was secretly helping Algerian nationalists in their fight for independence. 
Franz Fanon, the Algerian philosopher of revolution, was flown to Washington and 
treated at CIA expense for the cancer that eventually killed him." 47 
France was afraid of being replaced in North Africa by the US. On the eve of 
the cold war, however, the US was more afraid of communism than of failing to 
meet nationalist aspirations in North Africa, and the Arab world. The French gov-
ernment feared the nationalists more than the communists in the Maghreb because 
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the French communists supported the French Empire. Arab public opinion was 
strongly against France because of its harassment of nationalists and the kidnap-
ping of Algerian nationalist leaders, which activities forced Morocco and Thnisia 
to ask for American political support and military aid. 
Finally, most NATO members refused to use the NATO forces outside Europe 
and no European country supported the French demands that North Africa was 
part of French NATO or believed French rhetoric that the struggle in Algeria was 
between the communist and France in North Africa, it was nationalist struggle for 
independence and not for Soviet influence in Algeria. France rhetoric for using the 
cold war was unsuccesful to win NATO members for her help in Algeria. 
4.4 Soviet-Maghreb Relations 
Russian contact with the Maghreb states began many centuries ago. Letters 
of friendship were exchanged between Catherine II and the Sultan of Morocco, 
Mohammed Ben Abdullah around 1782-1783, which led to commercial relations 
between the two countries.48 Other Maghreb states, Libya, Thnisia and Algeria, 
were part of the Ottoman Empire. Their strategic location on the Mediterranean 
and their involvement in trade and piracy affected relations with Russia as with 
other European countries. 
After the Congress of Vienna in 1815, Tsar Alexander proposed an interna-
tional squadron in the Mediterranean to abolish piracy. Britain refused to agree 
to any plan which would admit Russian warships into the Mediterranean. Britain 
feared that Russia was merely seeking a pretext to secure a naval base there from 
which to attack Turkey.49 
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During the second half of the 19th century, Russian explorers and travellers 
had journeyed through North Africa. In 1848 and 1857 the anthropologist A. 
Alexandrovitch visited Tunisia and Algeria and Colonel Berens travelled to Alge-
ria respectively. In 1877 the explorer P.S. Tchihatcher travelled to Algeria and 
Thnisia.50 
In 1880, Russia attended the Madrid Conference and the convention of the 
Conference discouraged any foreign intervention, thus safeguarding the indepen-
dence and territorial integrity of Morocco until the beginning of the 20th cen-
tury. The Russian government signified its adherence to the convention on 4 April 
1881,51 and a Russian consulate was opened in Tangier in 1890.52 The Russians 
participated in and played a role in the two Moroccan crises. Russia attended the 
Algeciras Conference in 1906 and also supported French policies in North Africa 
during the Agadir crisis in 1911 because Russia was more interested in the Far 
East, South and Southwest Asia (the Northern Tier and the Gulf). Russia tried 
to get French support against Britain because the latter was the only European 
country that was challenging the Russian interests there. The Russians were also 
against the German policy in Morocco, and supported French demands because 
Germany had strong relations with the Ottoman Empire. The Russian policy 
was to win the support of France for Russian adventures in the Far East and in 
Southwest Asia. 
4.4.1 Soviet-Maghreb relations between two world wars: 
In 1924 Lenin denounced the Italian occupation of Libya. After the Russian 
Revolution of October 1917, a new Soviet foreign policy had been formulated. 
Lenin had focused on the strategic and geopolitical importance of North Africa in 
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fighting capitalism, and European power in particular. Lenin stated that 
"the road to Paris goes through the Maghreb." 53 
When Stalin held power in the Soviet Union after Lenin's death, he stated 
on 19 January 1925 that a new international situation faced the Soviet Union. He 
related the question of the colonies to the internal security of the Soviet Union, 
and North Africa was a part of the colonial question in Stalin's perception. 
"All this shows that forces being prepared and regrouped throughout Europe 
in connection with the complications beginning in the Far East, and with the new 
prospects opening in North Africa. All this is the premiss of a new war. And a new 
war is bound to touch our country." 54 
Moreover, Stalin argued that the communist element in North Africa could 
create a united front against imperialism. 66 The most important factor in Russian 
relations with North Africa emerged during the Rif war in Northern Morocco when 
Abd al-Krim announced the "Rif Republic" against Spanish occupation. The 
French press accused the Soviet Union of supporting Abd al-Krim. The Soviet 
ambassador to France, Krassin, issued in August 1925, an important statement 
denying Soviet involvement in the Rif war 
"As to the reports in certain French and foreign newspapers that the government 
of the USSR has sent envoys to Abd el-Krim [sic] and has given financial help to the 
Riff leader, may I state, officially and in the most categorical terms, that these reports 
are devoid of any foundation whatever, and that the Soviet government has never 
intervened and is not intervening in any way whatever in the events in Morocco, and 
has no relations whatever with the Moroccans." 56 
However, despite Soviet denial of their involvement in Rif affairs in Morocco, 
the Soviet representatives in Europe in 1926 had proposed participation in the 
International Conference. According to the Soviet representatives, they saw the 
involvement of Russia in the Algeciras Conference of 1906 as giving them rights to 
attend any conference related to Moroccan affairs. The Soviet Union were inter-
ested in involving themselves in Maghreb affairs at an international level despite 
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their internal problems and their conflict in Europe.57 
During the 1930s the Soviet Union involved itself in North Africa through 
local communist parties, although all the communist parties in North Africa were 
a part of the French Communist Party. More important, the founder leaders of the 
communist parties in North Africa were Jewish (the Algerian Jews were French 
citizens according to the Cremieux decree of 1870), for example the founder of the 
communist party in Morocco was Leon Sultan, from the Jewish minority there. 
In Muslim society such as in North Africa the Communists had less influence on 
the events. The Bolsheviks had little knowledge of the region and relied mostly 
on information provided by the French communist party. 58 After the end of the 
Second World War, Russia showed interest in the Mediterranean and saw great 
strategic value in the North African states. In fact, the Soviet Union requested the 
Allies to allow them bases in Libya and Morocco. 59 
Despite Soviet interest in the Italian colony of Libya as a trust territory, the 
Soviet Union maintained an intense and vocal opposition to colonialism in Africa. 
However, closer examination reveals certain paradoxes and inconsistencies which 
in fact diluted the Soviet anti-colonial role until the mid 1950s. Stalin was hostile 
to national bourgeois leadership into which virtually all African leaders came. 60 
But he felt the transfer of power to this group greatly weakened the prospects of 
communist parties and he recommended a united front between the communist 
and the national bourgeois to strengthen the revolutionary process against the 
imperalist. He stated that: 
"For countries like Morocco, where the national bourgeoisie has so far no rea-
son to split into a revolutionary and a conciliatory party, the task of the commu-
nist elements is to do everything possible to create a united national front against 
imperialism."61 
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Ironically, the French Communist Party, was not committed to the aboli-
tion of French empire in Africa. The French communist party argued that once 
a proletarian regime had been established in France, the colonial problem would 
automatically disappear, simultaneously with the end of capitalist exploitation.62 
The French communists only changed their attitude toward Algeria after the Al-
gerian bloody war was well under way. It is interesting to note that Stalin had 
never viewed the Third World as a major element in Soviet foreign policy, so he 
did not pay much attention to the Third World during his reign. 
4.4.2 Soviet Union and Maghreb independence: 
The Soviet attitude toward North Africa was influenced by two elements: 
first, the Soviet Union saw its relations with the Maghreb in terms of East-West 
relations in the eve of the cold war. Second, Soviet-French relations played a major 
role in influencing the Soviet perspective towards the Maghreb. For example, when 
Libyan independence was under consideration in the General Assembly of the UN, 
the Soviet Union, in January 1953, submitted a draft to the effect that the General 
Assembly considered it essential that all foreign troops and military personnel must 
be withdrawn from Libya, and all military bases there must be evacuated within 
three months. The Soviet Union was against military bases in Libya because of 
the Soviet national security in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. The Soviet 
Union also opposed the admission of Libya to the UN because of the American 
and British there. Despite Libyan independence in December 1951, it was only 
until September 1955 that Libya and USSR had agreed to diplomatic relations.63 
The Soviet Union criticised French behaviour inside North Africa by interpret-
ing French local reforms in Thnisia and Morocco as part of a French conspiracy 
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against the Maghreb nationalists' demand for independence. But despite the So-
viet criticism of the French, the Soviet Union was aware of the American military 
and economic presence in North Africa, because the Soviet saw the presence of 
weak France in North Africa as less harmful to Soviet interests than the presence 
of strong America in North Africa. 
"The North African countries have been covered with a network of American 
military and air bases. Wall Street monopolies are pumping important strategic 
materials out of this region. Between 1950 and 1952, exports from the French colonies 
to the U.S.A have risen in value as follows: 89% from Morocco , 49% from Tunisia 
and 7% from Algeria". 64 
When the French authorities in Morocco removed the Sultan of Morocco from 
his throne and sent him into exile, in 1953, the Soviet press reaction praised the 
Sultan's refusal to bow to French demands in Morocco, and accused the US of 
approving the French action. The Soviet Union also condemned jointly the US, 
Britain and France in the UN Security Council in refusing the petition of 15 Arab-
Asian states for the return of Sultan Mohammed V to Morocco. 65 
However, the Soviet support for North Africa was political and the Soviet did 
not get involved in military aspects of North African national movements. The 
Soviet's first priority was to protect Soviet interests in Europe, and the Soviets 
had no wish to disrupt their relations with France over North Africa because the 
French role in NATO was an important factor in Soviet strategy. 
There was not much Soviet support to Tunisia, but the Amerians were more 
active in Tunisian independence. However, when Tunisia won its independence, 
the Soviet Union established diplomatic relations in June 1956, three months after 
Tunisian independence, and in August 1958, ambassadors were exchanged between 
Morocco and the Soviet Union.66 
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4.4.3 Soviet Union and Algerian Revolution : 
Despite Soviet support for the national liberation movement and the Soviet 
Union's anti-imperialist policy, the Soviet interests were orientated more towards 
Europe, South East Asia, the situation in China, and in the Northern Tier of Mid-
dle East or Southern frontier of Soviet Union. When Algeria declared their war of 
Liberation against French occupation, the Soviet Union paid little official attention 
towards Algeria, but the Soviet Press criticised the French policy in Algeria. On 
7 July 1956, after two years of Algerian revolution, the Soviet newspaper Pravda 
stated: 
"The Soviet Union has always been opposed to all forms of national oppression 
and its representatives to the French-Soviet talks held in May 1956, expressed the 
hope that the French government, acting in a liberal spirit, would be able to find the 
right solution for this important problem in the spirit of the times and in the interests 
of the people. It is well known that the spirit of the times is expressed by the fact that 
the old colonial system is being destroyed and is becoming a thing of the past. Those 
who try to oppose this inevitable historical process doom themselves to defeat. The 
example of the peaceful settlement of the Moroccan and Tunisian questions could be 
very helpful in this matter.67 
Pravda, the communist party official newspaper expressed the Soviet concern, 
but in practical terms the Soviet Union was more cautious than to risk supporting 
Algeria with economic and military aid. In the 1957, the third anniversary of the 
Algerian revolution, French Journalist, and specialist on Soviet affairs, Michael 
Tatu, pointed out that the Soviet media rarely reported on the Algerian liberation 
organisation, FLN. He attributed this neglect to Moscow's reluctance to see the 
influence of a weak France replaced by that of a strong US in Algeria.68 
In February 1958, the Soviet government announced its first contribution of 
any kind to the Algerian refugees in Tunisia and Morocco. Seven months later, 
during a visit to Egypt by N.A. Mukhitdinov, a member of the CPSU's Presidium 
and Secretariat, a Soviet official, met for the first time with representatives of the 
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Algerian Provisional government which had recently been established in Thnisia 
to enhance the FLN's bargaining position. In December 1958, an FLN mission 
visited Moscow, but was refused diplomatic recognition and left empty-handed, 
and even had its request for Soviet arms rejected.69 
When de Gaulle returned to power in autumn 1958, Khrushchev saw oppor-
tunities to exploit France's differences with Britain and the US. Accordingly, he 
curbed his criticism of French policy in Algeria with the exception of the occasional 
comment that independence was inevitable. De Gaulle's policies were causing se-
rious strains in NATO and the European Economic Community (EEC), and his 
policy complemented Soviet objectives in Europe. The Soviets went too far in bar-
ring a shipment of Chinese arms for the Algerians from crossing the Soviet Union, 
as this later led to Chinese criticism of Moscow's position toward the Algerian 
Revolution. 70 
While China recognised the Algerian Provisional government shortly after it 
was set up in 1958 as de facto recognition, it also recognised it de jure in early 1960. 
The Soviet Union did not recognise the Algerian Provisional government even as 
de facto until September 1960. The Sino-Soviet split in 1960 led to concern in 
Moscow that China, by adopting an irreconcilably anti-French stand, in sharp 
contrast to Moscow's middle-of-the-road stand would be able to increase its own 
influence with the Algerian FLN and ultimately with the independent Algerian 
government at the expense of the Soviet Union.71 
Khrushchev had many reasons for keeping his distance from the Algerian rev-
olution. First, he wanted to avoid any action that might discourage de Gaulle from 
downgrading France's relationship with NATO and the US, or might damage the 
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Franco-Soviet rapprochement. Second, the Soviet policy of "Peaceful Co-existence 
in Europe" transcended the sympathy he may have had for a revolution in a Third 
World country remote from Soviet interests. Third, the French and Algerian com-
munists had ambivalent feelings about the FLN because the French working class 
in the French communist party were against Algerian independence, and in Algeria 
many communists were Jews, whose French citizenship made them suspect in the 
eyes of the FLN leadership which was Muslim and Arab. The FLN was a nation-
alist organisation which was intensely suspicious of communist participants. 72 
Khrushchev's position on Algeria changed very slowly, and when Farhat Ab-
bas, the first president of the Algerian Provisional government stopped in Moscow 
on his way back from China late in 1960, he received a great deal of attention, 
but no diplomatic recognition and no arms, only promises. Moscow extended de 
ju.re recognition to the Algerian Provisional government on 19 March 1962, only 
after de Gaulle had agreed at Evian to a ceasefire and accepted the inevitability 
of Algerian independence.73 Like the US, the Soviet Union had been influenced by 
France's role in NATO and in the EEC. The Soviet policy towards the FLN led to 
Algerian suspiciousness of communists after its independence in July 1962. The 
Algerian communist party was banned and Algerian-Soviet relations were built on 
national interest more than ideological principles.74 
4.5 Conclusion 
The US and Soviet Union had a marginal role in North Africa and the Mediter-
ranean in the 19th century. The US abandoned its isolationist foreign policy only 
after World War Two, despite US involvement in World War One, after which 
it had returned to the policy of isolation. The Soviet Union developed a global 
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foreign policy after its October revolution of 1917. The two superpowers played a 
major global role after World War Two. Despite their global role, they played a 
limited role in Maghreb until the 1950s. 
This chapter develops the following themes: 
1. Neither superpower had solid historical relations with the Maghreb states 
before World War One. The Russians were preoccupied with the Ottoman 
empire in the eastern Mediterranean, and despite its involvements in inter-
national conferences regarding Moroccan issues, did not play a major role 
in the Maghreb, but remained a part of European diplomacy. On the other 
hand, the US had greater trade relations with the Maghreb, especially with 
Morocco. The piracy issue was one of the American political difficulties with 
the Maghreb states. 
2. After World War One, the new Soviet revolution had influenced the national 
movements in North Africa and the Soviet model became attractive to North 
African elites, specially those who were in France.75 So most of the Maghreb 
nationalist movements and workers affiliated with the French communists 
before they developed their own organisations or political parties, but despite 
their ideological affiliation they received little support from the Soviet Union 
apart from some general statements. The US had equally little enthusiasm 
for North African affairs, except for economic relations. 
3. During World War Two, North Africa became incorporated into the Allies 
strategy. The US landing in North Africa raised the strategic value of North 
Africa to both the US and the Soviet Union. When the US built military bases 
in Libya and Morocco, the Soviet Union asked for a political and military 
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presence in Libya, but the Soviet request was refused by the Allies. 
4. After World War Two, North Africa become part of the superpowers cold 
war. Complicating this, the French affected superpowers relations with North 
Africa. Both the US and the Soviet Union were aware of, and sensitive about, 
direct relations with Maghreb national movements. The French roles in Eu-
rope and in NATO were more important to the superpowers than direct in-
volvement in the Maghreb which could alienate France on the eve of the cold 
war. 
5. The Soviet Union and the US used labour unions to support North African 
independence. The US was more active in international trade unions, and 
both superpowers used international trade unions as indirect involvement in 
African labour unions. Both superpowers tried to control Third World labour 
unions during the cold war era and the control of labour unions in the Middle 
East and in North Africa were part of both superpowers' political strategies. 
6. Soviet and American political and strategic objectives determined the super-
powers' relations with the Algerian revolution. Despite the cold war and ide-
ological rhetoric, the superpowers avoided direct political confrontation with 
France over Algerian independence because of their own interests in Europe. 
The Soviet Union recognised the Algerian revolution only at the last phase, 
after the French had reached agreement with Algeria. The Soviet faced a hard 
choice between the French in Algeria or a strong American presence in North 
Africa and the Soviet preferred the French option more than the American 
one. On the other hand, the US supported Algerian revolution financially 
and politically more than Soviet Union and the French accused the US of 
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encouraging the Algerian revolution. 
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Chapter V 
The Political Relations between the Superpowers and the 
Maghreb: 
Pragmatism or Ideology? 
5.1 Introduction 
The emergence of the Third World has been one of the most significant events 
of the post WWII era. The two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet 
Union have sought to attract as many countries in the Third World as possible to 
their own political sphere of influence. Both Superpowers tried to increase their 
international prestige, political influence, economic interests, and to win the Third 
World's support in international organizations. When the United Nations was 
founded in 1945, it had only 31 members that would now be described as Third 
World countries. Since then, this number has swollen to more than 122 states. 
These countries comprise 49% of the World land surface and 51% of the world 
population.1 
The superpowers have pressured Third World countries to adopt their eco-
nomic and political systems and orientations . The United States has supported 
the adoption of liberal democratic systems, at least for public consumption, and a 
capitalist free market economy, while the Soviet Union supported the communist 
systems and state controlled economy. So the two superpowers have competed 
in generally with each other in the Third World to spread their ideologies and 
influence. 
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The Soviet Union has encouraged the development of vanguard political par-
ties in the Third World. Also the Soviet Union was more sympathetic toward 
Socialist states than Capitalist oriented states. In particular, the Soviet Union en-
couraged Egypt, South Yemen, Ethiopia and Algeria to adopt Socialist systems. 2 
The superpowers have recognized that their credentials as Superpowers are 
legitimized not only by their massive nuclear arsenals but also by their abilities to 
influence and even determine the course of events in regions far away from their 
homeland. The credentializing aspects of US-USSR political competition in the 
Third World is one of several reasons why the US provided Stinger missiles to 
Afghanistan's Mujahedin and why the Soviet Union sent Mig-20s to the Sandin-
ista's regime in Nicaragua. Similar reasons explain why the Superpowers compete 
in the Middle East, particularly in times of crisis.3 
In the case of the Middle East, the United States has tried to replace the 
European colonial powers, particularly Britain and France, as the most influential 
state. Oil was the major subject of competition between American companies and 
European companies, particularly the British companies, and this competition had 
influenced the incidence of military coups in the Middle East in late 1940s and in 
the early 1950s such as in Syria (1949) and Iran (1953).4 
The United States has had a number of political objectives in the Middle East 
since the 1950s. These objectives are: first, the security of Israel; second, to deny 
opportunities to the Soviets in the region; third, to control the oil or at least the 
Free World's access to the oil; fourth, to protect pro- American regimes and to 
contain radicalism in the Middle East. To achieve these objectives America had 
opposed the Arab nationalist movement, and Persian nationalism as, for example, 
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when the US helped to overthrow the Mousadaq regime in Iran in 1953. 
United States' objectives in North Africa were no different to its objectives in 
the Middle East, but the United States faced French opposition in North Africa. 
During the cold war era, the United States tried to replace France and to combat 
the Soviet presence in the region, contain the radicals, and protect the pro-Western 
regimes such as Tunisia and Morocco. The Maghreb States have considerable 
influence in the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the US could use them 
to support Western interests, for example when Tunisia and Morocco participated 
in UN forces in the Congo in 1961. Moreover, the United States had sought to 
expand American cultural relations with North Africa.5 
The United States only began to develop policies toward Africa after WWII, 
(North Africa was part of the Bureau for African Affairs until recently). It was only 
in 1957 that the Bureau for African Affairs was established in the State Depart-
ment, then there were fewer Foreign Service officers in all of Africa than there were 
in the Federal Republic of Germany alone. When John Kennedy was chairman of 
the African subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he devel-
oped a reputation as a supporter of African nationalist, anti-colonial movements. 
During the 1960 presidential election campaign, he criticized the Eisenhower-Nixon 
administration for having ignored the needs and aspiration of the African peo-
ple. Kennedy's support for North African independence, particularly the Algerian 
revolution, had disturbed the French. As President, his first State Department 
appointment was a former civil rights activist, Michigan Governor G. Mennen 
Williams, as First Assistant Secretary for African Affairs. 6 
Soviet involvement in North Africa only began in the late 1950s. The Soviet 
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Union was interested first in the Northern Tier of the Middle East, Afaghanistan, 
Iran and Thrkey because of their geostrategic value to the southern borders of 
the Soviet Union . After the Palestinian problem in 1948 and the Suez Crisis, 
the Soviet Union tried to extend its influence in the heartland of the Arab world, 
Egypt, Syria and Iraq. 
Soviet political objectives in the Middle East were: First, To reduce USA and 
western presence and influence in the region. Second, To increase Soviet influence 
and presence in the area. Third, To enhance Soviet security in the Middle East. 
Fourth, To combat Chinese presence and influence. China's subsequent approach 
to Morocco in the Spring of 1959 ,and its growing interest in the Algerian war, 
coincided with an increasing apparent divergence in Soviet and Chinese policy 
toward the FLN. This issue and others were by late 1959, creating a critical new 
factor in Soviet relations with Africa. Fifth, To encourage socialist ideas in the 
Middle East, to support the activities oflocal communist parties and develop Soviet 
cultural relations with the region. Khrushchev endorsed the Algerian people's 
aspiration to build their life on Socialist principles. Moreover , the Soviets tried to 
destabilize the pro-western regimes in the area and to support anti-colonial feeling 
and nationalist aspirations in the Middle East.7 In this stage, the Soviet Union 
adopted the line that it was ideologically sound to support "bourgeois nationalist" 
regimes and movements, even those that suppressed communist parties eg the 
classic example of Egypt under Nasser. 
As in the United States, North Africa has been treated as part of the Africa 
Department within the Soviet Foreign Ministry and Soviet political objectives in 
North Africa are the same as they are in the Middle East, with more emphasis on 
Africa and the Mediterranean for political and strategic reasons. But the Soviet 
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Union during the Cold War was much more aware of American influence in North 
Africa than of French influence. The Soviet Union preferred weak French influence 
in the area to a stronger American influence. 
5.2 United States and the Maghreb 1960-1985 
The Maghreb formed part of the American strategy of containment. In 1948, 
George Kennan, the father of containment, outlined the areas of the world which 
America should not allow to fall to hostile powers . Kennan's list of such areas 
included: 1- The nations of the Atlantic community, which include with others 
Western Europe, the Iberian Peninsula, Morocco and the west coast of Africa, 
and the countries of South America; 2- The Countries of the Mediterranean 
and the Middle East as far east as, and including, Iran; 3- and Japan and the 
Philippines. Kennan reflected State Department thinking toward these areas and 
the American objective, according to Kennan, was the creation in these regions of 
"Political attitudes favorable to our concepts of internationallife" 8 
The American approach to North African states after independence has been 
influenced by Kennan's concept of containment. In this chapter we analyze USA 
and USSR political relations with Maghreb states, including both behaviour and 
the factors which shaped it. 
5.2.1 American-Libyan Relations 1969-1985 
The United States enjoyed warm relations with Libya after its independence 
and it signed an agreement with the Libyan government in 1954 for military bases. 
Richard Nixon, Vice President of the United States, visited Libya in July 1954 and 
met King Idris of Libya and, at the same time, the Libyan Prime Minister Mustafa 
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ben Halim visited the United States of America and met President Eisenhower. 
The United State granted Libya $40 million for a 20 year lease of military bases 
in Libya and also supplied Libya with wheat. According to American officials, the 
USA was planning in 1957 to create a Southern Tier Concept through coordinated 
programs with North African States, Sudan and Ethiopia, not through military 
cooperation, but by drawing these countries into closer relationships with the USA 
by economic and political means. 9 This approach did not fit with French interests 
in Africa. King ldris of Libya supported the Eisenhower Doctrine and adopted 
an anti-communist policy. After Libya entered the oil era, American companies 
dominated the oil industry there. 
After the Arab-Israeli war in 1967, Arab national sentiment developed in 
Libya and the Libyan monarch became unpopular after the accusation that the 
Americans had used its military bases in Libya to support Israel in the war. The 
unpopularity ofthe regime led the American Ambassador (1964-1969), David New-
som, to inform King ldris in 1967 that the United States had no obligation to 
defend any particular regime in Libya. Newsom's analysis of political development 
in Libya suggested that there was too much money flowing through oil revenue 
and too much obvious corruption. The King himself was uninterested in ruling 
the country10 and the situation was ripe for political upheaval and unrest. Ruth 
First argues that the American reaction to the Libyan situation was to encourage a 
change of regime.11 First suggests that the Americans encouraged the plot against 
King ldris to prevent anti-western feeling from getting out of hand. After Qaddafi 
led his successful military coup in September 1969, there was much speculation 
spread about the coup and the motives of the organizers. As mentioned before, 
some diplomats accused America of instigating the coup. Historically, according 
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to American sources, King Idris was in the British pocket.12 
Mary Brannan and others in their special report, The Real Story of Libya's 
Muammer Qaddafi , interpreted the situation inside Libya as a struggle between 
American and British supporters in the army. They described American relations 
with King Idris thus; 
"After the 1967 war Idris had begun to make increasing pressures on the Amer-
icans. It is rumoured that the American government then began to support Omer 
al Cheihly [sic], advisor of the king and the expected heir of the throne. Omer al 
Cheihly began to organize a coup. His attempt was planned for September 5th 1969; 
four days before, with the support of Idris, Qaddafi succeeded in killing the plotters 
and making his own coup. Immediately afterwards there was a sophisticated opera-
tion of misinformation. The coup was publically announced, but for ten days nobody 
was informed on the real nature of the coup. Qaddafi waited all this period before 
revealing himself. It seems that the American government believed that its own coup 
had taken place ... " 13 
In any event, the United States Administration recognized the new regime in 
Libya with a recommendation from David Newsom, who was now Under Secretary 
of State for African Affairs, and Joseph Palmer, the American Ambassador in 
Libya. The rise to power of Qaddafi in Libya opened a new era in Libyan-American 
relations. 
5.2.1.1 Nixon-Kissinger and Qaddafi. 
United States reaction to the Libyan revolution was low profile, because US 
interests were not threatened and Qaddafi's actions after the revolution fitted in 
with America's strategy in East-West confrontation. Qaddafi was seen as anti-
Soviet, an Arab nationalist and Muslim zealot. Henry Kissinger, National Security 
Advisor to President Nixon and later Secretary of State for Nixon and Ford, argued 
that energy supplies were in jeopardy only if the US did something to antagonize 
the new Libyan revolutionary regime 
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"we see no immediate threat to these [oil] interests, although such could re-
sult if the regime is threatened, or becomes increasingly unstable, or if there were a 
real confrontation over Wheelus, or in the event of renewed hostilities in the Middle 
East." 14 
During the Nixon era, the United States informed Qaddafi of two military 
coup attempts and Qaddafi's behaviour was seen to be in American interests de-
spite US differences with Qaddafi over the Rogers Plan, King Hussein's conflict 
with the PLO in September in 1970 and American support for Israel and Libyan 
support for the PLO. 
In 1970, Qaddafi closed the American and British bases, but Qaddafi had 
also denounced the USSR on many occasions and there were still mutual interests 
between Libya and the USA in oil, trade and in limiting Soviet influence in the 
Middle East and Africa. During the Indo-Pakistan war in 1971, he denounced the 
Soviet role in the conflict and he sent Pakistan several of Libya's squadrons of 
Northrop F-5 delivered before the revolution to the royal regime. He cooperated 
with Sadat of Egypt in crushing the military coup in Sudan in 1971, by ordering 
Libyan military aircraft to intercept a British airliner carrying two of the coup 
leaders. They were handed over to President Nimeri of Sudan who hanged them. 
It was a plot against the Soviets in the Sudan. The leaders of the Sudanese 
Communist Party were executed because of their involvement in the coup. Qaddafi 
had also approved Sadat's expulsion of Soviet military advisors from Egypt in July 
1972 and he criticized Iraq for signing the Soviet-Iraqi treaty in 1972. Qaddafi 
armed the Oman government against the Dhofar guerrilla movement which was 
supported by South Yemen and China. He criticized the Soviets for allowing Jewish 
migration to Palestine. 15 
America saw him as hostile to the Soviet Union because he would never allow 
181 
the Soviets to obtain any kind of bridgehead, military, political, or ideological in 
North Africa. Qaddafi banned political parties in Libya and he has never allowed 
communist activities in Libya. In this sense, he supported America's political in-
terests against the USSR. The Nixon Administration alerted Qaddafi when Adam 
al-Hawaz and Musa Ahmed ( Ministers of Defense and Interior respectively) at-
tempted to take power away from Qaddafi, four months after the coup in December 
1969. 
The CIA also informed Qaddafi of the Hilton Assignment in 1971 which was 
Orner Shalhi's plot against Qaddafi with the support of mercenaries from Europe. 
The CIA's reason for informing Qaddafi about the Hilton assignment was that it 
was a "total failure coup" and its failure would have been attributed to the United 
States. This it was feared would endanger the American community in Libya. 
There was also concern that France who was opposed to the US in Libya would 
gain advantages on the expense of American commercial interests. The United 
States informed the Italians who sent a message to Qaddafi informing him of a 
plot against him.16 
The United States had paid little attention to Qaddafi in this period because 
he had not challenged US interests. American action against Qaddafi would have 
run exactly contrary to the step by step peace policy of Kissinger in the region 
from 1973-1975, and also Qaddafi had not taken any serious action to affect the 
American peace process for a number of reasons: First, because he had not much 
power to do so; Second, because Qaddafi had not much influence in the Arab world, 
particularly with the Palestinians, and third, Qaddafi was trying to strengthen his 
power inside Libya. Moreover, Qaddafi had limited political experience in Arab 
politics because he had only been in power for four years. He had not broken 
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competely his relations with Egypt and Sudan. But on the other hand, Qaddafi's 
interpretation of Islam had created a serious problem with Islamic organizations 
and he had become less popular in the Arab world. 17 
During the Nixon-Kissinger era, the United States had developed a new strate-
gic approach to regional problems in the light of the Vietnam disaster. The Amer-
ican public were against military intervention, and Western Europe opposed any 
kind of military-economic action against Qaddafi. Sanctions or other action against 
Qaddafi would have strengthened his position both in the Arab world and inside 
Libya. A former American official in Libya, David Newsom, described Ameri-
can interests in Libya as: Protection of oil; Protection of American community 
in Libya; preservation of pro-Western orientation and minimization of the degree 
to which Libya can frustrate the United States peace process in the Middle East. 
The United States had protected its interests with low profile confrontations with 
Libya. American Ambassador Joseph Palmer had asked to leave Libya in 1972 be-
cause he had not been able to deal with high level officials such as Qaddafi. Since 
then the USA had been represented at Charged' Affaire level until the withdraw! 
of American diplomats from Libya in the last year of Carter's presidency. But de-
spite that, the United States had won Libyan support over oil prices in 1971-197318 
(see chapter 6). 
5.2.1.2 Carter and Qaddafi: The Policy of Detente 
When Carter became President, he adopted a regional approach to United 
States foreign policy, and he focused on the Arab-Israeli conflict. On the other 
hand, Qaddafi sought to intervene more in regional and international politics. The 
shift in Qaddafi's intervention had started in 1973 when he criticised Ethiopia in 
183 
May and threatened to move the headquarters of OAU from Addis Abbaba to Cairo 
because of Ethiopian diplomatic relations with Israel. Qaddafi also put pressure 
on Black African states to break their relations with Israel. Qaddafi helped ldi 
Amin in Uganda in 1973 by training several hundreds of Amin's troops in Libya. 
In the mid 1970s, he moved to support Muslim minorities even more widely and 
provided money and training to the Muslims in Thailand and the Philippines ( M oro 
Front), and it was also reported that Libya supported the Baader Meinhof gang in 
Germany, the Japanese Red Army and insurgents in Salvador, Nicaragua, Sudan, 
and Spain. Qaddafi had also moved closer to radical Palestinians and supported 
the Black Muslims and Red Indians in the United States. 
While the United States saw many of these groups as terrorist organizations, 
Qaddafi described them as national liberation movements. Qaddafi offered his 
Third Universal theory, as set out in his Green book, as a solution to world prob-
lems. His theory has not won popularity in the Arab world but it has won at least 
some respect in many poor countries in Africa and Asia. He was also seen by Third 
World masses as a supporter of oppressed people in the world and so extended his 
political influence.19 
Despite Qaddafi's and Carter's differing views on regional issues, national 
liberation movements and the Palestinian issue, American interests were protected 
in Libya. American oil companies were working in Libya, Libyan oil flowed to the 
United States and trade between the two countries had not been affected. Qaddafi 
had approached Carter to improve US-Libyan relations but Carter requested that 
Libya abandon international terrorism and support Carter's Middle East peace 
process. Qaddafi refused Carter's demands. But despite Qaddafi's failure to accept 
Carter's request, the United States during the Carter era had only used quiet and 
184 
secret diplomacy to solve Libyan-US differences. 
The United States defended Qaddafi from Egyptian attack on Libya in July 
1977 when Qaddafi and Sadat had reached breaking point in their relations. Sadat 
mobilized Egyptians troops on Libya's border and the American objective was to 
prevent the Egyptians from attacking Libya because it would endanger Thnisia; 
the Algerian position was not clear and the whole Maghreb would be in danger.20 
After Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in November 1977, Qaddafi had led the attack 
on Sadat and the United States, and he demanded the removal of Egypt from the 
Arab League. In December 1977, at the Tripoli summit which was attended by 
Syria, Algeria, Iraq, South Yemen and the PLO, Qaddafi announced the Tripoli 
Declaration to freeze relations with Egypt and establish an Arab Front against 
the USA- Egypt peace plan. The summit also called for boycotting all Egyptian 
individuals and firms dealing with Israel and the summit declared a defence pact 
that any attack on one of the states participating would be an attack on the others. 
So it was clear that Qaddafi tried to protect himself from any attack on him by 
Egypt or America for his strong condemnation of the Sadat-Carter-Begin peace 
plan.21 
Despite Qaddafi's strong public condemnation of the American-backed Mid-
dle East Process, there were important aspects which reflected the other side of 
Qaddafi-American relations during the Carter presidency: First, the Edwin (Ed) 
Wilson case; Second The Billy Carter case, the brother of President Carter. Ed 
Wilson a former marine served in the CIA for twenty years in a variety of assign-
ment such as the Bay of Pigs operation and other jobs in South East Asia, Latin 
America and Taiwan. Wilson has a history of involvement in secret operations all 
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over the world and also has wide contacts with government officials in Washing-
ton.D.C. He retired in 1971 from CIA service but enjoyed friendly relations with 
Theodore Shackley, the assistant to the Deputy Director of Clandestine Operations 
in the CIA, who retired in 1979.22 
Wilson began his contacts with Libya in 1976, when he approached the 
Libyans as a businessman with a firm conducting technology transfers from the 
United States to Libya. He recruited dozens of former Green Berets ( US Special 
Forces) to teach Libyan soldiers how to handle volatile explosives, shipped arms 
explosives to Libya with the aid of forged and fraudulent State Department export 
certificates, and he involved other CIA employees in export and training. Despite 
accusations of violating American law, he continued his work until his arrest on 15 
June in 1983 during the Reagan Presidency and he was later sentenced to 15 years 
in prison. Wilson confessed publicly that he had reported regularly to the CIA 
about all his activities in Libya. The most likely explanation for Wilson's activities 
was that the United States had used Wilson and his associates to penetrate Libyan 
circles involved in the training of Third World revolutionary movements. It is in-
teresting to note that during Wilson's activities, Carter had been informed about 
a plot to assassinate American Ambassador, Hermann Frederic Elits, in Cairo in 
1977 and he wrote a personal letter directly to Qaddafi about the plot. 23 
Added to Wilson's activities was the assassination of Libyan opponents of 
Qaddafi outside Libya. For example, in the United States, Faisal Zagallai was shot 
in his flat in Colorado October 14, 1980 by a former member of US Special Forces, 
Eugene Fafoya, who confessed later on that he had carried out the assassination, 
but claimed he thought it was a CIA operation. He thought that Ed Wilson 
was working with the CIA.24 During Wilson's trial, the CIA refused to share its 
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information with the US Attorney General's Office. It encouraged the belief that 
Wilson had refused a CIA order to assassinate Qaddafi in October 1981 when 
William Casey became CIA director and the CIA returned to its covert actions. 
In any event, the United States had tried to penetrate Qaddafi's regime and at 
the same time to keep an eye on the opposition to Qaddafi, and to encourage the 
opposition to work more closely with the USA. The American policy had been to 
work with the two sides at the same time. 25 
Libya had approached Billy Carter to help improve their relations with United 
States. Libya tried in 1978-1979 to gain influence in the US through labor unions, 
black organizations, oil companies and politically important individuals. Billy 
Carter visited Libya in the Fall of 1978 for eight days as a guest of the Libyan 
government. The Libyans had promised him opportunities to do business and 
make investments in oil. During this period Libya asked for American Boeing 
and C-130s which the United States had refused to sell it because of the Libyan 
position on the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Camp David negotiations and allegation 
of involvement in international terrorism. 26 
David Newsom, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs visited Libya 
on June 9, 1979 for three days of talks with Libyan Foreign Minister, A. Turaki 
about the Camp David Peace Process, terrorism and Libyan intervention in Africa. 
Brzezinski, President Carter's National Security advisor met Libyan diplomats in 
Washington.D.C in November 1979 to ask for Libyan help to release the American 
hostages in Tehran 
"This anxiety prompted very intense diplomatic efforts, both conventional and 
unconventional, the latter including the PLO and even the Libyans. One of these 
efforts involved the much-publicized conversation between me and Billy Carter, who 
had been cultivated by the Libyans. Both the Libyans and PLO actually did urge 
the release of the hostages, but their influence was not significant." 27 
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In reality, Qaddafi did not have much influence in Iran because of the dis-
appearance of Imam Musa al-Sadr 1978, or with the Middle East fundamentalist 
groups because of his interpretations of Islam. Officially, in 1979, Libya was close 
to the Carter's policy; Libya condemned hostage taking in Tehran and Libya also 
condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, and when the 
Libyan demonstration attacked the American embassy in Tripoli and burnt it, De-
cember 1979, Qaddafi wrote to Carter and the Libyans later paid compensation for 
the damage. 28 With the end of the Carter Presidency a new phase of American-
Libyan relations started which contrasted with the Carter political detente and 
secret diplomacy with Qaddafi. 
5.2.1.3 Qaddafi-Reagan: Diplomacy of confrontation 
Ronald Reagan adopted a global approach in dealing with the Third World, 
and he understood the world in east-west terms. Reagan intended to restore Amer-
ican power and prestige around the world. The shift in American policy against 
Libya was dramatic. The Nixon, Ford and Carter Administrations had ignored 
Libya as an unimportant nuisance which could not be punished because America's 
allies in Europe would not approve. But because Libya was unimportant and a 
weak state it was an ideal target for Reagan to enhance US's reputation and pres-
tige after Carter's humiliation in the hostage crisis. As William Quandt put it 
because Libya was a weak target unlike Iran or Syria it was an attractive target. 
The Reagan administration had labelled Libya as a terrorist state, a Soviet puppet, 
fundamentalist and a destabilizing element, particularly after the assassination of 
Sadat in October 1981. In December 1981, the US Administration leaked a false 
report that Qaddafi had sent a team to assassinate Reagan but the report was to 
prepare public opinion for US military action against Libya and to increase the 
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CIA's role in covert operations after years of restrictions.29 
The US government closed the Libyan People's Bureau in Washington in 
May 1981, and also called all American diplomats in Libya. In March 1982, the 
Reagan Administration barred further imports of Libyan oil, and the US began 
to support Libyan opponents of Qaddafi. The United States accused Libya of 
supporting radical groups in Latin America and the "Nation of Islam" sect inside 
the USA. On August 19, 1981 the first military confrontation occurred between 
Reagan and Qaddafi over the Gulf of Sdra, during which two Libyan SU-22s were 
shot down by US Navy F-14s. The US has never recognized Libya's so-called 
"Line of Death" in Gulf of Sdra 32' 30" N, and it used the line as part of the war 
of nerves. Reagan's objective in destabilizing Qaddafi was to provide a lesson to 
Third World countries who would like to oppose American policy. But US actions 
have strengthened Qaddafi inside Libya and in the eyes of the Arab masses and in 
Third World revolutionary movements. As Claudia Wright put it 
"Qaddafi has survived to date, not just because he has a good East German 
and Soviet intelligence network, but because he has anticipated the Americans more 
shrewdly than they have anticipated him." 30 
Libya votes with radical states and the Eastern Bloc in the United Nations. 
For example, Mozambique voted least of all African states with the United States, 
8.7 percent, followed by Angola and Libya at 11.4 percent. But in cultural rela-
tions Libya has between 3000-4000 students in US, most of them specializing in 
technology; the number of Libyan students in the USA is much bigger than in the 
USSR. Culturally, Libya has been oriented to the West more than the Eastern bloc 
despite Qaddafi's rhetoric.31 The US put pressure on Qaddafi not because he had 
threatened directly US interests, but because of US regional policy and US-Soviet 
relations. David Newsom, former US Under Secretary of State, has argued that if 
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the United States was flexible towards Qaddafi, he would not align himself with 
Moscow to such a degree as to affect the military balance in the Mediterranean. 32 
5.2.2 American-Tunisian Relations 
American relations with Tunisia were influenced by American support for 
Tunisian independence, the cold war, relations with France, the personality of 
Bourguiba, his ideology and pro-Western orientation, his adaptation of European 
culture to Tunisia and his criticism of Islamic values. Bourguiba had been in power 
in Tunisia from 1956 until he was ousted in November 1987. So the Americans 
had dealt with Bourguiba for more than thirty years and his charismatic leadership 
dominated the Socialist Destourian party and Tunisian foreign relations. 33 
During the struggle for independence, there were two organized nationalist 
movements, the Tunisian Labour Union UGTT, and the Neo-Destour party. The 
Americans had a strong relation with the UGTT, and they penetrated it through 
American trade unions as discussed above (see chaper 4). After independence, 
Bourguiba had tried successfully to bring the UGTT under his political control. 
After that, Bourguiba managed to gain control of the Neo-Destour party after a 
struggle over the leadership of the party with Saleh Ben Youssef. Ben Youssef 
was opposed to Bourguiba's policy toward the French because he was orientated 
to Arab Nationalism and Islamic values and to continuing the struggle against 
France. In 1956 Bourguiba managed to dismiss Ben Youssef from the Neo-Destour 
party and he tried to arrest him. Ben Youssef fled to exile in Egypt. Between 
1956 and 1961 Ben Youssef had led a political struggle against Bourguiba from 
exile in Cairo until he was assassinated in Frankfurt, Germany in August 1961 by 
Bourguiba's agents.34 
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During the Suez crisis, America condemned the French-British action against 
Egypt, and during that period Egypt enjoyed good relations with the US. On the 
other hand, Egypt's relations with France were poor because of Egyptian support 
for the Algerian revolution. American anti-colonial policy had been appreciated 
by Tunisian leaders and the Thnisian UGTT had adopted the American approach 
toward Arab-Israeli conflict,35 and in these circumstances Ben Youssef had built 
political links with Americans in Cairo. 
When Bourguiba controlled both the UGTT and the Neo-Destour party, the 
Americans found themselves having to co-operate with him because he was in full 
command of Tunisia. Bourguiba had also supported American policy in the Middle 
East. Thnisia supported the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957 to use force in response 
to Soviet aggression in the Middle East.36 Thnisia, newly independent, welcomed it, 
perhaps in the hope of American generosity in return and Tunisia also welcomed 
close and friendly relations with the United States partly as a counterpoise to 
France.37 
5.2.2.1 American- Tunisian relations 1958-1968 
In the late 1950s, Thnisia and France were at odds during the long Algerian 
war of independence, the US was able to be the neutral broker, strengthening its 
ties to the newly independent North African state. During the Sakhiet-sidi Youssef 
incident, February 1958, when French aircraft bombed a Thnisian frontier village, 
which French authorities alleged was being used as a base by FLN for raids into 
Algeria, 38 Tunisia demanded the evacuation of French forces from Thnisia, and 
an Anglo-American mediation team (the Murphy-Beeley mission) set out to solve 
the problem. Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary of State was appointed 
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mediator in the Franco-Tunisian dispute by the US government on February 19, 
1958. Murphy acted during WWII as the US diplomatic representative in North 
Africa and political advisor to General Eisenhower, then commanding Allied forces 
in the Mediterranean. 39 
The US put pressure on France and it used the argument that French action 
would push Tunisia toward the Soviets. When the government of Gaillard of 
France submitted its policy (evacuation of French forces) to the National Assembly 
on April 15, 1958, it was violently denounced by both the right wing and the 
communist deputies who accused it of accepting a policy dictated by the USA. 
The Gaillard government resigned on April 17 1958. M. Duclos (deputy) said in 
the General Assembly 
"Bourguiba is a puppet in the hands of the American Administration. To tell 
us that we risk driving him in the hands of the Soviet is a travesty of the truth, of 
the two dangers threatening us, the Soviet and the American, the second is the more 
immediate ... "40 
Bourguiba had tried to use the American card against France because the 
latter had military bases in Tunisia and also to solve the Algerian question. On the 
other side, the United States, in the cold war era, was ambitious to have political 
influence in Tunisia as a foothold in Africa and to use Bourguiba against Nasser 
who had begun to approach the Soviet Union. On May 3, 1961 Bourguiba visited 
the United States, and President John Kennedy greeted him as "a distinguished 
world statesman who had fought for freedom and principle. '~1 Kennedy compared 
Bourguiba to George Washington as a revolutionary leader. 
Bourguiba addressed a joint session of Congress, and repeated his demand for 
the evacuation of the French Naval base at Bizerta and for a solution to Algerian 
question. The Bizerta question led Tunisia to submit the dispute to the UN security 
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council and then to a special session of the General Assembly. The Assembly 
endorsed the Tunisian demand on August 25 1961. The French evacuated the base 
on October 15 1964. There was another factor which had led Tunisia to approach 
the United States, the Tunisian's government nationalization of French -held land 
which affected over 670,000 acres. The French reacted to the action by cancelling 
a loan and imposed strict quotas on imports from Tunisia. The French action had 
pushed Tunisia to strengthen its relation with the USA.42 
The United States welcomed Bourguiba's attitude toward the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. He was the first Arab leader to call for a United Nations solution for 
Palestine (partition plan) in 1947. In 1965, Bourguiba argued for Arab-Jewish co-
operation, and the argument had created a cold war between the Arab states be-
cause Egypt, Syria and other Arabs supported the liberation of Palestine. Tunisia 
was isolated in the Arab World because Arab public opinion was strongly against 
political compromise with Israel. After the June 1967 war, most of the Arab states 
broke off diplomatic relations with the US but the United States continued to en-
joy good relations with Tunisia at the expense of American-Egyptian relation and 
Soviet relations with radical Arab states. In May 1968, Bourguiba made a second 
state visit to the United States, where he met President Johnson and recalled the 
longstanding interests of the United States in Tunisia. Also, in the 1960s, Tunisia 
welcomed American Peace Corp Volunteers an organization formed by President 
Kennedy to help Third World countries. The program had over 200 volunteers in 
Tunisia in 1968.43 
5.2.2.2 American-Tunisian relations in the 1970s 
The United States cultivated Egypt in the early 1970s, and after Nasser's 
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death in 1970, Sadat oriented Egyptian politics toward the West, and this new 
orientation had important implications for American-Thnisian relations because 
Egypt was a more important country than Thnisia. Soviet influence had been 
replaced by American after the Soviet advisors were expelled from Egypt. Sadat 
took a more moderate position than Bourguiba in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Dur-
ing the 1970s, Thnisia faced a variety of difficulties, for example, the question of 
the succession, and serious social and economic problems, especially trade union 
strikes. 
Bourguiba had never liked his ministers to become too powerful and many 
ministers had been cast aside: Ahmed ben Saleh, the country's economic over-
lord until 1969; Mohammad Masmoudi after the signing of treaty with Libya in 
197 4; Ahmed Mestiri, a former minister of defence who later on led the opposition 
Mouvement de Democrates Sociallistes. 
The United States was aware of the succession problem in Thnisia particularly, 
after the Black January incident in 1978, when many workers were killed as a result 
of trade union confrontations with the government. It is perhaps interesting to note 
that Irving Brown of the AFL-CIO, who had a connection with the CIA, gave 
evidence favourable to Achour, the leader of the UGTT during his trial in Thnisia; 
as did the Secretary General of ICFTU, Otto Kersten. The Thnisian Government 
had accused the trade union leaders of cooperating with outside powers.44 
At the end of the 1970s, Thnisia had become a political player in Arab politics, 
After the Camp David agreement in 1979, Thnisia broke off diplomatic relations 
with Egypt, and the Arab embassies in Cairo - except Oman and Sudan- were 
closed, and Thnisia became the headquarters of the Arab League. In American 
194 
eyes, Tunisia moved to the centre of Arab politics, and with fears about the spread 
of the Iranian revolution, the Americans looked to Tunisia as an important state in 
North Africa, and the question of the succession to Bourguiba became an increasing 
American concern in the early 1980s.45 
5.2.2.3 American-Tunisian relations from 1980-1985 
Four factors had influenced American relations with Tunisia in the early 1980s: 
First; the Gafsa incident January 1980. Second; The transfer of PLO headquarters 
from Beirut to Tunis in 1982. Third; the unresolved succession problem in Tunisia, 
and Fourth; the popularity of Mouvement de la Tendance Islamique {MTI). 
In January 1980, Tunisian dissidents attacked the Tunisian town of Gafsa, a 
small mining town 300 kilometers southeast of Tunis. The attack was timed to 
coincide with the anniversary of a general strike in Tunisia two years earlier, during 
which the Tunisian army had fired on the strikers, killing dozens of them. The 
Tunisian Government accused Libya of the incident. It claimed that Tunisians were 
being trained in Libya to destabilize the Tunisian regime. Libya denied the inci-
dent and accused Tunisia and other foreign intelligence services of engineering the 
incident. But the United States reacted strongly to the incident and announced, 
on 31 January, 1980, that it was considering an expansion of its military program 
to Tunisia.46 The United States also stressed that it would "view with concern" any 
outside interference in Tunisian affairs and, at the end of February, the State De-
partment announced a decision to send a total of thirty armored personnel carriers 
and six helicopters to Tunisia worth $23 millions.47 The United States Ambassador 
to the United Nations, Donald McHenry, visited Tunisia on February 20 1980, and 
expressed United States support for Tunisian security. But President Carter had 
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no special interest in Thnisia, and did not give it much attention in relation to his 
human rights policy.48 It was France which dispatched its warships to the Thnisian 
coast. 
In the wake of the Iranian revolution and events in Afghanistan, the West had 
been keen to assume a more active role in the Middle East. It seems that the Gafsa 
incident had a positive side for the United States because the incident occurred as 
the Carter Administration was pressing for the US Congress to allow a controversial 
arms sale to Morocco. The Gafsa incident helped the Carter Administration to 
put pressure on the Congress to send arms to Thnisia and to pass the arms sale to 
Morocco.49 
The United States saw Thnisia as a moderate Arab state and the US had 
welcomed the move of the PLO headquarters to Tunisia, because it might lead the 
PLO to adopting a more moderate policy in the Arab-Israeli conflict. But the PLO 
moved because Thnisia was the headquarters of the Arab League and, in Thnisia, 
the PLO would have more independence than in Syria and Iraq. But the presence 
of the PLO created other problems for the United States when Israeli aircraft 
attacked the PLO headquarters in 1985.50 The Thnisian media strongly attacked 
the United States for the first time since the 1967 war. Many Thnisians believed 
that the United States had known of the Israeli raid in advance and did nothing to 
stop it. President Reagan's reaction increased Thnisian suspicion. Reagan stated 
after the Israeli raid that it was a "legitimate response and an expression of self-
defense."51 The statement disturbed Thnisian-American relations, Reagan was not 
interested in Thnisian public opinion or in solving the Arab-Israeli conflict but in 
American public opinion and in his relations with Israel. 
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Only after intense Thnisian pressure on the US, the US preferred abstention 
rather than veto of the Security Council resolution condemning the Israeli raid. 
The United States Deputy Secretary of State, John Whitehead, visited Thnisia 
to rebuild the US relations, but the US was still concerned about the unresolved 
problem of succession. American officials preferred a pro-American successor rather 
than a radical one close to Libya who might change the North African balance of 
power and stability. 52 The spread of the Islamic movement in Tunisia had created 
a problem for the US because the Americans did not want the Islamic movement to 
hold power in Thnisia or to spread in North Africa because of America's experience 
with Islamic fundamentalists in Iran. 
An American Embassy function in Tunis in February 1985 was a clear sign 
of American involvement in the succession problem in Thnisia. The US Embassy 
invited government leaders and critics to an evening's dinner and discussion of the 
country's future. A seminar was also held in Georgetown University attended by 
American and Thnisian officials and other American experts on Thnisia to discuss 
the Tunisian succession. The United States was attracted to the Tunisian model 
for thirty years because Bourguiba was seen as pragmatic, non-ideological, open 
to the West and secular.53 
Although Tunisia had a cultural agreement which was signed on November 
18th 1963, it was not active, and French culture and language dominated Thnisian 
life in 1970s and 1980s. As of September 1983 only 450 academic students had 
been trained in the USA compared to more than a thousand in France. 54 
5.2.3 American-Algerian relations 
Algeria won its independence during the Kennedy Administration. Kennedy 
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had been a strong supporter of Algerian independence in the 1950s when he was 
a senator and a member of the committee on Foreign Relations. 
5.2.3.1 American and Algeria: Ben Bella and Kennedy 
After independence a special relationship had developed between Algeria and 
the United States of America. The United States recognized the new Algerian 
government on 29th of September 1962, and Ben Bella visited the United States 
in October 1962, only three months after Algerian independence. It was the first 
trip Ben Bella made outside Algeria as a President. After his visit to the United 
States, Ben Bella visited Cuba where he met Castro at the time of the Cuban 
crisis. The Ben Bella visit to Cuba was not a sign of support for Castro against 
the US, but it was intended both to gain a type of legitimacy for Ben Bella as a 
revolutionary leader and for consumption inside Algeria and in the Third World. 
William Quandt described America's relations with Algeria as part of Kennedy's 
new approach toward new Third World regimes 
"During the Kennedy years, there seems to have been a desire to identify the 
United States with non-communist but progressive Third World countries. because 
of Kennedy's early interest, Algeria for a brief period was seen as a country to be 
courted in the hope of convincing neutral governments throughout the world that the 
cold war mentality of the Dulles era was over." 66 
Ben Bella had close relations with Nkrumah and Nasser but he was not sup-
portive of Communist ideology. Ben Bella had won a reputation as a revolutionary 
leader. He had influence in the Non-Aligned Movement as a progressive leader. In 
that sense he was a potential target for America to develop relations with. On the 
other hand, Algeria was desperate for economic aid and to balance its relations 
with France, it had built links with both the US and USSR, although its relations 
with the USSR were handicapped because of the USSR's position during the strug-
198 
gle for independence from France. Ben Bella developed effective relations outside 
Algeria but his domestic policy had isolated him within the FLN and it led to his 
overthrow in a non-violent coup in 1965.56 
5.2.3.2 American-Relations with Algeria: Boumedienne era 
The Boumedienne coup was directed at Ben Bella's internal policy, but 
Boumedienne had also a more Islamic-Arabic background than Ben Bella because 
Boumedienne had studied one year in al-Azhar University in Cairo and he was 
less enthusiastic toward the Eastern bloc. The United States was unable to stop 
the coup and it realized that Ben Bella had lost popularity inside Algeria despite 
his popular reputation outside Algeria. The United States believed that Boume-
dienne would be more moderate in his foreign policy and that he would adopt a 
Non-Aligned policy. 
After the 1967 War, and Arab accusations of United States involvement, Al-
geria broke its diplomatic relations with the United States. Algeria sent to Egypt a 
battalion-size combat team of infantry and artillery and about 100 MIGs planes to 
fight for the Arabs. Algerian demonstrators attacked the American Embassy and 
US information centre, but despite the broken diplomatic relations, consular rela-
tions were not broken, which left two American consulates operating in Oran and 
Constantine. 57 The Palestinian issue and the Vietnam conflict were points of polit-
ical dispute between the US and Algeria in the 1960s. After the Paris peace agree-
ment in 1973, the Palestinian problem has been at the centre of Algerian-American 
political differences because Algeria has been one of the strongest supporters of 
the Palestinian cause. As a leader of the Third World and Non-Aligned movement, 
Algeria has adopted anti-imperialist policies and allowed liberation movements to 
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open offices in Algiers. 
The United States was affected by the Algerian nationalization policy in the 
1960s and, despite American requests for compensation, the issue was critical to 
their political relations. In addition, Algeria became the headquarters of the Amer-
ican Black Panther party in 1970 because the leader of the group, Eldridge Cleaver, 
had fled to Algeria as a political exile. But, in 1972, two hijacking ransoms col-
lected by the Black Panthers were returned to the US and the Algerians cut off 
relations with and support for the group. Algeria had a conflict with France in 
the early 1970s over Algerian natural gas, and this conflict encouraged Algeria to 
develop trade relations with the United States. 58 
Economic interests between the two countries in 1973 and after had encour-
aged a political rapprochement between them. After the Arab-Israeli war in 1973, 
Algeria was frustrated from the Soviet policy during the war. After Kissinger's 
disengagement policy following the War, the US and Algeria started to minimize 
their differences and they adopted a more pragmatic approach in their contacts. In 
1973, Kissinger regularly consulted with Boumedienne in the course of his shuttle 
diplomacy. Kissinger has stated that he used Algeria to mediate between him and 
Syria and also to learn about Syrian objectives from Algeria during the disengag-
ment policy between Syria and Israel in the Golan heights. 59 
Two events combined to reduce Algeria's anti-American policy in the Middle 
East and Algerian weight in Arab politics in 1970s. One was the assassination of 
King Faisal of Saudi Arabia and the other was the Western Sahara problem with 
Morocco. King Faisal was a strong supporter of the anti-Kissinger policy in the 
Middle East, and through Saudi Arabia's money he had won influence in Egypt 
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and Syria and, in 1973, the Arabs used the oil weapon for the first time. Faisal 
and Boumedienne were strong supporters of the Palestinian issue. 60 
Kissinger claimed that Boumedienne distrusted Soviet policy in the Middle 
East, especially after Soviet behaviour in the October war in 1973. On the other 
hand, when Vernon Walters, the deputy chief of the CIA, met secretly with PLO 
leaders in Rabat, it was a sign of American flexibility toward the Arab-Israeli con-
flict. Algeria was encouraged by American policy toward Pakistan in 1971 during 
its conflict with India. Algeria saw an American tilt toward Pakistan as a progres-
sive policy. From an American perspective, the Non-Aligned Summit in Algiers 
in September 1973, Algerian adoption of New International Economic Order and 
South-North Dialogue, Algeria had become an important element and a positive 
factor in the Non-Aligned Movement because of Algeria's role in countering radical-
ization of the movement and encouragement toward positive neutral in East-West 
conflict. In 1973, Algeria and the United States resumed their political relations. 
Boumedienne paid an unofficial visit to President Nixon during Boumedienne's 
address to the General Assembly in 1974.61 
American-Algerian relations had been influenced by Algerian relations with 
France. In 1969 and 1970, the French-Algerian relations were influenced by two ele-
ments: France introduced protectionist measures against imports of Algerian wine, 
and Algeria nationalized French oil companies' interests. As a result, Algeria ini-
tially looked towards more cooperation with United States. But Giscard d'Estaing 
visit to Algeria in 1975, the first visit by a French President to newly independent 
Algeria, led to a settlement of the Algerian-French disputes over trade relations 
and French immigration policy (there were around 850,000 Algerian immigrants 
in France). The French-Algerian rapprochement had its impact on American-
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Algerian relations, especially on the eve of Carter's policy in the Middle East in 
1977. Algeria condemned American policy in the Middle East and the Camp David 
agreements, and Algeria joined the anti-Camp David camp and the steadfastness 
front against Sadat's peace with Israel. Boumedienne had adopted an Arab-Islamic 
policy with support for liberation movements until his death in 1979.62 
5.2.3.3 American-Algerian relations 1979-1985 
After Boumedienne's death, Chadli Bendjedid became Algerian president, 
(with the support of the military). The new President has developed a more mod-
erate approach in foreign policy, and he adopted a less revolutionary ideology. In 
his early years as President, Algeria played a major role as a mediator between the 
United States and Iran in the American hostage crisis. Algeria gained a reputa-
tion as a successful international mediator. Brzezinski, Carter's National Security 
Advisor, visited Algeria and met Iranian officials there. The Carter administration 
was inclined toward Algeria and the US adopted a neutral policy in the Western 
Sahara conflict between Morocco and Algeria, (see chapter eight). Carter, like 
John Kennedy, had adopted a regional approach in his foreign policy and he tried 
to combat Soviet influence in the Third World by new means, in particular he 
raised the Human Rights issue and he leaned toward more progressive regimes and 
distanced America from reactionary policies. Unfortunately, this new approach 
did not survive the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 
Algeria has increasingly orientated its need for technology towards the West, 
and especially the United States. In 1970, there were only 46 Algerians in graduate 
programs in North America, in 1978, there were 1,720, and by 1981, the figure 
reached 2,066. The first cultural co-operation agreement between Algeria and the 
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US was signed in June 1987.63 
During Reagan's first term in the White House, Algeria's relations with the 
United States were less warm than during the Carter years. Reagan's globalist 
policy led him to support Morocco. Alexander Haig described Carter's relations 
with Algeria in the following terms; 
"Certain State Department bureaucrats, whose sympathies clearly lay with Al-
geria, the revolutionary republic, rather than with Morocco, the kingdom, maintained 
that concessions to Algiers would encourage the friendlier trend in our recent relations 
following many years of gingerly contacts. I raised this matter with Bud Mcfarlane, 
who had done outstanding staff work on this question. I decided that the issue of 
Morocco's defence against a Marxist insurgency and Soviet intimidation was so impor-
tant in itself, and as a means of alerting Moscow and the world at large to the revival 
of American will, that some other means of acknowledging our genuine gratitude to 
Algeria would have to be found. "64 
The influence of conservative elements in the Reagan administration had lim-
ited Algeria's ability to approach the US. There were also differences with Ameri-
can companies over natural gas prices which helped distance Algeria from the US. 
Bendjedid visited the United States in 1985 to push the Reagan Administration 
toward a solution for the Palestinian problem but Reagan failed to respond.65 
5.2.4 American-Moroccan relations 
American relations with Morocco were influenced over three decades by Amer-
ica's perception of the stability of Morocco's monarch. George Lambrakis, Direc-
tor of the Office of Regional Affairs within the State Department's Bureau of Near 
Eastern and South Asian Affairs from 1979 to 1982, describes the American atti-
tude toward the monarch in the early days of independence 
"I'm constantly reminded that my first job in the Foreign Service in 1957 was 
reporting on North Africa. At that time, a very senior colleague explained to me 
that now Algeria had gone radical, in a very short time King Hassan of Morocco and 
President Bourguiba in Tunisia would be gone. That was almost 30 years ago and 
they are still in power. He was not being silly; he had the indicators." 66 
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Lambrakis's view was repeated by Americans many times in the 1960s, which 
the CIA reported in 1979 that Hassan's regime would not survive another year, 
and the same argument was used again in 1981 and 1983. The perception was 
derived from the widespread corruption surrounding the monarchy. According to 
Richard Parker, who was Deputy Chief of Mission in Rabat 1970 to 1974 and later 
on American Ambassador to Morocco 1978-1979, Hassan II or his relatives have 
been criticized for corruption, inefficiency, and ostentatious living, while 60 per 
cent of the population remains poor. 67 
However, American policy makers were interested in Morocco for geostrategic 
reasons in the cold war era and because of the American military bases there. The 
United States had been influenced by France's role in Morocco because France 
perceived Morocco as within its sphere of influence and area of interests. 
5.2.4.1 American-Moroccan relations: Mohammed V reign 1956-1961 
King Mohammed V of Morocco tried to build a direct relationship with the 
United States after Moroccan independence in 1956, while the Americans had nego-
tiated with France to settle their military bases in Morocco after WWII. According 
to an American official in 1956, King Mohammed V did not trust the French and 
particularly the role of the French communist party in Morocco. The King also 
had problems with France over Algeria and the migration of French from Morocco 
(after the destruction of many government files) left the new independent state 
without much experience to cope with government.68 
Moreover, Morocco was in a difficult economic position and the Moroccan 
army required a great deal of financial aid and equipment, so the King was in-
clined to seek help from the United States. On the other hand, the United States 
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discouraged Morocco from establishing relations with the Soviet Union, because 
the US was aware of Soviet interests in Morocco's strategic location. Also, the 
Americans had seen the King as a moderate voice in the Arab world and he had 
not only protected the Jewish community in Morocco, but his first cabinet included 
Jewish members. 
King Mohammed V of Morocco visited the United States in November 1957 
to strengthen his relations with the United States and to ask for economic aid. 
President Eisenhower visited Morocco in 1959, and reached agreement with Mo-
hammed V to withdraw from all bases by 1963. The United States also supported 
Morocco in its request for unification of Moroccan territories, particularly Tang-
ier, where America had a station for Voice of America. The American reaction to 
Tangier's status was similar to the USSR, both supported Morocco on the Tangier 
Question to remove the International status of Tangier.69 
When Morocco established diplomatic relations with the USSR in 1958 and 
received several MIG's in 1961, the United States informally criticized Morocco. 
But the United States implicitly supported Morocco in its attempt to establish the 
Casablanca group for African unity against colonialism in 1960. Neither the USSR 
nor the USA had a record as imperialist powers in Africa and both superpowers 
tried to encourage anti-colonialism. 70 
5.2.4.2 American-Moroccan relations 1961-1970: suspicion and mistrust 
When Hassan succeeded to the throne in 1961, many observers, Moroccan 
and foreigners alike, felt that Hassan II, having none of his father's charisma and 
spiritual qualities, would not last more than a year. Mohammed V had held the 
respect of the seasoned politicians and and the adoration of the ordinary people, 
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but Hassan II possessed neither. 71 Hassan II visited the United States when he 
was crown prince in 1956, and in April 1963 as king of Morocco. In the second 
visit, his official reception was warm, but his personal extravagances, exemplified 
by the purchase of five cadillacs, as well as an apparent disregard for his young 
wife and daughter, resulted in some criticism. The American image of Hassan II 
was that of a playboy rather than a statesman. 72 
Political developments in Morocco in the early 1960s caused difficulties for 
Hassan II. The Istiqlal party, the strongest Moroccan party after independence, and 
the only challenge to the king's power, had experienced a division inside the party. 
Al-Fassi, the charismatic leader of the party, was in favour of a one party system, 
and a constitutional monarch, while Balafrej argued for a multi-party system; 
Mehdi ben Barka, Abdelrahim Bouabid and the General Secretary of Moroccan 
Trade Unions (MUT) Mahjob Ben Sidiqi, were republican and Socialist in their 
ideas.73 
The Istiqlal party had split in the late 1950s, and the radical wing had formed 
the Union Nationale de Forces Populaires (UNFP), the latter had a more radical 
stance. The leadership of the new party were ex-members of the Istiqlal such 
as Ben Barka, Abdullah Ibrahim and Faqi Basri. King Hassan II adopted the 
first constitution in December 1962 but the UNFP had a negative attitude toward 
Hassan II and it had much influence over the National Union of Moroccan Students. 
To confront the Istiqlal party and UNFP, the government had encouraged Ahmed 
Reda Guedira to form the Front pour la Defense des Institutions Constitutionelles 
(FDIC).74 It was coalition of parties in support of the monarchy. 
During 1963 there were political struggles inside Morocco between the political 
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parties and the Front pour la Defense des Institutions Constitutionelles (FDIC) was 
accused of buying votes with wheat donated by the American programme "food 
for peace". Four Istiqlal deputies and a mayor addressed a letter to the United 
States embassy in Rabat 75 complaining about the misuse of American donation. 
The government's response to that accusation was to arrest these five despite 
the parliamentary immunity that the new constitution gave four of them. The 
government also brought libel suits against La Nation and Al-Alam newspapers for 
printing the letter and arrested 130 members from UNFP including their leaders al-
Basri and Abdulla Ibrahim. Ben Barka was in Cairo at the time but he was charged 
with supplying funds and aid to the plotters, and vague charges also implicated 
the United States and the United Arab Republic. 76 
It seems that the United States had doubts about Hassan's survival and it 
had developed warm relations with, and given implicit support to, the radical 
republican party, the UNFP. The United States had built close links with Ben 
Barka and the General Secretary of MUT, Ben Sidiqi. In 1956, during the MUT 
strike Ben Sidiqi stated that "we do not want the Americans to leave; they have 
done a great deal for the country. 77 
Ben Barka left Morocco in 1963 for exile to live in Paris, and to organize an 
opposition front against the regime. He cultivated a close relationship with Egypt. 
In 1965, riots spread in Moroccan cities particularly in Casablanca and they posed 
a major threat to the regime. During the riots, the King was denounced by name! 
and hundreds of people were wounded and about 100 people were killed. The 
causes of the riots were related to the economic recession in 1964 and to Arab 
nationalist feeling in Morocco. The Egyptian teachers in Moroccan high schools 
were thought to have played a major role in spreading nationalist attitudes. 
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The King declared a state of national emergency and suspended the consti-
tution on June 7, 1965 and a period of direct rule began that lasted until 1970.78 
The most important element in the 1960s in US-Moroccan relations was the assas-
sination of Mehdi Ben Barka in Paris in 1965. He was kidnapped and later killed 
and despite much speculation that Moroccan intelligence and some elements in 
French intelligence were involved in the episode, it seems that the incident itself 
was related to the struggle between France and the US for political influence in 
Morocco. 
It is hard to believe that the Moroccans had committed the crime without 
French knowledge, because General Oufkir, the head of security police in Morocco 
after 1960, and then Minister of Interior from 1964 to 1971, was in the French 
army before Moroccan independence and according to Mehdi Banounni (Moroccan 
politician), Oufkir was an agent of French intelligence. Oufkir's personal ambition 
and French interests had met together. Oufkir tried to eliminate his political rival, 
and the French protected their interests by preserving the regime. On the other 
hand, the United States, during the Kennedy years, had attempted to distance 
America from conservative regimes particularly those derived from a European 
colonial legacy, and Ben Barka had developed a reputation for socialism and pro-
gressive ideas. Kennedy's new approach was to support the forces of Third World 
socialism as a counter to communism in the Third World. 79 
Ben Barka was well known in America because, in 1957, the State Department 
invited him as a President of the National Assembly to visit the United States. 
He claimed to be a true democrat, and for a certain time, in sympathy with both 
the British and American democratic systems. According to Rom Landau, an 
American Jew, and a university professor in San Francisco University who was 
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close to Ben Barka from the 1950s, Ben Barka was anti-communist, and when the 
UNFP leader Abdullah Ibrahim became Prime Minister in Morocco in early 1960, 
the communists in Morocco had shrunk away almost to nothing. Socialist was 
used in the Third World as a political slogan but it did not mean communism, 
Ben Barka stated 
"we are socialists and we are aiming at a genuinely democratic government 
that will represent the true will of the people without wasting its time in constant 
inter-party warfare."80 
Hassan II had succeeded in the 1960s in neutralizing the opposition to his 
regime, and he had consolidated his power in Moroccan internal politics in a way 
which left no room to manouver to challenge his rule through political parties. It 
seems that the American approach to political change ( in favor of American influ-
ence and interests) in Morocco through the political parties and Moroccan Trade 
Unions (MUT) had failed81 because of the French influence and the support of the 
traditional politicians to the King. However, during this period, the charismatic 
opposition leader was assassinated, political parties lost their power, and then the 
military was the only force to emerge. 
5.2.4.3 American- Moroccan relations 1973-1980: From Coups to Co-operation 
Hassan II faced critical challenges in 1971 and 1972 when there were two 
attempted military coups. The King had become more dependent on his military 
forces for his survival after he had excluded Moroccan political rivals in 1960s 
and suspended the constitution. Moreover, in this kind of situation, corruption 
had spread because loyalty to the throne was more important than efficiency and 
honesty. 
Ali Benjelloun, former ambassador to the United States, was removed from 
209 
office as a Minister of Justice in 1967 because of corruption when he was Director-
General of the Sherifian Office of phosphates. He was never tried, but forced to 
retire. In Autumn 1970, two ministers were fired, allegedly for corruption; Mo-
hammed Imani, Minister of Public Work and Mohammed Benhima, Minister of 
Agriculture. Also in early 1971, four further ministers were fired because of corrup-
tion: Mamoun Tahiri, Minister of Finance; Mohammed Jaidis, Minster of Com-
merce; Mohammed Kriem, Minister of Tourism and Yahya Chefchauni, Director 
General of the Bureau of Mines. 82 
The United States was concerned about corruption in Morocco because of 
its strategic interests in an important geopolitical area in the cold war and its 
importance to NATO. The instability of Morocco or a new radical regime would 
affect the strategic situation in the Mediterranean. So in Spring 1971, the CIA 
prepared an intelligence report on Morocco for a Congressional Committee in which 
the gravity of corruption in Morocco was stressed.83 
In April1971, Mohammed Medbuh who was the leader of an abortive military 
coup in June 1971, was sent to Washington on a military mission but in reality, 
the King asked him to find out why Pan-American Airways had shown no interest 
in constructing an Intercontinental hotel in Casablanca. It had been rumoured 
that the sacked ministers had asked Pan-American for over a million dollars to 
be deposited in foreign banks. However, General Medbuh had close ties with the 
United States and he was a golf-partner of US Vice-President, Spiro Agnew, who 
had a visit to Morocco planned in July 1971. Despite the coup attempt and the 
killing of Medbuh, he went through with his scheduled visit two weeks after the 
coup.84 
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The United States had telecommunication facilities for its Mediterranean fleet 
in Morocco and an air base in Kenitra. The American bases were evacuated in 
1978. The second abortive military coup was in August 1972 when the air force, 
using US supplied F -5 aircraft, attacked the King's Boeing on his return from 
Paris. Diplomatic circles in Rabat and in the Arab World generally accused the 
US of instigating the coup attempt because the F -5s left with ammunition from 
the Kenitra base which was under American control and the rebel pilots had been 
trained in the United States. It is therefore hard to believe that the Americans in 
Kenitra did not have some kind of knowledge of the coup. The leader of the second 
attempt was Mohammed Oufkir who had emerged as a powerful man in Morocco 
as the new Minister of Defence after the first attempt in 1971. He had been 
Minister of Interior for seven years before he assumed control of the Ministry of 
Defence. The most likely interpretation that because of the French long standing 
relationship with the monarch, Oufkir found the Americans more helpful to his 
ambition. 85 
Hassan had emerged from the coups as more powerful. He executed the 
conspirators and controlled the military directly. Hassan II claimed that the first 
coup was externally instigated because 600 Moroccans had called at the Moroccan 
embassy in Cairo asking for passports in order to return. But Hassan became 
more cautious in the following years, and in order not to disturb his relations with 
America he suggested that 
"until it is proved conclusively to the contrary, I shall remain convinced that 
Generals Medbouk and Oufkir did not act as instruments of a foreign power."86 
In 1972, King Hassan II produced the third constitution (the second was in 
1970) but it was not until1977 that the elections were conducted. The multi-party 
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system had furthered Hassan's interests because the leaders of the parties were in 
Hassan's pocket, and the competition intensified between the political parties. In 
the case of the military, it was formally dominated by Berber officers but after the 
two attempted coups he had eliminated the military influence of the Berbers.87 
Hassan II adopted a more pragmatic approach in his foreign policy in the 
1970s, and his relations with America and particularly with Henry Kissinger had 
become closer. As a result of the Vietnam war, the United States adopted a 
geopolitical approach to further American interests, the "Nixon doctrine", which 
focused on regional powers to protect American interests as proxy forces instead of 
direct American military intervention. In this term, Hassan's power inside Morocco 
had convinced the Americans there was as no alternative to Hassan. On the other 
hand, the deployment of Moroccan forces in Syria in 1973 had increased Hassan's 
popularity inside Morocco. After 1973, Hassan supported Kissinger's step by step 
policy and disengagements. The Western Sahara issue has played an important role 
in Hassan's stability in the 1970s because all political parties supported Hassan's 
Western Sahara policy and his domestic failure was partly compensated by his 
success in the Sahara. 88 
Morocco had become a leading state in Arab and Islamic politics in the late 
1970s and early 1980s. Hassan had hosted the Organization of the Islamic Confer-
ence and Arab summits and he also became the Chairman of the Higher Committee 
for the Liberation of aL-Quds, the so called "Jerusalem Committee". More impor-
tant still, Hassan played a great role in the peace arrangements between Egypt and 
Israel; Hassan Tehami, the advisor of President Sadat of Egypt met Moshe Dayan 
in Rabat in 1977 to arrange peace negotiations between Egypt and Israel. Hassan 
was a strong supporter of the Camp David peace treaty and he had built good 
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relations with the Jewish community both inside and outside Morocco. The King 
allowed Moroccan Jews in 1985 to organize a world conference of Moroccan Jewry 
which was held in Canada. The World Assembly of the Moroccan Jewry held a 
second world congress in 1986 in Morocco. So the Jewish lobby in Europe and 
US were strong supporters of Hassan II. The influence of the Jewish community 
in America's media and in the Congress helped Hassan to improve his image in 
American political circles.89 
Despite Hassan's role in the Middle East, there were misperceptions between 
Hassan and Carter in the early days of the Carter Administration. During that 
era, Morocco had warm relations with the French President, Giscard d'Estang, and 
France and Morocco, with the help of the US, had intervened in Zaire in 1977 and 
1978.90 But Carter had adopted a regional approach in American foreign policy 
and raised human rights issues. Carter initially was cool towards Morocco and 
more orientated towards Algeria, and he did not support Morocco in the Western 
Sahara or sell arms to Morocco. Carter only supported Morocco with arms after 
the fall of the Shah of Iran and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the perceived 
American need for military bases for the Rapid Deployment Forces (RDF). The 
US was afraid to lose another friend. It was written in Casablanca during the Shah 
of Iran's temporary stay in Morocco after the Iranian revolution that "we have a 
Shah, we do not need another one. "91 
5.2.4.4 Reagan and Hassan II: Close relations 
Reagan adopted a global approach to American foreign policy and he was 
influenced by the Iranian revolution and perceived Carter's weakness in supporting 
American friends. As a conservative and with the support of Jewish lobby and 
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Saudi Arabian mediation, Morocco and the United States had for strategic reasons 
become close allies. The new socialist government in France which had criticized 
Hassan's human rights record had more sympathy with Algeria and Polisario. 
Hassan found himself closer to Reagan than to Mitterrand of France because the 
latter was a socialist, had close relations with the Moroccan socialist USFP and 
was critical of Morocco for the arrest of Abderrahim Bouabid, the leader of USFP 
in 1981. United States officials visited Morocco; Vice President Bush, Secretary of 
State Haig ( October 1981 and February 1982), Secretary of Defence Weinberger, 
and American Chief of Staff General John Vessy, they were all interested in military 
co-operation with Morocco, 92 (chapter seven). 
Hassan II visited the United States in 1982, and an agreement was signed for 
American use of Moroccan military bases when needed by the RDF. In January 
1983, Hassan executed General Dlimi on suspicion of a military coup attempt, and 
despite riots in Morocco in 1981 and 1984, Reagan continued to be a supporter of 
Hassan.93 Vernon Walters, an influential figure in the Reagan administration and 
US representative in the United Nations, has been close to Hassan for many years 
and has lobbied for him in Washington. 
Morocco's rapprochement with Libya in 1984, produced a strong condemna-
tion by Washington. The Reagan Administration tried to isolate Qaddafi and to 
discredit him while the Oujda treaty for Arab-African Union between Morocco and 
Libya had given legitimacy to Qaddafi and this disappointed the United States. 
The United States recalled its ambassador, Joseph Reed, and then replaced him 
with Thomas N assef who was also recalled when Morocco made a sudden rap-
prochement with Algeria. On the other hand, Morocco had strengthened its rela-
tions with the socialist government of Mitterrand. In the area of cultural relations 
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the French still dominated Morocco despite the arrival of Peace Corps volunteers 
in the 1960s. Morocco had fewer students in the USA than Libya or Algeria94 
(Table 5:1). 
5.3 Soviet-Maghreb relations 
Soviet relations with North Africa had been influenced by the cold war and 
by Soviet attempts to limit Western influence in the region. The Soviets had also 
used aid and cultural cooperation as a means of building influence in the future. 
The major regional conflict in the Middle East, the Palestinian problem had been 
an important factor in increasing the level of Soviet political contacts with the 
Maghreb states because all North African states support the Palestinian cause. 
Moreover, the role of Algeria and Morocco and other Maghreb states in the Arab 
world, the Non-Aligned movement, Islamic countries and Africa had encouraged 
the Soviets to develop political relations with the Maghreb. 95 
5.3.1 Soviet-Libyan relations 1969-1985 
Soviet-Libyan relations have been influenced by the personality and the ide-
ology of the Libyan leader, al-Qaddafi, and Soviet political links with Egypt and 
other regional states. Libyan conflicts with America had pushed Libya in many 
ways closer to the Soviets. The superpowers' regional competition had influenced 
superpower behaviour in the region. 
5.3.1.1 Soviet-Libyan Relations before 1969 Revolution 
The Soviet perception of the Libyan monarch was of a reactionary state under 
American and British control, an impression reinforced by the presence of American 
and British military bases. But despite that perception, the Soviets saw Libya more 
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as a victim than as an accomplice of Western imperialism. Full diplomatic ties were 
not established until1955, and diplomatic and commercial interchange developed 
slowly. Libyan parliamentary delegations visited the Soviet Union in 1961 and 
1968, and a delegation from the Supreme Soviet visited Libya in 1966. During 
this period, the Soviets kept channels open and awaited developments, because 
there was no communist organization in Libya, and the radical elements among 
the youth were orientated to Cairo rather than Moscow.96 
5.3.1.2 Soviet-Libyan relations: Suspicion and Cautious Relations 
The Soviet Union recognized the new Libyan government on the 4th Septem-
her, 1969, and the Soviet Charged' Affaire in Tripoli stated that his government 
supported Libya and was ready to provide any necessary assistance. The Eastern 
Europe states followed the Soviet Union, and East Germany and Bulgaria also 
recognized the Libyan revolution. 97 The Soviet newspaper Pravda, on September 
6th, 1969 welcomed the revolution 
"There is no doubt this is an important event. Libya is one of the major oil 
producers of the Near East. Wheelus Field, the American Air Force base, near Tripoli, 
and British military bases at Tobruk and El Adem are on Libyan territory. Libyan 
oil, as well as the foreign military bases located on its soil, were used by the English 
against the Egyptian people in 1956, during Tripartite imperialist aggression against 
Egypt."9s 
Despite Soviet support for the new Libyan regime, Qaddafi was strongly anti-
communist, and he criticized the Soviets during the Pakistan-India war in 1971. 
Qaddafi explained to Le Monde in 1971, that the Soviet supply of arms to Arab 
countries was a commercial affair. He saw Libya's relations with Moscow as one 
of mutual interest. He stated his view of Moscow and communism as follows; 
"We are against communism because communism is hostile to Islam. If the 
Soviet Union allows relations with the Arabs to deteriorate through the activities of 
the communists, such action will contradict the international policy proclaimed by 
Moscow and will prejudice its interests." 99 
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Qaddafi 's attitude toward commumsm has never changed, and the Soviet 
Union has consistently built its relations in the Middle East with governments 
rather than with communist parties for economic and geostrategic reasons. Libya 
and the Soviet Union shared many political objectives, for example, they were 
anti-imperialist and against the American political and military presence in the 
region. The Soviets had also been supporting the Arabs in the Arab- Israeli conflict, 
particularly after the 1967 war. Qaddafi had been calling for Arab unity, and the 
Soviets, at least in public, encouraged Arab Unity. 
During the visit of Libya's Prime Minister, Abd al-Salam Jallud, to Moscow 
on 23 February 1972, the two sides condemned US imperialist support for the 
Israeli military build up and reaffirmed their support for the Palestinian people. 
When Libya, Egypt and Syria announced their new Arab Federation, the Soviet 
Union welcomed the Federation of the Tripoli charter states in Benghazi on 17th 
April, 1971.100 The Soviet Union had seen Arab unity as a progressive force against 
imperialism, while the Americans had seen Arab unity as a threat to American 
interests. The Soviets tried to support the Arab aspiration for unity to win the 
Arab masses to the Soviet side.101 
5.3.1.3 Soviet-Libyan Relations 1975-1981 
After 1973, as a result of the October war, a new Arab regional alliance had 
emerged between Libya, Sudan and Egypt. Kissinger had won Sadat's confidence 
and started his step by step policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Soviets 
had felt that they had been ousted from the Middle East peace process and the 
Egyptian rapprochement to the United States meant that Sadat had all his cards 
in United States hands. The Soviet perception was that they had lost Egypt, 
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the core of the Arab world and the gate to Africa, and Libya offered them some 
compensation for the loss of its position in Egypt.102 In the case of Qaddafi, despite 
his long standing hostility toward communism and his criticism of the Soviet role in 
the Middle East during the October war, he carefully cultivated warmer relations 
with the Soviet Union during 1974. The main incentives were his quarrel with 
Egypt, Sadat's policy with the US and Qaddafi's own need for arms. 103 
Kosygin visited Libya in May 1975, and during that visit, the Soviets signed an 
economic, technical and cultural co-operation agreement. In the joint communique, 
the Soviet and Libyan officials condemned Israeli occupation of the West Bank and 
Gaza, and the Zionists. They called for the liquidation of imperialist bases and 
Kosygin asserted that 
"The strengthening of Soviet Libyan friendship was regarded by the USSR as a 
main element in strengthening the general anti-imperialist front of the socialist and 
developing countries." 104 
The Soviet Union's objective in Libya was geopolitical, as a gate to Africa 
after they lost political influence in Egypt. The close relations between the USA 
and Egypt led Qaddafi to visit the Soviet Union for the first time in December 
1976. The Soviets praised the Non-Aligned movement and Libya's active role in 
it. The Soviets regarded the Non-aligned countries including Libya as their allies 
in the anti-imperialist struggle.105 
Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in November 1977 had created a rift in the Arab 
world, and the Soviets supported the Rejectionist Steadfastness and Confrontation 
Front which was formed in Tripoli in December 1977 as a reaction to Sadat's 
visit. Jallud visited Moscow in February 1978 to discuss Sadat's peace with Israel 
as representative of the Steadfastness Front. Jallud met Brezhnev and Premier 
Kosygin and the Soviets called for a comprehensive peace settlement of the Arab-
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Israeli conflict. Kosygin said 
"The Soviet Union and Libya regard the task of a just settlement of the Mid-
dle East conflict as the most urgent of the tasks of contemporary international 
politics." 106 
However, Libyan political isolation in the region and the Camp David peace 
treaty had forced Libya to build close relations with the Soviet Union to counter 
the balance of power between Egypt and United States. The Soviets, despite their 
distrust of Qaddafi, favoured Libya over Egypt. Qaddafi was alienated from the 
United States and he courted Russia not because he loved Russia but to protect 
himself. 
5.3.1.4 Soviet- Libyan relations during Reagan era 
When Reagan came to power, Qaddafi was notably in conflict with America's 
allies, Egypt and the Sudan, and isolated in the Arab world but he was also 
in difficulty with many of his African neighbours because of Libyan intervention 
in Chad. In 1981, Sadat was assassinated and Nimeri was facing difficulty and 
instability in Sudan. America was keen to restore its influence and Reagan had 
increased the American defense budget to confront Soviet influence in the Third 
World. In these circumstances, the Soviets distanced themselves from Libya while 
Qaddafi tried to be close to the Soviets. In 1981, Qaddafi paid his second visit to the 
Soviet Union as a representative of Steadfastness but he antagonized the Soviets by 
saying prayers at the Grand Mosque in Moscow and by visiting cemeteries where 
he read Quranic verses.107 
Ideologically, the Soviets had realized that Qaddafi 's rapprochemeJit was unre-
liable, hut Soviet entente made sense only for hard currency and major oil deposits; 
from this perspective, Libya was a highly desirable partner for the Soviet Union. 
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To avoid direct confrontation with the United States, the Soviets had encouraged 
Libya to build relationships with Eastern Europe. The Soviets did not like to dis-
rupt their relations with the Americans over Libya because of the US accusation 
that Libya was a terrorist state, and the American-Libyan clash in the Gulf of 
Sdra. The Soviet Union praised the Tripartite Treaty of Ethiopia, South Yemen 
and Libya. The Soviets saw it as an important stage in strengthening the national 
liberation's solidarity and in stepping up their struggle against imperialism and 
reaction and for peace and progress.108 When Jallud visited Moscow in May 1982, 
the Soviets supported the Tripartite alliance, but in reality, Qaddafi tried to put 
pressure on Nimeri, to encircle Sudan, and to create a regional balance of power 
between US, Egypt and Sudan on the one hand and USSR, Ethiopia, South Yemen 
and Libya on the other hand.109 
According to Gregorii Arbatov, director of the American and Canadian Insti-
tute in Moscow, the Soviet Union had never taken Qaddafi seriously and during 
the American-Libyan clash the Soviet offered only a rhetorical condemnation. In 
cultural co-operation, although Libya and the Soviet Union had signed many agree-
ments, cultural co-operation was at a low level compared to the number of Libyan 
students in the USA and Western Europe. In 1981, Libya had only 275 students 
being trained in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.110 Whereas in 1972, there 
were over 600 Libyan students in the United States, by 1982 the number reached 
3000, many of whom were studying at graduate level,111 (see Tables 5:1;2). 
5.3.2 Soviet-Tunisian relations 
Soviet relations with Thnisia were often an inverse reflection of Thnisian re-
lations with France. The Bizerte crisis of 1961 led to a significant improvement 
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in Soviet-Thnisian relations.112 After Thnisian independence, diplomatic relations 
had been established more or less routinely in 1956. The Thnisian Communist 
Party played a minimal part in the attainment of Thnisian independence, and 
it pursued without success a policy of coalition with the Neo-Destour party (So-
cialist Destour party after 1962). From 1957 on, the Soviet Union was highly 
critical of Bourguiba's co-operation with the West which was dubbed "The policy 
of collaboration." 113 Soviet criticism and Bourguiba's anti communist policy had 
led to a ban on the Tunisian Communist Party in January 1963. But despite that, 
the Soviets ignored the Thnisian communists and tried to build government rela-
tions with Thnisia to reduce Thnisian reliance on the West, to penetrate Thnisian 
social and economic sectors and to win Thnisian public opinion to the Soviets 
side114 through the latter's support of the Arab cause and anti-colonial policy. 
Bourguiba was seen by the Soviets as a leader who had frozen the revolutionary 
forces of Thnisian society in the interest of an emerging bureaucratic bourgeoisie 
and state capitalist system. The Soviets saw him as a leader who had resisted 
Soviet influence on foreign policy.115 
5.3.2.1 Bizerte Crisis and the improvement of Soviet-Tunisian relations 
The Soviet Union had tried to use the Bizerte crisis to improve its relations 
with Thnisia. On the other hand, Thnisia also tried to put pressure on France 
by approaching the Soviet Union and also to alert the United States and NATO 
members of the need for political support in the crisis. Gromyko, the Foreign 
minister of the USSR explained to Sadiq Mokaddem, Tunisian Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs, that the Soviets supported the just demand of Tunisia for the 
immediate cessation by France of all actions in the violation of sovereignty and 
independence of the Thnisian republic and the withdrawal from Tunisia of French 
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troops. 
Mokaddem tried to encourage Soviet support, and he stressed the position of 
the Tunisian government on the question of its refusal to participate in military 
blocs and the necessity for liquidating foreign bases on foreign territory and the 
entire question of supporting and preserving international peace and security as 
coinciding with the position of the Soviet Union.l16 The Soviet Union supported 
Tunisia in the UN security council, and it was the only permanent member to 
support Tunisia in the crisis.l17 Moreover, the Soviet Union had connected the 
Bizerte crisis to NATO and the American military bases in Europe. According to 
the Soviet newspaper Pravda 
"The events in Bizerte have exposed to the Tunisian people the true character 
of the NATO military bloc. It was no accident that after one mass demonstration 
a crowd converged on the building of the U.S. Information Service with shouts of 
"B-29! B-29!." The Tunisians know well that the American B-29 planes, with which 
the member countries of NATO are armed, took part in the bombing of the peaceful 
population of Bizerte and of the border villages in the south of the country." 118 
Soviet support of Tunisia had improved relations and despite the banning 
of the Tunisian Communist Party, it did not affect the modest Russian-Tunisian 
detente.l19 The Tunisian-Soviet detente continued during the 1960s despite ide-
ological differences. The Soviet rapprochement to Tunisia was influenced by its 
geostrategic value and to distance Tunisia from the West in the cold war, or at 
least to neutralize Tunisia in East-West conflict. 
Bourguiba condemned the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, but 
the Soviet Union minimized the effect on Soviet-Tunisian relations by ignoring 
his condemnation and continuing relations with Tunisia. They accused Bour-
guiba of mobilizing Tunisian public opinion against the USSR, and they saw the 
anti-communist, anti-Soviet propaganda in Tunisia and the recent mass trial of 
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Thnisian students as imperialist conspiracy.120 When Thnisia obtained an Associ-
ation Agreement with the European Common Market in 1969, the Soviet Union 
criticized Thnisia's decision. The Soviets saw Thnisia's association with the Com-
mon Market as part of an economic strategy to force political change in the devel-
oping countries toward the west. 121 
Tunisian-Chinese relations had influenced Soviet relations with Thnisia be-
cause of the Sino-Soviet ideological split and their competition in the Third world. 
Thnisia had seen China as more radical and the Soviet Union as more moderate. 
Thnisia sided with the Soviet Union when the Chinese Embassy protested in Fall 
1967 against a published speech by Bourguiba, and accused him of siding with the 
United States imperialists and the Soviet revisionists. 122 The Soviet Union had 
built detente with Thnisia during the 1960s and, during that era, Bourguiba's sec-
ular attitude and modernization were more encouraging for the Soviets than the 
monarch in Libya and they distrusted Algeria after the fall of Ben Bella's regime. 
5.3.2.2 Soviet-Tunisian relations in 1970s 
Thnisia welcomed the SALT treaty between the two superpowers. The 
Thnisian government saw it as a relief to Europe and as opportunity for peace 
and co-operation in the Mediterranean and for the USSR to increase its influence 
in Latin America and Africa.123 On regional issues, Tunisian Foreign Minister, Mo-
hammed Masmudi, arrived in Moscow on 17 April 1973, for talks with Gromyko, 
the Soviet Foreign Minister, and with the Ministers of Trade and Culture. Tunisia 
and the Soviet Union supported the Middle East settlement on the basis of UN 
resolution 242 and both welcomed the Vietnam peace agreement signed in Paris, 
January 1973. Also the two sides had agreed to extend their co-operation and their 
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diplomatic relations. 124 
Despite Tunisia's close relations with the United States, it managed to main-
tain good relations with the Soviet Union. Kosygin visited Thnisia on May 15, 1975 
and, during his visit, he pushed the idea of economic and political co-operation be-
tween socialist and developing countries. Kosygin and Bourguiba both expressed 
their support for the Palestinian cause and for the liberation movements in Afro-
Asian countries. The Soviet Union had Thnisian support on regional issues and 
Thnisia had received Soviet support in scientific assistance and the Arab-Israeli 
conflict.125 
Soviet-Thnisian relations were disturbed by an incident of espionage in Thnisia 
by Soviet officials. In 1966, the Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Thnisia was 
declared "persona non grata" by the Thnisian government. This decision was 
followed by a similar measure taken against a member of the Thnisian Embassy 
in Moscow.126 Also, in 1973, two Soviet diplomats had been declared persona 
non grata, and the Soviet News Agency Novosti's former correspondent in Tunisia 
was expelled after allegations of espionage. The Thnisian government discovered 
a Soviet espionage network which included nine Thnisians and the former Press 
Attache of the Soviet embassy. The Soviet government apologized for the espionage 
incident. In view of Thnisia's pro-West foreign policy, it seems that the Soviet 
Union was preparing for the post Bourguiba era, because the problems over the 
succession began in the early 1970s.127 
Tunisia condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. 
When Thnisia boycotted the Olympic games in Moscow, the Soviets reminded 
Thnisia of their support for Thnisian Independence and economic aid 
"The Soviet Union was surprised by the Tunisian refusal to take part in the 
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Olympic Games, when Soviet coaches had done so much to build up Tunisia's National 
Sports movement." 128 
In the early 1980s, the Soviet reaction to the Gafsa incident was to describe 
it as a domestic issue but the Soviets criticized the Tunisian government and the 
Soviet press called for the extension of democracy in Tunisia. The Soviet reaction 
was different from the American, the latter shipped military assistance and blamed 
Qaddafi for the incident. The Soviet News Agency, Tass, reported the incident 
under a headline "the Tunisian National opposition movement" and it criticized 
French military intervention.129 The Tunisian government allowed the communist 
party to resume its activities in 1983, as a counter to the Islamic movement (MTI) 
which remained illegal. The three major political organizations in Tunisia in the 
1980s were Socialist Destour party (Government party); the trade union (UGTT) 
and the Islamic movement (MTI). 
5.3.2.3 Tunisian -Soviet Cultural relations 
The Soviet Union developed cultural links with Tunisia as an instrument to 
advance its influence. In 1963, the first cultural agreement between Tunisia and 
the Soviet Union was signed. The Soviet Minister of Culture visited Tunisia in 
January 1968 to strengthen Tunisian-Soviet co-operation and a cultural protocol 
was agreed. The Soviets also offered medical aid to Tunisia in 1964, and a group 
of Soviet doctors went to Tunisia to work in medical centres and to train local 
cadres. In 1973, there were 30 Soviet doctors working in Tunisia.130 
Just as the Americans had used the Peace Corps to assist Tunisian society 
and further its interests, the Soviet cultural and medical assistance had a similar 
objective. Indeed, both the American and the Soviets sought to influence the devel-
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oping countries through cultural cooperation. The Soviets established the Tunisian 
National Engineering School in Tunis, and opened a centre for the study of the 
Russian language; in 1974 about 250 Tunisians had started to study Russian.131 
The Thnisian- USSR Friendship Society was formed in Moscow in December 1975, 
and during the following years, there was further cultural co-operation. During 
1984, the Soviet Minister of Culture and the Minister of Higher and Secondary 
Specialized Education visited Tunisia and both ministers emphasized the impor-
tance of Thnisian-Soviet co-operation in cultural fields. 132 
In terms of relative population, Thnisia had more students in the Soviet Union 
in the 1970s and 1980s than the other North African states. It was a sign of the 
Soviet objective to build a solid relationship with Third World elites as a way of 
securing long term political influence.133 
Table 5:1 Academic Students being trained in USSR & E. Europe and 
USA as of 1981 and 1983 
State USSR & E. Europe,Dec 1981 USA, Sept 1983 
Algeria 2,225 2066 
Libya 275 3000 
Morocco 650 356 
Tunisia 1,055 450 
Source: Parker, R. 1987, p. 151. 
5.3.3 Soviet-Algerian relations 
Algeria became the fourth Arab country to have close relations with the Soviet 
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Union after its independence. There were three phases of Algerian-Soviet relations; 
the first phase was during the Ben Bella era; the second phase was the Boumedienne 
period from 1965-1978 and the third phase, the Bendjedid era. 
5.3.3.1 Soviet Union-Algerian relations 1962-1965: Ben Bella era 
The Soviet reaction to the Algerian revolutionary struggle and the war of 
independence with France had handicapped Algerian relations with the USSR. 
The Soviet reaction was cautious because of Soviet relations with France over 
Europe and NATO. But, despite that Ben Bella adopted the Socialist path and 
he permitted Algerian communists to participate in his government as individuals 
but not as a political party. He also nationalized segments of Algeria's agriculture 
and industry.134 
Ben Bella had used socialist and radical policies as a way of legitimizing his 
government. The Arab masses were against the West because of the legacy of 
imperialism and the Palestinian problem. Most leaders of Third World countries 
had taken a similar stance to legitimize themselves with Third World masses. 135 
In 1955, Ben Bella declared that he was anti-communist but he needed support 
for the Algerian revolution from both east and west. When he had gained power, 
he banned the Algerian Communist Party in 1962, after only a few months of 
independence.136 Ben Bella supported a single party-system. There were many 
factors that influenced Soviet-Algerian relations despite the Communist Party in 
Algeria being made illegal: First; the socialist attitude of the Algerian leader; 
Second, the Sino-Soviet ideological split; Third, Ben Bella's personal relations with 
Nasser of Egypt as an Arab hero opposed to the imperialist powers and politically 
(at least in public) oriented toward the Eastern bloc; Fourth, Khruschev's policy 
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to extend Soviet relations with Third World countries.137 
Ben Bella visited the Soviet Union in 1964 and he emphasized solidarity and 
cooperation between the two countries. He saw Soviet-Algerian relations as one 
of mutual respect of the two states, and he saw the relationship more in economic 
than in political terms. Ben Bella described the relationship in 1964, one year 
before he was overthrown as follows; 
"the Soviet Union always assists greatly in the development in our economy. 
Algeria, being a weakly developed country wants to expand its relations with all 
countries. We have to carry out several industrial projects, and we accept the partic-
ipation of all those who sincerly desire to cooperate with us on the basis of mutual 
interests." 138 
5.3.3.2 Soviet-Algerian relations: Boumedienne era 
The Soviet Union reacted coolly to Boumedienne's coup, but did not directly 
condemn the coup. The Soviet press criticized the Algerian government for the 
political arrests of persons they described as patriotic figures in Algeria. The 
Union of Soviet Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies sent a telegram to the 
Algerian authorities expressing their concern in the matter of the arrests. The 
Soviets described them as a violation of principles of humanity and the rights 
of man, because Boumedienne arrested communists and was less sympathetic to 
socialist attitudes.139 Both the US and USSR have used the issue of human rights 
to discredit unfriendly regimes in the Third World. America is more successful in 
raising the issue of human rights in its foreign policy. 
The military coup against Ben Bella in 1965 was not orientated against the 
Soviet Union directly, it was an internal struggle over power inside Algeria and 
against Ben Bella because he centralized power in his hands and personalized 
decision-making, and also tried to limit the power of the FLN. The Soviets con-
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tinued state to state relations with Algeria and, in December 1965, Boumedienne 
visited the USSR at the invitation of Podgorny, the Chairman of Presidium of the 
USSR Supreme Soviet. The two sides declared their firm stand against imperi-
alism, colonialism, neocolonialism and they called for national independence, and 
peaceful co-existence.140 
The Soviet Union and Algeria supported the Vietcong and condemned the 
American intervention in South Vietnam. Despite some differences between Algeria 
and the USSR over the conflict between Pakistan and India, both supported the 
People's Republic of China as the sole representative of the Chinese people. The 
Soviet Union had gained Algerian support on China, Vietnam, Southern Rhodesia 
and the Soviets supported the Arab cause in the Arab-Israeli conflict. 141 
In the later 1960s, Algeria had cooler relations with Western Europe and 
America. Algeria broke relations with Western Germany because of the latter's 
recognition of the state of Israel, and she also broke relations with Britain over 
Rhodesia in 1966, and with the US in 1967 after the Arab-Israeli war. Boumedi-
enne visited the USSR in October 1967 to seek Soviet support for the Arabs after 
their defeat in the war with Israel. Algeria was dissatisfied with Soviet support 
during the war, but tried to push the Soviets more towards the Arab side. Algeria's 
reputation as a revolutionary state with influence in the Third World, as a sup-
porter of national liberation movements and as a principal member in Non-Aligned 
movements had become important to the Soviet Union. 142 
Despite Algeria's refusal to condemn the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 
1968, and its neutrality in the conflict between China and the USSR in 1969, there 
were still differences with the USSR over, for example, the Middle East conflict and 
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Soviet natural gas trade with Europe. Algeria had felt threatened by Soviet trade 
policy in Europe, because Algeria's major export was threatened by competition 
from the Soviet Union's lower natural gas prices. Algeria had asked the Soviets to 
share the market instead of competing with each other, but the Soviets ignored the 
Algerian proposal. The issue had continued until early in the 1970s when Algeria 
established trade relations with the United States to sell natural gas.l43 
Soviet-Algerian relations remained good throughout the 1970s. Algeria al-
lowed Soviet aircraft en route to Angola to use Algerian airports. Boumedienne 
continued to use socialist rhetoric.l44 Kosygin, the Soviet Premier, visited Algeria 
in October 1971 and claimed there were no political problems in Soviet-Algerian 
relations that stood in the way of development and co-operation. In his speech in 
Algeria, Kosygin stressed the principles of equality and mutual respect between 
Algeria and the Soviet Union. Also the two sides emphasized co-operation between 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Algerian National Liberation 
Front (FLN), and even though the Algerian Communist Party remained banned, 
the CPSU and FLN exchanged visits during the 1970s. The Soviets tended to 
ignore the local communists and emphasised on state relations. 145 
Algeria continued to support Vietnam, and was the first country to allow the 
Vietcong to open their offices outside the communist countries. But Algeria also 
had political disagreements with USSR over the Indo-Pakistani war in 1972 and 
the emigration of Soviet Jews to Israel.146 
During the Non-Aligned conference in Algeria, in September 1973, Algeria 
called for a New International Economic Order and the South-North dialogue. In 
reality, the Soviet Union had no clear ideas about the "New International Economic 
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Order" despite their customary criticism of capitalism. 
The Arab-Israeli conflict had been the major issue in Algeria's relations with 
the USSR. Boumedienne visited Moscow in 1973 to ask the Soviets to support 
Egypt with arms following the Arab-Israeli war. After Sadat's visit to Jerusalem 
in 1977, and the division of the Arab world after the formulation of the Steadfast-
ness Front, Boumedienne visited Moscow in January 1978 to win Soviet support 
for the Arab coalition against what was seen as the separatist action of Sadat. 
Boumedienne described the Algerian view of co-operation with the Soviets as a 
balance of forces against the imperialists. 
"I wish to say that from point of view of the Algerians, the USSR will always 
remain a friend of the Arabs. Its presence in our region is not out of any mercenary 
motives; its aim is a balance of forces which is in our, the Arab interests." 147 
5.3.3.3 Algeria-Soviet relation: Bendjedid era. 
Bendjedid adopted a more pragmatic, reformist and moderate approach than 
Boumedienne. He was involved in mediation in the American hostage crisis in Iran 
and tried to liberalize the Algerian economy. He also tried to diversify the sources 
of military equipment instead of complete reliance on Soviet arms. During the 
invasion of Afghanistan, Algeria and Libya abstained in a UN vote to condemn 
USSR, but, in the Islamic Conference, Algeria condemned the Soviet invasion.148 
Bendjedid visited the USSR in 1981 after the Reagan Administration shipped 
arms to Morocco, and the Algerian-American dispute over natural gas prices. Alge-
ria was aware of the new Reagan strategy in the Third World, and close American 
relations with Morocco could affect the regional balance of power in the Maghreb. 
The USSR supported self-determination for the Western Sahara and Algeria was 
afraid that American support for Morocco would affect the outcome of the con-
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flict. In contrast, the Carter Administration had adopted a neutral approach to 
the conflict. 
Table 5:2 North African Students in France 1978 
State total students abroad(A) total students in France(B) %8 to A 
Algeria 13,342 8,909 66.7 
Libya 3,531 113 3.2 
Morocco 16,285 13,948 85.6 
Tunisia 10,739 9,258 86.2 
Source: UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1981. 
Algeria had developed cultural relations with the USSR after independence. 
In November 1963, Algeria and the Soviet Union signed a cultural agreement which 
enabled Algerian students to go to the Soviet Union for academic studies and train-
ing. Most of the training was for geologists, hydrologists, construction engineers 
and metallurgists. In 1971, there were 700 Algerian students studying in the 
USSR, while in 1970 Algeria had only 46 students in North American graduate 
programs.l49 The Soviet Union also supported Algeria with doctors and teachers 
and other professionals. According to Pravda, the USSR sent 400 doctors to Alge-
ria in 1975 and there were also about 1000 Soviet professors and teachers working 
there.150 Most Soviet aid was related to the oil industry. The cultural ties with 
Algeria were the greatest of all the North African states. 
In short, the Soviet Union was interested in Algeria as a revolutionary state, 
which was anti-colonial, a supporter of national liberation movements, an active 
member of the Non-Aligned Movement and a founder member of group 77 which 
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hosted its first conference in 1967, and a member of Opec. 
5.3.4 Soviet-Moroccan relations 
The Soviet Union had supported Morocco in the 1950s to put pressure on 
the US to evacuate American military bases from Moroccan territories. The cold 
war era between the superpowers and the geostrategic importance of Morocco had 
influenced the Soviet attitude toward Morocco. The Soviets were also worried 
about American penetration of North Africa as a new global power which would 
dominate them economically and politically. Bulganin wrote to the Moroccan 
Sultan concerning imperialist bases in the newly independent Morocco and asking 
for the removal of the American bases there. 151 
Mohammed V of Morocco had taken the initiative toward the Soviet Union be-
cause of the American bases and the French presence in Algeria. Mohammed was 
a strong supporter of Algerian independence and was humiliated by the French 
kidnapping of Algerian leaders from a Moroccan plane in 1956. He had played 
the American card against the French and at the same time he played the So-
viet card against the Americans. Moroccan political elites were supportive of 
King Mohammed's initiative, because the Soviet Union had supported the Mo-
roccan position over the removal of Tangier's international status and its return 
to Moroccan control. The Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs supported the self-
determination of the Moroccan people and Moroccan unification. The Soviet op-
position to the British-French and Israeli invasion of the Suez Canal had been 
welcomed in Morocco.152 
When the United Nations issued a resolution condemning Soviet intervention 
in Hungary in 1956, the Moroccan delegation abstained. The Moroccan repre-
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sentative explained that he believed it was inconsistent of the UN to condemn 
the USSR and not Britian, France and Israel over Suez. The primary Moroccan 
interest at the General Assembly had been the Algerian question. In 1961, the 
Soviets were supportive of the Casablanca Group as a anti-colonial force in Africa 
(Morocco was the principal founder with Egypt and Ghana).l63 
The Soviet Union supported Morocco's claim in Mauritania and on 28 Novem-
ber 1960, the Soviet veto banned Mauritania from joining the United Nations. The 
Soviets supported Morocco because the Arab League was in support of Morocco, 
then the Soviet Union was on good terms with Morocco, and in 1961, Brezhnev, 
the chairman of the Presidum of Soviet Union, visited Morocco. Eventually, the 
Soviet Union shifted in its position of supporting Morocco's claim in Mauritania 
following an agreement between the USA and the USSR. According to this, the 
USSR provided for the admission of Mauritania to the United Nations in exchange 
for US support for Mongolia's admission, October 1961.154 
5.3.4.1 Soviet- Moroccan relations : Hassan II era 
Moroccan-Soviet relations faced some difficulties during the 1960s, especially 
after the Algerian-Moroccan conflict in 1963, when the USSR tilted toward Al-
geria and shipped tanks and MIG fighters ( 4 MIG through Cuba and 8 Il-14 
transports from USSR) to Algeria. Despite the minor effect of arms shipments on 
the settlement of the conflict, it damaged relations with Morocco. But in 1967, the 
USSR had repaired the damage with the shipment of arms to Morocco indirectly 
through Czechoslovakia. However, the shift in the Soviet policy over Mauritania 
had harmed Soviet-Moroccan relations. 
The French-Moroccan crisis over Ben Barka in 1965 damaged, at least in 
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public, Morocco's relations with France. The growing Moroccan role in Arab 
politics after the 1967 war, also encouraged the two sides, Morocco and the USSR 
to approach each other. The Soviet Union was supportive of Arab moderates to 
find a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict and to avoid nuclear confrontation with 
the USA. Also the Soviets wanted to discredit the USA rather than France, and it 
accused the CIA of assassinating Ben Barka.155 Hassan II visited the Soviet Union 
in October 1966, when the Moroccan and the Soviet sides exchanged views on the 
international system and regional problems 
"the two sides confirmed their adherence to the principles of peaceful co-
existence among states with different social systems and declared their firm determi-
nation to strive along with other peace loving states to relax international tensions, 
and to strengthen peace and the international system." 166 
The Soviets appreciated Morocco's Non-Aligned policy and its support for the 
Vietnamese people as well as its condemnation of colonialism and neo-colonialism. 
Moroccan condemnation of colonialism was related to Moroccan territorial disputes 
with Spain. The Soviets supported Arab unity and the liquidation of foreign bases 
and the latter was a signal directed to Morocco itself. The Soviet support for Arab 
Unity had been regarded as a way to avoid the impact of intra-Arab disputes on 
Soviet relations with Arab States, such as Algeria and Morocco, Iraq and Syria.157 
In 1969, Podgorny, Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, paid a visit to 
Morocco at the invitation of King Hassan II. The two sides focussed on economic 
relations more than on politics. They reached an agreement on a permanent Soviet-
Moroccan intergovernmental commission on scientific co-operation. The Soviet 
Union had encouraged intergovernmental relations with Third World countries, to 
overcome the weakness of communist parties in the Third World. When Kosygin, 
the Chairman of the USSR council of ministers, visited Morocco in 1971, the two 
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sides focussed on the Arab-Israeli conflict and the rights of the Palestinian people 
to self-determination. Morocco and the Soviet Union declared their support for a 
settlement in South East Asia.158 
During the 1970s, Morocco was preoccupied by the Western Sahara conflict. 
The Soviet Union had adopted a neutral approach in the conflict, despite Hassan 
II's accusation that the USSR sent arms to Polisario. The accusation seems to have 
been a political manouver to put pressure on the United States to support Hassan 
II with arms (see chapter 8). The USSR had benefitted from economic relations 
with Morocco and it had no interest in getting involved in the Western Sahara 
conflict. As an intra-Arab conflict, it was a sensitive issue for the Soviets, but 
nevertheless, the Soviet Union had stable relations with Morocco and according to 
Hassan II 
"Moroccan-Soviet cooperation has always been quoted as an example in the 
African countries. I am most anxious to maintain the old friendship linking us with 
the USSR." 169 
5.3.4.2 Communist party in Morocco 
The Communist party in Morocco had been tolerated more than other com-
munist parties in any North African state. It was originally part of the French com-
munist party and at first contained no Moroccan members.160 Its first Secretary-
General was Leon Sultan, a Jew who was born in Algeria. By 1945, a Moroccan Ali 
Yata who was trained by the Comintern, had become the secretary general of the 
party. The party was banned by the French in 1952. After independence, it was 
banned again by King Mohammed V in 1959. The party remerged in 1968 as the 
party of Liberation and Socialism to be outlawed again in 1969 by King Hassan II. 
In 1974, a pro-Soviet communist group was granted legal status in return for sup-
236 
porting Hassan II. The new party called itself the party of Progress and Socialism 
and during all these changes Ali Yata has remained the Secretary-General.161 
The party had only 500 members in 1975, and it was seen as became serving 
Hassan's interests the Soviets have never taken the party seriously. During the early 
days of the Western Sahara conflict, Hassan had sent Yata on numerous occasions 
the Soviet Union to win support for his policy in the Sahara issue. Comparing 
Morocco with Algeria, Thnisia and Libya, the Soviets had found the communists 
enjoyed more freedom than in other North African countries.162 
In cultural relations, Soviet Union had offered Moroccan students places to 
attend Soviet universities, as part of their policy to influence Third World elites in 
the ideological struggle with the West and as an instrument of political influence. 
Patrice Lumumba University was founded by the Soviets specifically for Third 
World students. Morocco was a poor country and had experienced many years of 
French cultural domination which the Soviets had been trying to penetrate. The 
Soviets signed their first cultural agreement with Morocco in October 1966, and a 
Soviet consulate was opened in Casablanca in 1967, and a new cultural centre was 
opened in Rabat in 1968.163 Morocco also signed many cultural protocols with the 
USSR. The Soviets also supported their cultural centre in Rabat with a library (in 
1971, 85% of the books were in the French language). The centre offered Russian 
language classes (there were 100 students in 1972), and in 1983, Morocco signed 
a cultural cooperation agreement with the Soviet Union to increase the number of 
Moroccan students in the USSR.164 
5.4 Conclusion 
We can see some important themes in superpower political relations with the 
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Maghreb states. 
i. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have tried to enhance their po-
litical influence with the Maghreb States, and to reduce each others presence, 
but they have been inhibited by French influence in the region. In a French 
area of interest, it has been more difficult for the superpowers to exercise 
influence or to challenge the French position. 
ii. The pragmatic approach has dominated superpower relations with the 
Maghreb despite the ideological rhetoric of both superpowers. The United 
States has been to some extent more ideological than the USSR in its relations 
with the Maghreb states. Pragmatism has also characterized the Maghreb 
states' foreign policy toward the superpowers. For instance, the Soviet Union 
built relations with conservative states such as Morocco and Tunisia, while 
the United States relations with radical states were minimal. The Maghreb's 
radical states such as Libya and Algeria built strong economic ties with the 
West. 
iii. The Arab-Israeli conflict has influenced the Maghreb orientation toward the 
superpowers. It was an important factor affecting the Libyan and Algerian 
attitude toward the Soviet Union and a setback in their relations with the 
USA. The conflict also shaped Moroccan and Tunisian relations with the 
USA because of the Israeli raid on the PLO headquarters in Tunisia in 1985. 
The Soviets had gained over the conflict which enhanced their influence with 
Arab public opinion. 
iv. French relations with the Maghreb States had much effect on Maghreb policy 
toward the Superpowers, such as Tunisia in 1958; Morocco in 1965; Algeria in 
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the early 1970s and Libya during the Reagan era. In time of crises in French-
Maghreb relations, the Maghreb states used the superpowers as means of 
putting pressure on France. 
v. The Maghreb states used the superpower competition to win support of one 
of the superpowers for their policy. On the other hand, Maghreb states 
tried to use the superpowers against each other to serve their interests. The 
United States used the Soviet threat during the cold war era to moderate the 
French position toward North Africa in times of crises between France and the 
Maghreb States, such as Algeria's independence, and the Bizerta question. 
vi. The regional balance of power had affected both superpowers' relations with 
the Maghreb. Both the Soviet Union and the United States had tried to 
balance their relations with Algeria and Morocco, the two major regional 
actors in the subregion. 
vii. The Maghreb states had used a balance of power approach in dealing with 
the USSR and the USA or France. In the case of Morocco's relations with the 
United States, it seems that Hassan had adopted, in late 1970s, a policy of 
bandwagoning165 rather than balance. There was no danger from the Soviet 
Union but the threat to Hassan II came from the United States and France. 
Hassan used his relations with the United States to counter the French threats 
to his regime and to appease the United States. 
viii. Distrust shaped superpower relationships with the Maghreb states; Algeria 
and Libya lacked confidence in Soviet political intentions as did Morocco and 
Tunisia with the USA. 
ix. The Soviet Union concentrated more than the United States on inter-
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governmental institutional relations because of the weakness of communist 
parties in the region or because of restrictions on communists. The United 
States was less effective in inter-governmental institutional relations and 
America's peace corps was not a successful means of gaining political objec-
tive in the Maghreb. There were no cultural cooperation agreements between 
the United States and the North African States, except inactive agreements 
with Morocco and Tunisia in the early 1960s. Algeria after much hesitation, 
signed its first cultural agreement with the United States as late as 1986. 
x. French cultural domination in the Maghreb contained the Superpowers in 
their cultural relations with the Maghreb. But the Soviet Union had concen-
trated on cultural relations more than the United States, as a way of winning 
influence among Maghreb elites. The policy of free education in Russia was 
attractive to the poor countries of the Third World. While the US dealt di-
rectly with the Third World governments, the USSR had tried an indirect 
approach to influence the elites in the long run, a policy adopted because of 
the USSR's limited financial resources to help the Third World. France has 
continued to dominate culturally the political elites of North Africa. 
xi. Both superpowers have used the Human Rights issue to put pressure on North 
African States, particularly when there were political differences. The Soviet 
Union raised the Human Rights issue after Boumedienne's coup when he 
arrested the communists and the pro-Ben Bella group. But the Soviets did 
not raise the issue with Morocco or Libya. After Algerian-Soviet relations 
had improved, the issue disappeared. The United States had used the Human 
Rights issue as a form of political pressure to discredit Third World regimes 
when they had political differences with the United States. It had raised the 
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Chapter VI 
The Superpowers and the Maghreb: Economic Relations 
6.1 Introduction 
Economic interests are an important source of superpower competition in the 
Third World . The economic interests of the US dwarf those of the Soviet Union 
(see Tables 1,2,3). To the US, the Third World is important in term of natural 
resources, trade, and economic investments. The US is more dependent on foreign 
natural resources and oil and natural gas than is the Soviet Union. Western Europe 
and Japan also rely heavily on Third World countries for raw materials. 1 In this 
chapter we concentrate on three themes; superpower trade with the Maghreb, 
economic aid and investments in Maghreb states, and the way economic relations 
have influenced the Superpowers' political relations with the Maghreb. 
US trade with Third World countries was sizeable; in 1960, for example, 41% 
of total US imports were from the Third World, and 35% of total US exports were 
to the Third World. In 1981, the US exported $89 billion of manufactured goods 
to the Third World, which represented 40% of total US manufactured exports and 
exceeded the value of manufactured exports to Japan and Western Europe. In 
1985, 33% of total US trade was with the Third World. 2 
The Soviet Union has expanded its trading relations with Third World coun-
tries, but compared to the USA, it it less reliant on the Third World. In 1965, the 
Soviet Union had concluded intergovernmental trade agreements with only nine 
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Third World countries, whereas by 1985 the Soviet Union had concluded 79 trade 
agreements with Third World countries. Soviet trade relations have largely been 
based on trade agreements and economic cooperation and aid. In the 1970s, Soviet 
trade with Third World countries made up 12% of Soviet foreign trade. By 1982 
the figure had reached 14%. In comparative prices, the Soviet's trade with Third 
World countries was 120% higher in 1981 compared with 1970, and 40% higher 
than in 1975. In 1980, Soviet imports from the Third World countries were only 
8% raw materials. 3 
Table 6:1 US Exports to and US Imports from the Third World, 
1960-85. 
Years %Exports to Third World % of US Imports from Third World 
1960 35% 41% 
1970 30% 26% 
1980 37% 48% 
1985 34% 34% 
Source: US Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 
1973, 93rd ed.Washington D.C: US. GOP ,Table no.1292; Statistical Abstract of 
the United States: 1987, 107th ed. Table no.1406. 
Significantly, in every year between 1975 and 1984 , the Soviet Union enjoyed 
a positive trade balance with the Third World. 4 Soviet economic relations concen-
trated on scientific and technical cooperation, and Soviet assistance to Third World 
countries was largely concerned with bringing natural resources into production. 
The Soviets assisted Morocco in phosphate mining, Iraq in gas production, and 
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Guinea in bauxite production. This assistance with credit and loans was prepaid 
by Third World raw material and resources production. 
Table 6:2 Soviet Foreign Trade with the Third World 1970-1982 
(Billion Roubles) 
Years 1970 1975 1980 1981 1982 
Foreign trade turnover 2.9 6.3 12.0 16.5 16.9 
Exports 1.8 3.3 6.9 8.7 10.2 
Imports 1.1 3.0 5.1 7.8 6.7 
Foreign trade balance +0.7 +0.3 +1.8 +0.9 +3.5 
Source: V. Klochek, et al. Soviet Foreign Trade today and tomorrow, 
Moscow: Progress Publisher, 1985, pp. 177-180. 
In terms of investment, US firms had over $50 billion invested in the Third 
World states in 1986. The combined debts of Third world countries to Ameri-
can and Western European banking and lending institutions in 1986 topped $900 
billion. US banks have spread throughout Third World countries. For example, 
Latin America has more than 134 branches of US banks. President Gorbachev 
claimed that during a ten year period stretching through the 1970s and 1980s, 
US corporations removed profits from Third World states four times as great as 
the corporations total investments there. Gorbachev also asserted that the US 
annually takes over $200 billion from Third World states. 5 
In comparison, Soviet Union's investment in the Third World countries is 
negligible, and the Third World debt to the Soviet Union is correspondingly small: 
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about 3% of the Third World total external debt. Politically, the Soviet Union 
ha.s found it necessary to grant grace periods to twenty countries that have had 
difficulties in repaying their debt, for example, Egypt.6 
Thus the United States clearly ha.s greater economic interests in the Third 
World than ha.s the Soviet Union, and is consequently more likely to be motivated 
by economic concerns in the Third World than is the Soviet Union. Economic 
objectives have therefore shaped US foreign policy toward the Third World more 
than they have in the Soviet Union. The United States ha.s threatened to use 
force to protect its economic interests in the Third World and the protection of oil 
supplies in the Middle Ea.st constituted a major justification for the establishment 
of the US Rapid Deployment Forces (CENCOM) in 1980. Secretary of Defense, 
Harold Brown, said in 1979 that the flow of oil wa.s clearly one of the vital national 
interests of the United States and that 
"In protection of those vital national interests we will take any action that is 
appropriate, including military force." 7 
The United States ha.s a major economic involvement in Middle Ea.st invest-
ments and construction. In turn, Arab oil investments have played a major role 
in the US economy and Saudi Arabia and other Arab oil exporting countries have 
invested heavily in U.S. Treasury bills and bonds and commercial bank deposits. 
Total Saudi financial reserves in 1980 exceeded $110 billion, of which 75-85 per-
cent wa.s held in dollars. In 1980, about $60 billion of Saudi Arabia's foreign a.ssets 
were believed to be in US government securities and other American banking and 
financial institutions.8 At the start of Gulf crisis, in August 1990, the Kuwait gov-
ernment in exile announced that it had around $100 billion of its a.ssets in Europe 
and United States, 70% of which were in the US. This level of economic investment 
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is of such value to the US economy that the strength of US reaction to the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait becomes rather more intelligible. 
Soviet economic interests in the Middle East, particularly in the Arab World, 
are much smaller than those of the United States and Western Europe. Whilst the 
Soviet Union fostered trade with the Middle East, Soviet political and strategic 
interests have taken precedence. In the 1981-89 period, 26 percent of all Soviet 
products sold to the Third World went to the Arab Countries and the Soviet Union 
has been exporting oil for more than two decades, to Morocco. Soviet economic 
priorities during the cold war era were to deny the West and the US domination 
of the economies of the Middle East states and to weaken the Western economic 
presence in the region for strategic and political reasons. Accordingly, the Soviets 
encouraged the nationalisation of resources and state control of the economy. 9 
6.2 United States Economic Relations with Maghreb states 
The first US contact with North Africa was for economic purposes in the 
nineteenth century. Contact was maintained during the Moroccan Crisis in 1906 
and before United States had sought an open door policy. After WWI, the US 
clashed with France over access to North African markets, particularly over Mo-
rocco. After WWII, the American conflict with France over access to Moroccan 
markets reached the World Court of Justice. US companies and businessmen gave 
financial support to Maghreb national movements to offset French influence. Since 
independence, and with the discovery of oil and minerals, phosphates, lead, iron, 
zinc, and manganese, the Maghreb has become more important. US oil compa-
nies have become involved in North African oil and gas in Algeria and Libya. US 
companies also started to invest in Morocco and Thnisia, and the US offered fi-
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Table 6:3 US crude oil imports from major Arab world oil exporting 
countries, 1977-1982 (Billions of Barrels). 
State 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
Algeria 198 231 222 167 95 33 
Iraq 27 23 32 10 - 1 
Kuwait 15 2 2 10 - 1 
Libya 257 233 234 200 116 8 
Qatar 24 23 11 8 3 3 
Saudi Arabia 501 417 492 458 406 194 
UAE 122 141 103 63 28 30 
Source: US Bureau of the Census: Statistical Abstract of the United States 
1984, 104th ed .U.S. Department of Commerce, p. 580. 
nancial assistance and loans to the Maghreb in order to penetrate North African 
markets.10 
6.2.1 American-Libyan Economic Relations 
Libya was a poor country before the discovery of oil in 1959, and the US offered 
Libya wheat in exchange for the siting of US military bases in Libya. In 1954 the 
US supported Libya with 24,000 tonnes of wheat. Libya started to import from 
the US food stuffs such as rice and in 1966 Libya was importing $61.6 million of 
agricultural imports, and by 1971 imported a total of $122.7 million. US interests 
in Libya increased because of Libyan oil and the US came to dominate the Libyan 
oil industry with 20 US companies exploring and producing oil. By 1968, Libya 
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Table 6:4 USA economic assistance to the Maghreb 1953-1972 
($Million). 
States US development assistance* US export-import(bank loans) US total 
Algeria 178.9 34.0 212.9 
Libya 182.9 0 182.9 
Morocco 747.0 33.2 780.2 
Tunisia 727.7 7.6 735.3 
*US development assistance includes assistance granted under the Agency 
for International Development, and it does not include security and military aid. 
Source: Mclaurin,R.D. The Middle East in Soviet Policy. New York: Lexington 
Books, 1975, p. 82. 
was second only to Saudi Arabia as the most profitable base for US oil companies, 
with $1.5 billion of investment. In 1970, American companies had a market value 
of several billion dollars, and operations in Libya accounted for 88% of Libyan 
oil production, and returned about $60 million to the US balance of payments in 
1969.11 
Before the Libyan revolution, the US was the second largest exporter to Libya 
after Italy. Italy's trading position was due to its colonial history with Libya (see 
Table 6:5). 
6.2.1.1 US- Libya and Oil Prices 1969-1974 
The most important factor in US-Libyan economic relations in the early 1970s 
was the controversy over oil prices and revenues. After the Libyan revolution, Libya 
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Table 6:5 Libya Principal Sources of Imports 1967-1969 (Million 
Libyan Pounds) 
States 1967 1968 1969 Rank 
Italy 48.8 56.8 54.9 1 
USA 21.4 38.8 45.3 2 
UK 18.6 26.4 29.8 3 
FRG 13.3 19.1 21.5 4 
France 10.2 10.9 12.0 5 
Japan 6.8 8.5 11.8 6 
Source: African Contemporary record 1971-1972, p. B51 . 
entered into negotiations with the oil companies over oil prices and revenues and 
threatened the companies with control of production levels and nationalisation. 
The US objective at that time was to raise the price of energy to affect adversely 
the economies of Europe and Japan because the availability of relatively cheap oil 
faciliated the recovery of Western Europe and Japan and it also transformed these 
countries into rivals of the United States. The Europeans believed that the US 
helped Qadda:ffi to power as part of an attempt to allow significant oil price rises to 
occur, this would have increased energy costs for Europe and Japan, thus affecting 
adversely their industrial efficiency vis-a-vis the United States, itself a major oil 
producer .12 
The United States also had other objectives. It intended t o preserve the 
positions of US oil companies in the Middle East , and to provide the Shah of 
Iran with the revenues he needed to turn his country into the leading military, 
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economic, and political power in the Gulf in order to fulfil the aims of the Nixon 
Doctrine.13 The rise in oil prices required much more effective political action, and 
the conservative states did not have the ability to put pressure on oil companies 
because they depended for their security on the foreign powers. Libya was the 
ideal tool for the job because it had a revolutionary government and oil revenues 
from rising oil production. The new Libyan government could afford to get tough 
with the companies concerned. Using appropriate tactics, the Libyan government 
tackled the oil companies one by one. Kissinger described Libya as the state with 
most power to put pressure on the oil companies 
"Until then the role among the oil-producing countries was played by essentially 
conservative governments whose interest in increasing their oil revenues was balanced 
by their dependence on the industrial democracies for protection against external 
(and perhaps even internal) threats. Qaddafi was free of such inhibitions. An avowed 
radical, he set out to extirpate Western influence. He did not care if in the process 
he weakened the global economy." 14 
Kissinger mentioned US interests in Libya in economic terms. He said that 
the return of US balance of payments, and the security of US investments in 
oil were considered their primary interests.15 Moreover, Americans would benefit 
from oil assets and the taxes in the United States. Peter Odell added that the US 
objective of establishing a new collective stability in the oil system was for two 
reasons. First, it sought to provide a political solution to Arab-Israeli conflict and 
the higher revenues would force a compromise and political stability in the Middle 
East. 16 Ensuing events did not support his arguments. 
6.2.1.2 US-Libyan trade relations 
During the 1970s, Libya maintained strong trade relations with the US, par-
ticularly in oil and agricultural goods. The US had banned the export of all types 
of technology related to military and security affairs, and this led Libya to deal 
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with US companies and private individuals to obtain US technology. Ed Wilson, a 
former CIA agent (see chapter five) was accused of shipping banned technology to 
Libya, and Jerome Brower, president of an explosives firm in Pomona, California, 
was indicted on explosives charges for conspiring to ship a variety of high-powered 
explosives to Libya. The US tied selling technology to Libya with political progress 
in improving US-Libyan relation on regional and international political issues.17 
Ironically, between 1969 and 1981, the United States became the most im-
portant Libyan customer in trade, particularly regarding oil (Tables 6:3; 6:5). The 
only countries competing with the US were Italy and West Germany because they 
imported oil from Libya and exported technology. During the Reagan era (1981-
1988) however, US trade with Libya declined rapidly because Reagan adopted a 
hostile approach to Libya. 
After the Libyan revolution of 1969, the United States improved its trade 
relations with Libya. In 1973, Libya exported to the US 7.8 per cent of its total 
exports, and in 1978, Libyan exports to the US reached 40.7 per cent of total 
Libyan exports. The major export was oil, and the decade of the 1970s had been 
the strongest decade in Libyan-American trade relations, despite their political 
differences. Italy had fallen second to the US in Libyan exports, while the Federal 
Republic of Germany trailed in third place (see Table 6:6). 
Regarding Libyan imports, the US ranked sixth or below during the 1970s 
and 1980s. In 1973, Libya imported from the United States 5.3 per cent of its 
total imports, whereas Italy accounted for 25.8 per cent of Libyan imports in 
the same year. In the 1970s, Italy topped the list of Libyan imports followed by 
West Germany, France, Japan and the United Kingdom respectively. The EEC 
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Table 6:6 Libya's exports 1973-81 (value of percentage of total exports) 
States 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
USA 7.8 0.1 21.9 25.8 39.8 40.7 36.1 35.5 27.4 
Italy 28.0 33.4 21.9 19.4 16.8 21.8 18.0 18.5 23.8 
FRG 21.3 22.0 19.5 20.4 17.0 10.7 14.8 12.6 10.3 
Spain 1.8 3.7 5.1 5.2 5.5 6.2 5.3 4.9 6.7 
France 5.3 5.9 3.7 5.2 4.0 5.4 5.9 2.8 3.7 
Source: International Trade statistics Yearbook 1985, p. 597. 
has clearly been a major supplier to Libya (Table 6:7). In historical perspective, 
Western Europe has exported more to Libya than has the United States except 
to some extent with wheat. Libyan technological imports have mainly come from 
Europe. 
In March 1981, the US banned Libyan crude oil imports. The choice of 
economic rather than military or covert action against Libya characterised US 
policy until late 1985. The United States tried to put pressure on Libya by virtue 
of being the major Libyan oil customer. Total oil revenues were $15.22 bn in 
1979, and $22.53 bn in 1980. They fell to $15.65 bn in 1981 and $11.13 bn in 
1984. The Reagan administration restricted exports to Libya, and arrested many 
businessmen, such as Ed Wilson. In 1981, the US oil company Exxon, represented 
since 1955 by Esso Standard and Esso Sirte, withdrew from Libya, and in 1982, 
Mobil followed. The Reagan administration declared doing business with Libya 
illegal.18 But despite Reagan's action, US oil companies continued to operate in 
Libya through foreign subsidiaries. Americans employed by Libya's National Oil 
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Table 6:7 Libya's imports 1973-1982 (value of percentage of total 
general imports) 
States 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
USA 5.3 3.9 4.0 4.1 5.2 6.3 5.3 6.3 6.3 4.2 
Italy 25.8 24.8 25.9 25.5 27.5 24.1 26.4 29.5 30.2 25.4 
FRG 10.4 11.5 12.1 14.3 12.9 12.8 14.3 13.3 10.5 14.4 
Japan 6.4 7.0 8.3 8.3 7.4 7.4 8.9 7.5 7.6 5.1 
UK 6.9 5.0 5.5 5.4 5.7 7.1 6.9 7.0 6.9 8.0 
France 8.2 10.4 8.8 8.2 7.6 8.3 8.2 6.8 6.3 5.7 
Spain 2.5 2.8 2.5 4.3 3.3 3.2 2.8 4.4 3.0 3.2 
Source: International Trade Statistics Yearbook, 1985, p. 597. 
Companies were paid on average close to £100,000 a year tax free and received 
free accommodation. According to American employees 
"The whole thing is just so hypocritical, they're still pumping oil and making millions of 
dollars." 19 
6.2.2 American-Tunisian Economic Relations 
American economic relations with Thnisia have comprised two elements: aid and 
trade. 
6.2.2.1 American economic aid to Tunisia 
The United States provided economic and technical aid to Tunisia under a hi-
lateral agreement signed on March 26, 1957. In the years 1957 to 1962, the aid 
totalled about $147 million, and in 1962 the United States undertook to provide 
271 
about $184 million toward the Tunisian first 3-year development plan.20 By mid 
1967, total US aid to Tunisia reached over $500 million, the largest amount per 
capita of any African country. 21 Since 'l\misian independence and until 1985, US 
aid to 'I\misia amounted to almost $ 1billion, or about one-third of Tunisia's for-
eign assistance. 22 Additional US assistance was provided by various foundations, 
religious groups, universities, and philanthropic organizations. 
The major elements of US assistance to Tunisia were programmes undertaken by 
the Agency for International Development (AID) and the Peace Corps. The US 
provided aid to Tunisia under U.S. Public Law 480 (Food for Peace Program),23 
and it tried to encourage development in Tunisia so as to increase the stability of 
a pro-American regime. The US programmes included rural development, family 
planning, health care facilities and cultural, scientific and technological equipment. 
In the late 1970s, the Carter administration judged that Tunisia, amongst other 
countries, had reached a relatively high level of development as measured by its 
annual per capita income of $1,100 and cut off economic aid which had averaged 
nearly $40 million a year since the early 1970s. This step was intended to redirect 
aid where it was needed. In reality, the Camp David peace process had influenced 
the American decision because Egypt was granted economic aid, and Tunisia was 
seen as a stable country. The simple criterion of a rising income level appeared 
to ignore the regional and sectoral imbalance in Tunisia's state of economic de-
velopment. In the early 1980s, Tunisia experienced economic and social upheave!, 
and the stability of the regime was in danger. The Reagan administration took an 
essential first step in 1984 by re-establishing the economic aid cut off under the 
Carter administration. 24 
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The US aid was intended to win political influence during the cold war era and 
to stabilize pro-Western regimes. Moreover, it attempted, in the case of Tunisia, 
to direct the economy toward American interests and investments. In practice, 
there has been a positive relationship between economic aid and the stability of 
a regime. The US aid was directed at protecting the regimes in the Third World 
within the US sphere of influence. In the 1970s, Tunisia was affected by the general 
mood in the US due to Vietnam, when the US became less encouraging about the 
modernization of Third World countries. 
Within Tunisia, it became clear that the investment programme run by the statist 
administration, Ben Salah's project for a planned socialist economy, was not paying 
off, and by 1969 with the fall of Ben Salah it had been reversed. The United States 
was finding more fertile fields for investment in Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Algeria. 
It was less concerned about Tunisia as an American ally in the Maghreb states and 
the stability of the subregion had slipped in American priorities because America 
had acquired more influential allies in the Middle East such as Egypt and Saudi 
Arabia and simultaneously the US had improved its relations with Algeria. The 
internal turmoil which shook Tunisia in January 1978 severely changed the image 
of Tunisia as a stable society under Bourguiba. 
6.2.2.2 American trade with Tunisia. 
The United States did not have a balanced trading position with Tunisia. In 
general, during the 1960s, US products imported by Thnisia averaged close to 17 
per cent of Thnisia's total imports.25 One the other hand, the US took about 
1% of Thnisia's total exports. In part, this imbalance was due to the fact that 
US exports to Tunisia included Public Law 480 agricultural shipments. Further, 
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Tunisian imports of US products were relatively great because many US foreign 
aid loans to Tunisia stipulated the use of US imports in the completion of certain 
projects. 26 
In the 1970s and early 1980s, Tunisia had made progress in developing its trade 
with the US, but France still dominated Tunisian foreign trade. France remained 
Tunisia's major supplier and accounted for 34% of all imports in 1975 and 1976. 
The other major suppliers were Italy, West Germany and the USA. Tunisian trade 
with the European Economic Coummunity {EEC) expanded after an agreement 
was signed in 1976, giving Tunisia's agricultural products and industrial exports 
unrestricted access to the EEC market.27 In 1984, the US ranked fourth after 
France, Italy, and Germany respectively in Tunisian imports, (Table 6:8). 
Table 6:8 Tunisia imports 1975-1984 (value as percentage of total 
imports) 
State 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
France 34.4 32.2 28.1 33.2 26.2 25.2 24.3 26.0 
Italy 9.4 9.0 9.9 10.0 13.3 15.8 14.7 14.8 
FRG 8.5 10.0 11.2 11.7 9.9 9.5 9.2 11.5 
USA 6.7 6.2 7.0 4.6 6.0 5.9 7.6 7.9 
Greece 2.6 2.4 2.5 4.0 5.8 5.5 3.7 3.3 
Spain 2.5 2.6 3.7 3.1 3.8 3.3 3,3 4.1 
Japan 0.8 1.5 1.2 1.0 0.7 1.2 3.0 2.2 
USSR 0.4 1.0 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 1.0 0.5 
Source:International trade statistics Yearbook, 1985, p. 961. 
274 
1983 1984 
26.1 24.9 
11.5 14.7 
11.5 10.8 
9.3 7.1 
7.8 0.7 
4.5 6.2 
2.2 4.3 
0.4 1.4 
Thnisia's principal export in 1975 and 1976 was crude oil which accounted for 
38% and 40% of export revenues in those respective years. Other major export 
commodities were phosphates (19% of the total in 1975), and olive oil. In 1975, 
France was Thnisia's largest export market, taking 19%, and 17% in 1976. Italy 
ranked second, the United States third and West Germany fourth28 (Table 6:9). 
The 1985 figures of Thnisian imports-exports reflected the stability of Thnisian 
trade relations. The principal markets for Thnisian exports were France (25.3%), 
Italy {16.2%), West Germany {11.1%) and USA {6.6%). The major suppliers to 
Thnisia were ranked as follows: France (26%), West Germany (12.3%), Italy (12%) 
and United States (5.8%). The UK ranked below the US in trade relations with 
Thnisia.29 
Table 6:9 Tunisian Export 1975-1984 {value as per cent of total 
exports) 
State 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
France 19.1 17.1 17.9 16.8 19.4 15.4 17.7 19.3 24.3 20.5 
Italy 17.0 21.5 13.9 15.9 20.2 15.8 20.6 16.2 18.6 17.9 
FRG 7.6 6.9 16.3 16.4 10.5 12.9 8.2 10.4 11.4 9.5 
USA 10.3 13.8 10.6 8.5 8.7 14.5 17.4 23.0 20.6 19.1 
Greece 14.1 15.4 13.6 10.0 15.5 18.1 8.1 2.7 1.4 1.3 
UK 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.7 0.8 1.6 0.5 2.4 1.1 3.9 
USSR 1.1 0.9 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1 
Source: International Trade Statistics Yearbook, 1985, p. 961. 
It is important to note that Thnisian-European economic relations were vulner-
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able to US economic policy toward Europe. US pressure for free trade directed 
at Europe threatened Thnisia and the other Southern Mediterranean nations that 
traditionally exported to European markets. For example, the Reagan adminis-
tration proposed to sell more Florida citrus fruit in Europe, and tried to force the 
EEC to eliminate tariff concessions for competing fruit from Mediterranean coun-
tries such as Tunisia.30 The United States economic policy focused on economic 
aid in exchange for political influence, and competed with Europe in Thnisian mar-
kets; for instance, the EEC protested when US sold wheat to Tunisia at lower than 
European prices in order to dominate the Thnisian market.31 
6.2.3 American-Algerian Economic Relations 
Algerian economic relations with the United States could be divided into three 
economical levels of analysis: US economic aid to Algeria; the oil and gas trade 
relations; the Algerian initiative for a New International Economic Order (NIEO), 
and the American reaction to the NIEO as a Non-Aligned economic initiative. 
6.2.3.1 United States economic aid to Algeria 
United States economic links with Algeria were separate from their political re-
lationship during the Boumedienne era. Despite Algerian-American political dif-
ferences, Algeria was the first trading partner of the US in North Africa. After 
independence, during the Ben Bella years, Algeria received large amounts of US 
economic aid. In 1963, Algeria's agriculture minister announced that US was of-
fering Algeria $60 million in grants. The US tried to use economic aid to win 
political influence in radical states such as Algeria. Ben Bella's relations with 
President Kennedy strengthened the Algerian position in the PL-480 program. 32 
The keystone of US aid to Algeria was the PL 480 wheat program. Following 
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the drought of 1963, Algeria became a major recipient of PL 480 food for peace. 
During the programme's six years, Algeria was given wheat valued at over $175 
million.33 
When in 1963 Ben Bella nationalized the vacant properties which were left by 
former French owners, some Americans were affected and the United States asked 
Algeria for compensation but Algeria refused. The Algerian fear was, that if the 
US received compensation, France would ask for compensation, and that would 
amount to a great deal. In 1965, the US decided against renewing the PL-480 pro-
gram's aid because of that issue, but in 1966, the programme was renewed, albeit 
on a modest level as a sign of improvement in Algerian-American relations over 
the compensation issue. After Algeria severed diplomatic relations with the US, 
the PL 480 program was prohibited under the terms of the Gruening Amendment 
which forbids US humanitarian assistance for countries which sever relations with 
the US.34 
Despite the US prohibition of PL 480 aid, by mid-1972, the US Export-Import 
bank had nearly $500 million in credits and guarantees extended to Algeria to 
finance the purchase of US products. The same bank in 1976 lent Sonarem $15.8 
million for mining equipment, and later gave a further loan amounting to $37.1 
million to Sonatrach in order to finance the purchase of drilling equipment from 
the US.35 With the expansion of US trade relations with Algeria in the 1970s, US 
banks extended their financial support to Algerian companies. 
6.2.3.2 US and New International Economic Order 
Algeria clashed with the US in 1973 over the New International Economic Order. 
As a chair of the Non-Aligned summit, Boumedienne called for an emergency 
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Session of the General Assembly on petroleum, raw materials, and development. 
The session took place in April 1974. During the meeting Algeria put forward 
several recommendations: First; that all Third World countries should gain control 
of their own resources by nationalisation, and by establishing control over the 
machinery for fixing prices. Second; there should be a major international aid 
effort for the poorest countries. The session was followed by a call for a conference 
between raw material producers and consumers. Algeria intended to relate the 
costs of raw materials to the prices of producers, but the US refused to agree to 
Algeria's suggestion that raw materials and not just oil should be on the agenda. 
The US softened its position in 1975, when 35 nations met at a Paris conference 
on International Economic Cooperation. The United States Secretary of State, 
Henry Kissinger, argued that the newly rich oil-producing countries, which had 
quintupled the price of oil should be blamed for much of the economic anguish 
in the Third World and should share the burden. Kissinger was not really telling 
the Opec nations drastically to reduce the price of oil. But rather his aim was to 
drive a wedge between the oil producers and the truly poor countries in the Third 
World. The United States approach included plans for using the International 
Monetary Fund to underwrite low export earnings in the developing countries and 
opening capital markets to the poor nations. 36 However, this was not so important 
as issue as to affect Algerian-American economic relations, despite its political 
aspects. Algerian economic interests were involved with the United States, but it 
was also interested in its prestige and political reputation in the Third World and 
the Non-Aligned movements. 
6.2.3.3 US-Algerian trade relations 
Algeria emphasised trade relations with the US, especially oil and natural gas. US 
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oil companies including Esso, Mobil, Sinclair, El Paso, Philips, Getty Petroleum 
and Newmount Mines had worked in Algeria for many years.37 In 1969, an impor-
tant turning point was reached in US-Algerian economic relations when El Paso 
signed an agreement with Algerian Sonatrach for annual delivery of 10 billion cubic 
meters of liquefied natural gas to the US over a period of 25 years. In 1971, the 
amount was increased by 50%.38 The contract was similar to the Moroccan deal 
with the Soviet Union in 1978 over phosphates. 
Despite the absence of diplomatic relations between Algeria and the US, between 
1967 and 1968 US trade with Algeria nearly doubled from $33 million in US exports 
to almost $64 million, elevating the US to become Algeria's third most important 
trading partner, after France and West Germany.39 In 1973, 64.7% of Algeria's 
exports went to the ECC and 7.5% to the US; in 1977 the figures were 38.1% to 
the EEC and 51.8% to the US. The change is largely accounted for by a sharp 
growth in exports of oil and natural gas to the US.40 
Algeria's exports to the US reached around $1.2 billion and $1.7 billion in 1975 
and 1982 respectively, and by 1984 it was $2.5 billion. On the other hand, United 
States exports to Algeria are estimated for 1975 and 1982 to have been around $673 
million and $816million respectively, and by 1984 decreasing to $580 million41 (Ta-
ble 6:11). Algeria's orientation toward the US came after the conflict with France 
over Algeria's nationalisation of French capital in Algeria in the early 1970s. The 
United States encouraged Algeria to nationalise so as to replace the French compa-
nies in Algeria. France retaliated by reducing the volume of oil and wine imports 
from Algeria and by threatening to expel Algerian labourers from France. Algeria 
cut down vineyards on the one side and exported the wine to the Soviet Union and 
opened up its oil and gas to the US. France's relations with Algeria played a major 
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role in Algerian relations with the US. When Algeria had an economic conflict with 
France, it approached the US to minimise economic isolation and difficulties. 42 
Table 6:10 Algerian foreign imports 1975-1984 (% of Algerian total 
imports) 
states 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1984 
France 33.5 24.0 18.3 18.5 23.6 23.6 
W.Germany 11.6 14.5 18.2 13.6 11.3 10.7 
USSR 1.2 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.1 
UK 3.4 3.0 3.1 3.6 3.3 3.5 
Spain 3.7 4.9 5.3 6.4 7.0 4.4 
USA 11.3 8.7 6.5 8.1 6.0 5.7 
Source: International Trade Statistics Yearbook, 1985 p. 98. 
Comparative analysis of Algerian trade with the US and Western Europe shows 
that France was the major supplier to Algeria in the 1970s and 1980s. Germany 
became the second supplier to Algeria followed by other European countries such 
as Spain and the UK. In 1975, France's exports to Algeria reached 33.5% of total 
Algerian imports, and in 1984, it was 23.6% which gave France first place in the 
Algerian market. The United States had a minor percentage of Algeria's imports 
(Table 6:10). El Paso Corporation which was the largest American importer of 
Algerian natural gas in 1978, cancelled its deal because Algeria attempted to force 
up natural gas prices. Algeria has asked for a special relationship with the EEC 
and, if granted, it would undoubtedly shape future Algerian economic relations 
with the US. Geographical, historical and cultural relations have all played a major 
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role in strengthening Algerian economic relation with the EEC, especially with 
France, despite Boumedienne's perception of the superiority of US technology. 
Boumedienne was impressed by US technology, or he used technology as an excuse 
for his orientation toward the US on technology issue, following his differences with 
France. He stated that 
"If Europe was capable of equalling the US in this area, then the situation 
would be quite different, and if we have for some time been working with the Amer-
icans in various fields, and working profitably, this is solely because their firms have 
demonstrated much greater initiative, efficiency and skill than European firms. "43 
Table 6:11 Algerian Foreign exports(% ) 
states 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1984 
France 14.7 12.7 13.7 18.7 34.0 28.4 
W. Germany 19.0 14.7 11.5 10.9 3.6 3.0 
USSR 2.2 1.0 0.6 0.9 0.1 0.2 
USA 26.8 51.8 52.3 32.4 22.7 21.7 
UK 4.0 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.3 1.4 
Spain 3.1 2.4 2.5 3.7 5.3 3.4 
Source- International Trade Statistics Yearbook, 1985, p. 98. 
In late 1979 and 1980 the US and Algeria were in conflict over the price of 
natural gas. Both Presidents Carter and Reagan refused to allow the import of 
Algerian or any other imported gas at world market oil prices. The US showed 
no sympathy for the Algerian case, raising the price of natural gas as the prices 
of oil went up in the early 1980s. Algeria's problem was that it had to get a 
deal with the USA because the Soviet Union had been the major competitor to 
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Algerian gas in Europe. Algeria was showing signs of conciliation in the mid-1980s 
because it recognized that natural gas was not in short supply on the world market. 
However, the United States has exported foodstuffs, agricultural commodities to 
Algeria. According to US Department of Agriculture, in 1989, Algeria imported 
$2,980 million of foodstuffs 23% from the US and 24% from the EEC. 
6.2.4 American-Moroccan Economic Relations 
The main reason for the United States conflict with France over Morocco 
was the American call for an open door policy to the Moroccan market. After 
Moroccan independence, US companies invested in Morocco which led the Soviet 
Union to criticise capitalist control of the Moroccan economy. Despite US invest-
ment, Moroccan trade relations were still dominated by France and US trade was 
minimal despite significant economic aid to Morocco.44 
6.2.4.1 American trade with Morocco 
Since the early days of Moroccan independence, France had been Morocco's 
major trading partner. For example, in 1969, Morocco exported to France goods 
to the value of 863 million Dirhams, whereas it exported to the US goods to the 
value of only 48 million Dirhams. In the same year, Morocco imported from France 
goods to the value of 866 million Dirhams and from the US goods to the value of 
214 million Dirhams. In 1970, Morocco imported goods to the value of 392 million 
Dirhams from US and from France 1,074 million Dirhams.45 
France dominated Moroccan trade partly because French is spoken through-
out Moroccan markets, financial institutions and banks. Additionally, the US has 
been the world's largest agricultural exporter and the largest producer of phos-
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phates in competition with Morocco in European markets. America's concern for 
Moroccan stability led private US companies to be suspicious of the Moroccan 
market. In January 1983, a leading investment risk analysis firm in New York, 
Fout and Sullivan produced its political risks report in which Morocco was rated a 
country at high risk of violence. The country witnessed urban unrest and violence 
in 1981 and 1984, and widespread riots broke out over prices increases. According 
to World Bank definitions (in the early 1980s), 40 per cent of Moroccans have been 
living below the poverty line.46 
Table 6:12 US trade with Morocco 1968-1985 ( millions of US$) 
Years US imports from Morocco US exports to Morocco 
1968 11 70 
1969 9 53 
1971 7 102 
1972 11 58 
1977 22 372 
1979 40 271 
1982 51 396 
1985 44 279 
Source: Damis, J. 1986, p. 18. 
Morocco encouraged foreign investments through tax concessions and special 
investment codes (1973 and 1982) in order to develop its economy. In 1978, the 
total value of foreign investment in Morocco was estimated as $1,120 million, of 
which $235 million had been made since 1956. French investments represented 32.7 
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per cent of foreign investments in Morocco, whereas US investments represented 
only 9.5 per cent of total investments which although much less than of France 
was still larger than that of West Germany, UK, Italy and Spain.47 In the early 
1980s, the US government encouraged US companies to invest in Morocco and in 
January 1982, the US and Morocco signed a treaty which permited the avoidance of 
double taxation. The two governments also agreed to establish a joint commission 
for economic relations. The commission met on annual basis at ministerial level 
and at the fourth meeting of the commission in Washington.D.C in July 1985, a 
bilateral investment treaty and a bilateral tourism agreement were signed. 48 
However, US investments in Morocco increased during the years of the Reagan 
administration and it seems that, in the case of Morocco, economic investments 
followed improvements in political relations. Hassan built good relations with 
the conservative policy-makers in the Reagan administration. In 1985, there were 
36 US firms and 14 US regional and technical services companies with offices in 
Morocco, and 77 major US manufacturers had one or more agents in the country. 49 
Moroccan imports from the US have remained at a higher level than from the 
Soviet Union. But US exports to Morocco fell from 14.1 per cent of total Moroccan 
imports in 1971,to 9.7 per cent in 1983. During the same period exports from the 
Soviet Union rose from 4.0 per cent of total Moroccan imports to 5.5 per cent. 
The level of US-Moroccan trade had been quite modest in comparsion to US trade 
with the major oil producing countries such as Algeria and Libya. 50 
6.2.4.2 American economic aid to Morocco 
Morocco was the first North African state to receive aid from the US after 
independence. Economic assistance extended between 1954 to 1981 totalled $1,622 
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million. Tunisia received $1,256 million over the same period. US economic assis-
tance to Morocco between 1953 and 1972 totalled $780 million, whereas the Soviet 
Union's assistance is estimated over the same period at $88 million.51 
US economic aid was related to political objectives. When Morocco was in 
conflict with France over Algeria, and over Moroccan nationalization of French 
owned-farm land in the years after independence, the US was the first foreign 
country to offer aid to Morocco. In the years 1957 to 1959, US aid to Morocco 
totalled $28 million, $28 million and $48 respectively, whereas French aid fell from 
$14 million in 1957 to nothing in 1959.52 
The US Agency for International Development (AID) programme was de-
signed to promote and assist economic development in Morocco, and in particular, 
in the agricultural sector. In early 1963, the AID programme had been supple-
mented by a large Peace Corps program in which US volunteers provided services 
in family planning and other aspects of development. 53 
US economic aid to Morocco increased dramatically in the 1980s, due to the 
Reagan administration's globalist policy (East-West relations) toward Morocco. 
Aid was concentrated on agriculture, education, family planning and low-cost 
housing as well as to alleviate balance of payments strains by financing imports of 
agricultural equipment and supplies from the US (Table 6:13). 
In 1984, the US and Morocco signed a treaty which would protect US investors 
in Morocco. Agreements were also concluded with US companies for exploratory 
drilling, for example, the Mobil oil company which conducted offshore drilling 
in the Atlantic off Tarfaya in Southern Morocco. The US companies have seen 
Morocco as an asset for US investments with the settlement of the Western Sahara 
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Table 6:13 US foreign assistance to Morocco 1980-1985{$million) 
Years 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Development assistance (grants) 9.1 12.1 10.7 13.5 19.0 19.5 
Economic support fund (grants) 0 0 0 0 7.0 15.0 
Public law 480 title I (loan) 5.8 25.0 35.0 27.5 45.0 55.0 
Public law 480 title II (grant) 9.9 16.1 13.5 10.5 14.9 8.8 
Total 24.8 53.1 59.2 51.5 85.9 98.3 
Source: Damis, 1986. 
issue, because Morocco is rich in minerals especially uranium and phosphates.54 
The Moroccan open door policy and free market capitalist system, have encouraged 
the US into the Moroccan market. From the point of view of Moroccan foreign 
debts, which in 1985 stood at 13-14 billion, or 80-90 per cent of Morocco's gross 
national product (GNP), Morocco has been obliged to solicit US assistance with 
the IMF and World Bank. 
6.3 Soviet-Maghreb Economic Relations 
Subsequent to the independence of North African states, the Soviet Union 
attempted to establish commercial relations with them. The Soviets criticized 
capitalist investment in the Maghreb states, and also offered economic aid to the 
Maghreb. Morocco was the first North African country to receive aid from the 
Soviet Union. After Algerian independence and its adoption of socialism, the 
Soviet Union started to support Algeria with technical and economic assistance. 
Libya received less Soviet assistance than the other Maghreb states because of 
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its conservative government and King Idris was under American pressure not to 
receive or approach the Soviet Union for aid. 
Table 6:14 Soviet and Eastern European Economic Aid 
1954-1981 (in millions of Dollars) 
State Millions of Dollars 
Algeria 1,570 
Morocco 2,315 
'funisia 325 
Libya 3 
Source: Parker, R, 1987, p. 151. 
The Soviet Union was aware of the depth of US economic penetration into 
the Maghreb states. In 1958, the Soviet Union claimed that the US controlled 
Moroccan minerals: US Morgan group controlled 40 per cent of Moroccan lead 
output and 80 per cent of zinc production. The Soviet Union criticised US capital 
as a tool of imperialism, and in 1972 claimed that almost a quarter of private US 
investment in Africa was in Libyan oil. The Soviet Union enc~mraged socialist 
regimes, and it offered economic aid in order to challenge US capitalist influence 
in the Maghreb. The Soviet Union created an intergovernmental commission on 
economic, scientific, technical and trade co-operation with the Maghreb. The 
Soviet Union invested its capital in raw materials in North African states, such 
as Morocco, and in construction projects, and re-exported imported goods and oil 
from the Maghreb for hard currency. 55 
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Table 6:15 Soviet and East European Economic Technicans 
in North Africa in 1981 and 1984. 
State 1981 
Libya 31,700 
Thnisia 600 
Algeria 11,150 
Morocco 2,350 
Total 43,685 
Source: Parker, R, 1987, p. 198. 
6.3.1 Soviet-Libyan economic relations 
1984 
53,800 
415 
10,750 
2,325 
53,800 
In March 1961, the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister visited Tripoli and an-
nounced the successful conclusion of trade agreements, but it was not until two 
years later that any trade was actually recorded. By 1962, Libya had finally ap-
pointed an ambassador to Moscow, and the following year Libya received shipments 
of machinery in exchange for exports to the Soviet Union of wool, hides and to-
bacco. By the end of the 1960s Libya's annual per capita income had risen to US 
$1500, representing considerable dollar buying power. Nevertheless, the value of 
Libyan-Soviet trade in the 1960s was very low, partly because of the Libyan po-
litical attitude towards the Soviet Union and partly due to US influence in Libya 
(Table 6:16). 
After the revolution, the Soviet Union started to view Libya as a potential 
target for economic co-operation. The Soviet Union expressed its support for the 
firm stand taken by the Libyan government regarding the monopolist oil compa-
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Table 6:16 Soviet Trade with Libya, 1962-1966 (in million of Libyan 
Pounds) 
Years 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 
Import .5 1.2 1.4 1.1 1.3 
Export .06 .13 .24 .11 .05 
Source: Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1966, p. 481. 
nies. On December 13th, 1971, Radio Moscow indicated the Soviet reaction to the 
nationalisation of Libyan oil 
"This reaction indicates above all that Libya's action in the struggle against oil 
colonialism has scored a direct hit." 66 
In March 1972, an agreement on economic and technical co-operation between 
Libya and the Soviet Union was signed. It provided for co-operation in refining 
oil, developing power generation, and in other branches of the Libyan economy, 
particularly in prospecting for mineral deposits and gas. The Soviet Union also 
offered training for Libyan personnel. 67 During Kosygin 's visit to Libya in May 
1975, the Soviet Union agreed to build a large metallurgical plant, a number of 
power lines, a reinforced concrete factory, to establish state firms and to train 
Libyan specialists in Moscow. 58 
More striking was the development of Libyan-Soviet co-operation in atomic 
energy for peaceful purposes. An agreement was signed in this regard in Moscow 
in 1976. The Soviet Union was to train Libyan atomic energy specialists. Soviet 
aid in the nuclear field was the first outside the socialist bloc excepting Finland. 
However, the Soviet Union did not deliver any nuclear energy aid until 1978.59 
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During Qaddafi's visit to the Soviet Union, Libya was offered 200 km high tension 
power lines. Soviet design institutes were drawing up blue prints for a standardised 
power network, atomic power stations, and the complete development of the Libyan 
gas industry up to the year 2000. These blue prints also involved the exploitation 
of the large iron ore deposits in Southern Libya.60 
Despite Soviet-Libyan co-operation in the early years of 1970s, the value of 
trade between the two countries was not high. The figures in Table 6:17 give little 
indication of economic co-operation because of the strength of Libyan relations 
with Western Europe and with the US. We can divide Libyan trade relations with 
the Soviet Union into three time periods: The pre-revolutionary period, during 
which Libyan-Soviet trade was slight: a period of transition from 1969 to 1980, 
during which trade relations rose to a moderate level; and a period from 1980 to 
1985 which witnessed a high level of trade between the countries reflecting Libya's 
trade conflict with the US (in particular the US economic embargo). During this 
last period, Libya received weaponry from the Soviet Union in exchange for oil 
(Tables 6:17; 6:18). 
At the end of the 1970s, Libya and the Soviet Union had increased their 
economic co-operation in response to US restrictions on trade with Libya and 
because of the political differences with the US. During the Reagan administration, 
politics had affected economic relations with Libya and economic relations between 
Libya and the Soviet Union had improved. Soviet-Libyan non-military trade had a 
value of Roubles 450.9 million {293 million Pounds) in 1980, 5 per cent more than 
in 1979.61 In March 1984, the Soviet news agency Tass, reported that Libya had 
become the Soviet Union's main trading partner in the Arab world, as the value 
of trade had risen 160% from 1981levels to US$ 1.7 billion a year.62 
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Table 6:17 Soviet Foreign Trade with Libya 1970-1974 (million of 
Roubles; per cent) 
Years 1970 % 1971 % 1972 % 1973 % 1974 % 
Imports 0 0.00 0 0.00 30.0 0.23 30.4 0.20 - -
Exports 12.9 0.11 8.9 0.07 8.6 0.0 14.1 0.09 28.5 0.14 
Turnover 12.9 0.06 8.9 0.07 38.6 0.15 44.5 0.14 28.5 0.07 
Source: The Soviet Union 1974-75, London: C.Hurst&Company, 1976, p. 
156. 
The Soviet Union had started to buy Libyan oil in exchange for arms and to 
resell the oil for hard currency. The Soviet Union gained from Libya both in terms 
of hard currency and in construction projects inside Libya. As Helen Kitchen put 
it 
"The USSR, some leading analysts believe, could buy much more Libyan oil for 
itself or allow its satellites to buy more than it does now, and then try to resell it. 
This happened in 1980 in a small way, when Greece took a total of 850,000 tons of 
Libyan oil directly from the Soviet Union in addition to the 3 millions tons or so it 
brought directly from Libya."63 
Table 6:18 Soviet trade with Libya 1976-1984 {millions of Roubles) 
Years 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 
Export 16 52 163 221 140 
Import 0 107 288 1,126 1,133 
Total 16 159 451 1,347 1,273 
Source: Papp, D, 1986, p. 96. 
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6.3.2 Soviet-Tunisian economic relations 
The Soviet trade policies represented an instrument with which to chip away at 
the economic linkages of neo-colonialism. 64 Regarding Tunisia, the Soviet intention 
was to offer a new market with the aim of impeding Tunisian progress towards 
association with the EEC. The Soviet Union also had sought the immediate pay-
off of port facilities and markets for its own goods. 65 Economic relations with 
Tunisia has two sides: trade relations and economic aid. 
6.3.2.1 Soviet trade with Tunisia 
The Soviet Union and Tunisia signed their first trade agreement in July 1957, 
and a Tunisian trade delegation visited Moscow in January 1961. Trade had not 
been extensive: Tunisian's total foreign trade in 1966 was around $408 million of 
which the Soviet share was $12.5 million or roughly 2% of total trade. Tunisian 
trade with the Soviet Union did not approach that between Tunisia and the United 
States66 (see Table 6:18). In 1973, Tunisia and the Soviet Union signed another 
trade protocol and announced an increase in trade between the two countries of 
20 per cent. The Soviet Union exported to Tunisia machinery and equipment, 
ships, timber and other commodities. Tunisia exported to the Soviet Union olive 
and cork, olive oil, and almonds67 but Soviet trade with Tunisia was small in 
comparison with trade with Europe or the United States (Tables 8 and 9) 
As the figures in Table 6.19 show, Soviet-Tunisian relations remained low key. 
This was in spite of agreements concluded between the two countries in October 
and December 1983 on a $25 million irrigation project and on various maritime 
issues such as establishment of a regular Tunisian-Soviet shipping line and naval 
repair facilities in Tunisia. In April 1985, the Soviet Union and Tunisia signed 
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Table 6:19 Volume of Soviet foreign trade with Tunisia 
1970-1982(millions of Roubles) 
Years 1970 1975 1980 1981 1982 1985 
imports 2.6 7.0 5.5 2.4 5.1 11.6 
exports 3.1 3.5 19.5 12.7 6.1 11.4 
total 5.7 10.5 25.0 15.1 11.2 23.0 
Source: Shearman, Peter, 1987, pp. 1083-1117. 
1986 
19.2 
19.7 
38.9 
an agreement that created a permanent commission on economic, scientific and 
technical, and trade relations; it was a sign of the strengthening of their economic 
cooperation. 68 
6.3.2.2 Soviet economic aid to Tunisia 
Tunisia was not the major recipient of Soviet economic aid to Africa. The 
first Soviet aid to Tunisia came in 1961, when the Soviet Union offered aid for 
the construction of dams, hospitals and educational facilities. The Soviet credits 
were extended at the time of the Franco-Tunisian crisis over the disposition of 
the naval base at Bizerte in 1961. The Soviets intended to take advantage of the 
Franco-Tunisian conflict in the cold war to penetrate, and extend relations with, 
Tunisia.69 
Soviet aid to Tunisia by the end of 1967 totalled $11.5 million, of which 
$0.5 million was in the form of grants, and the remainder in bilateral long term 
loans. This amount accounts for merely 2.2 per cent of all Soviet and Eastern 
European aid to the African continent.70 Between 1965-1967, Soviet aid to Tunisia 
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represented only 4.6 per cent ($11.5 million) of total foreign aid ($253 million) to 
Thnisia. During the same period US aid represented 58.5 per cent ($148m) of total 
foreign aid. 71 
By 1965, Soviet aid and loans had enabled the constructions of four dams, and 
two power stations. Soviet technical assistance was also provided for the extraction 
of uranium from Thnisian phosphate. Capital aid from the Soviet Union to Thnisia 
between 1954-1972 totalled $34.0 million.72 
6.3.3 Soviet- Algerian economic relations 
6.3.3.1 Soviet-Algerian Trade relations 
Soviet trade with Algeria grew steadily after 1962.Its exports to Algeria ex-
ceeded its imports and the Soviets spent foreign exchange earned in this way on 
importing goods from industrialized capitalist countries. In 1968, Algeria and the 
Soviet Union signed a seven-year trade agreement, and trade between the two 
countries increased. The Soviet Union pledged to purchase one third of Algeria's 
annual wine production in exchange for agricultural machinery. 73 The price of wine 
later became an issue affecting Algerian-Soviet economic relations because Algeria 
had asked for an increase in the price of wine paid by the Soviet Union in order to 
decrease the deficit in trade between the two countries. Between 1966 and 1969, 
Algeria ranked fifth among Soviet Union's Third World trading partners.74 
Algerian trade with the Soviet Union was influenced by Algeria's relations 
with the West. When the West, particularly France, refused to buy Algerian wine, 
Algeria signed with the Soviet Union a contract under which it would supply the 
Soviet Union with five million hectolitres of wine. The agreement covered the 
294 
Table 6:20 Soviet foreign trade with Algeria (millions of Roubles) 
Years 1970;% 1971 ;% 1972 ;% 
exports 62.5; .54 52.6; .42 55.9 ; .44 
imports 55.8; .53 69.3; .62 58.6 ; .44 
turnover 118.3; .54 121.9 ; .52 114.5 ; .44 
Source: The Soviet Union 1973, London: C. Hurst & Company, p. 97. 
period 1969-1975, during which Algeria supplied a total of 35 million hectolitres of 
wine. France had been affected by the Algerian nationalisation of oil companies, 
by Algerian agricultural reform and Algeria's emphasis on the industrial sector. 
The Soviet Union welcomed the nationalisation because for ideological reasons, 
and supported Algeria with technology which was not available from the West. 75 
In the 1970s, Algerian trade with the Soviet Union increased, and Algeria 
signed a second trade agreement with the Soviet Union in February 1972. The 
overall volume of Algerian trade, which was $126 million in 1970, rose to ap-
proximately $149 million in 1973. Between the years 1968 and 1972, Algeria had a 
trading balance surplus with the Soviet Union. In 1973, this trading surplus turned 
to a deficit of $8,624,758 due to the diversification of products, especially equip-
ment exported by the USSR to Algeria. 76 On the other hand, exports of Algerian 
oil and wine were greatly reduced and restricted. The Soviet Union was importing 
oil from Algeria and reselling it for hard currency. Algerian oil was exchanged for 
Soviet arms. 77 
In 1983, Algeria celebrated the 20th anniversary of Soviet-Algerian economic 
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and technical co-operation. During that 20 year period, Soviet assistance had 
above all been concentrated in the industries of mining, metallurgy, oil and gas 
production and power. The Soviets had completed about 66 out of 122 projects 
in Algeria. In order to increase trade, the Soviet Union and Algeria in 1974 had 
established a joint Algerian-Soviet shipping line operating between Algerian ports, 
the Black Sea and Azov Sea. 78 
Table 6:21 Soviet foreign trade with Algeria 1975-1986 (millions of 
Roubles) 
Years 1975 1980 1985 1986 
exports 112.3 92.6 132.3 88.4 
imports 134.7 62.5 272.9 239.9 
total 247.0 155.1 405.2 327.8 
Source: Shearman, P, 1987, p. 1093. 
In the early 1980s, Soviet trade with Algeria had increased particularly in term 
of Soviet imports. By 1985 the volume of trade reached 405.2 million roubles. 
6.3.3.2 Soviet economic aid to Algeria 
Soviet economic aid to Algeria was extended in two credits, m 1963 and 
1964, totalling $250 million. Algeria was desperate for Soviet aid after a costly 
revolutionary war. The early aid was concentrated on major projects, such as 
the steel works at Annaba which cost $125 million. The Soviet Union initially 
offered Algeria 500 tractors, and more than 100 combines. They also built dams, 
irrigation systems, technical institutes and training schools, and carried out a 
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number of oil and mineral surveys. The Soviet Union adopted a pre-emptive 
strategy in order to prevent US or Western companies from controlling the Algerian 
economy. Soviet economic credits extended to Algeria between 1975 and 1979 
have been estimated of $304 millions, while over the same period Soviet economic 
credits extended to Morocco totalled $2.0 billion.79 The explanation is the Soviet 
agreement with Morocco over phosphates, the largest Soviet agreement with a 
Third World country. 
Between 1954 and 1981 Soviet aid to Algeria amounted to $1,045 million. 
The Soviets increased their aid in the early 1980s, and in 1980 alone, Algeria 
received $315 million. Most Soviet aid to Algeria concentrated on developments 
and investments in technology which had not been offered by the West. In 1972, 
eighty deep wells were drilled in the Algerian Sahara region with the help of Soviet 
experts, and the Soviet Union estimated it had designed 21 dams.80 The Soviet 
Union built the Jarada thermal power station and concentrated on hydro-electric 
projects in Qabail which involved the building of 21 dams there. The major part 
of Hajjar steel complex at Annaba was built with Soviet aid in 1972, producing 
410,000 tons of high quality steel a year during the 1970s81 (Table 6:22). An 
important element of Soviet aid to Algeria was the Soviet advisors. The number 
of advisors reached 2500 in early 1980 but declined to 800 advisors by 1985. The 
decline reflected Algerian reorientation in development and technology toward the 
West, after a long period of socialist development. 
Despite Soviet aid and trade with Algeria, the EEC and North America had 
been the major Algerian partner in trade. In 1973, 76 per cent of Algeria's exports 
went to the EEC and the US; in 1977, the figure had risen to 90 per cent. The 
change which occurred was the sharp growth of exports to North America primarily 
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Table 6:22 The number of new Soviet foreign aid projects 
planned and completed 
Years total before 1975 1975-77* 1977-79* 
Planned 90 8 
operational 45 9 
*increase. Source: Papp, D, 1986, p. 105. 
to the United States.82 
2 
4 
1979-81 * 
7 
5 
6.3.3.3 The Soviet Union and New International Economic Order. 
total 1982 
120 
65 
Despite the Soviet Union's declared policy of supporting the Third World, it 
adopted a critical attitude toward Third World demands for a New International 
Economic Order. The Soviet Union asserted that the capitalists were responsible 
for Third World problems because of their colonial history. It went further to ac-
cuse the multinational corporations, the World Bank, the IMF, the arms sales, and 
the control of the international media by the US and the West as the main factor 
responsible for the economic problems of the Third World. The Soviet Union's 
diplomacy toward NIEO was an indirect rejection of the NIEO and attachment of 
sole blame on the West for the grievances of the Third World. 83 
After the fourth United Nations conference on Trade and Development (UNC-
TAD) held in Nairobi in May 1976, the Soviet Union adopted a clear position to-
ward Third World demands. The Soviet Union's response was that it should not 
be asked to devote a certain percentage of its GNP to assist the Third World. The 
Soviets had taken the opportunity to ask for a restructuring of all sectors of world 
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trade, not only those affecting the Third World, but all countries including the 
Socialist countries. The Soviet Union saw the restructuring of the world economy 
as a global problem not only one for the Third World. It called for the concept 
of International Economic Security. In fact both East and West were sufficiently 
apprehensive to eschew the rhetoric of sympathy and concentrate on the diplomacy 
of rejection. The Soviet position was less radical than the Third World's and to 
Algeria's radical demands. 84 
However, the Soviets tried to use the issue of NIEO to their political and 
economic advantage. It sought equitable and non-discriminatory terms and they 
asked that any West-South concession should be applied to East-West trade. In 
1979, the Soviet Union complained that international measures against protection-
ist tendencies could be effective only if they were not confined to the interests of 
one group of countries.85 
6.3.4 Soviet-Moroccan economic relations 
Soviet trade with Morocco developed after Moroccan independence in 1956. 
The Soviet Union criticised US capitalist companies in Morocco as tools of imper-
alism, and in 1958 the first trade agreement with Morocco was signed. Between 
1965-1968, Morocco ranked seventh among the Soviet Union's trading partners in 
the Middle East and North Africa, while the Soviet Union ranked fourth among 
Morocco's trading partners in 1966-1967, accounting for 4 per cent oftotal Moroc-
can trade. 86 
The trade balance was in the Soviet Union's favor between 1965-1975, with 
the increase in Moroccan imports of Soviet oil, and the Soviet oil deliveries met 
about 60 per cent of Moroccan oil needs. In addition, the Soviet Union exported 
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chemical products, timber, glass, medicines, machinery and equipment. In 1983, 
there were over 3500 Soviet-made tractors working on Morocco's fields. Morocco 
exported to the Soviet Union citrus fruit and phosphates. Canned fish, especially 
sardines, had been the third item of Soviet imports next to phosphates and citrus 
fruit from Morocco. The latter sold 174,000 tons of oranges to the Soviet Union 
during the 1973-1974 season, and overall the Soviet Union accounted for one third 
of Morocco's citrus exports in the 1970s. 87 
In 1978, Soviet-Moroccan trade relations moved into a new phase with a 
thirty years, $2 billion accord for Soviet development of the Meskala phosphates 
deposits in Southern Morocco. The 1978 agreement was billed by King Hassan II 
of Morocco as the "contract of the century". It was Moscow's largest commitment 
to a single project in the Third World and marked the first Soviet agreement to 
import phosphates. Most of the 10 million ton annual output from Meskala would 
be exported to the Soviet Union to repay the $2 billion loan, and the surplus would 
be exchanged for Soviet goods. Morocco's reservations about a close relationship 
with communist countries did not extend to commercial relations. Even before 
the 1978 Meskala agreement, Soviet-Moroccan trade relations had developed and 
increased. Also in 1978, Morocco agreed to a joint ownership arrangement with 
the Soviet Union for developing Moroccan fisheries. 88 
In order to strengthen trade relations with Morocco, the Soviet Union had 
built two cold stores, one at the port of Agadir and the other at Casablanca docks. 
The stores were linked to the Moroccan cold storage system planned for the main 
citrus fruit and vegetable growing areas, and for agricultural and fishery products. 
The Soviet Union had also signed a shipping agreement with Morocco in 1971 and 
Soviet ships annually carried 400,000 tons between ports in Morocco and third 
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Table 6:23 Soviet foreign trade with Morocco 1970-86 (millions of 
Roubles) 
Years 1970 1975 1980 1981 1982 1985 1986 
exports 32.5 45.7 92.6 92.6 126.9 112.5 65.6 
imports 17.6 41.2 105.4 105.4 134.2 66.2 52.5 
total 50.1 86.9 198.0 198.0 261.1 178.7 118.1 
Source: Shearman, P, 1987, pp. 1083-1117. 
countries. 89 
It is important to note here that the Soviet-Moroccan agreement in 1978 also 
had a political objective in addition to its economic purpose: Morocco was trying 
to put pressure on the Carter administration to sell arms to Morocco. The Soviet 
Union hinted at co-operating on the development of Moroccan strategic minerals 
such as uranium. However, the Carter administration refused to favour Morocco 
in the Western Sahara conflict, despite the fact that Morocco is estimated to have, 
along with the Sahara, 70 per cent of the world's known reserves of phosphates. 90 
In comparing Moroccan trade with the Soviet Union and the US, Morocco 
imported more from the United States than the Soviet Union; for example, Mo-
roccan imports from the US amounted to $271,424,000 in 1980 and $486,954,000 
in 1984, whereas in the same years imports from the Soviet Union amounted to 
$149,246,000 and $154,843,000 respectively. On the other hand, Morocco exported 
more to the Soviet Union than to the USA; for example, in 1980 and 1984, Mo-
roccan exports to the Soviet Union amounted to $121,063,000 and $46,970,000 
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respectively, and to the US $32,713,000 and $32,899,000 respectively.91 
6.3.4.1 Soviet aid to Morocco 
Soviet economic aid to Morocco amounted to $2,100 million dollars between 
1954 and 1981. The Soviet Union aided Morocco in the construction of dams and 
hydro-electric projects: between 1956 and 1981, the Soviet Union had completed 
82 projects.92 In 1971, Soviet aid to Morocco amounted to 39.6 million Dirhams. 
Aid from the Soviet Union focused on development and construction which Third 
World countries had been requesting. The dams, power stations and hydro-electric 
projects were important for Moroccan development, and were hard to get from 
western countries. Further, the Soviet Union supplied Morocco with experts and 
technology, and as helping countries to cope with the various tasks of national 
economic develpoment and exploitation of their national resources. 93 
The Soviet Union assisted Morocco in constructing important facilities such as 
the Mansur Eddakhabi hydro-electric power complex, the Jerada thermal power 
station and the Moulay Youssef hydro-electric station. The Mansur Eddakhabi 
dam agreement was signed in 1969, as a joint project to develop the southern 
region of Morocco. It was opened in the presence of the Soviet Foreign Trade 
Minister. The contract for the construction of Ait Adel hydro-electric power station 
was signed between Morocco and the Soviet Union in October 1971. Most of the 
projects were built with loans from the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union supported 
Morocco with 39 experts dispatched to work on the projects, as advisors. 94 
The Soviet Union and Morocco developed co-operation in the area of utilizing 
Morocco's rich oil shale deposits and thus were competing with the US companies 
in this area. Soviet geologists produced a map of Morocco's mineral resources, the 
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first time in Morocco's history that such a map had been compiled and published.95 
Moroccan-Soviet economic relations developed much further than in other Maghreb 
states. Ideology was abandoned, and national and mutual interests won over ide-
ological differences. The Soviet Union had penetrated the area in which the US 
had failed to participate. When the US pulled back its support for the Aswan 
dam in Egypt, the Soviet Union supported it and in this way had won influence 
with Egypt. The same principle applied to different degrees in Morocco and other 
Third World countries. The Soviet Union took advantage of Third World economic 
difficulties and the lack of US support. 
In general terms, the Soviet Union conducted trade with a small number of 
Arab countries. For instance, in 1961 as much as 88.3 percent of Soviet trade 
with Arab states was concentrated in five states: Egypt (64.9%), Libya (0.6%), 
Morocco (2.7%), Iraq (13.3%) and Syria (%6.8). Soviet trade with Arab states 
have varied according to the country's commitment to the socialist model and 
political attitude. For instance, Egypt's share of total Soviet trade with the Arab 
world decreased from 68.0 percent in 1965 under Nasser to 14.3 percent in 1985. 
Maghreb states shared 32.6 percent of Soviet trade with the Arab States in 1980, 
while seven Arab states including Maghreb States shared 93.2 percent of Soviet 
trade with the Arab states in the same year.96 
6.4 Conclusion 
The Superpowers relations with the Maghreb states reveal a number of themes 
which characterise more generally superpower relations with Third World coun-
tries, particularly in the French area of interest. 
1- Political relations have been generally separated from economic relations in 
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the Maghreb's relations with the Superpowers except in specific cases, e.g. 
Libya's relations with the Reagan administration. Algeria and Libya had 
strong trade relations with the US despite their political differences, and Mo-
rocco had strong economic relations with Moscow rather than with the US. 
Mutual interests dominated economic relations, despite ideological and polit-
ical rhetoric. The Maghreb states were different to Eastern Arab countries 
which had politicised their economic relations with the Soviet Union, for ex-
ample, Egypt. 
u- Both superpowers encouraged the development of their preferred economic 
systems in the Maghreb states and, when Tunisia adopted socialism in the 
late 1960s, the US was not encouraging. The Soviet Union encouraged Alge-
rian socialism and supported the nationalisation of economic sectors in the 
Maghreb. The US was sensitive to the nationalisation issue but when it served 
American interests, for example, in Algeria, it supported the nationalization 
policy. 
lll- EEC countries have dominated the markets in Maghreb states, but economic 
relations between the Maghreb states and the superpowers have been en-
couraged as a result of differences between EEC countries and the Maghreb 
states, such as France with Algeria, Tunisia and Libya. When the Maghreb 
states had no other market for their oil or natural gas, they turned to the 
superpowers. 
IV. Economic relations between the superpowers and the EEC have also influ-
enced their relations with the Maghreb states. US agricultural trade with the 
EEC affected the Maghreb states and the Soviet Union's natural gas trade 
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with the EEC affected the Algerian natural gas market in Europe. 
v. Both superpowers have used economic aid to win political influence. The 
United States tried to eliminate the Soviet presence in the Maghreb states by 
means of economic aid to the Maghreb. The US also tried to limit the eco-
nomic influence of France in the region. The Soviet Union used its economic 
aid as a pre-emptive strategy to distance the Maghreb states from the West, 
particularly, the United States. 
VI. The Soviet Union has been more successful in Maghreb states in creating 
intergovernmental commissions on economic, scientific and technical and trade 
co-operation. The Soviet Union offered a great deal of credit for developing 
Maghreb states' natural resources. Hard currency has been another economic 
objective of Soviet trade with North Africa. 
vn. The United States has concentrated on oil and natural gas investments in the 
Maghreb states. The major US projects which generate huge profits, needed 
more capital and higher technology than the Soviet Union was able to offer. 
vn1. Both superpowers had paid lipservice to Third World demands for NIEO and 
the Soviet Union tried to use the issue for its political and economic interests, 
and to win economic concession from the West for East-West trade relations. 
The United States refused the Third World demands and it put the blame on 
Opec including its two North African members. 
IX. The economic aid and programmes of both superpowers were based on three 
criteria: the strategic importance of the region; the region's economic im-
portance as a market for the exports of the superpowers, and as a source of 
raw materials. These criteria are relevant to superpower policies toward other 
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Third World countries. 
Economically, the Maghreb states have been under EEC economic domination 
because of historical and political ties. Geography has played a major role in those 
relations, and for the forseeable future the EEC will continue to limit the economic 
relations of the superpowers and North Africa. EEC aid, trade, investment and 
North African workers in Europe are major factors in consolidating links between 
the Maghreb and the EEC countries. 
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Chapter VII 
The Superpowers and the Maghreb: Strategic relations 
7.1 Introduction 
The United States and the Soviet Union both considered the Third World 
important to their geostrategic plans. As a maritime power, the U.S. is concerned 
to secure its routes of communication and trade, and in the 1950s concluded a 
number of treaties with Third World states in an effort to contain Soviet influence 
and expansion. The American strategic objective could be summarised in the 
following points: 1) to have military bases in the Third World; 2) to sell arms to the 
Third World; 3) to co-operate with Third World countries in military affairs and to 
intervene in the Third World by using proxy forces to project American interests; 
4) to deny the Soviet Union any military presence in the Third World; 5) to 
penetrate Third World military elites through training and military co-operation; 
6) to encourage the Third World military to adopt American military doctrine and 
7) to co-operate with the Third World in intelligence sharing against the Soviet 
Union and other pro-Soviet regimes.1 
The Soviet Union had geostrategic objectives ofits own: 1) to deny the West a 
presence, particularly military bases, in the Third World; 2) to jeopardise western 
lines of communication in time of war, and to have military bases or facilities in 
the Third World; 3) to promote and maintain pro-Soviet regimes, as Soviet proxy 
forces, in Third World countries; 4) to sell Soviet arms and weapons to Third 
World countries in order to earn hard currency and to station military facilities 
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there; 5) to spread Soviet military doctrine and to build military co-operation 
with the Third World elites; 6) historically, the Soviet Union has sought to reach 
the warm waters of the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean in order to realise 
strategic objectives in the chokepoints straits2 such as Gibraltar, Dardanelles and 
Suez. 
In this chapter we concentrate on the superpowers strategic relations with 
the Maghreb States, with an emphasis on the following strategic themes: 1) Arms 
transfers; 2) Mediterranean relations; 3) military bases; 4) military intervention 
and 5) intelligence co-operation. 
7.2 Maghreb geostrategic values 
The Maghreb States have a geostrategic value which has been important to 
the Superpowers. In World War II, Germany and Italy sought to use their North 
African holdings to disrupt Allied Mediterranean communication, and in turn the 
Allies used North Africa as a launching pad for their conquest of Italy and their 
advance into Germany itself. These historical facts encouraged both the United 
States and the Soviet Union to concentrate on the Mediterranean as a vital area 
in their military planning in time of war and peace. In addition, the Maghreb's 
location on the Mediterranean means that the North African states control the 
Mediterranean strategic chokepoints. Morocco controls the entrance of Gibraltar 
where it monitors the 50,000 ships that pass through the Straits each year. This 
is obviously of considerable importance to Western defence.3 
The Maghreb has been considered as a bridge both to Black Africa and to the 
Middle East. Both superpowers have tried to station military facilities there. The 
United States was keen to maintain a sizable military presence in North Africa in 
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order to monitor the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was selling huge quantities of 
arms to the Maghreb States, particularly to Libya and Algeria, and it used Algerian 
airports as a bridge to Central Africa and Angola. From a military perspective, in 
time of war, the Maghreb was seen as a vital area regarding the European theatre.4 
7.3 Superpowers, Arms Transfers and the Maghreb 
Arms transfers are a significant phenomenon of international relations and as 
a tool of the foreign policies of superpower relations with Third World countries. 
Arms transfer decisions are heavily influenced by political and economic motives, 
and are used to affect the behaviour and attitude of Third World countries toward 
the superpowers. 5 
Until 1979, the United States was the leading world power in arms transfers, 
the Soviet Union ranking second, and France third (Tables 7:1;2). From 1979 until 
1989, the Soviet Union took over as the leading world power in the arms trade and 
the United States ranked second. After 1989 the United States once again took 
the lead from the Soviet Union. 
7.3.1 The United States, Arms Transfers and the Maghreb States 
It is possible to distinguish five phases in US arms transfers to the Third 
World: 
1. Phase One 1950-1963: 
The United States provided weapons to Western Europe in furtherance of its 
containment policy against the Soviet Union. During this period, Western Europe 
received more than $18.4 billion of arms from the United States, ranking first in 
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Table 7:1 World's arms transfers 1963-1986 four years average(US 
$million constant 1981 Dollars). 
States 1963-6 1967-70 1971-74 1975-8 1979-82 1983-6 
USA 3,660 6,504 7,877 8,456 7,968 9,034 
USSR 3,238 3,206 6,399 8,275 11,143 14,806 
France 364 384 1,116 1,673 3,019 3,596 
UK 421 303 824 1,207 1,971 1,045 
W.Germany 273 249 366 1,047 1,261 1,249 
Italy 56 62 231 623 890 763 
Others 1,409 1,518 2,547 4,161 6,378 7,733 
Totals 9,421 12,216 19,360 25,442 32,630 38,226 
Source: World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, various years. 
US Arms and Disarmament Agency, Washington.D.C: U.S.Government Printing 
Office. 
arms purchases from the US. East Asia and the Pacific received $8.9 billion of arms 
and the Middle East and South Asia $1.57 billion of arms.6 The priority of the 
United States during this period were such that security, political and strategic 
objectives dominated US arms transfers policy and took precedence over economic 
objectives. Most arms transfers were on credit and long term loan. The United 
States also delivered arms to the Middle East as part of its containment policy but 
United States arms sales to North Africa were limited because France remained the 
major arms supplier to North Africa. Between 1950-1973, North Africa imported 
14.2% of French arms transfers to the Third World, whilst the United States and 
the Soviet Union transferred respectively 1.3% and 3.2% of their arms transfers to 
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Table 7:2 World arms transfers, four year averages (percentage). 
States 1963-6 1967-70 1971-74 1975-8 1979-82 1983-6 
USA 38.8 53.2 40.7 33.2 24.4 23.6 
USSR 4.4 26.2 33.1 32.5 34.1 38.7 
France 3.9 3.1 5.8 6.6 9.3 9.4 
UK 4.5 2.5 4.3 4.7 6.0 2.7 
W.Germany 2.9 2.0 1.9 4.1 3.7 3.3 
Italy 0.6 0.5 1.2 2.4 2.7 2.0 
Others 15.0 12.4 13.1 16.3 19.6 20.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, various years. 
US Arms and Disarmament Agency, Washington.D.C: U.S.Government Printing 
Office. 
the Third World to North African states (Table 7:3). 
2. Phase Two: 1964-1973 After the Cuban crisis, the United States shifted 
its geopolitical perspective on arms transfers away from Western Europe and 
toward Third World countries. Due to the Vietnam War, this shift was espe-
cially to East Asia and the Pacific. John Kennedy, as US President, added 
the concept of counter-insurgency to the military strategic objective for arms 
transfers, in order to counter the increasing influence of the Soviet Union. 
By 1964, the Vietnam War dominated US foreign policy, and the domino 
theory influenced the US decision makers toward East Asia. East Asia and 
the Pacific region ranked first in receiving American weapons. It is estimated 
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Table 7:3 Main Suppliers of Weapons to Maghreb states 1950-1973 
(US $m constant 1973 prices) 
States 1950-60 1961-65 1966-70 1971-73 Total1 Total2 %3 
USA 2.5 2.7 109.6 5.2 120 8817.5 1.3 
USSR - 123.8 166.4 18.6 308.8 9486.8 3.2 
France 22.6 19.7 48.7 280.5 371.5 2604.7 14.2 
1- Total of arms transfers to Maghreb states. 2-Total of arms transfers to the 
Third World excluding Vietnam. 3- percentage of arms transfers to Maghreb states 
to total arms transfers to the Third World. Source: Prepared by the author from 
SIPRI. Arms Trade Registers: The Arms Trade with the Third World, Sockholm 
(Sweden): Almqvist & Wiksell International Stockolm, 1975. 
that $19.1 billion of arms were delivered to East Asia by the United States, 
$2.7 billion to Europe and Canada, and the Middle East received only $582 
million.7 
During the Johnson Administration, the United States reviewed its policy of 
arms transfers to the Third World and it sought to focus on social and economic 
development in the Third World, instead of supplying arms assistance to counter 
revolutions. This policy rejected the prevailing attitude of American foreign pol-
icy makers toward countering communism.8 But the credibility of this policy was 
overwhelmed by the war in Vietnam. It was an aspiration more than a practical 
policy. 
3. Phase Three: 1974-1976, Kissinger Policy. 
321 
After the American defeat in Vietnam, US policy makers questioned the arms 
transfers policy in countering the threat posed by insurgent groups in the Third 
World. During this phase, the arms transfers policy was influenced by the Nixon 
doctrine of using regional powers to protect American interests. Economic motives 
dominated American objectives, particularly with the increasing price of oil. There 
was a geographical shift in American arms transfers policy away from East Asia 
and the Pacific toward the Middle East and, in consequence, the Middle East 
ranked first in arms transfers. 
Once British military forces had been withdrawn from the Gulf, President 
Nixon and his Secretary of State gave Iran carte blanche to buy American weapons. 
The backlog of Iranian arms ordered climbed from $500 million in 1972 to $2.2 
billion in 1973 to $4.3 billion in 1974.9 
Henry Kissinger, the architect of arms sales policy to Iran, had another ob-
jective in selling American arms. He believed that the economic situation and 
post-Vietnam political imperatives made these massive sales more compelling than 
ever they were before 1976. Such analysts saw the relationship between the prices 
of oil and gold and the decline in the value of the dollar as a way to absorb the 
effect on the industrialised nations of the oil price increase.10 
The rate of increase in the US balance of payments deficit was being acceler-
ated by the rapid rise in the price of oil. The United States intended to recover 
as many Petrodollars as possible. American Deputy Secretary of Defense William 
Clements testified before the Congress that the arms sales to Iran, Saudi Arabia 
and to the Gulf, strengthened both free world security and the United States bal-
ance of payments.11 Andrew Pierre went further, explaining the arms transfers 
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policy of the United States and the Western Europe as way 
"to recycle the large amounts of Petrodollars which were paying for oil." 12 
Moreover, the burgeoning arms trade was benefiting both the American econ-
omy and employment. For example, it is estimated that the impact of a total ban 
on sales would have increased unemployment by 0.3 per cent and reduced the US 
gross national product by $20 billion (0.8 per cent).l3 Economic factors dominated 
this phase of United States arms transfers. The Maghreb states, especially the oil 
producing countries (Libya and Algeria) were clients of the Soviet arms industry. 
Morocco and Tunisia were more dependent on credit and aid, particularly from 
Western Europe, especially France. 
4. Phase Four: Carter era 
The Carter Administration developed a different perception of United States 
policy toward the Third World. Instead of arms sales, it adopted an economic and 
social development policy in order to stabilise Third World countries and counter 
the influence of the Soviet Union. Carter perceived that the spread of conventional 
weapons threatened international stability, and the US had a special responsibility 
as the world's leading military power to shape the pattern of the world arms 
trade. Carter viewed arms sales as an exceptional foreign policy implement.14 
Carter emphasized human rights and democratization as a more effective way of 
influence and stability than arms sales. 
Carter's arms trade policy faced criticism from arms dealers and lobbyists 
attacking Carter's policy because of the damage to US economic interests. During 
this phase, for the first time, the Soviet Union dominated the arms trade market in 
the Third World (Tables 7:1,2). During his first two years in office, Carter refused 
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to sell arms to Morocco on political grounds, and banned the sales of arms and 
other technological, military-related equipment to Libya.15 But after the Iranian 
revolution 1979, Carter supported arms sales policy to protect America's friends. 
5. Phase Five: Reagan's Pragmatic Policy: 
The Reagan Administration's approach to arms transfers was very different 
from that of President Carter. Reagan emphasised the use of arms sales as a 
foreign policy tool. The United States military and embassy staffs were instructed 
to provide courtesy and assistance to firms which had obtained licenses to market 
items. During his first three months in office President Reagan allowed more than 
$15 billion in arms transfers to governments around the world. 16 His policy was 
influenced by his "rollback strategy". The United States was prepared to help its 
friends and allies, to strengthen them through arms transfers. Economic factors 
played a major role in fashioning the United States arms trade policy. Middle East 
countries were the principal importers of American weaponry. The Iran-Iraq War 
gave a major increase to the sale arms to Saudi Arabia and to other Gulf States. 
In the 1950s and 1960s, the United States transferred weapons as assistance to 
its clients for political allegiance in the East-West conflict. After 1970, the United 
States supported its allies and friends in order to gain economic advantage from 
the arms sales. Strategic and political objectives, therefore, had characterised the 
two decades of arms transfers. In the 1970s and 1980s, the United States received 
much revenue from its arms sales, particularly from selling to the Middle East 
OPEC States.17 
In addition to economic benefits from arms transfers, the United States was 
using arms trade as a political means to influence Third World military institutions 
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and military doctrine. Richard Murphy, the former Assistant Secretary of State 
for Near Eastern and Southern Asian Affairs, stated American objectives in arms 
transfers in the following terms 
"For thirty years Arab states friendly to the United States have turned chiefly 
to us as a source of arms and technology- to the near exclusion of the Soviet Union. 
The Arab intelligentsia is schooled in American Universities; their technicians are 
skilled on our systems. Perhaps most important, members of their military learn our 
doctrine, train on our systems, and develop lasting professional and personal ties with 
American counterparts that they carry back to their own countries." 18 
Murphy's argument was intended to win congressional support for arms sales 
to Saudi Arabia and reflected the strategic importance of the arms trade. However, 
an economic consequence was that buyers subsequently became dependent on a 
continuous flow of spares from the United States, and the sophisticated weapons 
systems required large amounts of training and assistance from the US. For in-
stance, Iran was heavily dependent on American spare parts, especially during the 
Iran-Iraq War, and this led in part to so the called "Iran-gate Scandal". 
The Maghreb states were less dependent on the United States, and comparing 
the Maghreb with other Middle Eastern states, (with the exception of Libya), the 
Maghreb states were moderate in their arms purchases. For example, between 
1978 and 1982 the Maghreb states bought a total of $28.5 billion of arms and this 
amount decreased between 1983 and 1987 to $13.3 billion.19 Libya was the major 
importer of weapons in North Africa. Between 1978 and 1982, arms totalled 44.2 
percent of total Libyan imports. Between 1983 and 1987, Libya bought arms to 
the value of $8.3 billion, comprising 26.8 percent of total Libyan imports. The 
decrease in oil prices influenced the Libyan decision to buy arms. Algeria ranked 
second in North Africa for the purchase of arms (Table 7:4). 
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7.3.1.1 United States-Morocco arms transfers 
The American supply of military hardware to Morocco began in 1960, when 
Morocco signed a military agreement with the United States organising the mil-
itary bases in Morocco and setting a time for their withdrawal from Morocco in 
1963. The military agreement included a restriction on Moroccan use of American 
military equipment. The United States stated that the weapons should not be used 
outside Morocco and must be used for internal security. The United States was 
afraid that Morocco would use the military weapons in the Arab- Israeli conflict 
either directly, or indirectly by transferring them to other Arab states. 20 
During the 1960s, the United States supported Morocco with 24 Northrop F-
5A and F-5B fighter bombers, and anti-tank weapons, C-130H Hercules transport 
aircraft, 50 M-48 tanks and 330 M-113 armoured personal carriers. In 1963 and 
1965, the United States tried to reward Morocco for the American military bases 
(Kenitra base was used by US until 1978) there and to strengthen the Moroccan 
position in its border conflict with Algeria. The Soviet Union supported Algeria 
during the conflict by supplying weapons through Egypt. 21 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the United States arms programme with 
regard to Morocco concentrated on strengthening Morocco's overall military pos-
ture. This programme did not relate to the war in the Western Sahara, but to the 
Moroccan role in Africa, and to the regional balance of power in North Africa. In 
1974, the US Army General Edward Patrin, visited Morocco to assess its defence 
needs. He recommended equipping two Moroccan armoured brigades stationed 
along the Algerian frontier. This equipment was to be provided through military 
sales (not aid) at a cost of about $500 million, with delivery to be completed by 
326 
Table 7:4 Arms imports in North Africa ($ million) 
States 1978-82 % of total imports 1983-87 % of total imports 
Algeria 6,037 8.9 3,440 6.2 
Libya 19,315 44.2 8,347 26.8 
Morocco 2,645 9.9 911 4.4 
Thnisia 489 2.3 629 3.9 
Source: World military expenditure and arms Transfers, 1988. US Arms 
Control and Disarmament: Washington.D.C: U.S.Government Printing Office. 
1980.22 
United States military credits to Morocco from 1975 to 1980 ranged between 
$14 million and $45 million a year, which was far too small to finance major arms 
purchases and therefore Morocco was not attractive to American arms dealers. 
During and after the 1970s, with the increase in the oil prices, Saudi Arabia and 
other Gulf States supported Moroccan arms purchases and financed the deals with 
the United States.23 
In 1977, Morocco asked the United States for military assistance to deal in 
particular with the Polisario because of the conflict over Western Sahara. The 
Moroccans requested OV-10 aircraft and attack helicopters, but the United States 
Congress opposed the Moroccan request because of the probable use of American 
weapons in Western Sahara. According to the Carter administration, the use of 
US weapons outside Morocco was a violation of the American-Moroccan military 
agreement in 1960.24 
327 
In 1977 and 1978 the United States rejected Moroccan requests to provide as-
sault helicopters and fixed wing COIN aircraft because this equipment was partic-
ularly suited for operations against the Polisario. The ban on American weapons 
sales was influenced by Carter's regional approach toward North Africa and by 
his favourable view of revolutionary Third World countries such as Algeria. Hu-
man rights issues also played a role. The Carter Administration and the United 
States Congress supported a peaceful resolution to the Western Sahara conflict. 
To support Morocco with weapons would encourage Morocco to refuse a political 
settlement and negotiation with Polisario which the United States favoured. 25 
Morocco maintained a cool relationship with the Carter Administration. It 
was suspicious about the Americans apparent concern for human rights, to the 
extent that there were accusations of a Carter conspiracy to overthrow the Shah 
of Iran. It was well known that the Shah had close relations with King Hassan of 
Morocco. Carter was not at all enthusiastic about arms transfers to Morocco. 26 
Morocco reacted to Carter's restriction on the sale of American weapons to 
Morocco with bitterness. In December 1977, King Hassan postponed his scheduled 
visit to the United States. The bitterness deepened and in 1979 Morocco asked for 
the withdrawal of the US Ambassador, Richard Parker, one of America's Arabists 
in the State Department.27 
However, in 1979, the Carter administration reversed its arms transfers to 
Morocco, and approved the sale of a $235 million arms package including six OV-
10 Bronco armed reconnaissance planes, 20 F-5E Fighter bombers, and 2Y Hughes 
MD-100 Light helicopters to be delivered in 1981-82. There were several reasons 
for the shift in Carter arms policy toward Morocco in 1979. First, the Carter Ad-
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ministration sought to assure friends abroad that the United States was a reliable 
ally after the fall of the Shah of Iran in February 1979. Second, Morocco had 
played a major role in backing American and French interests in Zaire in 1977 and 
1979. Third, Hassan II sheltered the Shah of Iran after his final departure from 
Iran. Fourth, Saudi Arabia paid for Moroccan arms purchases, and using its close 
relations with the United States, Saudi Arabia had mediated between the United 
States and Morocco. Fifth, Hassan supported Carter's peace process in the Middle 
East. Sixth, Polisario attacks against positions within Morocco had demonstrated 
a new threat that could justify, in certain situations, the use of American weapons 
against the Polisario as being more defensive than offensive. This latter 'point 
made the sale of arms to Morocco justifiable in the eyes of the American Congress. 
Morocco was facing a threat to its internal security, and the defeat of Hassan II 
would lead to instability not only in Morocco but in the whole of North Africa and 
the Iberian peninsula. 28 
During Reagan's first term in the White House, Morocco received special 
strategic-related attention from the United States. This was for a number of rea-
sons: Reagan's offensive policy toward East-West relations; his use of the Third 
World countries; and Morocco's geostrategic position. The United States strength-
ened Morocco's military position with arms. Between 1974-1985 the United States 
gave Morocco between 1974-1985 about $2.3 billion in arms (Table 7:5) 53.8 per-
cent of that amount was transferred during Reagan's first term in the White House. 
Most of the arms were paid for by Saudi Arabia, an ally of Morocco. 29 
Each year between 1975 and 1982, Saudi Arabia gave Morocco between $500 
million and $1 billion to buy arms and for government expenditures. When Saudi 
Arabian financial assistance was reduced because of the decline in oil prices af-
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Table 7:5 U.S foreign military transfers to Morocco 1974-1985 ($m). 
(agreements, deliveries, credits and commercial arms exports) 
Year amount Year amount 
1974 15.038 1981 220.1 
1975 298 1982 105 
1976 155.1 1983 209 
1977 122.6 1984 144.5 
1978 149 1985 132.9 
1979 191.9 
1980 428.4 total 2304.4 
Source: Darnis 1986, p13. 
ter 1983, Moroccan arms imports declined and its arms purchases were limited 
to spare parts and light weapons.30 The United States military credits which var-
ied from 1976 to 1982 were insufficient to cover payments on all new equipment 
acquisitions.{Table 7:5). 
The increase in America's arms transfers to Morocco in the early 1980s was 
related to military co-operation between the United States and Morocco. The co-
operation started when the two states signed a military co-operation agreement in 
1982. The agreement allowed United States military forces to use the Moroccan 
air bases in the event of need for the rapid deployment of forces to the Middle 
East.31 
The co-operation agreement in 1982 had nothing to do with the conflict in 
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Western Sahara, it was related to military operations in southern NATO countries, 
Portugal and the South Atlantic and the stationing of B-52 bombers. By its pres-
ence in Morocco, the United States tried to link the American Telecommunication 
Centers in Kenitra, Bouknadel and Sidi Yahia with American bases in the Azores 
(Portuguese) and to the new NATO naval base at Port Santo in the Madeira islands 
(Portuguese) west of Morocco in the Atlantic. It was also intended to connect the 
American bases with both French bases in West Africa, Senegal, and Gabon, which 
would provide a satellite communication centre for ocean surveillance. 32 Despite 
the emphasis on the possibility of using Moroccan bases, it was only in 1958, when 
the United States forces intervened in the Lebanese civil war, that United States 
aircraft landed and refuelled at Kenitra en route from the United States. 33 
Although in 1983 there were joint military exercises between US and Moroc-
can military forces entitled "Bright Star", it is hard to believe that arms transfers 
influenced Moroccan policy. Despite United States pressure to settle the West-
ern Sahara conflict by negotiation (especially during Carter's Administration), 
Morocco had never accepted this American policy. The American-Moroccan dis-
agreement led to withdrawal of two American Ambassadors from Morocco during 
Reagan's first term in the White House. Morocco had other differences with the 
United States on regional issues. France had the upper hand in Morocco in terms 
of arms sales and between 1981-1985, Morocco purchased 45.8 per cent of its total 
arms purchases from France, but only 27.8 per cent from the United States (Table 
7:6). 
7.3.1.2 The United States-Tunisian arms trade 
Thnisian arms imports were low, coming principally from France, but also 
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Table 7:6 Value of arms transfers, cumulative 1981-1985 to North 
Africa by major supplier ($million) 
States Total USSF USA Fr u~ GFF Chine Ita Polan< Cz< other %USSF %UE %F'l 
Algeria 3,890 3,200 170 10( 16( 160 0 40 0 10 50 82.2 4.3 2.5 
Libya 10,45~ 4,600 0 72~ 5 180 320 85( 300 87t 2600 43 0 6.9 
Morocc< 1,255 0 350 57t 0 10 0 20 0 0 300 0 27.8 45J 
Thnisia 580 0 330 20( 0 10 0 30 0 0 10 0 56.8 34,L 
Source: World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1986, pp. 143-145. 
the United States. A number of factors influenced Tunisian arms transfers: the 
stability of Thnisia; Bourguiba's passive attitude towards the Arab-Israeli conflict; 
and Bourguiba had deliberately kept the army weak and therefore out of any power 
struggles. Bourguiba feared army participation in politics, and was afraid of a 
military coup d'etat. As a homogeneous society, 95 percent Sunni Muslim, Thnisia 
was stable. Tunisia did not attempt to match Algeria or Morocco by building a 
strong army. Few Thnisian Muslims were recruited into the French army during 
Thnisia's years as a protectorate, and Tunisia acquired its independence more or 
less peacefully. 34 
After Thnisian independence in 1956, Bourguiba asked the United States to 
supply arms when France refused his demand for arms. The United States hesi-
tated at first to support him, but after Thnisia indicated its needs to the Soviet 
Union and Egypt because of refusals by both France and the US, in 1959 the 
United States started supplying Thnisia with a small military aid programme.35 
332 
According to the figures of Arms Trade Registers 1975, France dominated arms 
transfers to Tunisia in the 1960s, with the exception of 12 NAF-86 Sabre aircraft 
which were delivered by the US in 1969, with other light weapons in 1959-1960.36 
In the 1970s Tunisia modernised its army. This was in response partly to 
internal troubles and unrest, especially in 1978 during the strikes by Tunisia's 
UGTT; partly to the spread of Islamic Fundamentalism (after 1978); and partly 
to the external threat posed by Thnisia's neighbours, notably Libya. The internal 
and external situations led Bourguiba to increase military expenditure. Between 
1976 and 1977 the military budget more than doubled, and Thnisian armed forces 
personnel grew in number from 22,000 to 32,000. Between 1975 and 1978, military 
spending averaged 4.5 percent of the state budget, and grew to average 10.2 percent 
between 1979 and 1982.37 
Between 1979 and 1983, Thnisian arms imports reached $385 million. The 
United States took $110 million of this trade and France only $30 million. Despite 
Tunisian intentions to increase the size of its army, a number of factors encouraged 
Thnisia to become more dependent on aid and grants from the United States: the 
decrease in oil revenues; the fall in phosphate prices; the weakness of agricultural 
prices; and the limiting of aid to Thnisia from rich Arab states. 38 
The Reagan administration was interested in Thnisian security and stability 
and was aware of Libya's threat to Thnisia. With that perspective the United 
States and Tunisia formed a US - Thnisian Joint Military Commission. This com-
mission met annually to discuss military co-operation. Between 1982 and 1984, 
the Reagan Administration decided to raise military aid to Tunisia after it was 
annually $20 million. The increase in United States aid was due to the Reagan 
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Administration's response to the Tunisian dissidents supposedly (backed by Libya) 
attack on Gafsa in 1980.39 
The burden of military spending on Tunisia was very high. Between 1979-
1982, Tunisia's military increased its manpower by 45 percent. Military expendi-
tures increased from 4.5 per cent of state budget to 10.5 per cent. It is estimated 
that the purchase of military hardware accounted from 40 to 45 percent of this 
military expenditure. The United States increased its arms transfers to oil produc-
ing countries for economic revenue, but for poor states such as Tunisia without the 
ability to pay for American arms, the United States offered limited help through 
aids and credits. 
Between 1981 and 1985 (Table 7:6), Tunisia imported a total of $580 million 
of arms, the United States shared $330 million of this total amount, 56.8 percent of 
Tunisia arms imports, France $200 million, 34.4 percent. The increase of American 
arms transfers was due to the Libyan threat, and to American long term credit to 
Tunisia. France offered only limited military aid to Tunisia because of the French 
economic situation and French economic interests in Libya. However, American 
arms transfers to Tunisia became available only during the early 1980s, and did 
not play as major a role in American-Tunisian relations, for example, as in OPEC 
arms imports from the us.40 
7 .3.1.3 The US - Algeria Arms Trade 
Despite strong Algerian-American economic ties in natural gas, the United 
States arms transfers to Algeria were very limited. In 1963, the United States 
supported Algeria with 2 Beech D-18s aircraft, the first and only arms transfers 
during the 1960s and 1970s. The absence of an American-Algerian arms trade was 
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due to Algeria's political attitude towards the United States and NATO, and the 
restriction which the United States placed on the use of military weapons.41 
After 1978, Algeria started to look for American military equipment because 
it tried to restore its arms purchases. Between 1978-1982, the United States sold 
Algeria $370 million worth of American weapons. Algerian mediation for American 
hostages in Iran in 1980 opened up a new phase in American-Algerian relations. 
Algeria asked for Lockheed C-130 transport aircraft, twenty of which were delivered 
between 1981-1985, 17 for the Algerian Air Force and three for Air Algerie. The 
United States also supplied telecommunications equipment and military trucks 
during that period. In 1985, the US Department of Defense provided Algeria 
with $50,000 of credit for training Algerian naval officers under the international 
military education programme. This was the first co-operation between Algerian 
army personnel and the US military. By December 1985 the US had only 9 military 
personnel in Algeria; 3 in the military and 6 in the maritime corps training the 
Algerian armed forces. 42 
Since its independence, Algeria had been dependent on the Soviet Union and 
France in the content of military doctrine and training. France was more effective 
in influencing Algerian military doctrine because of French historical military rela-
tions with Algeria. The military schools in Algeria were staffed by French officers, 
whilst the Russian advisors concentrated on training Algerian personnel on the use 
of Soviet weapons.43 However, between 1981 and 1985, the United States shared 
only 4.3 percent of Algerian total arms imports (Table 7:6). 
7.3.1.4 The United States-Libyan arms Trade 
Until1959, Libya was extremely poor and dependent on British and American 
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aid. The American and British military bases led them to offer military aid to 
Libya. King Idris was not interested in a strong army, and preferred to depend 
on tribal rivalry rather than the regular army. He did not trust the regular army 
which was created by the United States and Britain.44 
During the 1960s, the Libyan monarch was threatened by Arab nationalism 
in Egypt. After the 1967 war, the spread of this feeling among the Libyan elites 
led to political pressure over the monarch for military modernisation. In 1968 
the Libyan government set a $1.1 billion budget for a defence programme. The 
oil revenue helped the king to buy arms but he was more dependent on his arms 
imports on British and American sales.45 
United States military aid to the Libyan monarch was due to three elements: 
its military base in Libya; oil interests, there were 20 US companies producing 90 
percent of Libyan oil: and to reduce the Soviet influence in the Mediterranean. 
In 1954, the United States signed a treaty with Libya providing aid and formally 
establishing Wheelus airbase near Tripoli.46 
From the time of Libya's independence until1964, the United States provided 
Libya with $8 million in military grants. Between 1965 and 1969, America granted 
aid amounting to $9.4 million, and sold Libya $50.2 million worth of military 
equipment. Before 1969, Libyan aircraft were bought from the United States, naval 
vessels were British and the armoured fighting vehicles were bought from the US 
and Britain.47 After the revolution in 1969, the direction of Libyan arms imports 
re-orientated towards the Socialist bloc. However, in the early 1970s France was the 
leading source for Libyan Arms sales. The revolutionary government requested the 
withdrawal of American and British military bases, the evacuation being completed 
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in 1971.48 
Following the 1967 war, France adopted an embargo on arms transfers to 
Israel. The Arabs saw France as neutral and closer to the Arab's view of the Arab-
Israeli conflict. France was no longer regarded in the same light as the United 
States and, for radical Arab States, it became a potential friend, along with the 
Soviet Union. In 1970, the Libyan government asked France to modernise the 
Libyan Air Force. It announced a deal with France over 110 Mirages; 50 Mirage 
Vs and 50 Mirage Ills. The deal was worth $144 million. France dominated Libyan 
arms imports until1976.49 Between 1979 and 1983 France exported arms to Libya 
amounting $856 million, ranking second after the Soviet Union. Between 1981 and 
1985 French arms sales to Libya amounted to $725 million, ranking fourth after 
the Soviet Union, Italy and Czechoslovakia. 50 The civil war in Chad also affected 
French-Libyan arms sales relations (see chapter 8). 
During the 1970s the United States refused to sell arms or military equipment 
to Libya. It has continued to ban arms trade with Libya because of its political 
differences with Qaddafi. Most of the technological equipment from the United 
States sold to Libya is transferred in illegal ways (see chapter 5). The absence 
of American arms sales to Libya led the Soviet Union to dominate Libyan arms 
purchases (table 7:6).51 
7.3.2 The Soviet Union, Arms Trade and the Maghreb 
Soviet arms sales to the Third World can be divided into three phases. 
1. Phase one: Containment; the Political-Strategic Objective 
The Soviet Union entered the arms market in the Middle East for the first 
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time in 1955 when they supplied Egypt with arms through Czechoslovakia. The 
Soviet shipments were a response to America's refusal to sell arms to Egypt. The 
Soviet strategic objective was to encourage Egypt to challenge the Baghdad pact 
which was formed to encircle the Soviet Union in the early years of the Cold 
War.52 Despite Soviet arms transfers, however, the Soviets shared only a small 
percentage of the world arms market. Between 1963 and 1966 the Soviets had only 
4.4 percent of total arms transfers, whereas the United States had 38.8 percent 
of the world market. After the Arab-Israeli war in 1967, Soviet arms transfers 
were increased in an effort to attain political objectives in the Arab World. Soviet 
arms exports increased to reach 26.2 percent of the total world arms trade (Table 
7:2). The increase in Soviet arms exports was due in part to regional conflicts 
such as the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Vietnam War, and in part to the Soviet 
support for national liberation movements. Major quantities of Soviet arms were 
offered to Third World countries as military aid on low interest credit terms. The 
Soviets were usually prepared to accept repayment in local soft currencies, or in 
raw materials to be resold on the international market. The Middle East ranked 
first in Soviet arms exports during this phase. 53 
2. Phase Two: Strategic diffusion 
The Soviet Union attempted to strengthen its strategic role in the Third World 
through arms sales. In the 1970s it extended its arms transfers to geostrategic 
regions in order to achieve regional equality with the United States. The Soviets 
added to their existing clients in the Middle East clients in the Horn of Africa, 
Angola and India, as well as other Third World states. The 1970s' war in the Horn 
of Africa, the civil wars in Angola, Chad and the Middle East increased Soviet 
arms transfers. North African states also became major clients of the Soviet Union, 
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particularly Algeria and Libya because of the civil war in Chad, and the Western 
Sahara conflict. 
Table 7:7 Soviet Military Aid to the Third World, 1955-1964 ($m) 
Region amount 
Middle East 1437 
South Asia 1695 
Africa 735 
East Asia 404 
Latin America 30 
Total 4291 
Source: Gu Guan-Fu "Soviet aid to the Third world" Soviet Studies, 
vol.xxxv, no.1 1983, p74. 
'Moreover, the Soviets tried to counter Chinese influence in the Third World 
particularly after the ideological split between the two major Communist States. 
In this phase, strategic objectives were more important to the Soviet Union than 
economic objectives. Arms sales were also exchanged for military bases, landing 
rights, and facilities, for example, in South Yemen, Somalia and North Vietnam.54 
3. Phase Three: economic interests - Hard Currency 
In the 1970s the ideological element became less important in Soviet arms 
transfers to the Third World. It sold arms to conservative states, some of which 
even waged war against local communist parties, for example, in Pakistan, Iran, 
Iraq, Egypt and Guinea. Algeria and Libya, despite banning local communist 
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activities, also received large quantities of Soviet arms. 
Between 1975 and 1978 the Soviet Union ranked first in arms transfers to 
the Third World. It was the first time the Soviet Union had led the world in 
arms transfers. It shared 33.5 percent of the world arms trade. The Soviet Union 
continued to challenge US domination of the arms trade until 1988. In 1978-
1982 and 1983-1985 the Soviet shared 34.1 and 38.7 percent of world arms trade 
respectively55 (Table 7:2). 
In the 1970s the growth and change in the values and structures of the arms 
trade were further stimulated by the increase in oil prices. In 1970, Third World 
imports amounted to $11 billion and, by 1980, imports had increased to $20 billion. 
The oil states bought arms not only for themselves but they also lavished arms 
on poor allies. For instance, the Arab Gulf States and Libya pledged $2.3 billion 
for four years to the front line states with Israel: Syria, Jordan and Egypt. By 
the end of the 1970s, 80 percent of the Soviet arms exports were delivered to the 
Middle East. The Iran- Iraq War also played an important role in Soviet arms 
transfers to the Middle East. 56 Between 1970 and 1981 more than two thirds of 
Soviet arms transfers to Third World states were paid in hard currencies. Arms 
sales accounted for half of the USSR's exports to the Third World, and 60 percent 
of the USSR's trading surplus. 57 
By 1980 over 40 percent of Soviet arms transfers agreements were invoiced 
in hard currency or commodities such as oil amounting to $4.2 billion increasing 
to $6.1 billion in 1982 before falling back to $4.2 billion in 1985.58 In the 1980s 
economic interests dominated arms trading with the Third World, and the Soviet 
Union was ready to sell arms for hard currency without respect for political ideology 
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and human rights records, as in the cases Iraq, Iran, Syria and Libya. 
7.3.2.1 The Soviet Union-Algeria Arms Trade 
The Soviet Union dominated arms sales to the Maghreb, particularly to Alge-
ria and Libya. In the 1960s, Algeria was the main importer of Soviet arms. Between 
1960-1973, the Soviets ranked second to France in supplying arms to North Africa. 
(Table 7:3). In this period the Maghreb received 3.2 percent of Soviet total arms 
transfers to the Third World. In the 1960s, Tunisia and Morocco depended on 
France and the United States, while Libya received military aid from the United 
States and Britain.59 Algeria looked to the Soviet Union because the Europeans 
and the United States were not ready to disturb their relations with France by 
supplying arms to Algeria and changing the regional balance of power in North 
Africa. The conflict over borders with Morocco pushed Algeria to strengthen its 
army. Boumedienne, then Defence Minister, visited the Soviet Union in October 
1963, and signed an agreement with the Soviets for arms supply and training.60 
During the Algerian War of Independence with France, the FLN received 
arms from the Soviet Union through Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco. China was the 
first communist country to send arms to the FLN. The competition over political 
influence between China and the Soviet Union was partly why the Soviet Union 
supported Algeria in its conflict over borders with Morocco. Ben Bella also tried 
to create a popular militia, similar to China's popular army. It was part of Ben 
Bella's policy aimed at reducing the power of the regular army. In April 1965, 
Ben Bella dismissed the Minister of the Interior, a Boumedienne supporter, and 
attempted to force the resignation of another of Boumedienne's close allies, Abd al-
Aziz Bouteflika, the Algerian Foreign Minister. The army overthrew Ben Bella in 
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August 1965, and since then the army controlled the political life of Algeria.(Table 
7:6). 
Algeria strengthened its army for several reasons: its regional competition 
with Morocco; internal unrest in the Kabylie mountains; and the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. Algeria was a strong supporter of the Palestinian armed struggle against 
Israel. 61 In many cases Algeria had bought arms and transferred a proportion 
to other Arab states. Between 1965 and 1967 Soviet military sales to Algeria 
amounted to $116 million and included tanks, aircraft and naval aircraft. The 
increase in Algerian arms imports was due to the Arab-Israeli conflict, when Algeria 
sent forces to Egypt and 3000 men were deployed along the Suez Canal, MIG 
squadrons were sent to Egypt during 1967 war and provided facilities to Egyptian 
aircraft. 62 
During the 1960s, France competed with the Soviet Union to supply Algeria 
with military training. The domination of the French language in Algeria, par-
ticularly among the military elite and the historical relations between France and 
Algeria increased the Algerian-French co-operation in the military fields. Algeria 
signed agreements in 1963 and 1967 with France, maintaining a permanent pres-
ence in Algeria. Military co-operation increased after France imposed an arms 
embargo on Israel. The Engineering School was established with French military 
assistance at Cape Matifou and was staffed by a French military assistance mission. 
In 1970, it was reported there were 341 French military training officers in Alge-
ria, 13% of French military personnel overseas. The French also provided Algeria 
with a number of spaces at the St. Cyr Military Academy and the French School 
of Gendarmerie at Melun. French Defence Minister, Pierre Messmer, disclosed in 
1969 that 673 Algerians were being trained in French military services.63 
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In the 1970s Algeria increased its purchases of Soviet arms. There were many 
reasons for this: the rise in oil prices; the Arab-Israeli War in 1973; and the Western 
Sahara Conflict. During this decade, French-Algerian relations were at a low ebb 
because of French support for Morocco and Mauritania in the Western Sahara 
Conflict. It has been estimated that, between 1963 and 1974, Algeria received 
$350 million of Soviet weapons and, between 1975 and 1985 the amount reached 
$3.5 billion. Between 1981 and 1985, the Soviet Union shared 82.2 percent of 
Algerian arms imports, while the US shared 4.3, and France only 2.5 percent of all 
Algerian arms imports64 (Table 7:6). 
Algeria relied on the Soviet Union to train Algerian cadets, and to advise on 
military doctrine, because of the Soviet arms supplies. Between 1963 and 1965, 
1000 Algerian officers were trained in the Soviet Union. It is estimated that by 1981 
3,395 Algerian military personnel had been trained in the Soviet Union. Soviet 
advisors were stationed in Algeria to train the Algerian army on the use of Soviet 
weapons. By 1985 there were 1000 Soviet advisors in Algeria but the number has 
decreased since then because Algeria has reduced its military spending. While the 
Soviets dominated the military training in Algeria because of Soviet weapons, the 
French influenced the military doctrine because they penetrated and dominated 
the military academies in Algeria. 65 
As the Soviet presence declined in the early 1980s, the French presence in-
creased especially after the Socialist Administration took office in Paris. The 
French government opened up more places in French military schools for Algerian 
cadets, and extended Algerian credit in arms trade. In 1984, the French provided 
Algeria with approximately $52 million for the purchase of French military equip-
ment. Algeria approached France and the US for electronic equipment to improve 
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its C3I system. Despite Algeria's reliance on Soviet weapons for the previous three 
decades, it actually shared only a small percentage of Soviet arms sales to the 
Third World. Between 1982 and 1985 Algeria accounted for only 2.2 percent of 
Soviet arms transfers to the Third World, whereas Libya shared 8.2 percent.66 
Algeria spent little on arms imports compared to the amount spent by the Gulf 
states. In 1984, Algeria ranked 48 of 144 states in world military expenditure, and 
in terms of the percentage of military expenditure to GNP, it ranked 82. In 1976 
military expenditure represented 3.4 percent of total Algerian GNP, and in 1984 
this had declined to 2. 7 percent, despite the Western accusation of Algeria being 
a Soviet arms trade client.67 The arms trade as such did not influence Algerian 
foreign policy and France still influenced Algerian military doctrine. 
7.3.2.2 USSR- Libyan Military Relations 
Since World War II, the Soviet Union has had a strategic interest in Libya. 
In 1945, after the Italian defeat, the Soviets asked the Allies to control Libya. 
In the following years, after independence, the United States blocked the Soviet 
offer of supporting Libya with arms. The Americans and the British maintained 
military bases in Libya and therefore organised the Libyan military forces. Libya 
was attractive to both the Allies and the Soviet Union because of Libya's strategic 
importance on the Mediterranean, and in particular its control of the southern end 
of the Mediterranean region. 68 
After the Libyan revolution in 1969, the Soviet Union supported Libya with 
weapons. In the early 1970s the Libyan government asked France for more than 
100 Mirage fighter planes to build up the Libyan Air Force. In the early years of 
the revolution, Libya turned to France for arms sales more than to the Soviets. 
344 
The United States refused arms to Libya for a number of reasons: Libyan support 
for various national liberation movements; the Arab-Israeli conflict; and Qaddafli's 
conflict with Sadat and Nimeri, two of the United States' closest Arab friends. 
The first Libyan contact with the Soviets was in 1970, when the Soviets de-
livered to Libya 30 medium-sized tanks, and 100 armoured personnel carriers and 
military vehicles. The competition was between France and the Soviet Union, not 
with the United States after the latter refused to support the Libyan revolution 
with military equipment. In 1970, the US and Britain evacuated their military 
bases in Libya.69 
The Libyan decision to seek Soviet help for arms purchases was due to the 
refusal of Western countries to support Libya with weapons. For example, France 
was concerned about the balance of power in North Africa and Libyan intervention 
in Chad. The Libyan policy during the early stage of the revolution was hostile 
to Soviet policy in the Middle-East but moving from this position in May 1974, 
Libyan Prime Minister, Jallud, asked the Soviet Union for weapons. The Soviet 
Union signed an agreement with Libya to sell arms in exchange for Libyan oil. 
The Soviets made their terms of arms' delivery easier than those of the West, with 
low interest, cheap prices, an easier method of payment, and credits without any 
limitation on the use of weapons. 
In the early 1970s, the Soviets kept a low profile in Libya. In the Arab-Israeli 
war in October 1973, Libya made a substantial contribution to the Arab cause in 
the form of financial assistance to Egypt and Syria. 
Despite Soviet arms delivery to Libya, the Libyan government was against 
offering the Soviets any facilities in the Mediterranean. Soviet arms transfers to 
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Libya were seen by the Libyans as being on a commercial basis more than on an 
ideological one(Table 7:6). 
The largest Libyan arms agreement with the Soviet Union was concluded in 
December 1974. The Soviets supplied Libya with TU- 22 supersonic bombers, Mi-8 
helicopters, SA-3 and SAM6 missiles, tanks, and anti-tank missiles, with MIG-23 
jet fighters. More than 600 tanks of the 1000 reportedly ordered in 1974 were from 
the Soviet Union, and 100 Libyan naval personnel were sent to the Soviet Union 
for submarine training. 70 
The main objective of Soviet arms sales to Libya was to earn hard currency. 
Political objectives, although secondary, also shaped the deals. The first stage was 
characterised by the low profile of Soviet arms transfers. Between 1969 and 1974 
Libya received $750 million worth of Soviet equipment. After 1975, Libya paid 
in hard currency from oil revenues and the second phase of Libyan-Soviet arms 
transfers started. In this stage Libya strengthened its army to 27,000 troops and 
modernised its equipment with 1000 tanks. The Air Force numbered 5000 troops 
with 100 Mirage fighters. The Libyan conflict with Egypt in 1977, involvement 
in Chad and the Soviet relations with Egypt, all increased the arms transfers to 
Libya. In 1979, Qaddafi's intervention in Uganda forced Libya to strengthen its 
army.71 According to USACDA estimates, between 1979 and 1983, the spending 
on Libyan armed forces totalled $12.095 billion. In 1983 alone, Libyan military 
expenditure totalled $4.2 billion giving Libya the highest military expenditure per 
capita in Africa and the Arab world. 72 
The increase in arms purchases reflected the political relations between Libya 
and its neighbours: Chad, Egypt, Sudan and Thnisia. Between 1979 and 1984, 
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Table 7:8 Libyan Arms Purchases between 1974-1984{$m) 
Years $m Military Expenditure to GNP% 
1974 726 6.2 
1975 794 7.0 
1977 1679 9.5 
1979 3000 12.4 
1982 3311 10.7 
1983 4301 15.1 
1984 5101 17.8 
Source: World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1986, p83. 
Libya reached the peak of its military purchases. During this period Libya was 
involved in conflicts with these neighbours, and the United States was strongly 
against Libya. US pressure isolated Libya, and Libya feared American support for 
Libya's neighbours. 
The Soviet Union found the golden opportunity to support Libya with 
weapons. Between 1981-1985, Libya accounted for 6.9 percent of Soviet Union 
arms transfers to the Third World. Libya ranked third amongst countries in the 
Third World after Iraq (15.9%) and Saudi Arabia (9.8%) in its arms purchases. In 
this period, Libyan total arms purchases were 10.4 billion, the Soviet shared 43.9 
percent, Italy 8. 7%; Czechoslovakia 8.3%; France 6.9% and the rest distributed 
among different countries, (see Table 7:6). The Libyans tried to vary its arms pur-
chases, but most Western arms came from Italy and France. Western countries' 
refusal of arms to Libya pushed it towards the Soviet Union. 73 
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Libya sent its military personnel for training in the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe. Between 1955 and 1984 the total numbers reached 7630 comparing to 3555 
and 145 from Algeria and Morocco respectively trained there in this period.74 . 
Table 7:9 The Leading Third World Customers of Soviet arms sales 
1982- 1986 (% of total the USSR arms transfers to Third World) 
State per cent State percent 
Syria 24.7 Angola 4.8 
India 20.3 North Korea 3.4 
Iraq 19.5 Vietnam 2.6 
Libya 8.2 Afghanistan 2.6 
Cuba 4.8 Algeria 2.2 
Source: SIPRI Yearbook, 1987. 
In summary, Soviet arms transfers did not influence Libyan politics despite 
the US charge that Libya was a Soviet surrogate. There is no evidence of military 
bases or naval facilities being offered to the Soviet Union. In North Africa, arms 
transfers hardly influence politics and the Soviet Union had been selling arms but 
for a basic economic reason: hard currency. The United States offered most of 
its arms to North Africa as credit and aid. The principal clients of American 
arms were Arab oil producers in the Gulf, which dominated the market, especially 
Saudi Arabia. The US absorbed the Petrodollars through arms trading. The 
United States has been transferring arms to Israel and Egypt for strategic and 
political reasons. 
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7.3.2.3 USSR-Morocco Arms Trade 
After Morocco's independence in 1956 the Soviet Union offered to sell arms 
to Morocco, but the Moroccan government rejected the suggestion under US pres-
sure. The Soviets intended to encourage Morocco to press for evacuation of French 
and American military bases on Moroccan soil. In the Cold War era, the Soviet 
Union was impressed by Morocco's strategic importance in Northwest Africa and 
its control of the Gibraltar Strait, the gate to the Atlantic Ocean. 
On the other hand, Moroccan public opinion, especially that of the politi-
cal elite, was strongly against the American military bases in Morocco. Most of 
the Moroccan elites were in favour of Soviet arms. When the Soviet Union sup-
ported the Arab League decision on Mauritania, Morocco responded by opening 
the way for Soviet weapons to be exported to Morocco. The Moroccan political 
elite criticised France and the US for their position toward Moroccan demands 
in Mauritania. Morocco also asked the Americans to evacuate their bases from 
Morocco by 1963. The Soviet Union intended to encourage Morocco to adopt a 
neutral position in Northwest Africa. The Soviets were encouraged by their success 
in Egypt. 75 The Soviet Union's stand in Suez crisis, and the Palestinian issue, the 
legacy of colonialism, and Arab nationalist movements, all helped the Soviets to 
gain popularity in the Arab World. 
The presence of American military bases, the Spanish occupation of Ifni and 
Western Sahara, and the Algerian war against French colonialism forced Morocco 
to use Soviet-Moroccan relations as political leverage against the American and 
European military presence in Morocco. 
The first shipments of Soviet equipment accompanied by Soviet advisors ar-
349 
rived in Morocco in November 1960 and early in 1961. The weapons included 12 
Mig-17 jet fighters and two Mig-15 jet trainers which were delivered in 1961. In 
1962, the Soviets delivered 4 Mig-17s, its last arms sales to Morocco until 1967. 
The Algerian-Moroccan border conflict, and the shift in the Soviet position on 
Mauritania, both influenced the Moroccan arms purchases from the Soviet Union. 
The second Moroccan-Soviet arms deal was in 1967-1968, when the Soviets shipped 
arms to Morocco through Czechoslovakia. Morocco received 120 Soviet T-54 and 
T -55 tanks. It was estimated that the deal amounted to $20 million 76 
After 1968, Morocco did not receive weapons from the Soviet Union because 
Morocco did not spend much on weapons and usually it had received arms on 
credit or aid from Western countries. In addition, France was the major supplier to 
Morocco dominating army training and military doctrine. Moroccan naval vessels 
were completely equipped by France (Table 7:6). The Royal Military Academy at 
Dar al-Bayda near Meknes is the principal training institution for the Moroccan 
officer corps and was founded by the French in 1918. The instruction received at the 
Royal Military Academy was the highest level attained by most Moroccan officers. 
The school was staffed by a core faculty of nine French officers on secondment 
and its curriculum included training in tactics, logistics, and terrain analysis. The 
competition over influence in Moroccan military elites is now between France and 
the United States. The Soviet Union no longer has influence on the Moroccan 
military. 77 
7.3.2.4 USSR-Tunisia and the Arms Trade: 
After independence, the Soviet Union approached Tunisia to offer military 
aid and co-operation, but Thnisia refused the offer. Politically and ideologically 
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Bourguiba was more oriented toward France and the United States. As a prag-
matic politician, Bourguiba used the Soviet Union to achieve political and military 
support from the West. He used his contact with the Soviet Union to pressurise 
France and the United States. Bourguiba approached the Soviet Union in order 
to force the United States to put pressure on France during the 1958 crisis, and in 
the 1980 crisis he contacted the ' Soviet Union in order to get arms from the US. 
In other words, Bourguiba was using the Soviets to satify his own interests. 
Tunisia is a small and poor country. Its expenditure on arms was very small. 
Tunisia has never been a target for arms sales for economic reward, and is of little 
interest to the Soviet Union in terms of arms trading.78 Tunisia opened its ports 
to the Soviet navy in the Mediterranean, but still there are no military relations. 
7.4 Superpowers, Maghreb and Mediterranean Security 
After World War II, the Mediterranean became part of the superpowers' 
global and regional strategy. Both the United States and the Soviet Union saw 
the Mediterranean as a vital area for their economic, political and strategic in-
terests. The United States intended to transform the Mediterranean into "an 
American lake".79 Being situated at a crossroads of world trade, especially for oil, 
the Mediterranean encourages the US to maintain a permanent presence. 
The American military campaigns of 1942-1943 in North Africa were the open-
ing for an historic transformation of the Mediterranean into 'an American lake'. 
It also opened the eyes of American strategists to the importance of the Mediter-
ranean and North Africa to European security and NATO operations in time of 
war. In geopolitical term, the United States sought to ensure that no core power, 
especially industrial power such as Nazi Germany would dominate the Eurasian 
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heartland. The Mediterranean is an important part of 'World Island'. Econom-
ically, the United States aimed to ensure that the peripheries of the Pacific Rim 
and the Mediterranean basin, and also Latin America would be integrated, under 
American aegis, into a global market economy. The US prepared itself to replace its 
British ally in the Middle East and the Mediterranean. Britain was the dominant 
sea power in the Mediterranean until the decline of the British empire after World 
War II, from which it emerged as an exhausted power with inadequate resources 
to keep its overseas colonies. 80 
After World War II, the Soviet Union was an ideological power in the Eurasian 
heartland. It saw the Mediterranean as a vital part of the Soviet southern flank. 
For strategic, economic and political reasons the Soviet Union started to increase 
its naval forces in the Mediterranean. 81 
The Maghreb states occupy 88.7 percent of the Mediterranean southern shores 
and its coasts extend 4169 km from Tangier to Egypt. This location encouraged 
both superpowers to develop their political and military relations with Maghreb 
states both generally and individually, because they are part of the Mediterranean 
with geostrategic importance to both superpowers in time of peace or war. The 
Maghreb states themselves raised the issue of the Mediterranean which they saw 
as part of Maghreb security. They were aware of their political, strategic and eco-
nomic interests. Historically, the Maghreb states were part of Mediterranean diplo-
macy from the time of piracy to World War II. They are strongly involved with the 
Non-Aligned Movement, and have historical relations with France. The Maghreb 
states have called for the Mediterranean to be a zone of peace and neutrality. 82 
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7.4.1 The Soviet Union and the Mediterranean: Objectives 
The Soviet Union perceived the Mediterranean and the Middle East to be 
an integral part of American-Soviet global competition. Historically, the Soviets 
have had ambitions toward the warm waters of the Mediterranean since Tsarist 
times. Imperial Russia devoted over a century of effort to breaking out of the Black 
Sea and becoming a Mediterranean power. Geographically, the Soviet Union has 
limited room for northward expansion, and it tried to break the lockout at the 
Turkish straits. However, it was faced by the British who wanted to keep the 
Russians out of the Mediterranean, and Moscow wanted to protect the Black Sea 
Coast against invading naval forces. 83 
In strategic terms, the Soviet Union tried to create the impression that in the 
event of any serious conflict in this part of the world, it could shut off naval routes of 
crucial importance to the Western countries and Japan. The Mediterranean straits, 
Gibraltar, Otranto, Bosphorus and Suez had an important strategic importance 
to the Soviets and the Americans. Moreover, the Soviets had the desire to parry 
the US fleet in the Mediterranean, especially, FBS system which could hit Soviet 
territory.84 
The initial Soviet presence in the Mediterranean was for reconnaissance pur-
poses, keeping an eye on the American Sixth Fleet, and to send arms to the Soviet 
allies in the Middle East and Africa and other parts of the Third World. For 
the Soviets, the Mediterranean has a defensive and offensive objective. In Soviet 
strategy, the Mediterranean is both vital for the defence of Soviet territory, and 
offensive against US maritime force in the Mediterranean. The historical experi-
ence of World War II taught the Soviets that, with the allied force having attacked 
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Germany from the south after they landed in North Africa, to win the war in the 
southern theatre they needed potential forces in the Mediterranean. The Soviets 
also intend to strengthen the military balance in the Mediterranean.85 
In political terms, the presence of Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean was 
a political instrument more than military one, especially during peacetime. The 
Soviet Union tried to establish the fact that the Soviet Union was a Mediterranean 
power with legitimate interests in the area and that its perfectly natural intention 
was to win friends and influence people. The Soviet presence in the Mediterranean 
gave a signal to Third World countries surrounding the Mediterranean, including 
North African States, that the Soviet Union had the power to help them. In the 
crises of 1967 and 1973 the Soviet Union supported the Arabs with arms through 
the Mediterranean. 
In economic terms, the Mediterranean plays an important role in the Soviet 
economy as an essential pathway to the Atlantic and for the Black Sea Fleet. Soviet 
economic interests in the Atlantic, especially the African coasts, Indian Ocean and 
Far East depend on the Mediterranean route. It is estimated that 70- 80 percent 
of the Soviet Union's 86 supplies to Vladivostok are shipped via the Mediterranean 
and according to Bruce Kunihom that 
"over 60 percent of Soviet exports and 50 percent of its imports go through the 
Bosphorus and an average 150 Soviet merchant ships ride the Mediterranean at any 
one time" .87 
The Soviet Union has trade interests and fishing agreements with many 
Mediterranean states, such as Morocco. Soviet fishing trawlers based in Spain, the 
Canary Islands, and ranging as far as Angola, pass through the Mediterranean. So-
viet fishing vessels equipped with highly sophisticated radar equipment are known 
to be engaged in military espionage. Soviet auxiliary ships have supported naval 
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operations in Guinea and elsewhere in the Atlantic.88 
The Soviets gradually increased their presence in the Mediterranean. During 
the first phase, in 1953, the Soviets started to use Volna port in Albania. This 
phase ended abruptly in June 1961 as a result of a deterioration of Soviet-Albanian 
relations. The Albanians expelled the Soviets and seized two submarines when the 
two countries severed diplomatic relations as a result of the Sino-Soviet split.89 
In 1958, the Soviets attempted to establish a permanent naval presence in the 
Mediterranean for the first time, as a reaction to political upheaval in Jordan and 
Iraq and the American intervention in Lebanon in 1958. The Soviet Union moved 
dramatically to the Mediterranean. Its out of area ship days in the Mediterranean 
grew by 66 percent in 1958 over 1957. There were additional increases of 310 
percent and 37 percent in 1959 and 1960 respectively. Because of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict in 1967 and the strategic parity between the two superpowers, the Soviet 
Union increased its activities in the Mediterranean. In May 1967, 20 Soviet ships 
passed through the straits of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles and another 27 passed 
through the following months as a sign of support and protection for friends. 90 
After the 1967 war, the Soviet navy also kept some of its warships at Port Said in 
Egypt in a manner intended, perhaps, to deter the Israelis from attacking by the 
sea. 
During the Jordanian crisis in 1970, the Soviet fleet swelled from 46 to 60 
ships as a signal to the US Sixth Fleet not to intervene against Syrian forces in 
North Jordan. These were positive correlations between political upheavals in the 
Mediterranean and Soviet naval increase in the area. After the signing of the 15 
years Soviet-Egyptian treaty of friendship, in June 1971, the Soviet naval presence 
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in Egyptian ports was increased. At the time, the USSR had a total of 96 ships in 
the Mediterranean, 34 of which were combat ships and only 23 submarines.91 
When the 1973 war approached, the Soviet navy helped Arab states by taking 
a number of Moroccan troops from Oran in Algeria to the battle field in the Golan 
Heights in Syria. 92 When it began, the Soviet navy rapidly became involved in an 
operation to move over a million tons of crucial military supplies to the Egyptians 
and the Syrians, in order to increase their capability to fight the Israelis. The 
Soviet navy was involved in an active war zone for the first time since 1945. In all 
the Middle East crises 1967, 1973 and 1982 the Soviet threat of action was designed 
to bring pressure on Israel. The Soviet navy had a psychological deterrent on the 
US and Israeli behaviour in the Middle East and North Africa.93 
Between 1956 and 1980, the Mediterranean became foremost in Soviet naval 
visits. It is estimated that the Soviet presence increased from 500 ship days visits 
in 1956 to 16,900 in 1980. In 1956, the Mediterranean ranked third in Soviet ship 
days visits: 13% in 1956, after the Atlantic Ocean (62%) and the Pacific Ocean 
(25%). In 1980, the Mediterranean ranked equal first with the Atlantic in Soviet 
naval ship days visits, (29%), compared with the Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean 
(both 20.5%). This presence indicates the importance of the Mediterranean to the 
Soviet Union as a gateway to the Atlantic Ocean, the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean 
and the Far East94 (Table 7:10). 
7 .4.1.1 Soviet Policy toward the Mediterranean: 
The Soviet policy was intended to create a zone of peace in the Mediterranean 
by effectively balancing the US Sixth Fleet. In the 1950s, the Soviets argued 
that the Mediterranean should become a "nuclear free zone". 95 This campaign 
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intensified in the 1960s after the addition of SSBNs to the United States existing 
nuclear strike capability from carrier born aircraft. The Soviets also supported 
the idea of reduction and complete prohibition of external naval operations in the 
Mediterranean. The Soviet Union claimed to be itself a Mediterranean power, 
because of its access from the Black Sea, as compared with the US which was an 
aggressive interloper. The Soviet Union saw its navy as a stabilising factor in the 
Mediterranean, and as a counter to the American presence, Admiral N avoitsev 
said that 
"Presence of the Soviet Squadron in the Mediterranean is the most important 
factor in stabilising the situation in this most unstable part of the world. 96 
In June 1981, during the visit by Chadli Bendjedid, President of Algeria, to 
Moscow, Leonid Brezhnev proposed that the Mediterranean should be transformed 
from an area of military- political confrontation into a zone of lasting peace and 
co- operation. Brezhnev suggested an international agreement to supervise the 
Mediterranean. Brezhnev's proposal included: 1) reduction of armed forces in the 
area; 2) withdrawal from the Mediterranean of naval ships armed with nuclear 
weapons; 3) no development of nuclear weapons on the territory on non-nuclear 
Mediterranean countries; 4) the restating by the nuclear powers of commitments 
not to use nuclear weapons against any Mediterranean country that does not allow 
these weapons to be stationed on its territory. 97 
In 1988, President Gorbachev called for the freeze on the US- Soviet fleet 
strength to be followed by the establishment of naval ceilings and eventually of 
superpower warships. He went further in suggesting a conference of representa-
tives of the Mediterranean states and other parties concerned as a forum at which 
solutions could be discussed. Gorbachev also called the Soviet Union and the US 
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to notify each other and all Mediterranean countries in advance of the movements 
of the warships and of military exercises. He also called for observers to monitor 
them.98 
Seeing a major threat to their southern front from the US Sixth Fleet, the 
Soviets intended to neutralise the American fleet or remove it from the Mediter-
ranean. The Soviet Union has developed a policy of co-operation with the Maghreb 
and other non-aligned states to eliminate the danger from the Mediterranean. 99 
7.4.2 The United States and the Mediterranean 
The American military presence in the Mediterranean, and their interests in 
the Middle East coincided with the transformation of the United States into a 
global military power with a permanent global foreign policy. The first act of the 
United States Policy that could be qualified as Mediterranean was the enunciation 
of the 'Truman Doctrine' to protect the independence of Greece and Turkey. The 
US Secretary of Defence (then War) explained that the independence of Greece 
and Turkey was strategically vital because of their location near the cross-roads of 
the world. 100 
In 1946 the United States warned about the Soviet's Mediterranean ambi-
tions. The US decision-makers suggested the establishment of a permanent naval 
presence in the Mediterranean as first line of defence against Soviet expansion. 
On 11 January 1946, the Department of Navy issued a press release announc-
ing the proposed deployment of elements of the Twelfth Fleet to operate as a 
Mediterranean Squadron, first referred to as" The United Naval Forces Northwest 
African Waters", but on 1 February 1946, renamed "The United States Naval 
Forces M editerranean.101 
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Having announced its policy of maintaining US naval forces in the Mediter-
ranean, with a civil war in Greece, and with the British notice to the United States 
that it would be unable to continue economic and military support for Greece and 
Turkey, the US government considered the policy of containment to be necessary.102 
On 12 February 1950, less than six months after the North Atlantic Treaty came 
into force, and only four months before the outbreak of the war in Korea, the 
US Sixth Fleet came into being. In the years that followed, the US Sixth Fleet 
repeatedly proved the value of naval forces as an instrument of national policy.103 
The United States increased its Sixth Fleet, with mutual security treaties 
concluded through bilateral approaches. This was to define the future orientation 
in US relations with the countries of the Mediterranean, including those joining 
NATO, the Middle East and North Africa. US bilateral accords for naval, air and 
intelligence installations were signed during the 1950s with Italy, Spain, Morocco, 
Portugal, Greece, Thrkey and Libya.104 The United States naval objectives in the 
Mediterranean were to maintain the security of its allies in the Mediterranean and 
to contain Soviet expansion.105 
The United States guaranteed the security and the survival of Israel, and of 
the Egyptian regime after 1972 after the expulsion of the Soviet advisors. The US 
also tried to protect its trade, routes and oil supplies. About 40 percent of the oil 
consumed by France and West Germany passes through the Mediterranean. Italy 
and Austria receive almost all of their imported oil by this route. The United 
States intended to keep the influence of the Soviet Union out of the Mediterranean 
and it tried to promote regional stability on the Southern NATO Front.106 
Geostrategically, the Mediterranean might be considered an extension of the 
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US Atlantic Strategy. As the sea area with the heaviest concentration of naval 
forces, it thus posed the most likely threat of future naval warfare. The United 
States used its Sixth Fleet to protect its allies and friends in the area. It intervened 
in Lebanon in 1958, to protect pro-Western conservative President Chamoun from 
Arab nationalist groups, and in 1967 the United States Navy moved to Israel and 
the Egyptian coast which resulted in the Israeli attack on the American ship "Lib-
erty". In 1970, the US Sixth Fleet moved to the Eastern Mediterranean, potentially 
to intervene in the Jordanian Civil War. The US Sixth Fleet is major instrument 
of American foreign policy in the Middle East and the Mediterranean.107 
7.4.3 The Maghreb States and Mediterranean Security 
The Maghreb States regarded the Soviet Naval Squadron in the Mediter-
ranean as part of the military balance of the area. They believed that in a time 
of constant conflict in the Middle East, the Soviet Squadron could stabilise the re-
gion and counter the American naval presence. The Maghreb states' perception of 
Mediterranean security was influenced by many factors: the Arab- Israeli conflict; 
the French attitude toward Mediterranean; the US presence in the Mediterranean; 
the Maghreb economic interest in the area, because the main routes of Maghreb 
trade passes through the Mediterranean; and the Maghreb states' security. His-
torically, the Maghreb had experienced invasion from its northern borders rather 
than the south. The French, Spanish and Italian invasion of North Africa came 
from Europe and through the Mediterranean. The Spanish legacy is still evident 
in the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla on the Moroccan Coast.108 
The Maghreb states reacted differently to the presence of the Superpowers in 
the Mediterranean. President Boumedienne called for 
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"the departure of the navy of all countries that are not part of the 
Mediterranean. What we need is co-operation among countries bordering on the 
Mediterranean" .109 
The Algerian government refused to offer the Soviet Navy a permanent base 
in Mers el-kebier, even though the base was evacuated by the French Navy in 1968. 
Algeria, however, allowed the Soviet navy to visit the Algerian port on a regular 
basis, and it ranked first among Maghreb States in Soviet naval total shipdays visit 
(Table 7:10). Algeria had no naval co-operation with Sixth Fleet, seeing the US 
presence in the Mediterranean as part of American hegemonic policy in the world 
and as a tool of imperial policy.110 
Algeria, being an oil and natural gas producer, has much interest in the 
Mediterranean. Through the Mediterranean, Algeria exports its oil and there 
is a gas pipeline from Hassi R'mel in Algeria through Thnisia to Menerbio in Italy. 
In April 1991, the ministers of Industry of Algeria, Morocco and Spain signed 
an agreement in Madrid to complete pipelines to carry gas from Algeria through 
Morocco to Spain. This economic co-operation increased the importance of the 
Mediterranean to Algerian economic interests and national security. 
Algeria supported the Soviet proposals that the Mediterranean should become 
a 'Zone of Peace', and that there should be an international agreement to arrange 
Mediterranean Security. During the Cold War era, Algeria, an influential member 
of the Non-Aligned Movement, raised the issue of Mediterranean neutrality in the 
Cold War between the superpowers. 
The Bourguiba government took a realistic approach toward the naval pres-
ence of the superpowers in the Mediterranean. He agreed that the Mediterranean 
should become a 'lake of peace', but considered the continued Soviet presence in 
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Table 7:10 A cumulative totals of Soviet Naval port visits in the 
Maghreb ' region and other Mediterranean States, 1956-1980. 
Country total shipdays visits rank 
Algeria 2252 2 
Thnisia 1695 3 
Libya 13 6 
Morocco (Atlantic coast) 666 4 
Gibraltar 4225 1 
Spain (Mediterranean coast) 171 5 
Malta 6 7 
Source: Watson, B. Red Navy at Sea, 1982. pp 197-209 
the Mediterranean fruitful in balancing the two superpowers. Tunisia built co-
operation with the US Sixth Fleet and the Soviet Squadron in the Mediterranean. 
Between 1956 and 1980, it was the second most important Maghreb State after 
Algeria in Soviet naval port visits (Table 7:10). The Soviets met with success in 
Thnisia. In 1976, there were port visits to Sfax and Sousse and visits to Menzel-
Bourguiba began in 1977. From 1977 through to 1980, the average duration of 
the calls of the Soviet Navy to Menzel-Bourguiba exceeded the normal 4 to 6 day 
limit, which indicated that the Soviets enjoyed some port facilities. The Soviet 
presence there increased from 1961 days in 1977 to 392 days in 1980 suggesting 
that the Tunisians granted the Soviets unlimited access.112 
Menzel-Bourguiba port ranked as the ninth most used Mediterranean port by 
the Soviet navy through 1980, with a total of 1210 ship days visit, and Thnisia as 
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a whole ranked as the sixth most visited by Soviet Squadron for all Mediterranean 
nations. The Soviet increase in its visits to Thnisian ports was due to Egyptian-
Soviet relations. After the expulsion of Soviet advisors from Egypt in 1972, and 
the cool relations between Moscow and Sadat, the Soviet used Thnisia for their 
Squadron facilities and repairs.l13 
On the other hand, Bourguiba also welcomed the US Sixth Fleet visits to 
Thnisian ports. For political reasons, however, (Arab public opinion and Tunisian 
domestic politics) the Bourguiba government kept relations with the Sixth Fleet 
on a low profile. 
Despite Libyan-Soviet political relations, the Libyan government did not give 
the Soviet Union permanent bases in Libya. It was the last Maghreb State to 
have a regular visit of a Soviet Squadron. From 1956 to 1980, it was reported that 
Soviet naval ship days visit to Libyan ports only counted 13 days after 1980 (Table 
7:10). When Libya confronted the United States in the early 1980s, the Soviet 
Naval Squadron in the Mediterranean increased their visits to Libya.l14 
Libya refused to replace the US Sixth Fleet with the Soviet Fleet, especially 
after the 1969 revolution, despite rumours in 1969 that the Soviet Fleet in the 
Mediterranean manoeuvred to prevent British intervention to return ldris to power. 
Officially, Libya stressed that there should be neither Soviet nor American military 
forces in the Mediterranean. Qaddafi's confrontation with the United States, espe-
cially during Reagan's years 1981 to 1986, offered the Soviet Union the opportunity 
to build naval relations with Libya. The United States used its Sixth Fleet in the 
Mediterranean to put political pressure on Qaddafi, because of Libyan-American 
differences on the regional issues of Chad, Thnisia, Egypt and Sudan.115 
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The US Sixth Fleet confrontation with Libya went back to October 1973 
when Libya claimed the Gulf of Sidra to be part of Libyan territorial waters. The 
United States did not recognise the Libyan claim. In February 1974, the United 
States described the Libyan claim as unacceptable and a violation of international 
law. The claim became a political issue in Libyan-American relations. During the 
Carter presidency, the issue played a major role in US relations with Libya. 
When Reagan came to the White House, he used the issue of the Gulf of Sidra 
to put political pressure on Qaddafi. He challenged Libyan claims and in August 
1981, he ordered an US naval exercise within the area claimed by Libya. After one 
day of American manoeuvres in the Mediterranean, on 19 August 1981, American 
F-14 fighter planes shot down two Libyan Soviet-built SU-22 planes. The Libyan 
fighter planes were carrying out military exercises 60 miles off the Libyan coast 
over the Gulf of Sidra. The American fighters were patrolling a sixteen ship naval 
task force in the Mediterranean. The 1981 incident followed the 1973 high seas 
incident between Libyan and American fighter aircraft.116 
During Libyan intervention in Chad in 1983, the United States moved its 
Sixth Fleet towards the Libyan coast and France intervened with military force to 
support the Habre government.l17 
The major confrontation between Libya and the Reagan Administration was 
in April 1986, when American F-111 attacked Libya in an attempt to kill Qaddafi 
and to destabilise his regime. The Mediterranean states such as France and Spain 
refused to allow the American F -11 fighters to pass through their space to attack 
Libya. The Thatcher government in Britain, however, permitted the US F-111 
planes to attack Libya from their bases in Britain. The incident came after weeks 
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of US Naval flight operations intended as a psychological humiliation to Qaddafi.l 18 
The American attack was condemned by all the Maghreb States and the USSR. 
Non-Aligned countries supported Libya against the United States. The attack 
increased the Maghreb states' demands for the Mediterranean to be demilitarised, 
and to create an area of "Peace and Cooperation" .119 
Libya encouraged the neutral policy of Malta and the evacuation of foreign 
military bases there. Libyan economic aid and co-operation with Malta was due 
to Malta's strategic location, and its influence on Libyan national security. British 
forces left Malta in 1979 and in 1981, the Italians signed a bi-lateral treaty with 
Malta guaranteeing its independence. The Maltese government then proceeded 
to re-established its connection with Libya, and in 1984 the two countries signed 
a renewable treaty of friendship whereby the Libyans agreed to supply arms and 
training to Maltese armed forces. 120 
Morocco developed a moderate policy toward both the superpowers' presence 
in the Mediterranean. As a Mediterranean state, Morocco has one natural port 
at al-Husemis, the other natural ports being the Spanish enclaves: Ceuta and 
Melilla. US and Soviet naval ships visited Moroccan Atlantic ports. Between 1954 
and 1980, the Soviet Squadron visited Morocco's Atlantic coast 666 shipdays visit. 
Morocco signed an economic agreement with Moscow particularly for phosphates 
and fishing. The Mediterranean is the main route for Soviet-Moroccan trade. 
There are other reasons behind Moroccan co-operation with superpowers in 
the Mediterranean. The main issue is the potential conflict over Ceuta and Melilla. 
The two ports are in a position to control the Strait of Gibraltar. Hassan compared 
the return of Ceuta and Melilla to Morocco with the Gibraltar issue between Spain 
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and Great Britain. Hassan saw the Soviets as a balancing factor in the issue 
especially after Spain officially joined NATO in 1986. He stated that Morocco will 
have to regain Ceuta and Melilla as soon as Spain restores Gibraltar, he looks for 
Soviet support since 
"The Soviet Union will not allow one country to control the Straits from both 
sides." 121 
Historically, the Soviet Union was against control of Gibraltar strait by one 
state. European states were also against one state control of the Gibraltar Strait. 
The internationalisation of Tangier City was part of this policy. Britain, France and 
Germany resisted Spanish ambitions in Morocco. When France and Spain divided 
' Morocco, the Tangier issue was raised because of the chokepoint Gibraltar.122 
Morocco might seek not only Soviet support in its case against Spain in Ceuta and 
Melilla, but also it might get Great Britain, United States and France in terms of 
two state control of Gibraltar.123 
Moreover, the Mediterranean became important in terms of military strat-
egy and regional conflicts involving superpowers. In the Arab-Israeli conflict, the 
Maghreb used the Soviet Squadron to support other Arab countries. In April 
and July 1973, the Russian Navy sea-lifted several thousand troops and about 60 
tanks from Morocco and took them to Syria. They were carried from Oran port in 
Algeria to Tartus in Syria in two Soviet Alligator Amphibious warfare ships and 
provided with an escort which included SAM-equipped cruisers and a destroyer to 
protect them from Israeli air and submarine attack.124 When the war came the 
Soviet navy was involved in a competitive re-supply operation with the United 
States. While the United States were helping the Israelis with tens of thousands 
tons of military supplies, the Russian did the same for the Egyptians and Syrians. 
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The Soviet Navy escorted its merchantmen in and out of the war zone.125 
At the sixth conference of Non-Aligned countries in Havana in 1979, for the 
first time, the conference placed the item of zone of peace and co-operation in the 
Mediterranean on the conference's agenda. At the seventh conference of heads of 
states or governments of Non-Aligned countries convened in New Delhi in 1983, the 
conference condemned the mounting tension in the Mediterranean, and the Middle 
Ea.st, and supported Malta's specific status of neutrality. In 1986, the Non-Aligned 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs condemned the renewed attack of the United States 
against Libya which constituted a serious threat to peace within the region, a.s well 
a.s on a broader world scale to security and peace.126 
The Non-Aligned nations called on the US government to desist from those 
kind of actions, including military manoeuvres in the Gulf of Sidra. The Minis-
ters stressed once again their support for the idea of transforming the Mediter-
ranean into a zone of peace and co-operation. They expressed their full solidarity 
with Libya, and they sent a special delegation to Tripoli, after the US attack in 
April 1986, to convey expressions of support and solidarity to Colonel Qaddafi. 
The Non-Aligned states shared the Maghreb and Soviet view toward peace in the 
Mediterranean.127 
France held a view towards the Mediterranean which wa.s different from that 
of NATO in that President de Gaulle stressed regionalism over globalism in the 
Mediterranean. De Gaulle and his successors were trying to take the Mediter-
ranean out of Cold War policy. The French adopted the policy of neutralisation of 
Mediterranean a.s a zone of peace. In June 1971, President Pompidou stated the 
French public opposition to the Mediterranean situation, 
"France and the Mediterranean countries would like to be left alone and we 
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have ' no desire to see the presence of fleets foreign to the Mediterranean" .128 
The French raised the slogan of "la Mediterranee aux Mediterraneens", 129 
and, as a political gesture, de Gaulle removed the French navy from the Mediter-
ranean in 1959. After 1975, with the withdrawal of French Naval Forces from 
the Atlantic, the French government strengthened its naval forces in the Mediter-
ranean. France saw that the more massive the military forces in the Mediterranean 
became the harder it would become to settle conflicts regionally, and the greater 
would be the danger to peace and security regionally or globally. Historically, re-
gional conflict threatened the Mediterranean itself. The superpowers were close to 
direct involvement because of the Arab- Israeli conflict. 
In sum, the United States was seeing its Sixth Fleet as vital to American 
interests and European trade and energy consumption, but France, Maghreb and 
the Soviet Union called for demilitarisation of the Mediterranean as a zone of peace 
without foreign forces. The Maghreb and France moved closer towards a joint 
policy in the Mediterranean. The Russians saw themselves as a Mediterranean 
power and the Maghreb States considered the Soviet presence vital for as long as 
the US Sixth Fleet remained there. 
7.5 Superpowers, Military bases, and the Maghreb 
After World War II, the superpowers engaged in geopolitical competition for 
strategic access, and denial of such access to its rival. They remained a faithful 
reflection of traditional geopolitical theories (Mackinderian heartland-Spykman's 
rimland) from which the patterns of basing access naturally followed. 130 
The Soviet Union, largely boxed in within its own continental empire, slowly 
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expanded its basing facilities, most importantly in the Middle East and Cuba. 
During the 1960s, the United States adopted the strategy of wide military bases in 
Europe, South East Asia and the Middle East. The US enthusiastically annexed 
North Africa to rimland as part of its strategy of containing of Soviet Union by 
building military bases in Libya and Morocco. 
"From this rimland, nuclear armed B-36 bombers could strike at Soviet military 
concentrations if required; war supplies could be pre-stocked with the assurance they 
would not fall into the hands of adversaries; Soviet maritime and naval activities 
could be kept under surveillance; facilities in North Africa and the Central Africa 
could be used to transport equipment to the Middle East; communications and other 
intelligence activities could be carried out in comparative security, anti-submarine 
patrols in the Atlantic, the Red Sea, and the Indian Ocean could be facilitated. 131 
7.5.0.1 United States-Morocco and Military bases 
The United States military bases in Morocco went back to World War II when 
the United States signed a secret agreement with France to use Moroccan airfields 
for B-47 bombers, when Morocco was still under French colonial rule. The US was 
controlling four military bases, Kenitra, Benguerir, Nouassir and Sidi Slimane. 
The Sultan of Morocco was upset because the United States ignored the King and 
negotiated with France, and it stationed on Moroccan soil 20,000 troops. It was 
the largest base in Africa. 132 After Moroccan independence in 1956, the Moroccan 
King viewed the United States forces as a matter of some concern, feeling that the 
US presence impinged on the country's sovereignty. This was a sensitive problem 
for Moroccan public opinion and the Arab world, and affected Moroccan neutrality. 
When President Eisenhower visited Morocco in 1959, he reached agreement 
with the Moroccan Sultan, Mohammed V to transfer all bases from Morocco by 
the end of 1963. In that year, the American bases were reduced to small military 
communication facilities at Kenitra, Sidi Boukendel and Sidi Yahia. In 1977, 
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the United States announced that their usefulness was outdated and they were 
evacuated in 1978. But, despite the US official announcement, there were rumours 
that some of the American bases were converted into more powerful and useful 
intelligence gathering posts connecting the important Western flank of the Atlantic 
network with the Canary Islands installations.133 
The major shift in American military relations with Morocco regarding the 
military bases occured during Reagan's first term. In 1982, the United States 
signed a military agreement with Morocco allowing American forces to use Mo-
roccan bases. It provided US access to Moroccan air base facilities in the event 
of South West Asia deployments. In 1982, a joint military commission was es-
tablished between Morocco and the United States. The agreement was achieved 
following the visit of King Hassan of Morocco to the United States in 1982.134 
The agreement was initiated by former Secretary of State, Haig, and Moroccan 
Foreign Minister, Boucetta. The agreement did not provide blanket access for the 
United States. Morocco retains the right to deny the US access to airfields should 
it be in their best interests to do so. When the United States requested permission 
to use the facilities for the transit of two C-SA aircraft during the Middle East 
of "Bright Star" exercises of 1983 with Egyptian forces, permission was denied, 
as the Moroccan government sought to indicate its displeasure over its impending 
loss of military assistance funds. 135 
Moroccan political relations with the US were disturbed in the early 1980s 
despite the military agreement. Morocco had been using the granting of bases 
to gain United States support for Moroccan regional ' interests especially with 
Spain and Portugal and other issues in Northwest Africa and the Iberian Penin-
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sula. On the other hand, the United States had been using Morocco's geostrategic 
importance as an alternative to Portugal and Spain, particularly in bargaining for 
aid; for instance, when Spain asked the US to withdraw F-16 fighter planes from 
Spain 1987. Portugal and even Morocco were under consideration as possible sites 
for basing F -16s. Morocco was being surrounded by American military bases in 
Southern Europe, and the Moroccan bases gave Hassan more room for diplomatic 
manoeuvre. 
Morocco was also under consideration in 1987 when the Portuguese socialist 
government wanted to increase the rent of its bases to the United States, which 
was $17 million annual payment for the use of Lajes air base in Azores, the United 
States raised Morocco as a potential strategic alternative to put pressure on Por-
tugal and also, in case of conflict with Spain over the bases.136 
7.5.0.2 The United States, Algeria and military bases 
The United States tried to encourage Algeria to deny the Soviet Union mili-
tary bases or naval facilities. The United States also assured Algeria that Ameri-
can military bases in Morocco were not directed against Algeria but for East-West 
strategic competition in case of war. Algeria had never allowed the United States 
military bases in Algeria and attacked the presence of American military bases in 
North Africa and other African countries. It also condemned American military 
bases in the Mediterranean 137 
7.5.0.3 The United States, Libya and military bases 
The United States signed an agreement with the Libyan government for an 
American military base near Tripoli. The first agreement was in 1951, and it was 
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renewed in 1954 for 20 years. According to the agreement the United States offered 
Libya $40 million, on average $2 million military and economic aid every year. The 
United States had full control over the base which was called ' 'Wheelus Air Force 
Base'. With the strategic value of Libya on the southern Mediterranean, and the 
climate of Libya which is ideal for pilot training, the United States used it for 
training and as a base in case of military confrontation with the Soviet Union in 
the Mediterranean. The United States trained the Libyan Air Force and organised 
the Libyan Army. 
The bases were a major political problem to the Libyan government particu-
larly after the Arab-Israeli war. In 1967, the Arabs accused the United States of 
using the American bases in Libya for supplying Israel. Demonstrations spread in 
Libya against the United States presence. 138 
In 1953, Libya signed a treaty with Great Britain "Libyan- United ' King-
dom treaty of friendship". Both US and Britain used the military bases along 
the Mediterranean Coast in exchange for extensive military supplies and training 
assistance. During the reign of King Idris, the United States and Great Britain 
were the dominant powers in Libya, both in controlling the military bases, and in 
the Libyan economy through the oil companies. The US was training the Libyan 
Air Force, while the British were building and training the Libyan Army.139 
After the Libyan revolution in 1969, the British evacuated their military bases 
near Tobruk and Benghazi in March 1970. The United States operational and 
maintenance support of the Libya Air Force ended in June 1970, when the Ameri-
can personnel evacuated Wheelus Air Base near Tripoli. US military aid to Libya 
was relatively small and between' 1958 and 1970 amounted to US $17.4 million in 
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grant aid and US ' $43.4 million in sales. With British and American evacuation, 
the Libyans approached France to build its Air Force. In 1970, the Libyan gov-
ernment signed a purchase agreement with France to buy 100 Mirage planes.140 
The French government agreed to sell Libya the Mirages, and declared that it had 
agreed to establish a training school in Libya. The French instructors engaged in 
the training of Libyan pilots and ground crew to operate and maintain the Mi-
rage aircraft. Additional numbers of Libyans attended training programmes in 
France.141 
7.5.0.4 The United States, Tunisia and military bases 
Thnisia's government did not allow the US a military base. It tried to take a 
neutral position in the East-West conflict. On the other hand, the United States 
had military bases in Libya and Morocco and there was no need for the US to 
put pressure on Thnisia for military bases, provided that the US Sixth Fleet was 
allowed to visit Tunisian ports. 
The Reagan Administration provided Tunisia with arms in exchange for 
the commitment by Thnisia's government to allow the United States to use the 
Thnisian airspace and ground facilities in the event of a Soviet supported conflict 
including Algeria, Libya or Egypt or in another Arab-Israeli conflict. The United 
States was encouraged by the uncertainty of the US position in Egypt and the 
conflict over the US military bases in Greece. The United States saw Thnisia as a 
potential alternative for United States forces. 
Whereas the Carter Administration had refused Thnisia's proposal for an 
American military base in Thnisia, the Reagan Administration was more enthusias-
tic about such a proposal. According to Thnisian opposition sources, in particular, 
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Ahmed Ben Saleh, the Secretary General of the Socialist Movement, the United 
States supported Thnisia with arms during the Reagan era as part of Thnisia's 
permission to use their ports and air bases, particularly Bizerte base as an Amer-
ican monitoring station. But it is very hard for Thnisia to admit publicly to such 
a deal with the US because of Thnisian public opinion and its reputation in the 
Arab World, particularly with the increasing opposition to the Thnisian regime 
from radical group such as the Islamic fundamentalist, al-Nahda Party, 142 or the 
other opposition groups such as Trade Unions and Socialists. 
7.5.1 The Soviet Union, Maghreb and military bases 
The Soviet Union's strategic objective in the Maghreb was to deny the United 
States a military presence and to encourage local governments to close foreign mil-
itary bases on their soil. It was also in the Soviet interest to have military facilities 
there. Two North African states (Algeria and Libya) had military relations with 
the Soviet Union but Algeria refused to offer the Soviet Union military bases de-
spite Soviet support for Algeria with arms. There were rumours of Soviet access 
to Algerian bases particularly to Mersel-Kebir, the former French military base in 
Algeria, which was evacuated in 1968.143 When Marshal Grechko visited Algeria 
in July 1968, the Algerian army newspaper El- Djeich wrote 
"Algeria had not rid herself of French bases with the intention of letting another 
power install itself there" .144 
The official position of the Algerian government was a position neutral in the 
East-West conflict. When it was reported in 1971 that the Soviet Union had signed 
a secret agreement with Algeria to operate MIG-23 aircraft out of bases there, the 
Algerians denied the reports. Rumours were spread by French and Moroccan press. 
The Soviet Union reacted to these reports as groundless. During the Presidency 
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of Giscard d'Estang, France maintained close relations with Morocco. The latter 
tried to win American political support by using these rumours. The Soviet Union 
then had facilities (limited access) in Algeria but not as a military base (exclusive 
extraterritorial control via treaty) as the United States had in Libya or Morocco. 
When French and Moroccan media reported of bases in Tindouf in 1976, the 
Soviets claimed that Tindouf was not a military base but a railway line from iron 
ore mines in the Tindouf area to the Mediterranean. Soviet experts had been asked 
by Algeria to carry out necessary technical survey work on the line.145 The Soviet 
official condemned the whole idea of military bases in the Third World as an idea 
of colonialism, 
"The Soviet Union was firmly against the presence of troops and foreign military 
bases on the territories of the other countries" .146 
Algeria's neutral policy determined the Algerian position, but was in co-
operation with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union developed major intelligence 
gathering sites in Algeria as it had done in Libya, Ethiopia and South Yemen, 
among other locations. Even though the sites may not be in every case under 
the exclusive control of the Soviet military, their function dovetails perfectly with 
Soviet military intelligence and reconnaissance activities. 
Libya approached the Soviet Union in the early 1970s, for arms sales. Libya 
did not offer the Soviet Union military bases, but it offered the Soviets access 
to facilities. Despite Libya's dependence on Soviet weapons and military training, 
Libya maintained a policy independent of Soviet military co-operation. There were 
over 1000 Soviet military advisors, and the Soviets had facilities to reach Africa 
through Libya, but not military bases.147 
Both Morocco and Tunisia were strategically important to the Soviet Union 
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because of the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, the Soviet objective was to deny the 
United States a military presence and military bases in North Africa. The Soviet 
Union was anxious for access to Moroccan bases for strategic reasons. The Soviet 
Union condemned the presence of American bases in Morocco and encouraged the 
Moroccan demands of American evacuation. During the 1980s, the Soviet Union 
criticised Reagan's military policy of deployment and military bases in Morocco 
and even in Portugal and Spain.148 
7.6 Superpowers, military intervention, and Maghreb: 
The superpowers were using regional powers to intervene on their behalf in 
regional issues. For example, after Vietnam, the United States adopted the 'Nixon 
Doctrine'. This Doctrine encouraged proxy powers to intervene in the Third World. 
The Soviet Union avoided intervening directly in Third World countries, the 
only exception was the Afghan case, for geostrategic reasons. The Soviet Union 
preferred to intervene indirectly by supporting third parties with weapons, eco-
nomic aid and political support to achieve its political objectives in the Third 
World. The Soviet Union supported the Arabs with weapons in order to balance 
US support for Israel with direct intervention. It also supported the Angolan gov-
ernment (MPLA) by shipping arms to Angola. But it did avoid direct involvement 
in the Civil War in Angola. The Soviet Union also supported the Cuban military 
presence in Angola. The Cuban forces were also protecting American companies 
in Angola. It is interesting to note that the United States sold more American 
goods in Angola than they were selling to Liberia, which has a special relationship 
with the United States.149 
The Maghreb states have more military power than any sub-Saharan African 
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state. During the past three decades the Maghreb states' forces were used to 
keep the peace in Black Africa and have protected many African governments. 
When Tunisia and Morocco sent their forces to Congo in 1960 as United Nations 
Peacekeeping Forces, it was the first military involvement of North African states 
in the continent, as a Pro-Western move to contain communism.150 While Tunisia 
had a limited military role, Morocco and Libya were more active in Africa by 
sending their military forces to intervene in regional conflicts. Morocco intervened 
in Zaire in 1977 and 1978, but the intervention was not as Proxy Forces to the 
United States but to protect European interests notably French and Belgian and 
to achieve political objectives for Moroccan interests itself by winning support for 
Morocco's claims in Western Sahara. 
Table 7:11 Military balance in Maghreb 
State Armed Forced, Active: Reserve Planes Tanks 
Algeria 169,000 : 150,000 346 910 
Libya 76,500 : 40,000 544 2100 
Morocco 203,500 : ? 117 220 
Tunisia 42,100 : ? 31 173 
Source: Military balance 1987-88, London: International Institute for Strate-
gic Studies. 
In March 1977, Zairian dissidents based in Angola attacked across the bor-
der into Zaire's western Shaba province. After it became apparent that Zaire's 
armed forces were unable to cope with the invasion, all three of the most directly 
concerned Western governments, the United States, Belgium and France, found 
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themselves constrained in one way or another by domestic political factors. 151 
The French were preoccupied with municipal elections in which a coalition 
of French communists and socialist was scoring major gains against Giscard's 
government. The United States was handicapped by the Vietnam legacy and 
congressional restrictions on American foreign interventions. Moreover, the Carter 
administration focused on a regional approach and avoided an East-West approach 
in Third World conflicts particularly in Africa. The European interests were more 
involved than the United States in the African continent. 
King Hassan of Morocco took the initiative and sent Moroccan troops to Zaire, 
1,500 Moroccan troops being committed to Zaire's defence. France provided eleven 
French aircraft to assist in the airlift of Moroccan troops and equipment. Hassan's 
decision was influenced by France more than any other foreign state. Giscard 
d'Estang supported Morocco financially in its war with Polisario and convinced 
Hassan of the danger of Soviet and Cuban involvement in Africa. The French 
involvement though limited, was criticised by the French Socialist and Communist 
parties. 152 
During Shaba I, 1977, the United States kept its role to a minimum. The US 
did not have a major interest in Africa, and it doubted the allegations of Cuban 
involvement and was anxious to avoid the spread of superpower rivalries to Africa. 
Mobutu of Zaire, did receive assurances of American support, plus deliveries of 
existing orders for non-lethal equipment, but they were sent by chartered civilian, 
rather than military transport, and requests for arms were refused. 
President Carter saw France as the greater competitor in Africa threatening 
the interests of the United States more than the Soviet Union. Historically, France 
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had more influence and interests in Africa than the United States. Most African 
States had been created by France and Great Britain. President Giscard d 'Estaing 
told a news conference 
"I should like to tell the French that Africa is quite close. Africa is a continent 
from ' where, traditionally, a certain number of our resources as well as a certain 
number ' of raw materials come, and with which we have very close links, and Africa, 
even if remote for many Frenchmen, is the continent neighbouring ours. So that a 
change in the political situation in Africa, would have consequences for France and ' 
Europe" 163 
King Hassan II criticised the United States reaction to Shaba I. He accused 
the United States of abandoning its role and of not distinguishing between friends 
and foes. It was clear the Hassan's reaction to Shaba I was a response to the 
French government's request more than to the United States which reacted slowly 
to Shaba I. 
In 1978, the United States reacted differently to Shaba II, when the dissi-
dents attacked Shaba from Angola. The United States wanted to signal to African 
and Middle Eastern governments, notably Egypt and Saudi Arabia, its willing-
ness to support friends and oppose Communist intervention. Carter saw it as 
an opportunity to demonstrate to critics at home and doubters abroad American 
determination to oppose Soviet-Cuban adventurism. The United States was criti-
cised for its behaviour in Shaba I, and in Shaba II, it tried to recover its reputation 
among American allies in Africa and the Middle East more than challenging the 
Soviet or the Cuban in Africa. 
Morocco refused to intervene alone in Shaba II, and it requested other African 
states to send troops in addition to France and Belgium. Hassan II did not intend 
to put himself up as "Africa's Policeman". Senegal sent its forces to participate 
with others in Shaba II, and the United States and Saudi Arabia financed Shaba 
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II and the Moroccan forces were carried by American military aircraft. 154 
Whatever the American position in Shaba I and II, Hassan responded for 
Moroccan domestic political reasons. The King probably wished to keep some of 
his troops occupied and Zaire provided an occasion. The situation in the Western 
Sahara meant that Morocco was coming under increasing pressure within the OAU 
and since Zaire had voted against Polisario, Hassan might well have seen that as 
a chance not only to repay a diplomatic debt but also to collect some kind of 
support from the US and France for arms and support on the Western Sahara 
issue. Moreover, Hassan saw the long reach of Moscow and Havana in Zaire, but 
it might be closer to collective self-defence than to collective security. The Shaba 
incident might threaten the principles of territorial integrity and the immutability 
of post colonial borders. 
Hassan used his intervention in Zaire to win American support but he did 
not act in response to an American request. He calculated steps such as his act 
in the Gulf crisis in 1991. Hassan also sent forces to Saudi Arabia and the United 
Arab Emirates, the Moroccan forces in the latter has been there for many years to 
protect the Royal Family in Abu Dhabi. He built a personal relationship with the 
Amir of Abu Dhabi and King of Saudi Arabia to get financial support for Morocco. 
Whatever the situation, the Moroccans might better be labelled as French proxy 
rather than American proxy in Africa. Despite Hassan's intervention in Zaire, 
this appeared not to endanger his relations with the Soviet Union, particularly his 
economic relations.155 
Morocco supported Jonas Savimbi in Angola, when the Congress prohibited 
aid for Unita, the guerrilla group seeking to overthrow the Angolan government 
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(MPLA faction). In 1981, Jonas Savimbi met American officials in Morocco. He 
received military training and weapons through Morocco. It was well known that 
the CIA supported Unita to topple the Angolan government. Hassan's political 
objective in supporting Unita was to win Reagan's support in Western Sahara and 
to appease the American administration.156 Morocco sent troops to other African 
' States: Morocco had 300 troops in Equatorial Guinea in 1986.157 
Table 7: 12 Libyan sponsored attempts of destabilisation 1976-1986, 
military training, direct military interventions on behalf of regimes 
and anti-regimes. 
Training of anti regime elements Intervention 1 Anti-regime2 
Burkina Fasso : 1982-83 Uganda: 1976-1979 Egypt: 1977 
Chad: 1970-86 Chad : 1980-1986 Chad: 1973; 1983;1984-86 
Gambia: 1981 
Niger: 1976; 1982 
Mali: 1982 
Sudan: 1975-85 
Tunisia: 1980; 1982; 1984 
Somali: 1978-85 
Western Sahara: 1976-84 
Zaire: 1976-86 
1= direct military intervention on behalf of regimes 2= direct military in-
tervention on behalf of anti-regime factions against governments. Source: Rene 
Lemarchand 1988. pp.9-10 
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In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Libya increased its intervention in the 
Third World particularly in Africa. Despite American accusations, it is hard to 
believe that Qaddafi acted on the Soviets behalf. The Reagan administration 
confronted Qaddafi and deliberately accused him by destabilising Africa. There 
was no evidence of Soviet support apart from arms transfers for hard currency.158 
The Soviets did not mind if it saw a pro- Western regime destabilised or overthrown 
and a new radical regime installed. There is a difference between acting as a 
surrogate on the one hand, and acting in self-interest which overlaps with the 
interests of a superpower. The Soviet Union denied involvement in any Libyan 
intervention.159 
7. 7 Superpowers, Intelligence and the Maghreb: 
Two geostrategic areas which concern North Africa dominate the strategic 
strong points: Gibraltar and Cape Bon in Tunisia. The Cape controls the passage 
between the Western and Eastern part of the Mediterranean basin. The location of 
North Africa on the Southern Mediterranean gives it a strategic value of monitoring 
Southern Europe, Mediterranean, and the Middle East. 
Intelligence gathering was an important element in superpower strategic ob-
jectives in North Africa. There were three dimensions of superpower intelligence 
co-operation with the Maghreb States: the external dimension of the intelligence 
to superpower security and political objectives in the area; superpower influence 
inside the Maghreb States as monitoring the internal political situations; the con-
tact with the political elites, both superpowers made use of their political and 
cultural relations notably with elites in Third World countries, and attempted to 
recruit them to superpower objectives. 
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The United States was using the Maghreb states, particularly Morocco and 
Libya, for its intelligence gathering through US military bases there. After the 
Libyan revolution and evacuation of American bases there, the United States' 
limited presence in Libya affected its intelligence gathering with the exception of 
CIA contacts with elements of Libyan opposition to the Qaddafi regime.160 
In Morocco, the United States had been using military bases. The facility at 
Sidi Yahia was a listening post for the American National Security Agency. It is 
reported that the post is still being used by the United States despite American 
denial of its presence there. The United States had its electronic listening post to 
counter the Soviet Union presence in North Africa and the Mediterranean. The 
United States did not have freedom of action in Algeria and Libya, and it had no 
strategic co-operation with these two countries. 
The Soviet Union tried to have a military presence in North Africa but without 
any success. In 1958, the Soviet Union encouraged Morocco to ask the United 
States to evacuate its military bases in Morocco. The 1960 military aid to Morocco 
was part of Soviet political and military objectives to distance Morocco from the 
United States. The Soviets went further and criticised Morocco over the presence 
of American military bases there. 161 Algeria and Libya had closer relations with 
the Soviet Union in military affairs. The Soviet Union had no military co-operation 
with Morocco except in the early 1960s, when Moroccan Soviet relations were close 
over the Mauritanian issue. 
In 1972, in persuit of regional co-operation, Kissinger encouraged military 
co-operation between the intelligence services of Saudi Arabia, Iran, Morocco and 
Egypt. All of these states then had close relations with the United States. Ac-
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cording to the Egyptian journalist and former Minister of National Guidance and 
political advisor to late President Nasser, Mohammad Heikal, the co-operation 
led to the formation of the Safari Club, in 1972 and included the French intelli-
gence service (SDECE). The Club's aim was to counter Communist activities in 
Africa, and more specifically to protect the heavy investments in Africa of French 
companies and Western banks such as Chase Manhattan.162 Its first successful 
achievement was when Egypt and Morocco sent their troops to Zaire in 1978. The 
rescue operation had the blessing of the US and France. The main objective of 
Nixon and Kissinger's support for the Club was part of American global strat-
egy particularly after Congress limited American direct intervention in regional 
conflicts. The Club enabled the US to intervene directly without any expense.163 
Both superpowers attempted to penetrate political and military elites in North 
Africa. The CIA started its relations with North African elites through labour 
unions, becoming the most organised in North Africa in the early 1950s. Through 
the trade unions, the United States cultivated a relationship with the Maghreb 
elites such as Ben Barka in Morocco and Yosseff Ben Saleh in Tunisia. 
The success of the United States was limited in its connection with North 
Africa because of the domination of French language and culture. The French 
continued to monitor the superpower situation there.164 Language, historical re-
lations, cultural co-operation, all these factors gave the French the advantage of 
penetrating the political elites in North Africa in a way similar to that which the 
British intelligence presence in Pakistan and India grew from the use of English, 
and British colonial history and cultural domination especially over the elites. 
The French assisted North African states in the surveillance of opponents to North 
African regimes. The contacts of opponents of the regimes with foreign states 
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other than France were under French surveillance.165 
Military elites are the most powerful in the Third World. In North Africa, 
except Thnisia and Morocco, the military have been controlling the governments. 
The Tunisian military elites are becoming powerful in Tunisia after Bourguiba, 
and the President of Thnisia, Zine Al Abdin Ben Ali, trained in France and the 
United States. The Moroccan military was strong in the 1960s but its political 
power declined after the attempted military coups in 1971, 1973 and 1983. 166 
However, France had strong historical links with North African armies. For 
example, during World War I some 200,000 Algerians were conscripted into military 
service with the French and fought against Germany. There were 40,000 Moroccan 
troops serving in the French army during World War I. Moroccans also fought with 
the Allies against the Axis Forces in Thnisia. By the end of World War II 300,000 
Moroccans had fought with the allies in the North African campaign. In 1954, it 
was estimated that some 126,000 former soldiers of all ages were living as civilians 
in Morocco. The rural areas were traditionally sources of recruits for the French 
army.167 
When the French organised the Moroccan Army in 1956, many Moroccan 
units transferred from the French army. There were 10,000 troops serving in the 
Spanish protectorate forces. During 1963, 80 per cent of the Moroccan officers 
were Berber and had served in the French or Spanish armies. That huge number 
of officers and troops who were serving in the French army gave France much more 
influence on Moroccan and other North African elites. In 1983, there were rumours 
surrounding the killing of Ahmed Dlimi the Commander of Moroccan intelligence, 
and the commander of Moroccan Southern Arms. A Moroccan official reported 
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that his death was due to a car accident but there were some rumours that the king 
had executed him after evidence that he was preparing a military coup. It was 
claimed that the incident was a power struggle between the CIA and the French 
Secret Services in Morocco. In November 1982, Dlimi met in secret in Paris with 
Algerian foreign minister, Ahmed Taleb al-Ibrahmi, to discuss the Sahara issue. 
The French officials knew of that meeting and a negotiated settlement would have 
been a blessing for French African policy. It is interesting to note that in the early 
1980s, Mitterrand's government was not on good terms with Morocco, and just 
two days before Dlimi incident, the French Antenne 2 televisin channel presented 
a 30 minute portrait of Dlimi.168 
Moroccan-American intelligence co-operation increased after 1982 for many 
reasons: the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982; the evacuation of the PLO; the 
bomb attack on the American Embassy in Beirut in 1983; and the kidnapping of 
William Buckley, the head of CIA office in Beirut who was directing CIA activities 
in the Middle East. The United States reevaluated its intelligence position and 
it was reported that the United States moved the CIA headquarters for Middle 
East activities from Beirut to Rabat in Morocco. The change in location was 
emphasised with the appointment of Joseph Pettinelli as a head of CIA station in 
Rabat who was in Pakistan just before the overthrow of Zulfika.r Ali Bhutto, as his 
expertise and advice could be useful to Hassan. Pettinelli was appointed in 1981, 
at the time of Reagan's active military relations with Morocco. His role was not 
limited to Morocco alone which was only a stationing operation in North Africa 
and the Middle East. 169 
The United States and the Soviet Union kept an eye on internal political 
developments to monitor domestic politics and to recruit local agents. In Libya 
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and Algeria, Soviet citizens were granted freedom to contact local citizens in civil or 
military installations because there were more than 1000 Soviet Advisors in Algeria 
and around this number in Libya. United States citizens were more suspicious in 
Algeria and Thnisia, and to some extent their movements were monitored by local 
secret services. US academic field research was also limited in both countries. 
US citizens enjoyed freedom of activities in Morocco and Tunisia. They con-
ducted their research without restriction from local authorities. American intel-
ligence agents were even active in recruiting and monitoring the Soviet Union in 
Thnisia and Morocco. In 1982, Anatoli Bogaty, a KGB officer, defected from the 
Soviet Embassy in Morocco to the United States. In June 1986, Oleg Agranyauts, 
a KGB agent, defected from the Soviet Embassy in Tunis to the United States. 
This action reflected the ability of American intelligence to move in Thnisia and 
Morocco more freely than Libya and Algeria.170 
The Soviet Union was looking to recruit local agents in the Maghreb States. 
Agranyaurs revealed the KGB network in North Africa after his defection in 1986. 
In 1966 and 1973, the Tunisian government discovered a Soviet espionage network 
in Tunisia. On the other hand, the United States was monitoring Moroccan public 
attitude towards political change, and also focussing on the Morocco's elites. The 
American cultural centres played a major role in assessing the elites' reaction to 
any possible changes.171 
Intelligence activities were part of the superpowers' strategy in North Africa 
to counter each other's influence. The superpowers were faced by extensive French 
intelligence activities. Most Moroccan elites, especially in the military, had worked 
with the French before independence. These elites had also become the majority of 
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North African officials after independence. A former American diplomatic and in-
telligence official stated that the US intelligence about Morocco was still dependent 
on French sources. The United States increased its military training aid to Mo-
rocco with the objective of providing additional independent sources from France. 
The GRU (the Soviet Military Intelligence) and the Soviet advisors through their 
military training was able to monitor the military in Algeria and Libya, but lacked 
influence because of the lack of success of communism in Muslim ' society.l72 
In sum, both superpowers were unsuccessful in increasing their presence in 
North Africa, but the United States was more able to do so than the Soviet Union, 
for the US could share with France intelligence information on North Africa. The 
Soviets developed major intelligence gathering in Algeria and Libya through their 
military advisors there but even that may not be with official Algerian or Libyan 
knowledge. 173 
7.8 conclusion 
In this chapter we have argued that North Africa became a target for both 
superpowers' influence. The United States saw North Africa as part of American 
strategic planning to counter the Soviet Union's expansion. Moreover, North Africa 
was important in time of war because of its strategic importance and its control 
of strategic straits. The American bases in post war times were used to achieve 
a balance of forces with the Soviet Union in the Mediterranean and even in the 
European theatre. 
- Both the United States and the Soviet Union used arms transfers to achieve 
political, strategic and economic objectives in North Africa. In the early 
1950s and 1960s, the arms transfers were credits and aid, and the economic 
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objective dominated Soviet policy. In the 1970s, hard currency became more 
important to the Soviet economy. Both superpowers separated ideology from 
arms transfers in North Africa except in the case of the United States and 
Libya. The United States was relating arms transfers to political co-operation. 
There was no positive correlation between Soviet arms transfers to North 
Africa and political influence. The Soviet Union had political differences with 
Libya and Algeria but it supported them with weapons for economic reasons. 
The United States politicised arms transfers to North Africa as with Libya 
and Morocco, but it had little success because there were alternative supplies 
to the US such as France and the Soviet Union. 
- The Maghreb States did not act as proxy forces to either superpower. The 
Moroccan intervention in Zaire was as proxy for French interests more than 
the United States, and Morocco acted to achieve its political interests more 
than as a client of the United States. Qaddafi's military intervention in Africa 
can hardly been seen as being in Soviet interests or as a Soviet proxy. Qaddafi 
had a self-perception of his role as independent in Africa rather than serving 
the Soviet Union. 
- The Maghreb States had emphasised the neutrality of the Mediterranean and 
their approach to Mediterranean security was closer to the French perception 
than to that of either superpower, but Algeria and Libya shared the Soviet 
view of security and peace in the Mediterranean. No state in the Maghreb 
announced its support for the presence of the US Sixth Fleet in the Mediter-
ranean. 
- Both superpowers focussed on the military elite in North Africa, but they had 
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been faced by France's strong relationships with the North African military 
elite. Most of the Maghreb's elite had been trained by the French. The dom-
ination of the French language in North Africa made it difficult to challenge 
the French intelligence resources there. The Maghreb had become a theatre 
of espionage for both US and the Soviet Union but the confrontation between 
French and American intelligence there was strong enough because of French 
sensitivity towards America. There is a history of French-American competi-
tion there. Overall, most North African military elites remained oriented to 
France rather than the superpowers. 
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Chapter VIII 
Superpowers, Regional Conflicts and Stability in the 
Maghreb subsystem 
8.1 Introduction 
Regional conflicts and regional stability were major concerns of superpower 
relations and competition in the Third World. After World War II, the United 
States sought to replace the European powers as the dominant influence in the 
Third World. The US supported a particular kind of status quo in the Third World 
which saw political instability as a threat to American interests. In this chapter, the 
term stability is used as an antonym of revolutionary change, and implies minimal 
unpredictability.1 The responses of the superpowers towards regional conflicts and 
the stability of North African regimes, are also analysed in this chapter. 
Whilst the United States supported regional stability and the status quo, the 
Soviet Union - as a new world power with ideological ambitions - challenged that 
status quo of international and regional systems. The Soviet Union favoured a 
change in regional balance of power and wanted to shift it to the Soviet side. It 
supported national liberation movements as part of the Soviet challenge to the sta-
tus quo in the Third World. The two superpowers viewed regional stability/ status 
quo in different terms. In Christopher Coker's words 
"For the Soviet Union instability still represents an opportunity to exploit; for 
the United States it still represents a threat, not even all challenge to which it might 
rise by displaying greater imagination". 2 
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8.2 Superpowers, areas of influence, and grey areas 
The United States and the Soviet Union were both concerned with the sta-
bility of certain regions in the Third World and there was some sort of unwritten 
agreement, a tacit pact', regarding the superpowers' respective spheres of influence. 
For example, Latin America was part of the American sphere of influence (Monroe 
Doctrine, 1823) as was the Arabian Gulf (Carter Doctrine, 1980).3 The United 
States singled out Saudi Arabia as vital to American interests. After the assassi-
nation of King Faisal of Saudi Arabia in 1975, the United States and Saudi Arabia 
signed a 'secret pact', under the terms of which Saudi Arabia pledged to invest 
a large proportion of its surplus earnings in US bonds in exchange for American 
political and military protection for the Saudi Arabian royal family. 4 
Afghanistan, by way of contrast, was treated as if it lay within the Soviet 
sphere of influence long before the Soviet invasion in 1979. Africa, to a large 
extent, was an unmarked area, a grey area for which the superpowers competed 
freely. It was mostly within the European sphere of influence, particularly of France 
and Great Britain. The Soviet Union only became involved in African affairs in 
the early 1970s: notably in the Horn of Africa and in Angola in 1975. The United 
States' policy toward Africa in the early 1960s, supported African decolonisation. 
The United States saw the regional power in grey areas as part of East-West 
balance of power. In 1955, Henry Kissinger described the importance of peripheral 
areas to the national interests of the United States and to American balance of 
power in facing the Soviet Union: 
"The Soviets can achieve their ultimate goal, the neutralisation of the United 
States, at much less risk by gradually eroding the peripheral areas, which will im-
perceptibly shift the balance of power against US without ever presenting US with a 
clear challenge." 5 
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In order to achieve a balance of power, and to further its policy of contain-
ment of Soviet influence, the United States supported the "Baghdad Pact", the 
pact was led by Britain to alert the Northern Tier of Muslim States (Turkey, Iran 
and Pakistan) against the Soviet threat in the early 1950s. In seeking to counter 
the Soviet Union, the Baghdad Pact managed to accomplish the reverse. It pro-
vided the motivation for Moscow to make its historic Czechoslovakia arms deal 
with Egypt, and thus establish its first real outpost in the region in 1955. Soviet 
behaviour toward the Baghdad Pact was mainly a reaction to counter the new re-
gional alliance. The Soviet foreign minister V.M. Molotov stated at the time that 
Moscow's major concern was to oppose the pact. It did not intend to arm Egypt 
against Israel, for it was too premature for the Soviet Union to shift to the Arab 
side because the Soviets had supported Israel with arms in the 1948 Arab-Israel 
war. The Soviets intended to encourage Egypt to oppose the pact. Moscow pro-
vided Egypt with arms at a time when the West would not. This Soviet act was 
a geopolitical achievement which helped to shift the regional balance in favour of 
the Soviet Union.6 
The United States and the Soviet Union have intervened to prevent gov-
ernments from coming to power that they believe might represent, directly or 
indirectly, an unacceptable threat to their security. There are many instances of 
the United States supporting authoritarian regimes, for example, in South Korea, 
Chile, Pakistan and even in Morocco. The Soviet Union similarly offered assis-
tance to many governments that they were by no means socialist or democratic. 
It cannot be said that one side supports legitimate and recognised governments, 
and the other supports revolutionaries. 7 
The United States intervened m Central America because it saw radical 
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change there as a direct threat to American interests. Strategically, Latin America 
is considered the United States' 'backyard' and any change in Latin America is 
considered to affect United States interests and the regional balance of power. In 
October 1962, the United States announced a total blockade on Cuba despite a 
limited Soviet presence there at that time because it feared that the continued 
existence of a communist government there with Soviet offensive missiles might 
precipitate unacceptable change to the US in Latin America as a whole. In the 
1980s, the United States supported the 'Contras' in Nicaragua to overthrow the 
Sandinista government which was accused by the United States of being commu-
nist. The United States feared Sandinista support for Salvadorian rebels, which 
could, in turn, lead to a change in the balance of power between radicals and 
conservatives in central America. 8 
The United States did not only exert its power within its immediate area 
of influence, but also in the ' grey areas. The United States supported the re-
gional centres of power which they called the Linchpin States (e.g. Iran, Pakistan, 
Philippines and South Korea) which could determine the outcome of the rivalry. 
They were local surrogates acting on America's behalf to preserve her strategic 
and economic interests despite the fact that they were oppressive regimes. 
American short-term strategic objectives, however, created long-term insta-
bility, as in the case of Iran and other dictatorships with a record ' of serious 
human rights violations. By placing great reliance on Iran to be the Policeman of 
the Gulf, as part of Nixon Doctrine of using regional hegemonies to protect Amer-
ican interests, it transformed the Shah from being a minor despot to a leader with 
ambitions for great power. But the Shah had systematically alienated most of the 
key elements in Iranian society, and this led to the Iranian revolution of 1979.9 
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More recently, the United States intervened in the Arabian Gulf when the 
balance of power and regional stability were threatened by the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait. The balance of power shifted towards Iraq and endangered the stability 
of Saudi Arabia, the America's key ally in the Gulf. Whatever the reasons behind 
American intervention in the Gulf, the United States could not tolerate the Iraqi 
action because of the threat it posed to American interests.10 Ironically, the United 
States had previously supported the regime of Saddam Hussein during the Iraq-
Iran war. 
The Soviet Union intervened in Afghanistan when the Soviets considered that 
the internal situation in Afghanistan might lead to instability and threaten Soviet 
national interests. The Soviet invasion in 1979 was mostly a reaction to internal 
developments in Afghanistan. During the last decades, the Soviet Union supported 
the conservative monarchy in Afghanistan because it was not allied with the West. 
Historically, Afghanistan had acted as buffer zone between Russia and, initially 
the British Empire in India and then the US in Pakistan in the 1950s and after. 
As the civil war spread in Afghanistan because of widespread opposition to the 
government of the People's Democratic party (pro-Soviet Communists) the United 
States supported the Mujahedin in attempting to destabilise the Afghan regime, 
just as the Soviets had been doing in Southeast Asia and Vietnam in the 1960s.11 
Both superpowers used regional conflicts to increase their influence and to 
decrease each other's presence in the Third World. In some cases, the superpowers 
saw their competition in Third World conflicts as a zero-sum game. They exploited 
regional conflicts to enhance their strategic, political and economic interests and 
the United States involved itself directly or indirectly in Third World conflicts 
whenever it saw a threat to US interests. The interventions in Vietnam, Central 
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America and the Middle East fit in this category. 
In many cases, the superpowers tried to exploit regional conflicts for the 
benefit of their own interests by not emphasising political solutions to the conflicts. 
The Iran-Iraq war lasted for eight years {1980-1988), and the superpowers played 
only a minor role in trying to stop the conflict until the last stage of escalation 
when they forced a resolution to the conflict through the United Nations. Both 
the radical fundamentalist regime in Iran and the Arab Nationalist regime in Iraq 
were seen by the US as dangers to the stability of American friends in the region. 
The Soviet Union was concerned to weaken the Iranian Fundamentalist regime 
because of Muslim aspirations within the Soviet Union and accordingly sold arms 
to Iraq. The Soviets were also interested in obtaining hard currency. To this end, 
the Soviet Union took advantage of the Arab-Israeli conflict to win friends in the 
Arab world. Thus, a political objective of the Soviet Union was continuing regional 
conflict. 
The Soviet Union tried to prevent resolutions to regional conflicts because 
Soviet allies in the Third World were dependent on the USSR for as long as the 
conflicts continued. Once the conflict was at an end, Soviet allies no longer needed 
to depend on the Soviet Union, and they drifted away. As the superpowers inter-
vened to protect their respective spheres of influence in the Third World, they also 
tried to preserve stability in some areas. 
8.3 Superpowers and regional stability in the Maghreb 
Three major issues have affected Maghreb stability and the regional balance 
of power since World War II: the Western Sahara conflict; civil war in Chad; and 
the Arab-African Union. The behaviour of the United States and the Soviet Union 
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towards these issues reflects their perception of the stability of the North Africa 
subregion. 
The Maghreb has enjoyed relative stability over the past thirty years. The 
Libyan revolution in 1969 and the military coup in Algeria in 1965 were the only 
major events which really threatened political stability in North Africa. Despite 
the fact that the King of Morocco has faced military coup attempts and internal 
riots, he has been in power for more than thirty years. Bourguiba was in power for 
more than thirty years before he was ousted in 1987. In terms of regional stability, 
there have been no upsets apart from a minor border conflict between Morocco 
and Algeria in 1963. Libya has been involved in border and political disputes with 
its neighbours, but even these disputes were contained. The major issues in the 
Maghreb have not led to foreign intervention, except by France in Thnisia in 1980, 
and French protection for Mauritania in the early days of the Western Sahara 
conflict. 
8.4 Arab-African Union and the Superpowers reactions 
On 13 August 1984, King Hassan II of Morocco and Colonel Qaddafi of Libya 
met in Oujda in western Morocco and signed an agreement of unity between their 
two countries. The result was the formation of a political union, the Arab-African 
union, a loose confederation, rather than a unified state to which participants 
would surrender sovereignty.14 
The Union caught many observers by surprise, because Hassan II and Colonel 
Qaddafi had a long history of political disputes and a conservative monarch had 
made a common cause with the most radical state in the Arab world. Moreover, 
Qaddafi had attempted to destabilise the Hassan II regime for more than a decade, 
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and each one ofthem was providing active support to opponents of the other. It was 
even more surprising that the initiative came from Hassan II, who then abrogated 
the union agreement two years later in August 1986 after Qaddafi criticised Hassan 
II's meeting with Shimon Peres, the Prime Minister of Israel. 15 
The Union was a response to the situation in which both countries found 
themselves in 1984. Morocco was facing economic problems in the early 1980s: 
the country was crippled by an unemployment rate of at least 20%; an $11 billion 
foreign debt; and in:flation.16 In the riots in Morocco in June 1981 and January 
1984, many people were killed. In the light of these domestic events, King Hassan 
hoped that Libya would find jobs for many thousands of unemployed Moroccans. 
The King sought economic aid and oil from Libya, and popularity inside Morocco 
by allying Morocco with Libya's radical policy. For domestic political reasons, 
Hassan intended to demonstrate his independence from the US.17 
The number of Moroccans working in Libya increased from 10,000 to 14,000 in 
1985, and Libya loaned Morocco $100 million as a gesture of friendship. Morocco 
benefited from Libyan oil: by the end of 1985, Morocco was receiving 500,000 tons 
annually at concessionary rates. Qaddafi had been a major supplier and supporter 
of Polisario in the Western Sahara conflict, supporting Polisario with weapons, 
arms and financial aid. Qaddafi promised to cut off support for the Polisario 
guerrillas fighting Morocco for control of Western Sahara. Senior Moroccan officials 
argued that the main purpose of the Moroccan-Libyan treaty of union was to 
strengthen Morocco's hand in its war against the Algerian-backed Polisario Front 
in Western Sahara. In addition, Hassan built a personal relationship with Qaddafi 
which is an important factor in Arab diplomacy. 18 
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On the other hand, Qaddafi was isolated within Libya. There were indications 
that Qaddafi had trouble with the armed forces particularly after his unsuccessful 
adventure in Chad and with the death of Hassan lshka.l in 1984, the military 
commander of the central region of Libya. Those opposed to Qaddifi's regime 
such as the National Front for the Salvation of Libya attacked his headquarters, 
Babal-Azziziya barracks, in May 1984.19 
Libya also faced a decline in oil revenues. 20 Earning's shrank from $22 billion 
in 1981 $10 billion in 1983 and $9 billion in 1984; per capital income fell from 
$11,000 in 1981 to $8,000 in 1984. Declining oil revenues forced Libya to reduce 
its overall demand for imported labour and many Egyptian, Thnisian and other 
nationals were deported, and were replaced by Moroccan nationals. The economic 
situation also affected Libya's political objectives. With increased opposition in-
side and outside Libya, Qaddafi concluded that he could increase his popularity 
inside Libya by reducing his ideological distance from the conservative, pro-western 
regime in Morocco. 
In spite of Qaddafi 's ideological rhetoric, Libya is a traditional and conserva-
tive society. After Libyan opposition elements attacked his residence21 , he became 
very aware of his domestic situation. Qaddifi was also able to acquire new legit-
imacy both domestically and in the Arab, African and Islamic worlds by allying 
his regime with that of Hassan II, the founding member of OAU, principal ally of 
the Western powers in North Africa, founding member of the Islamic Conference, 
and the head of the Islamic Committee for Jerusalem. 22 
Morocco had been providing assistance to the National Front for the Salvation 
of Libya {NFSL). The NFSL was set up in 1981 by former Libyan Auditor General 
417 
Mohammed al-Magaryef after his resignation as Libyan Ambassador to India. The 
NFSL received military training in Morocco in 1981, and it held its first anti-
Qaddafi congress in Morocco in May 1982. Libya welcomed Morocco curtailment 
of support for the NFSL, and Morocco went further by handing over to Libya 
some of Qaddafi's opponents. It was the diplomacy of quid pro quo, Polisario for 
NFSL.23 
Geopolitically, the Arab-African Union redressed the regional balance of 
power in northern Africa. It created a third axis joining the two states that had 
been isolated and felt threatened by the other two axes. 24 In October 1982, Egypt 
and Sudan announced the integration of their two countries, which came to be 
known as the Takamal Project. It has been suggested that the Takamal Project 
was an American idea because Egypt and Sudan were close allies of the United 
States.25 
In response, Algeria and Tunisia formed the alliance of brotherhood and con-
cord in March 1983 and, in December, Algeria invited Mauritania to join them. 26 • 
Libya considered that the Egyptian-Sudanese alliance threatened Libyan security, 
and in particular, Qaddifi felt that Sudan and Egypt might be involved in military 
action against him by supporting his opponents. 
Algeria had a cool relationship with Libya for many reasons: during the strug-
gle for Algeria's presidency on Boumedienne's death in 1979, Qaddafi backed Bend-
jedid's rival, colonel Saleh Yahiaoui; Libya supported former Algerian President 
Ben Bella who was released from jail; Libya encouraged Islamic Fundamentalism 
in Algeria to win influence and to put pressure on the ruling party (FLN); Libya 
criticised Algeria's Non-Aligned positive policy because Bendjedid had adopted a 
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moderate policy in international affairs; Qaddifi had built his own power base in 
Western Sahara which Algeria did not like, as it did not want to let Polisario out 
of its control and influence. Algeria also assumed a different policy over Chad and 
enjoyed good relations with African states outside the Algiers-Tunis-Noukchott 
axis. In 1983, Algeria signed treaties with Niger, and Mali concerning frontiers as 
well as aid for projects in border regions, and Algeria-Senegal relations improved 
with Abdo Deouf. 27 
By allying with Morocco, Libya was placing itself in a situation to counter 
the Egyptian-Sudanese alliance in the East, and the axis of Mauritania-Tunisia-
Algeria, the Brotherhood and Concord alliance. Morocco and Libya co-operated 
together to counter Algeria's growing regional influence and power in North Africa. 
They intended to put pressure on Tunisia to resume a position of relative neutrality 
in regional affairs in North Africa. By allying with Libya, Morocco managed to 
tilt the regional balance of power in the Maghreb in its favour. Morocco hoped 
that Qaddafi would curtail his support for Polisario, and in return Hassan publicly 
acknowledged Libyan co-operation by issuing a number of statements explaining 
the legitimacy of Libya's involvement in Chad. 28 
It has been claimed that Hassan, who was in close contact with France and 
the United States over the Chad situation, warned Qaddafi that he might have 
to send troops into Chad against Libya and, by so doing, Hassan successfully 
managed to stem Qaddafi's support for Polisario and Morocco agreed to support 
Libya in Chad. Hassan became a mediator between Libya on the one hand and 
France and Chad on the other hand in negotiations leading to the withdrawal of 
foreign forces from Chad.29 Qaddifi was isolated in North Africa, the Arab world 
and Black Africa and the Union helped Qaddafi to enhance his legitimacy inside 
419 
and outside Libya and to end his isolation. 30 
Hassan II hoped to score points for himself at a diplomatic level, especially 
with the United States and other Arab, African and European countries, by demon-
strating that he had the ability to moderate Qaddafi's international behaviour, 
especially regarding international terrorism and foreign adventures in Africa and 
other parts of the world. Hassan tried to convince the US that he had partially 
neutralised Qaddafi's anti-US activities; had helped to induce Colonel Qaddafi to 
moderate his policies in bringing Qaddafi back into the Arab political framework; 
and had restored unity to the Islamic Conference in which Hassan was a prime 
mover; and begun to patch up divisions within the OAU.31 
By allying himself with Hassan of Morocco, America's friend in the Middle 
East, Qaddafi believed he could moderate American policy toward Libya. When 
President Reagan came to power, the United States had adopted a hard line against 
Qaddafi, who became a major target of the United States counter-terrorism policy. 
With his isolation, Qaddafi became an easy target. Qaddafi saw Hassan II as a 
means to decrease American pressure.32 
8.4.1 United States reaction to the Arab-African Union 
Hassan II surprised the United States by his initiative to form the Arab-
African union with Libya. The Reagan administration viewed the Union as an 
intelligence failure, and there was speculation that the American Ambassador to 
Morocco, Joseph Reed, had not been informed in advance. Reed was called to 
Washington and was removed for his failure to predict the Union. Reagan saw 
that an American ally had suddenly initiated a treaty of friendship with Libya's 
radical strong man, Colonel Qaddafi, Washington's 'Public Enemy Number One'.33 
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Hassan reacted speedily to American reaction. In September 1984, he sent 
his special advisor Ahmed Redia Guedira to visit Washington to explain Moroccan 
objectives for the Union. Odderia met with George Bush, then Vice-President, and 
with United States Secretary of State George Shultz. 34 When America criticised 
Morocco over its relations with Libya, Hassan reacted sharply that 
"before being a friend of the US, I am the King of Morocco." 35 
Hassan knew that the Reagan Administration with its new global strategic 
interests could not ignore Morocco because of American interests in Moroccan 
military bases and the Voice of America (VOA) in Tangier. 
The United States dispatched its roving Ambassador, Vernon Walters, a long-
time friend of Hassan, to Rabat to warn Hassan that an angry Congress might try 
to block the $140 million in military and economic aid agreed for Morocco in fis-
cal year 1985. Despite that, American aid to Morocco continued without delay. 
Morocco hired the Washington public relations firm Gray and Co. to ensure a 
sympathetic hearing in the US. 
The United States was aware that the rapprochement between Morocco and 
Libya might give Qaddafi a legitimacy in Libya and outside, whereas the United 
States' objective was to discredit Qaddafi in the Arab world and in international 
areas in order to destabilise him. The United States also thought that the Union 
might give Qaddafi an opportunity to make mischief in Morocco, exploiting the 
vulnerability of the Rabat regime in the wake of domestic unrest and rising internal 
opposition. Of even greater concern was Washington's fear that the new alliance 
might strengthen Qaddafi, whom the US considered an international outlaw.37 
Morocco responded that US fears were without foundation. Hassan II and 
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other Moroccan officials declared that Morocco is a free and sovereign state with 
the right, and indeed the obligation, to pursue its own national interests. Morocco 
argued that the behaviour of Qaddafi might in fact be moderated. In July 1985 
Hassan did send his Prime Minister Karim Lamrani to Washington to explain the 
Moroccan situation, but despite that, later in 1985 and in early 1986, relations 
between Morocco and the US became increasingly strained38 because of the US 
confrontation with Libya over international terrorism. 
Morocco tried a different approach to improve its relations with the United 
States and to protect its national interests by signing that treaty with Libya. In 
March 1985, the United States was the only country to be represented at the 
annual feast of allegiance to the Moroccan throne, and by no fewer than three 
presidential envoys: the US Ambassador to the United Nations Jeanne Kirkpatrick; 
her designated replacement General Vernon Walters, and then the US Ambassador 
in Morocco, Joseph Reed. One other important gesture made to the US by Hassan 
in March 1986 was an invitation to CIA Director, William Casey, and American 
Ambassador to the UN, Vernon Walters to be honoured guests at the Throne 
Day ceremonies in 1986. Hassan's tactic was to build a closer relationship with 
Reagan's influential circle and to appease Washington.39 
Morocco extended an invitation to Shimon Peres, the Prime Minister of Israel 
in July 1986. Morocco was the second Arab State, after Egypt, to contact Israel 
directly. Hassan's main objective was to rebuild his relations with Washington. 
As a result, the federation broke down when it was no longer useful after Morocco 
improved its relations with both Algeria and Thnisia. Further, the United States' 
political and economic pressure on Morocco was successful in turning the alliance 
into a liability. 40 
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The serious problem for America's political allies in the Third World was that 
the US wanted them to behave according to American principles and to follow 
American lines. In the Third World, however, no leader can afford to be labelled 
pro-American if that means he will be seen as serving America's interests rather 
than those of his own people, as a former American diplomat put it: 
"Americans, however, like to personalise relations with foreign states, to place 
foreign leaders in convenient, over-simplified categories. Like Pluto's dog, they like 
what they know." 41 
8.4.2 Soviet Union reaction towards Arab-African Union 
The Soviet Union reaction to the Arab-African Union differed from that of 
the United States. The Soviet Union enjoyed good relations with both Libya and 
Morocco. It has strong economic relations with the two countries. Politically, the 
Soviet Union saw the Arab-African Union as an opportunity to avoid the serious 
dilemma in which the Soviet Union found itself over Soviet-Arab relations. So-
viet diplomacy had been suffering from intra-Arab conflicts. The Soviet Union 
was enjoying warm political relations with Algeria. The brotherhood and concord 
alliance might strengthen the Soviet relations with Algeria's allies, Tunisia and 
Mauritania. Moreover, it might have been possible to use the two axes, brother-
hood and concord and the Arab-African Union, to counter the American axis in 
Northern Africa, the Egyptians-Sudanese.42 
The Soviet Union saw stability and co-operation in the Maghreb as part of 
Soviet interests. The Soviet Union built economic and political relations with 
North African states despite their ideological differences. The Soviet Union's view 
of stability in the Maghreb was described by the Soviet Premier, Kosygin, and it 
has continued as a basis of Soviet policy in the region. 
"The victory will be brought closer by the cohesion of the Arab countries in 
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the struggle against aggression and colonialism, as well as the consolidation of co-
operation between its Arab countries on the one hand, and the peaceful-loving coun-
tries on the other. We defend honest co-operation between countries in questions 
connected with liquidation of international problems, but we are opposed to foreign 
policy which may be based on temporary calculations or on calculations designed to 
achieve personal gain by creating tensions in relations between other countries and 
by making them clash with one another." 43 
In 1976, the Soviet Union called for Maghreb unity and a peaceful solution to 
the Western Sahara conflict.44 The Soviets preferred co-operation between Arab 
states, and were in support of stability of the regimes, because change in the 
region might not be in the best interests of the Soviet Union. Conservative Muslim 
societies were giving way to the wave of Islamic fundamentalism in North Africa 
and the rest of the Arab World. 
Whereas the US perceived Qaddafi as a dangerous element in the Maghreb 
and Africa, and worked to destabilise his regime, the Soviet Union took a different 
view. For example, when Libya announced it had reached agreement with Alge-
ria in principle on political unity, the United States protested to Algeria against 
any political union with Libya. Vice President George Bush expressed American 
concern to the French government over the proposal of unity. The United States 
tried to isolate Libya in the Arab world. Moreover, in September 1987, the United 
States tried unsuccessfully to prevent Iraq's reconciliation with Libya by giving 
Iraq intelligence about Libya's shipment of Soviet-made mines to Iran in exchange 
for chemical weapons. The American actions were in accordance with its policy 
of maintaining the status quo. One the other hand, when the Maghreb states an-
nounced the formulation of the Arab Maghreb Union in February 1989, the USSR 
publicly supported the Greater Maghreb concept as well as its extension to Libya, 
but because of Libya, the United States adopted a cautious and reserved approach 
to the union. The Union would, however, moderate Qaddafi's policies, and con-
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trol his behaviour, more effectively than any American bomb. As the Algerian 
President argued "the United States bombed Libya but Libya is still there." 45 
8.5 Superpowers and the Western Sahara Conflict 
8.5.1 Historical background 
In 1975, after a long period of Spanish colonial rule ( in 1884 the Spanish 
government declared a protecorate over Rio de Oro and, in1934 the Spanish troops 
occupied the interior part of the Sahara) the government of Spain announced its 
withdrawal from the Western Sahara. Spain left the Sahara without leaving behind 
a structure for political authority. The Spanish decision came after a long period 
of political struggle between the Maghreb states and Spain which passed through 
different phases. 46 
During 1960s and until1974, the parties to the conflict concentrated on diplo-
matic efforts to reach a solution to the Western Sahara conflict. The Maghreb 
states shared a common interest in the decolonisation of Western Sahara. On 
the opposing side was Spain, the colonial master of the Sahara. In 1974, when 
Spain began to take steps to leave the Sahara, preparation accelerated on all sides 
in anticipation of a potential conflict.47 Between 1974 and October 1975, Morocco 
made clear its intention to take over the Sahara and reached an understanding with 
Mauritania over the Sahara. Under a trilateral agreement reached in Madrid on 
14 November 1975, Spain handed the Western Sahara over to Morocco and Mau-
ritania, both of which took the responsibility to administrate the Sahara jointly. 48 
In April 1976, Morocco and Mauritania agreed to divide the Sahara between 
them. Algeria, after its initial support for Morocco and Mauritania, then came out 
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strongly in favour of Saharan self-determination. Algeria felt that its interests were 
challenged by Morocco in the Sahara.49 Algeria and Polisario (Algerian-backed and 
formed in 1973) challenged the division of Sahara. The conflict broadened into a 
wider dispute between the Maghreb's two leading powers,50 Morocco and Alge-
ria, especially after the announcement of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic 
(SADR) on 26 February 1976. Algeria recognised and supported the Sahrawi 
Republic. 51 
Morocco claimed that Western Sahara was part of Greater Morocco and it 
was taken by the Spanish during the colonial period. On 16 October 1975 the 
International Court of Justice announced its advisory opinion that the Western 
Sahara was not a territory without a master (terra mullius). The Court (14 to 2) 
found that there were legal ties between the Moroccan Sultan and some tribes in 
the Western Sahara. It also reaffirmed the rights of the Sahrawi populations to 
self determination.52 Hassan II took the opportunity of the Court's decision and 
called upon Moroccans for a peaceful march, 'The Green March', in November 
1975 as a political manoeuvre to control the Western Sahara. Hassan II reached 
agreement with Spain, the "Madrid agreement", on the 14 November 1975. Under 
the agreement, Spain transferred the administration, but not the sovereignty, of 
the Sahara and authority over its coastal waters to Morocco and Mauritania. Ac-
cording to the Madrid agreement, Spain shared 35% of investment of phosphates 
in the Western Sahara, whilst Morocco and Mauritania were allocated 55% and 
10% respectively.53 After Spain's departure from the Sahara in February 1976, 
Morocco and Mauritania agreed in Aprill976 to divide the Sahara between them, 
and to absorb the Sahara into their own national territories against the diplomatic 
opposition of Algeria and the military opposition of the Polisario Front. 
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In 1976, Polisario concentrated its attention on the weaker and economically 
over-strained Mauritania whose economy depended heavily on iron ore mined at 
Zouerate and moved only via a 300 mile vulnerable rail link to the sea. After 
two years of fighting, Mauritania was finding it increasingly difficult to sustain 
the burden of the fighting despite French help. Morocco therefore stepped up 
its military assistance to Mauritania. In early 1978 there were 10,000 Moroccan 
troops in Maurit~nia. 54 
On 10 July 1978 the President of Mauritania since independence, Mokhtar 
Ould Daddah, was overthrown by military coup. The new military government 
agreed to a cease-fire with the Polisario, and the two parties sought a solution 
suitable and acceptable to all parties of the conflict. In 1978 Moroccan forces 
added Mauritania's part of the Western Sahara to Morocco, and since then, the 
whole Western Sahara has become part of Morocco. 55 
Algeria has supported the Polisario Front, motivated by its geopolitical and 
economic interests in the region. Despite Algeria's support for Polisario, Algeria 
preferred to avoid direct military confrontation with Morocco. The question of the 
Western Sahara has been unresolved since 1975 between Morocco on one hand, and 
Algeria and Polisario on the opposing side. The conflict has become a domestic 
issue for Hassan II, and an economic liability for Morocco. The United Nations and 
OAS has called for a referendum on self-determination for the Western Sahara.56 
8.5.2 The Soviet Union's behaviour toward the Western Sahara: 
The Soviet Union adopted a neutral position in the Western Sahara conflict, 
and placed its priority on advancing beneficial relations with the two major actors 
in the conflict, Morocco and Algeria. Soviet commercial interests and investments 
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in Morocco were balanced by its military and political commitments to Algeria. 57 
When Spain was occupying the Western Sahara, the Soviet Union denounced 
Spain as a colonial power, and accused the Spanish government of keeping the 
people in Western Sahara as underpaid workers on the rich phosphate deposits. In 
October 1974, Leonid Brezhnev said that the struggle of Western Sahara against 
Spanish domination had entered a decisive stage. Brezhnev cited Morocco as the 
leader of the struggle, although he added that Algeria, Mauritania and Tunisia 
were supporting the struggle. The Soviet Union perceived the Western Sahara 
issue as part of colonial policy in Africa.58 Before 1974, the Soviets condemned 
Spain over colonial policy because at that time there was no public conflict among 
the Maghreb states over the Western Sahara. The Soviet Union was in a strong 
position to attack Spain and to strengthen Soviet ties with the Maghreb states and 
the Non-Aligned movement and to win Maghreb public opinion.59 
When the Western Sahara conflict created tension among the Maghreb States, 
particularly after 1975, the Soviet Union faced a serious dilemma in attempting to 
satisfy all parties. Soviet commentators accused the Western press of attempting 
to create differences between the Maghreb States on the Western Sahara issue. 
When Morocco opposed Spain on Western Sahara, the Soviets had no difficulty 
in extending their support to Morocco. But when tension between Algeria and 
Morocco became serious, the Soviets took pains to demonstrate their neutrality. 60 
After 1975, the Soviet Union no longer saw the Western Sahara as a problem of 
colonialism in North Africa. Anatoly Gromyko {son of late Soviet Foreign Minis-
ter) Director of the USSR Academy of Science Institute of Africa and Director of 
African Affairs in the Soviet Foreign Ministry, in an Analytical Survey of African 
Achievements, Problems and Prospects, published in 1983, did not mention the is-
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sue of independence in Western Sahara or the Polisario movement or the SADR.61 
In November 1975, the Soviet Union's representative to the United Nations 
Security Council, Jacob Malik declared that 
"the people of Western Sahara have the full right to determine their future." 63 
The Soviet declaration in the UN on the Saharan question was influenced by 
Algerian support for Soviet policy in Angola. Algeria supported Angola's "MPLA" 
faction, and allowed the Soviet airlift transit through Algiers airport. In 1976, the 
Moroccan navy intercepted a Soviet vessel near the Sahara coast, and it declared 
that the vessel was carrying weapons and three Algerian officers. Morocco accused 
the Soviets of sending arms and weapons to the Polisario through Algeria and 
Libya.63 Morocco gave a warning to Moscow, severed diplomatic relations with 
East Germany and froze the Meskah phosphate negotiations (which were later 
concluded in 1978).64 
Morocco's anti-Soviet rhetoric was a tactical step to gain French and American 
support in the Sahara conflict. For this reason, Morocco tried to portray the 
conflict in East-West terms. There was no evidence that the Soviets had directly 
supplied arms to the Polisario, and the Soviet Union did not place legal and specific 
end-use limitations on its weapons in the case of Algeria and Libya in contrast to 
the restrictions placed by the United States on its customers. 65 The Soviets built 
up a diplomatic and cultural presence in Morocco, and in 1978 signed the Meskala 
agreement which accounts for the largest Soviet investment in the Third World. 66 
The neutrality of the Soviet Union in the conflict proved to be genuine. When 
Polisario proclaimed the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) on 27 Febru-
ary 1976, Soviet reports made no comment other than to say that the majority of 
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the OAU states were in favour of recognising it. However, Polisario and the SADR 
obtained neither diplomatic recognition from the USSR and the Eastern block nor 
did they receive direct military support.67 
The Soviet Union set forth a strategy of maintaining a balanced relationship 
between the two antagonistic sides in the Sahara dispute. The Soviet Union offered 
Sahrawi students places to study in Soviet Universities, and yet tolerated Algerian 
support of Polisario with Soviet made weapons, supporting the Sahrawi in the 
United Nations and OAU solutions for self-determination in Western Sahara. One 
Soviet official went further, when the Soviet Ambassador in Senegal stated that 
it is impossible to ignore the Polisario Front in the search for a solution to the 
Sahara problem. Whilst, in November 1979, the Soviet Union voted with African 
states and the Non-Aligned Movement for the Polisario as the sole and lawful 
representative of the Sahrawi people, 68 this does not necessarily contradict genuine 
Soviet neutrality. The Soviet Union was manoeuvring to appease Algeria and other 
Third World countries and at the same time monitoring the secret negotiations 
between Polisario and Moroccan officials. 
The Soviet Union tried to satisfy all parties to the conflict and official Soviet 
policy stated that 
"The USSR favours the solution of the Western Saharans problem by peaceful 
and political means, taking into consideration the interests of all sides concerned 
without any outside interference, to say nothing of military interference. The Soviet 
Union proceeds from its principled stand in support of the Western Saharan people 
to self-determination and takes into account the relevant decisions of the UN and the 
OAU."69 
The Soviet Union emphasised a position of principle i.e. the right of Sahrawi 
to self-determination based on UN and OAU resolutions. The Soviets did not, 
however, elaborate on what self-determination meant in this case. The Soviets 
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encouraged a peaceful solution and the consideration of the interests of all parties 
in the conflict. Implicitly, the Soviets might simply withdraw recognition of at 
least some of Morocco's claim over the Western Sahara territory.70 The Soviets 
did not antagonise or alienate any of the parties in the dispute and thus sustained 
their multi-dimensional interaction with both Morocco and Algeria. 
The Soviet Union justified its policy on a number of grounds: the initial ab-
sence of an international consensus on the conflict; caution on the part of the 
United States; the Soviet Union's own direct interests; the position of the commu-
nist party in Morocco, the Party of Progress and Socialism, as a strong supporter 
of Moroccan claims in the Sahara and the Soviet perception that communism as 
an ideology had no roots in the tribal society of Western Sahara.71 
The Maghreb has been marginal to Soviet global policy and the conflict has 
been kept within regional limits. Soviets interests in Morocco, and American inter-
ests in Algeria explain why the Western Sahara conflict is so little internationalised, 
and the conflict has never brought the two superpowers to confrontation because 
both superpowers have avoided policies likely to alienate either Algeria or Morocco. 
8.5.3 United States behaviour towards Western Sahara: 
The United States policy towards the Western Sahara issue should be seen on 
three levels of analysis; first, the domestic level; i.e. the political situation inside 
Morocco and the stability of the regime; second, the regional level in the Maghreb 
and Iberian Peninsula: Portugal and Spain; third, the global level, particularly, the 
increase of the Great Powers' involvement and East-West reaction to the conflict. 
On a domestic level, by 1973, King Hassan was politically isolated on several 
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fronts. These included: the refusal of opposition parties to participate in a coalition 
government; direct attacks from within the military coups; urban terrorism and 
rural guerrilla operations. In 1970, the political opposition boycotted the Parlia-
mentary elections and referendum on the Constitution. There were two attempted 
coups d'etat in July 1971 and August 1972. In March 1973, bombs were set at 
selected targets in Casablanca and Rabat and in the countryside. The guerrillas 
failed to rally popular support and were quickly killed or captured by Moroccan 
National Security Forces. In April 1973, several hundred left-wing activists were 
arrested and many of them were tortured. Moreover, the Moroccan government 
suspended the Rabat faction of the UNFP. The economy was in bad condition, in 
1973, drought led to a poor harvest. Also, the unemployment ranged from 20 to 
30 percent in the cities and probably averaged about 40 percent in the rural areas. 
In those circumstances King Hassan II was looking for a political manoeuvre to 
bind the political parties behind him. 72 
In mid-1974, the Western Sahara issue provided a common nationalist cause to 
which all major political parties rallied. All the parties enthusiastically supported 
and worked with the king as he orchestrated and led the national campaign to 
recover the Sahara. The left wing (communists) Party of Progress and Socialism 
and the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (SUPF) became as militant on the 
Western Sahara issue as the moderate Istiqlal Party was. 
As the former American diplomat in Rabat put it in 1975, 
"The king was able to divert attention from his internal problem last summer 
by focusing on an external issue-the recovery of the Sahara territory to the south of 
Morocco, more commonly known as the Spainish Sahara." 73 
Henry Kissinger, then American Secretary of State recognised the domestic 
political importance of the Sahara to King Hassan. The Western Sahara crusade 
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enabled the king to recover politically from the previous crises which had rocked 
his regime. At that time, Kissinger was more enthusiastic for King Hassan than 
any other American official and had managed to build a personal relationship with 
him.74 
On a regional level, the political upheaval in Portugal threatened the United 
States' base rights at Lajes in the Azores, which had proved invaluable. In July 
1974, the coup in Lisbon paved the way for decolonisation of Portugal's African 
Empire. Portugal's decision also contributed to the Moroccan decision to mo-
bilise the Sahara campaign. 75 When Spain announced its intention to abandon the 
Sahara, it was part-motivated by the revolution in neighbouring Portugal which 
withdrew from both Angola and Mozambique. The King of Morocco considered 
this to be the time to intervene, it was a golden opportunity after a hard political 
struggle. 
During the Kissinger era, the United States was adopting a geopolitical ap-
proach in its foreign policy to enhance American influence and to counter the Soviet 
Union in the Third World. There was also another concern, the United States in-
tended to solve the Western Sahara before the death of General Franco, because 
the new political democratic process in Spain could complicate the issue, and the 
Spanish right would have to concentrate on possible domestic turmoil following 
Franco's death rather than on a conflict in the Maghreb. 76 
General Vernon Walters, then Deputy Director of the CIA played an impor-
tant role in the 1975 negotiations. A friend of Hassan since the general's day as an 
intelligence agent in Vichyite North Africa, Walters tied Spain's co-operation on 
the Western Sahara to the renewal of the lease of the Spanish bases for $1.5 billion 
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in new US weapons. Within two months of the signing of the Madrid accords, a 
five-year US-Spanish treaty was signed which included an agreement favourable to 
Spain. Walters has kept silent on his role in the Morocco-Spanish agreement over 
Western Sahara. 
"It would look like the king of Morocco and the king of Spain are pawns of the 
US and that would not be in anybody's interest." 77 
There is circumstantial evidence, including US lack of support for UN res-
olution (3458a) against the Green March that lends credence to the allegation. 
The Spaniards, for their part were convinced that Hassan II could not organise 
the Green March without outside help, especially the United States. The Green 
March was organised in November 1975.78 
The United States realised that the instability in Morocco might destabilise 
the whole of North Africa. An American scholar Lewis Ware put it thus in 1975, 
"political instability in the Sahara could ea.<~ily destabilise the entire Iberian 
Peninsula and have serious consequences on the United States' strategic interests in 
Spain".79 
Despite the United States proclaimed 'neutrality' in the conflict, it was, infact, 
more theoretical than real. In January 1976, King Hassan sent his former Prime 
Minister, Karim Lamrani, to the United States with a military shopping list. In 
the same year, the State Department continued the flow of arms and ammunitions 
and notified Congress of the US's willingness to sell 24 F -SE aircraft to Morocco. 
Most of the time, Kissinger kept his support for Morocco away from Congress 
to avoid a Congressional protests. 8° Kissinger was motivated by his Middle East 
disengagement process after the October 1973 war, and Morocco was one of his 
mediators with Egypt, Syria and the PLO. The first meeting between the PLO 
and the US was in Rabat, Morocco in 1973, when Vernon Walters met Khalid AI-
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Hassan, Arafat's political advisor. Kissinger's first visit to an Arab State was to 
Morocco in November 1973, on which occasion his purpose was to ask Morocco to 
moderate the PLO and Sadat of Egypt's policy toward the Palestinian problem.81 
On the global level, Kissinger was influenced by the Vietnam war and the 
American geostrategic perspective toward the Soviet Union. After Vietnam, the 
surrogate strategy became a cornerstone of the United States foreign policy toward 
the Third World. The main theme of this strategy was the United States would 
arm reliable Third World allies to play the role of regional gendarmes in trouble 
spots to contain the threat of leftist insurgencies and to maintain conservative 
pro-US governments. Kissinger supported Morocco and after the Soviet involve-
ment in Angola in 1975, the United States became more aware of Soviet influence 
and competition in the continent. When Kissinger returned from South Africa in 
October 1975, and stopped in Madrid on his way to Washington. He stated 
"The United States will not allow another Angola on the East flank of the 
Atlantic Ocean" .82 
The United States supported Morocco with weapons but it did not recognise 
Moroccan sovereignty over the Sahara, the US did acknowlege Moroccan adminis-
tration over the Sahara. 
When Carter was elected President, he adopted a regional approach to Amer-
ican foreign policy in the Third World. In his first two years in the White House 
from 1977 to 1979, Carter had banned and restricted American arms sales to 
Morocco. Carter called for a political settlement to the conflict and distanced 
himself from Kissinger's policy. He asked for self-determination and, as a ges-
ture, the United States contributed $100,000 to the International Committee to 
the Red Cross for the Sahrawi Refugee Relief Fund, and the first public US Con-
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gressional hearing on the conflict was held. Moreover, the United States officials 
visited Polisario Camps and met directly with Polisario leaders. Carter's policy 
toward Morocco led many to believe that Carter wanted to cut short past admin-
istration alignments with King Hassan.83 The Carter administration believed that 
Hassan's regime lacked stability, and his human rights record was not particularly 
respectable. The CIA believed that Hassan's regime might not survive one more 
year. Many members of Congress visited the Western Sahara and supported self-
determination and criticised Moroccan policy toward the Sahara. After a visit to 
the Western Sahara and Polisario camps in August 1979, Stephen Solarz, Chair-
man of the House Subcommittee on Africa, argued that the arms sales was not in 
the United States national interest because it would reward King Hassan for his 
policy in the Sahara and would damage United States relations with key African 
states such as Algeria and Nigeria. 84 
The Carter administration imposed restrictions on arms sales to Morocco 
and accused the Moroccan government of violating the US-Moroccan agreement 
in 1960 which prohibited use of American arms against third parties.83 The 1960 
US Moroccan military agreement prohibited weapons for any other purpose than 
the self-defence of Moroccan territory, and America did not recognise the Western 
Sahara as part of Moroccan sovereignty. 
In February 1978, under pressure from Congress, President Carter ordered 
a ban on the delivery of ammunition and weapons to Morocco. The liberals in 
Congress, and Carter himself, were appeasing Algeria, the main American trade 
partner in North Africa. Early in 1980, Carleton Coon, Director of North African 
Affairs at the State Department convened a regional ambassadorial meeting at 
the American Embassy in Madrid to co-ordinate US policy toward the Western 
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Sahara conflict. The State Department arranged a meeting with the Polisario 
Front. The Unites States sent several envoys to confer with the Polisario leader-
ship about the possibility of direct negotiations between the parties. Paul Simon, 
representative from illinois; Andrew Young, US ambassador to the United Nations 
Security Council and the Deputy Chief of Mission of the US embassy in Algiers 
were among the envoys. The latter visited the Tindouf region in December 1980, 
and had discussions with the Polisario Front. 86 
While the Carter administration was trying to approach Algeria and Polisario 
by putting pressure on Morocco for a political solution, French President Giscard 
D'Estaing, a personal friend of Hassan, opposed the proclamation of the SADR in 
1976. During Giscard's visit to Morocco in 1977, he stated that on the question 
of the Western Sahara, France would vote in the United Nations for Morocco and 
Mauritania. Giscard D'Estaing sent a squadron of Jaguar jet planes to Mauritania 
in 1977 and 1978 to provide air cover in an attempt to defend the shaky regime 
there. In addition, Giscard D'Estaing asked President Carter in 1978 to help the 
French effort in Africa. He spoke of the heavy burden of French intervention in 
Africa and wanted American involvement to help. 87 
However, France lobbied to put pressure on Carter to support Hassan II's 
regime. The United States was reluctant to provide arms for what Morocco consid-
ered self-defence. The ban introduced an element of friction into the United States 
harmonious relations with Morocco and in spring of 1979 King Hassan asked for 
the withdrawal of the Unites States ambassador in Rabat, Richard Parker.88 
In October 1979, the Carter administration changed its policy and agreed to 
deliver arms to Morocco and the State Department defended its decision in the 
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Congress as being vital to American interests in North Africa. The change of 
Carter's policy was due to the third party element, the loss of American allies in 
the Third World. The Carter administration, following the losses of Somoza in 
Nicaragua, the Shah of Iran, Ethiopia and Afghanistan, was highly alarmed and 
quickly moved to enhance Hassan's position in the war against the Polisario. 89 
However, there was a split within the Carter administration over the question 
of supplying Morocco with reconnaissance aircraft and helicopter gunships. The 
CIA felt that new weapons would do Hassan little good since the basic problem 
lay in an inflexible command structure. Following the 1972 coup attempt, King 
Hassan took strong steps that stripped the military, especially the air force, of 
much of its power. Hassan took over as his own Minister of Defence and Chief 
of Staff. Hassan showed his apparently well-founded mistrust of the military by 
virtually disarming the ground forces and tightening control on ammunition and 
all military operations. The State Department tilted toward the CIA argument but 
added that the sales of arms would endanger American relations with Algeria. 90 
The National Security Advisor to President Carter, Zbigniew Brzezinski ar-
gued that a show of support for a long term ally should be made in order to reassure 
other allies, particularly Saudi Arabia, in the aftermath of developments in Iran 
and Nicaragua on 22 October 1979. The sale of OV-10 reconnaissance aircraft was 
approved, but at the same time the United States put pressure on King Hassan to 
negotiate for a political solution. 
Deputy Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, was sent to Rabat to urge 
the King to compromise with Polisario, and Brzezinski went to Algeria to reassure 
President Bendjdid and explain the American policy to him regarding American 
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arms sales to Morocco. 91 
However, Morocco's human rights record was still under suspicion by Carter. 
This pushed Morocco more toward its historical ally; France. Giscard d'Estang 
was a strong supporter of the Moroccan monarch. The Conservative Government 
of Giscard d'Estang attempted to renew French political influence in Africa. After 
Carter's failure in Iran in 1979, and the Soviet involvement in Horn of Africa 
and Angola, the United States acknowledged that Morocco was integral to US 
security needs in the Mediterranean and Africa. The escalation of the Sahara 
War through American military reinforcements was apparently of concern to the 
Carter administration. The strengthening of Morocco's position in the Sahara 
was equal to the stability of the throne. Hence, the Americans saw Morocco in 
terms of American security requirements and plans in the area. A policy that was 
vigorously reinforced by the Reagan Administration. 
In 1981, the Reagan Administration came to power with a different agenda, 
tried to strengthen American military power, roll back the Soviet presence in the 
Third World particularly after the American humiliation in Iran and the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan, both of which added psychological consequences to the 
Vietnam legacy. 
The Reagan administration saw American-Moroccan relations in geostrate-
gic terms and passed over the human rights issue and the regional approach to 
the conflict over Western Sahara. He had seen American relations with Third 
World countries in terms of East-West competition, and he adopted a realist and 
geopolitical approach toward the "evil Empire". 
The Reagan administration removed the limitation placed on arms sales to 
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Morocco by the US Congress in 1980. The State Department announced its refusal 
to create a linkage between political settlement and arms sales to Morocco as the 
Carter administration had. In 1982, the United States negotiated with Morocco a 
military facility in Morocco for the use of Rapid Deployment Forces (in 1983 and 
after CECOM). King Hassan visited Washington in May 1982, following Alexander 
Haig's visit to Morocco in February 1982. The principal theme of the Reagan 
administration concerning Morocco was military co-operation. 
Despite American arms support to Morocco, the Reagan administration's of-
ficial policy toward the Western Sahara conflict (at least in public) was neutrality. 
It did not recognise Moroccan sovereignty over the Sahara, but it supported Mo-
roccan administration there.94 
The United States had tried to respond to legitimate Moroccan needs for 
national defence, but the US had no desire to be caught in the middle of the 
conflict, which was not of its making and did not affect its real interests. In the 
wake of Polisario's October 1981 victory at 'Guelta Zemmur' in which the Front 
employed Soviet made SA-6 missile for the first time, the United States responded 
by sending a three-man training team to the Moroccan F-05 Unit at Meknes. 
The United States team -US Air Force Pilots- stayed in Morocco 60 days to train 
Moroccan pilots how to fly over SA-6 missile launchers and destroy them. The 
US also offered a team of 20 US ground forces experts to train the Moroccans in 
Commando style tactics. The aim was to develop a special unit that could make 
Commando-type attacks on SA-6 units in the desert, perhaps using helicopters. 
The United States went further and supplied the Moroccan Air Force with cluster 
bomb units which had been requested by Morocco for several years. 95 
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Unlike Moscow's genuine neutrality, Washington pursued a rather contradic-
tory policy despite its official neutrality: although unwilling to recognise Morocco's 
sovereignty over Western Sahara, it had accepted its administration. The United 
States support for Morocco has remained almost unconditional except for two years 
during Carter's term of office. 
When Bendjedid came to power in Algeria, Washington seems to have decided 
that Algeria was no longer a radical, intransigent, and revolutionary state and like 
Rabat has come to regard President Bendjedid as a pragmatist whose economic 
and political reforms should be given support, not least in the hope that Alge-
ria will limit its friendship with, and military dependence on, the Soviet Union. 96 
Moreover, the United States seems to be convinced that Algeria is no longer in-
terested in toppling King Hassan. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union 
intended to escalate the conflict or to use it for political advantage. 
8.6 Superpowers, Civil war in Chad, and Regional Stability 
8.6.1 Internal Setting 
Chad was under French Colonial rule from 1900 until its independence in 
1960. The geographical position of Chad gave it a critical role in French strategic 
policy in Africa.97 Black Africa under French rule was larger than all of Europe, 
minus the Soviet Union, but with a population smaller than that of France alone. 
The French adopted a policy of Balkanisation of its African colonies. It created 
fourteen separate states out of what had previously been ruled as two large African 
Federations, French West Africa and Equatorial Africa. France encouraged its 
former colonies to form the Defence Council of Equatorial Africa in 1961. This 
was established with the help of France from the Central African Republic, Chad, 
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the Congo and Gabon.98 
The civil war in Chad had its roots in the sheer diversity of ethno-cultural 
aggregates comprised with its boundaries. The internal situation in Chad is com-
plex and tragic. It has a heterogeneous society: Northerners versus Southerners, 
Muslims versus animists and Christians, Arabs versus black African groups. The 
southern people of Chad are black, Christian, Animist and more educated - with 
French help - than the Northerners, and more oriented to French culture and 
language. The Southerners are completely dominated by the Sara tribes which 
constitutes the largest ethnic group in the whole {30%).99 
The Northerners were Muslim nomads. They were against the French role in 
Chad. They had more of a common culture, values and tribal relations with Sudan, 
Egypt and Libya than with the Southerners. The Civil War in Chad represented 
a personal conflict between the North and the South. It was also part of personal 
ambition between the Northerners themselves: Habre and Goukouny were from 
the North. 100 
In economic terms, the population in the North is nomadic or semi sedentary, 
while in the South all the people are agrarian and sedentary. The economy of the 
North is based on livestock raising, while the South cultivates the cotton which 
earns up to 80% of Chad's export income. The dividing line between the Muslim 
North and the Christian-Pagan South is also the boundary between "Cotton Chad" 
and "Cattle Chad". While the North comprises 80% of Chad's territory, one half 
of Chad's population resides in the populated South-West. In the South, about 
half of the school-age children go to school, while in the North only 3% acquire 
some kind of formal education.101 
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The French favoured the Southerners and offered them most of the admin-
istration. In effect, France used the policy of divide and rule to dominate Chad. 
While the French were welcomed in the South, they were seen in the North as 
foreign invaders and infidels. France was faced in the North by fierce resistance. 
After independence in 1960, French forces were stationed in the North because the 
Northerners were hostile to Southerners ruling the country. The French continued 
to administer and police the North because the situation was uncontrollable in the 
North. There was continuing hostility between North and South.102 
After the French forces withdrew from the North in 1964, the Northern regions 
were in revolt against the independent government of Chad, which they saw as a 
French puppet surviving only with the help of France.103 France intervened in 
Chad many times to protect the government of Chad. In 1968; 1978 and 1982, 
French Forces were dispatched to Chad after the rebels of the North, with Libyan 
support, threatened the central government of Chad.104 
Continued French involvement in Chad was influenced by many factors. First, 
the domino theory prevalent during the period of French involvement in Indo-china, 
when France was defeated. Second, failure to support the central authority in Chad 
would have destroye French credibility with all former African colonies, who looked 
to France as a protector from internal and external danger. Third, France had 
economic interests in Libya, along with the presence of some 2500 French citizens, 
and it did not intend to destroy its relations completely with Libya or to become 
involved in a direct confrontation with Libya over Chad. Fourth, the French aim 
was also to protect the uranium fields in neighbouring Niger. Moreover, in 1978 
the French tried to stabilise the situation in Chad by drawing up a French-Libyan 
understanding about their respective spheres of influence in Chad. 
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8.6.2 Libyan intervention in Chad 
In 1966, the rebel Front Liberation N ationale du Tchad (Frolinat) was founded 
by urban, educated Northerners who were fiercely opposed to French colonialism 
and Southerners, the Christian of Chad. The Frolinat leaders were inspired by 
Nasser's doctrine of Arab socialism and radical anti-colonialism.105 The Libyan 
government under King ldris supported Frolinat but, in reality, relations were 
never close between the leaders of Frolinat and King ldris because of Frolinat's 
ideology. In the late 1960s King ldris reached agreement with Tombalbaye of 
Chad to maintain Islamic institutions in Chad and the status of Chadian workers 
in Libya. 
After the Libyan revolution in 1969, the new Libyan government continued to 
support Frolinat in Chad. Qaddafi's was more revolutionary than ldris' regime. He 
was motivated by Libyan national interests; uranium, Pan-Arabism, Pan-Islamism 
and anti-colonialism. The first Libyan intervention in Chad was in 1972, when 
Libyan troops occupied the Northern border of Chad, the Aouzou Strip. Libya 
claimed that the strip was part of Libyan territory, for the strip contains rich 
uranium deposits. Despite Libya's occupation of the Aouzou Strip, Tombalbaye 
signed a treaty of friendship in December 1972, in exchange for Libyan financial 
aid to Chad and Libyan promises to reduce support to Frolinat. 
Chad broke relations with Israel and agreed to concessions over the Aouzou 
strip in Northern Chad. Qaddafi did not want to jeopardise its Mirage deal with 
France and Libya was ready to come to terms with France in Chad, in 1971-1972, as 
a quid pro quo for the 110 Mirages. In essence, Libyan state interests temporarily 
overrode public ideological commitment. In 1975, Tombalbaye was assassinated, 
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after France learnt that he wa.s preparing to sell oil prospecting rights to a US com-
pany, and a new government wa.s established by Chad's Chief of Staff, Malloum.106 
Whilst he moved a little closer to the Muslims in the North, this wa.s a tactical 
move which would not challenge the ba.sic character of the Malloum government 
of being southerners, Christian, Sara tribes, Pro-French and Conservative. The 
rebels continued their struggle to overthrow the Central government in Chad. 
President Sadat publicly announced his support for the Malloum government 
in 1977 while Libya supported the rebels. The regional enemies of Libya, such a.s 
Saudi Arabia, Morocco and Sudan, supported the Chad government. These states 
were strongly representing the view of the United States. France and Libya had 
their own interests in Chad and, in 1978, France and Libya divided Chad into two 
sphere of influence: Libyan influence in the Muslim north, and French domination 
in the Christian south. France stationed a military force in Chad particularly in 
the south and Libya built a military ba.se in Northern Chad.107 
The second Libyan intervention in Chad occurred in 1980, when 700 Libyan 
troops entered Chad at the invitation of the then President, Goukouni, to put down 
an uprising led by Hissein Habre. Habre's forces were defeated and withdrew to 
Sudan's borders in the Ea.st. It is interesting to note that Goukouni and Habre 
are both from the North. The struggle over power in Chad had emerged between 
the two rivals from the Muslim North, the quarrel having tribal roots.108 
After Habre's defeat, Libya announced its goal of unification with Chad in 
January 1981. The announcement created an international outcry and under pres-
sure from African States, France, and the US, Goukouni requested the complete 
withdrawal of the Libyan forces from Chad. In November, 1981, the Libyans pulled 
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back to their position in the Aouzou strip. 
The third Libyan intervention occurred in 1982, when Hissene Habre strength-
ened his forces with the support of Sudan, Egypt, France and the US. Habre suc-
cessfully overthrew the Goukouni government. But with Libya's support, Gouk-
ouni's troops in the Tibesti mountains, and in the summer of 1983, Goukouni 
launched an offensive attack against government positions in Northern and East-
ern Chad but French forces were dispatched to Chad with Zairian military forces 
to protect Habre's government. 
In 1984, France and Libya negotiated an agreement to withdraw all foreign 
forces· from Chad and although France and Zaire honoured the agreement, Libyan 
military forces remained in Northern Chad. The internal struggle continued in 
Chad until December 1990 when the Habre government was overthrown by ldris 
Deby, who visited Libya and France to gather support to stabilise Chad. Habre 
had stayed in power with French and American support from 1983 until he was 
overthrown by rebel forces in Chad, in December 1990 .109 
8.6.3 United States, the civil war in Chad and regional stability 
The United States established diplomatic relations directly after Chad won 
its independence. Despite diplomatic relations, Chad's economic relations with US 
companies did not grow until the late 1970s. The United States remained cautious 
about becoming involved in Chad's internal politics because the United States had 
few interests there.103 
During the Carter administration, the US was preoccupied with other re-
gional issues and paid little attention to the civil war in Chad. The US encouraged 
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its regional allies: Sudan, Egypt, Morocco and Saudi Arabia to counter Libyan 
involvement in Chad. France was the only European state involved in Chad. 
In 1977, a joint Egyptian-Sudanese delegation headed by Egypt's Vice President 
Hushi Mubarak, visited Chad and declared its support for the Chadian demand 
to open negotiations about the Aouzou Strip. President Sadat publicly voiced 
his support for Malloum. The Carter administration, however, was not in favour 
of destabilising Qaddafi, although it did support Egypt, Sudan, Saudi Arabia and 
Morocco in their support for Malloum. The United States preferred indirect Amer-
ican pressure in Chad.l11 
The turning point in US policy toward Chad started in 1980, especially when 
President Goukouni met with Qaddafi in January 1981 in Tripoli to announce 
the Libyan-Chadian unity proposal. The United States reacted strongly against 
the union between Chad and Libya. The United States encouraged its allies in 
the OAU, Europe and the Middle East to stop the union.112 The United States 
took a direct stand against the merger of Chad and Libya. The US opposition 
was expressed in part through the decision of the Reagan administration to boost 
military aid to the countries opposing Libya, such as Morocco, Thnisia, Egypt and 
Sudan.113 The US also criticised the decision of the OAU in Nairobi in 1982 to 
give the Presidency of the OAU to Libya. The United States backed and pushed 
French military intervention in Chad to secure Libyan withdrawal.114 
The US had no desire to send American troops to Chad or acquire perma-
nent bases but, in early 1981, the CIA proceeded to funnel significant quantities of 
cash, armaments, and vehicles into Habre's hands thereby jeopardising the chances 
of success of the OAU peace-keeping operation before it even materialised. Rea-
gan's covert aid to the Habre guerrillas in 1981 undermined the one test that the 
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French, the Libyans, the OAU and Goukouni's government had agreed on: the 
establishment of a peace-keeping force. This, however, did not prevent the Reagan 
administration from paying lip-service, as well as $12 million worth of logistical 
assistance, to the OAU peace-keeping force. 115 
The collapse of the Goukouni regime in June 1982 had far-reaching implica-
tions: it dealt a severe blow to French policies in Chad, spelled the defeat of the 
formula advocated by the OAU committee on Chad, and exposed the importance 
of the OAU peace-keeping force on the ground. For this triple defeat the Reagan 
administration could claim much of the credit.116 
In response to Libyan intervention in Chad, the US, on 7 August 1983, sent 
AWACS and F-15s to Sudan. On 24 August, the US announced the withdrawal of 
the AWACS from Sudan. French resources said one reason why the US AWACS 
planes in Sudan were being withdrawn was because there would have been commu-
nication difficulties between them and French aircraft and equipment and because 
the French air force did not intend to attack the Libyan planes. France hesitated to 
confront Libya directly because of French interests in Chad and Libya. The French 
had understood the civil war in Chad to be an internal conflict more than a design 
of Qaddafi.117 Moreover, in August 1983, the US aircraft carrier Eisenhower which 
was operating in the Mediterranean, moved to the Libyan coast to put pressure on 
Qaddafi if the hostilities in Chad continued.118 
In 1983, in response to the Libyan invasion of Northern Chad, Reagan au-
thorised $25 million in military equipment for Chad and offered $10 million of 
aid. The US also sent advisors to Chad to help Habre with 1000 paratroopers 
from Zaire as well as Redeye missiles. The Moroccan, Egyptian and Sudanese 
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governments also helped.119 The United States provided economic aid to Chad, 
including substantial emergency food aid as well as relief and rehabilitation as-
sistance. For fiscal years 1983 through 1986, US economic and humanitarian aid 
to Chad totalled almost $100 million; security assistance totalled $48 million.120 
In March and December 1986, Reagan authorised $25 million in emergency assis-
tance including small arms, ammunition, trucks, jeeps, anti-aircraft and anti-tank 
weapons, uniforms and first-aid kits. The Reagan administration's main objective 
was to destabilise Qaddafi's regime, as the US saw Qaddafi as a major threat to 
American friends in Egypt, Sudan and other African states. According to a US 
State Department official statement 
"The US believes that resistance to Libyan domination of Chad is important for 
regional security and is concerned about the threat posed to Chad and its neighbours 
by the continued Libyan occupation of parts of Northern Chad" .121 
The United States used Chad for training the Libyan opposition, the National 
Front for the Salvation of Libya (NFSL). It attempted to penetrate and destabilise 
Libya through Chad. When Hissene Habre was defeated in December 1990, by 
rebel forces led by ldris Deby, American planes carried the Libyan opposition to 
Zaire.122 The CIA had penetrated the Libyan opposition in the early 1980s in 
Cairo and Chad. In a secret base near Ndjamena, US military advisors trained 
anti-Qaddafi Libyan exiles and Libyan prisoners of war in Chad who had changed 
sides. These "Libyan Contra" from the NFSL, the main Libyan movement opposed 
of Colonel Qaddafi, were used by the US in Chad in an attempt to overthrow 
Qaddafi. It is estimated that there were 600 opponents to Qaddafi in Chad in 
December 1990. 
The United States let Habre be overthrown because of his links with Iraq. 
The Iraqi occupation of Kuwait made Qaddafi and Chad strategically irrelevant. 
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France and the US saw that Habre had lost his credibility in Chad. France and 
the United States were in favour of political change in Chad in order to stabilise 
the internal situation. 
Moreover, despite Habre having requested intervention from France, the US 
and Morocco, no one offered any help to Habre. Qaddafi adopted a neutral position 
in the Gulf crisis, and he built a closer relationship with Mubarak of Egypt, the 
key American ally in the Gulf crisis. The US saw Qaddafi's stand in the Gulf 
crisis as more important than the failing regime in Chad. Qaddafi has been trying 
to improve Libyan relations with the United States since George Bush became 
President in 1989.123 
8.6.4 Soviet Union, Civil War in Chad, and regional stability 
The Soviet Union established diplomatic relations with Chad in 1964 and 
offered cultural and economic aid to Chad. But Soviet political relations with 
Chad were at a low level for a number of reasons: it saw little of economic interest 
in Chad; the Soviet had strong economic ties with Libya, particularly in arms sales; 
it did not therefore like to sacrifice its relations with Libya for the sake of minor 
interests in Chad and it perceived Chad as a French area of interest.124 The Soviet 
Union saw Chad as a tribal society and with no potential for communist ideology 
there especially in a poor country with high levels of illiteracy. 
The Soviet Union did not support the insurrectionary movement of the Froli-
nat which was formed by Ibrahim Abacha in 1966, despite the Front's socialist and 
anti-colonialist attitudes. The Soviet Union even thought more favourably of the 
Tombalbaye regime, to the point of congratulating him in 1972, on the annihilation 
of the armed movement of the Northern rebels, which was, after all, supported by 
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French troops.125 In the Soviet perspective, as soon as a state no longer manifested 
any declared hostility toward the Soviet Union, it did not fail to make a show of 
its diplomatic receptivity and political leniency.126 
After the overthrow of President Tombalbye in 1975, the new President of 
Chad, Malloum, hoped to establish privileged relations with other major world 
powers and to distance Chad from total dependence on France. Malloum's ob-
jective was to increase his popularity in the North. President Malloum ordered 
French troops to leave Chad because of his conciliation with Northern Chad and 
the Muslim rebels. At one time, it seemed as if the USSR might fill this role but 
since the Soviets were supplying arms to Libya this possibility was lost.127 When 
France intervened in Chad in 1978, in support of Malloum's government, against 
the threat from the Muslim North, the Soviet Union viewed France's intervention 
in Chad as part of a French colonial policy to dominate Africa 128 
The United States accused the Soviet Union of involvement in the civil war 
in Chad. The American accusation came in 1981 when President Reagan esca-
lated American confrontation with Libya. The Soviet Union denied the Ameri-
can/Western accusation. The Soviet Union was also accused, in 1977, of sending 
Soviet advisors to train the rebels and the Libyan forces. The American media 
went further to describe Chad as a new Soviet bridgehead and a communist base 
in the heart of Africa. The US government tried to use the Soviet threat to win 
America's public and congressional support for America's policy in Chad.129 The 
Soviets refuted the United States propaganda as disinformation and they accused 
the United States of preparing public opinion in America and Europe for military 
intervention in Chad in order to destabilise the Qaddafi regime in Libya.130 
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While the United States attempted to use the Soviet presence in Libya as a 
sign of Soviet involvement in Chad, other regional powers in Africa were trying 
to use the Soviet threat to wrest economic and military aid from the West. In 
January 1981, the Nigerian Foreign Minister described Libya as a proxy force for 
Soviet influence in West Africa, and he went further to accuse the Soviet Union of 
seeking control of uranium and other strategic minerals. Egypt was also trying to 
use the civil war in Chad and the superpowers' competition in Central Africa to 
obtain further military aid from the United States. The issue was becoming a way 
for getting arms and economic aid from US and France.131 
The Soviets criticised the French presence in Chad. They accused the French 
of using the civil war in Chad for preserving France's special relationship with a 
group of African countries including Chad which has a strategic value to France in 
Central Africa. The Soviet newspaper Pravda asserted that the Soviet Union had 
nothing to do with what was going on in Chad and that the Soviet objective was to 
see foreign troops evacuated from Chad.132 In 1982, when France and the United 
States intervened in Chad, a Soviet official described the American objective in 
the following terms; 
"The US is trying to use the present phase of the crises in Chad, caused by 
the rebellion of Habre, in its own interests. Washington is attracted by geographical 
position of the country which can easily be turned into a strong point for exerting 
pressure on Libya, which adheres to anti-imperialist positions." 133 
The Soviet Union saw American secret arms supplies to Habre as a destabil-
ising factor against Libya. In 1983, the Soviet Union demanded an immediate stop 
to foreign intervention in Chad where the domestic conflict risked degenerating 
into an area of international tension through the fault of the Western powers. The 
Soviets indirectly warned France against serious aggravation in the Chad situation. 
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The Soviet Union criticised the involvement in Chad of Western powers who were 
trying to attract certain African countries into the conflict. The aim of western 
foreign interference,in the Soviet view, was to force a neo-colonialist government 
in Chad and to transform the territory of this sovereign state into a new arms base 
in the fight against the liberty and independence of African people. 
The Soviet Union was in favour of overthrowing of Habre regime and replacing 
it with a new government which would limit French and American interference in 
Africa. The Soviets were naturally against an American puppet regime in Chad.134 
Whilst the United States wanted the stability of the Habre regime, the So-
viet Union wanted to preserve Qaddafi's stability in Libya. The USSR viewed the 
French intervention in Chad in 1983 as a result of American pressure on France to 
intervene. The USSR accused the CIA of being the main supporter of the Habre 
regime. On 28 January 1983, Pravda reported that Habre had been put into power 
with the assistance of the CIA and that Habre had no support from the Chadian 
people. The Soviets also said that the Habre government was of doubtful legiti-
macy, in much the same way as Reagan was doubtful of the legitimacy of Qaddafi's 
regime in Libya. The Soviet Union denied accusations of Libyan involvement in 
Chad, and argued that the French and the US were using Libya as an excuse to 
intervene in Chad and to strengthen their presence in Africa and to protect their 
puppet regimes in the African continent.135 
8. 7 conclusion 
The Maghreb was not "an area of influence" for the US or the Soviet Union. 
It was not as vital a region as Latin America and Afghanistan or Eastern Europe 
to the United States or the Soviet Union. The Maghreb might best be considered 
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a grey area for the Soviet Union and United States. France had seen the Maghreb 
as 'living space' for French interests and this perception had encouraged French 
intervention in the region directly or indirectly as in Mauritania, Tunisia, Chad 
and Morocco. 
The superpowers intervened directly with military force in other regions in 
order to stabilise the situation and to preserve the regional balance of power. Both 
superpowers had supported stability in the Maghreb and maintained the balance 
of power except in the case of United States with Libya. 
There were similarities in the behaviour of the superpowers towards Maghreb 
stability and regional conflicts. They saw regional stability and the status quo 
as the best way to protect their interests. Neither of the superpowers tried to 
destabilise the situation. Arms sales to North Africa were part of their political 
and economic objectives. 
Both superpowers used regional conflict to extend their influence and presence, 
but in the case of the Maghreb, both superpowers adopted a cautious approach, 
and publicly declared a neutral position in the Western Sahara conflict. The 
prolongation of war was not due to external factors but rather to domestic factors 
in Algeria and Morocco. 
In the case of the stability of North African regimes, both the Soviets and the 
US supported stability except the American attempts to overthrow Qaddafi and 
to destabilise his regime because the United States viewed him as a destabilising 
factor among its allies in the Maghreb, Sudan and Egypt. While the Soviet Union 
had been supporting Arab and Maghreb unity, the United States worked against 
Arab and Maghreb unity. The US had seen Arab or Maghreb unity as a threat to 
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American interests and to Israel. 
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Chapter IX 
Conclusion 
This thesis has traced the superpower involvement with North Africa and, 
in particular, it has analysed the political, economic, and strategic relations of 
the superpowers with the Maghreb states. The thesis begins by arguing that 
economic and strategic interests have shaped the superpowers' behaviour toward 
North Africa. Overall, national interests have dominated their behaviour, and 
ideology has been a relatively less important factor in superpower relations with 
the Maghreb. It is argued that France has influenced the superpowers' attitudes 
towards North Africa and both of the superpowers paid more attention to their 
relations with France rather than with the Maghreb states because of the important 
French role in Europe. 
In the introduction to this thesis, I pointed out that systematic studies of 
superpower relations with the Maghreb are few. This thesis is therefore offered 
as a contribution, if not pioneer to the literature on superpower-Maghreb rela-
tions. The usefulness of this study is found in its comprehensive analysis of super-
power involvement in the Maghreb and, partly in its exploration of the particular 
themes which have contributed to superpower relations with the Third World. 
The Maghreb is a unique case in superpower relations with Third World coun-
tries, particularly because of the French historical involvement there. The thesis 
also explored the interdependence of political, economic, geostrategic and external 
elements in the superpowers' relations with the Maghreb. 
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Three tasks remain: the first is to summarise the analysis and the themes; 
the second is to see whether the analysis has a relevance beyond the Maghreb, and 
the third task is to outline the prospects for future relations. 
The thesis emphasises that the European powers were interested in the 
Maghreb states for strategic and economic reasons. During the multipolar sys-
tem which prevailed in the 19th and early 20th centuries, the European powers 
competed to dominate North Africa for strategic, economic and political reasons. 
France saw North Africa as its backyard, and struggled hard to dominate the re-
gion. Great Britain saw North Africa as vital for British naval power, and strate-
gically important for the protection of its trade routes in the Mediterranean and 
the Atlantic. 
The European multipolar system evolved in such a way as to produce a bal-
ance of power policy to protect the different interests. Africa was divided up so 
as to appease these interests rather than produce confrontation. Great Britain 
supported France in North Africa after it had won French support in Egypt. Italy 
dominated Libya, while Spain shared Morocco with France, and Germany was 
compensated by Cameroon. The European multipolar system was not motivated 
by ideological considerations but rather by economic interests and the struggle for 
political power within Europe. The struggle was extended to the colonial areas. 
Geopolitical factors in the multipolar system influenced the behaviour of European 
states towards North Africa and European states were eager to discourage other 
states from outside the European system from gaining a foot-hold in North Africa. 
France had fought hard to prevent the United States from gaining an economic 
base in North Africa, particularly in Morocco. Great Britain tried to prevent 
Russia from gaining maritime bases or influence in the Mediterranean. 
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The evidence presented in this thesis demonstrates the value of the multipolar 
system to North African states. As we saw in chapters two and four, the European 
states competed strongly over North Africa, and it took them many years to reach 
agreements over Morocco, Tunisia and Libya because of the colonial ambitions of 
the new powerful nation-states in Europe such as Germany and Italy. It was easier 
for France in the early 19th century to occupy Algeria (1831) because Britain 
was the only powerful state able to challenge France but historically it is easier 
to reach an agreement with one actor and to share interests rather than to reach 
an agreement with many different actors and interests. It had taken France more 
than thirty years to reach agreement with Spain over dividing Morocco because 
Germany, Italy and Great Britain all had different interests in North Africa. 
I believe that a multipolar system would serve the Third World countries 
better because it is easier for small states to resist powerful states and to find an 
ally for protection in a multipolar system rather than in a unipolar or a bipolar 
system. When France occupied Algeria, Amir Abd al-kadir asked the United States 
and Great Britain for help against French occupation, but the US was not (until 
WWI) part of the European system and the Mediterranean was dominated by 
only one European power, Britain, which had more interest in co-operating with 
France rather than confronting her over Algeria. Until1912, the Sultan of Morocco 
had successfully maneuvered to protect Morocco's sovereignty by exploiting his 
diplomatic ties with Spain, Germany, the United States and Britain. 
1- Indirect Support for the Independence of the Maghreb States 
In the more recent bipolar system, despite the presence of ideological conflict 
and the cold war, the superpowers' behaviour in North Africa was dominated by 
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their respective national interests. Both of the superpowers, the United States and 
the Soviet Union, were influenced by strategic and economic interests. Neither su-
perpower directly supported the independence of North Africa, despite the United 
States' adoption of the self-determination principle and the Soviet Union's hostility 
to colonialism. Both superpowers prioritised their strategic interests in Europe, 
leaving France a role in North Africa. Despite the Soviet rhetoric of supporting 
national liberation movements, it did not support the Algerian cause until the eve 
of the FLN's political victory when France recognized the Algerian demand for 
independence. Both superpowers adopted an indirect approach to support Third 
World countries and, in particular, they created and used the international trade 
union movement as one means of influencing events. 
The evidence suggests the fact that the international trade unions, ICFTU 
and WFTU were used by the United States and the Soviet Union respectively 
to increase their influence in the Third World and to avoid direct confrontations 
with France or other colonial powers in the Third World. The United States went 
further to support North African trade unions by providing information on French 
activities. The CIA links with North African nationalists were largely through 
trade unions, and the United States was more interested in trade unions because 
they were well organized and they were part of French trade unions before they 
became independent. Trade unions in North Africa had a greater power than the 
trade unions in other parts of the Middle East. 
It has been argued in this thesis that the American trade unions, American 
Federation of Labour and Congress of Industrial Organizations were successful in 
North Africa because of North African trade unions' experience with the commu-
nists in France. First, the communists had influence in French trade unions but 
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the majority of the French communists supported the French presence in Algeria. 
Second, the founders of the communist parties in North Africa were non-Muslim, 
and the majority of them were Jewish who affiliated with and supported the French 
policy in North Africa. 
2- Ideology is Secondary to National Interest with France 
We have argued in this thesis that the behaviour of both superpowers in third 
party areas of influence were not primarily determined by ideological factors, but 
by the superpowers' interests with the third party itself. The priority lay with 
the superpowers' relations with the third party (France) and the superpowers' re-
lations with the third party's area of influence was secondary to their relations 
with France. If there were contradictions between the superpowers' interests with 
France and superpowers' support for North Africa, the superpowers preferred to 
deal with France rather than with North Africa, despite the superpowers' ideolog-
ical principles of anti-colonialism and self-determination. Both superpowers were 
therefore pragmatic in their policies towards the Maghreb. The thesis supports 
the argument of the realist school of world politics which emphasises that nations 
behave according to their national interests rather than their professed ideology. 
In the 1950s, France was suspicious of the United States' relations with the 
Maghreb states. The French were sensitive to American attempts to displace them 
in North Africa, particularly for economic reasons. The French suspicion was a 
reaction to American efforts in Iran and Egypt to replace or to share interests with 
the British. The Soviet priorities were in the Northern tier of the Middle East 
and with Europe rather than with North Africa. North African leaders therefore 
focused on the US rather than on the Soviet Union to put pressure on France to 
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gain their independence. 
In the case of the ideological factor in the foreign policies of Maghreb states, 
the thesis argues that radical states in North Africa, such as Algeria and Libya, 
have used radicalism as a means to legitimise their regimes. This is also the case 
in other radical states in the Third World. Both Algeria and Libya suppressed and 
banned the communist parties. The Algerian government worked with communists 
but only as individuals rather than as members of a legal political organization. 
The evidence confirms the view that there is often a gulf between rhetoric and 
reality which produces highly ironic situations, for example, a radical Angolan 
regime using Cuban troops to guard Gulf Oil facilities against the black Unita 
forces supported by a racist South African government and the CIA. 
Comparing the superpowers' behaviour in other Third World areas, the United 
States did not hesitate in the Cuban Missile Crisis to precipitate a nuclear con-
frontation with the USSR to protect its sphere of influence. The Soviet Union 
supported Vietnam in furtherance of ideological and strategic objectives in South-
east Asia. It was a matter of vital interests and balance of power for the USSR. 
Even in 1968, the Brezhnev doctrine in Eastern Europe was part of its protection of 
its sphere of influence and, when the Soviets felt their interests threatened, it was 
extended to Afghanistan. Historically, French behaviour in North Africa has been 
to some extent similar to both US policy in Latin America and to the Brezhnev 
doctrine. When Mitterrand threatened to use force in Algeria in June 1991 if the 
Islamic Salvation Front endangered the Algerian regime, it demonstrated clearly 
the continuing French concern with North Africa.1 
Superpower competition was greater in the eastern part of the Middle East 
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than in North Africa as each sought to replace each other or limit each other's 
presence. The British withdrawal from east of Suez left a power vacuum, which 
was rather different from the French withdrawal from North Africa where she left 
behind strong cultural, political and economic influences. This French legacy has 
limited the superpowers' role in the area. 
3- Political conflict with France encourages the Maghreb states to ap-
proach the US or USSR while conflicts with the US encourage the 
Maghreb states to approach USSR and vice-versa 
The superpowers' political relations with North Africa were at a normal level, 
not dramatically strong as in the case of Egypt and the Soviet Union. On the 
other hand, the governments of North Africa were cautious about dealing with the 
superpowers and even Algerian relations with the Soviet Union passed through 
suspicious and critical periods. The conflict between the United States and Algeria 
over international political issues encouraged Algeria to build political ties with the 
USSR. Also, Qaddafi turned to the USSR after his conflict with the United States 
over political issues despite him being strongly anti-communist. Morocco turned 
to the United States after its conflict with France over Algeria, Mauritania, and 
other political issues. Bourguiba approached the United States after his difficulties 
with France over Bizerta and Algerian independence. 
4- The superpowers tried to build cultural ties with North Africa so 
as to influence the political elites in the Maghreb but French cultural 
domination proved a major obstacle 
In cultural terms, the superpowers were unsuccessful in influencing elites in 
North Africa. Despite the fact that cultural co-operation was part of the super-
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powers' political strategy, they were unsuccessful because the French were main-
taining and spreading the French language. France was the first colonial country 
to strengthen its relations with its colonies through language. Most of the former 
French colonies in Africa still use French as the official language. Most of the su-
perpowers' efforts to exploit domestic political forces through cultural cooperation 
have been counterproductive because of the strong French cultural presence there. 
The political relations with both superpowers tend not to influence cultural 
cooperation, for example, more Algerian and Libyan students have chosen to study 
in the United States than in the Soviet Union. Whilst Morocco has close relations 
with the United States, most Moroccan students attend French universities. Soviet 
educational assistance is the principal reason why many North African students 
attend higher institutions in the USSR. The Soviet Union offered scholarships 
and this policy was attractive to poor countries such as the North African states. 
Returning students have not greatly increased Soviet influence, even fewer seem 
to have changed their political persuasions after four or five years of study in the 
USSR; indeed, they became anti-communist. 
French cultural co-operation is still strong in North Africa, in spite of the 
tensions between the Arabists and Francophonists in Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco 
over domestic policy such as the Arabianisation of educational institutions. In 
1989, there were 12,948 Algerian; 25,834 Moroccan and 7,172 Tunisian students in 
France and there were 1,705 and 2,242 North African students in the USSR and 
the USA respectively. 2 
The thesis draws attention to a neglected dimension in international relations 
theories, the role of cultural factors in the analysis and interpretation of superpower 
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involvements in the Third World. The cultural element is an important factor in 
great power influence in the Third World. The colonial powers still have influence 
in their former colonies because of their cultural influence among elites there. The 
French cultural influence is an important factor in preserving French influence in 
North Africa. 
Human rights issues have been used by the superpowers to put pressure on 
North African states. In 1965, after the overthrow of Ben Bella's regime, the Soviet 
Union criticised Algeria because of the political arrest of communists and other 
political opponents. The Soviets preferred an indirect reaction to the coup. The 
United States also used human rights as a political means to discredit Qaddafi's 
regime; even Carter's administration used the human rights issue against Morocco 
to put political pressure on Hassan II. 
5- Strong economic ties despite political differences 
The superpowers built up economic relations with North Africa despite their 
political differences. Soviet economic links with the Maghreb were not influenced 
by political concerns, as was the case in the eastern part of the Arab World. For 
instance, Egypt's share of Soviet trade with Arab countries plummeted from 68.0 
per cent in 1965 under President Nasser's leadership to 15.5 per cent in 1980 when 
Egypt abandoned the socialist model and turned to the United States.3 The case 
was different in the Maghreb because of the Soviet need for hard currency and the 
Maghreb states' need for Soviet economic co-operation, particularly in construction 
projects and arms sales. The United States had substantial oil investments in both 
Libya and Algeria, while the Soviet Union had strong economic ties with Morocco. 
However, despite all this, in general economic terms Europe ranked first in dealing 
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with the Maghreb states, particularly as a market for European exports. 
American economic interests influenced American relations with the colonial 
powers. United States applied pressure on France over Morocco to secure an open 
door policy; the US intended to force France to remove the French commercial 
restriction over the Moroccan markets for American goods. The open door policy 
also affected relations with Britain. The latter complained of American pressure 
for an open door policy in Third World countries, especially in former British 
colonies.4 
American oil companies actively sought a place in the Middle East oil industry 
but in the inter-war period British-based oil companies appeared to have a strong 
advantage in that Britain was still the key military and political power in much of 
the region. In their efforts to penetrate the Middle East oil industry, the Ameri-
can majors had the strong and active support of the American State Department. 
The United States supported Mousadeq's nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian oil 
company (now British Petroleum), then almost 100% owned by the British. The 
US turned (US-British coup in 1953) against Mousadeq only after the American 
companies had acquired 40% of the Iranian oil. The United States helped Algeria 
when the latter nationalized its oil. The Soviet Union also supported the nation-
alization of the oil companies in the Middle East for ideological and economic 
reasons. This economic competition might well return in the new multipolar sys-
tem of the 1990s. Both superpowers welcomed and encouraged the increase in oil 
prices in the early 1970s. The Soviet Union benefited from oil's prices, and the 
United States benefited from the effect of high oil prices on the European and 
Japanese economies. 
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The United States and the Soviet Union both offered economic aid to the 
Maghreb states, but American aid was linked with American political objectives, 
for example, the United States refused to offer economic aid to Algeria because of 
political differences, and they did not offer aid to Libya. American aid to Morocco 
had increased in the 1980s because of Reagan's strategic objective in gaining access 
to Moroccan military bases. The Soviet Union was not able to offer considerable 
financial aid because of domestic economic difficulties but also Soviet aid was linked 
to Soviet political objectives in North Africa. 
6- Economic interests behind arms transfers 
Economic interests tended to dominate superpowers arms transfers to the 
Maghreb states. The Soviet Union transferred arms for hard currency without 
any restrictions or ideological inhibitions. The United States was not a major 
supplier to Morocco and Tunisia because they did not have the financial resources 
of other American friends such as Saudi Arabia, Iran until 1979, and the GCC 
states, who paid billions of US dollars for American weapons. This thesis argues 
that it was economic factors rather than security considerations which dominated 
arms transfers to North Africa. 
The superpowers paid considerable attention to military training programmes 
to influence the North African military but they were not successful in supplanting 
French military influence. French trained military personnel have been in power 
for decades in Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. Ben Bella served in the French 
army before the Algerian revolution, the present Algerian Defense Minister, Khalid 
Nazzar, joined the Algerian revolution after he had served in the French army, and 
only left the French for the FLN on the eve of the Algerian victory. 5 
479 
In Morocco, the Commander of the Moroccan military, King Hassan was 
trained in France and graduated from Bordeaux University. President Ben Ali of 
Tunisia trained in French and American military academies. Qaddafi is the only 
military leader in the Maghreb who trained in the United Kingdom. The thesis 
argues that the superpowers were not able to challenge the French. The Soviet 
Union was not able to influence the military in Algeria or Libya despite a large 
Soviet military programme directed at the Third World. 
The American International Military Education and Training (IMET) pro-
gramme achieves considerable success in other parts of the world but not in North 
Africa. According to a 1991 congressional presentation prepared by the Depart-
ment of State and the Defense Security Assistance Agency, over 1,500 !MET-
trained personnel (as a whole) are now cabinet ministers, ambassadors, chief of 
military services and commandant of senior professional military schools. The 
French and the French-trained personnel in North Africa are suspicious of such 
American training programmes. In the unsuccessful F-5 air assassination attempt 
against King Hassan of Morocco in 1972, the rebel pilots were trained in the United 
States. The death of Adlemi in 1983 was part of the French-American struggle to 
influence military elites in Morocco.6 
The thesis confirms that geostrategy played a major role in superpower re-
lations with the Maghreb states, particularly during the cold war era. Regional 
states, however, tended not to take sides between the superpower, despite the 
American bases in Morocco, because the Americans did not have complete man-
date over these bases as they did in Iran under the Shah or in the Philippines. 
Geopolitical considerations therefore prevailed over ideological affinity in the su-
perpowers' strategic relations with the Maghreb states. 
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The study also confirms that neither radical states in North Africa such as 
Algeria or Libya nor the conservative states such as Morocco and Thnisia have 
served as proxy forces for the superpowers in cases of regional conflict or interven-
tion. In the case of Moroccan intervention in Shaba I and Shaba II in Zaire, the 
thesis demonstrates that Morocco worked closely with the French and Hassan II 
tried to to use this act as a political gesture to win American congressional support 
in the Western Sahara conflict. The Moroccans might therefore be considered as 
proxy for the French more than for the United States. 
The superpowers were in favour of stability in the Maghreb and they did 
not intervene directly in regional conflicts. Both superpowers saw the stability of 
North African regimes as being in their interests because they could not usually 
gain enough influence to enable them to change the regimes to their sphere of 
influence as happened in the cases of Gaafar Nimeri in Sudan, or Najibullah in 
Afghanistan. 
The superpowers' behaviour in other regional conflicts was rather different, 
for example, Afghanistan, where the CIA were involved in helping the Afghan Mu-
jahedin to destabilise the Afghanistan government. The superpowers confronted 
each other in Vietnam, and supported opposing factions in Angola because of the 
superpowers' vital interests. The United States intervened in Panama for Ameri-
can geopolitical interests as it intervened in other Central American conflicts. The 
Soviet Union intervened in Czechoslovakia in 1968 because of direct Soviet interests 
there. In the case of the Maghreb, the superpowers saw that there were no advan-
tages to exploiting the regional conflicts there. Moreover, as we have seen their 
relations with neighbouring governments were insufficiently close to allow them to 
intervene on behalf of one side or the other. In general terms, the superpowers 
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intervene when their sphere of influence is under threat. American involvement in 
Chad was not serious enough to destabilise Qaddafi. Even the Carter administra-
tion saw Chad as an area of French interest. 
The United States antagonised the Arab nationalist movement in 1950s and it 
saw Arab unity as a threat to American interests in the region. The United States 
opposed to the Arab unity in 1960s, and the United States adopted the same 
attitude toward the case of the Arab African Union between Morocco and Libya. 
The United States favoured political fragmentation in the Arab world because any 
united front in the Arab world would jeopardise American interests because of the 
United States longstanding support of Israel. The United States criticised Algeria 
over the proposed unity with Libya and put pressure on Morocco to abrogate the 
unity agreement with Libya. The United States also reacted cautiously to the 
Arab Maghreb Union. 
One the other hand, the Soviet Union welcomed Arab unity because it fur-
thered Soviet interests. A strong Arab front against the US would serve Soviet in-
terests against the US. Moreover, Arab unity would strengthen the Soviet Union's 
relations with the Arab world and the Soviet Union would avoid the dilemma of 
taking sides in intra-Arab conflict between conservative and progressive regimes. 
The Soviet Union saw unity in North Africa as way of a strengthening of the Soviet 
position in North Africa as it might reduce the isolation of Soviet friends such as 
Libya. 
In the case of the Western Sahara conflict the thesis supported the argument 
that the conflict is related to the domestic and regional policies of both Morocco 
and Algeria. Morocco has been using the conflict for long term domestic stability 
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to distract attention from political and economic difficulties such as 1981 and 1984 
riots. 
Both superpowers have not directly involved themselves in the dispute. In 
order to sustain their vital interests with two North African rivals, the superpow-
ers subordinated the issue of independence for the Western Sahara to untroubled 
interaction with both Morocco and Algeria. The two superpowers have maintained 
cordial relations with Morocco and Algeria through effective management of the 
Western Sahara conflict. 
Comparing the Western Sahara conflict to the Eritrea or Namibia conflict, 
Western Sahara is not directly linked to Algeria's national interest as Eritrea is 
to Ethiopians. An Ethiopia without the Eritrean coast's access to the Red Sea 
would be a land-locked state with almost no strategic value. In this sense, both 
Addis Ababa and the superpowers are concerned about their interests in the Horn 
of Africa and the Middle East, but the Western Sahara is not vital to Algerian 
national security. 
The strategies of South Africa and the Western countries were based upon the 
defense of their interests while they managed the Namibian problem. Moreover, 
the Namibian issue became an American domestic issue in American foreign policy 
because of black and liberal concern in the US. In the case of Western Sahara the 
issue is different. Algeria is not a land-locked country, and cooperation is possible 
with Morocco, and the phosphate resources of the disputed territory are already 
divided between Spain, Morocco and Mauritania. Also, French companies are 
active both in Morocco and Algeria, and for the two superpowers there is no vital 
interest to get involved directly. 
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Compared to the Palestinian issue and the Iran-Iraq war, the Western Sahara 
is different because the other two conflicts are linked to domestic, regional and 
global interests and the strategic objectives of both the United States and the 
USSR, and these interests have tended to complicate the two issues and encouraged 
direct involvement in the conflicts. The United States is directly involved in the 
Palestinian issue partly because it is a domestic issue in the US through the work of 
the Jewish lobby. The Soviet Union supported the Arab states by political means 
and arms. Both superpowers also sided with Iraq and Iran during the Gulf war to 
protect their interests and to maintain the regional balance of power. 
The Maghreb is a special case in the superpower relations with the Third 
World. While the East-West conflict tended to shape the superpowers' behaviour 
in the Third World countries, North Africa's relations with the superpowers have 
been influenced by other external factors, such as the EC, especially France. 
7- Prospects for the Future 
When Gorbachev came to power in March 1985, he focused on Soviet internal 
problems and adopted the policies of glasnost and perestroika to deal with Soviet 
economic problems. Gorbachev also adopted a new approach to Soviet foreign 
policy and his new thinking and the downgrading of Marxist-Leninist ideology 
in world affairs was a radical departure. Moreover, Gorbachev decreased Soviet 
involvement in the Third World and focused on Soviet economic problems. 
The disintegration of the Soviet Union and its retreat from the Third World 
has shaped the international system. The military confrontations between the 
US and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) are mostly eliminated, 
and a new international system has emerged. The new system is characterised by 
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economic factors. A new multipolar system has emerged and economic competition 
is the main issue in this new system. Japan, the EEC, China and the United States 
are now the main players in this new system. 
The CIS is preoccupied with its own economic problems. The Republics 
are desperate for finandal aid from the West to rebuild their economies. The 
Commonwealth market has become attractive to capitalist competition. In the 
meantime the Russian withdrawal from the Third World and its economic problems 
has left the Third World to the EC states, China, the United States and Japan. 
In the Middle East, Russia has turned towards the Gulf states for financial aid. 
During the Gulf Crisis the Soviets obtained $5.5 billion from Saudi Arabia and $2.0 
billion from Kuwait. This is the first time the Soviets have shifted their attention 
to concentrate on the Gulf. 7 
The CIS is unable to compete with the EEC in the development of the North 
African economies. As a result of the Soviet disintegration, the independent Mus-
lim republics of Central Asia have become another factor in influencing future 
Russian relations with the Maghreb States. Historically, Russia engaged in bloody 
wars with Muslims, particularly with the Ottoman Empire in the eighteenth and 
the nineteenth centuries. 
With the spread of Islamic fundamentalism in both the Maghreb and the 
Muslim republics of the former Soviet Union, the Maghreb outlook will be focused 
towards the Muslim republics because the new Commonwealth has nothing to 
offer to North Africa in international affairs as a result of the decline of Russian 
power at international level. The Russians might continue construction projects 
in the Maghreb, or fishing cooperation as with Morocco, but it will be very hard 
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for Russia or other republics to replace or compete with the US or the EC in 
investment, or export and import relations with the Maghreb states.8 
The major competition in the Maghreb in the 1990s will be between the 
United States and the EC countries. The EC states will also compete amongst 
themselves over the North African market particularly between France and other 
EC countries, but this will depend on how well the integration policy develops 
in the EC in 1992. The integration of the EC seems likely to lead to intense 
competition between the US and the EC in Third World markets. 
The United States has signed economic co-operation agreements with the 
Maghreb States in the past three years. But American economic aid is limited 
compared to the EC aid to North Africa (Tables 9:1; 9:3). But on the other hand, 
there are two possible levels of tension; first, competition between the US and the 
Maghreb for agricultural markets in Europe, American agricultural products might 
compete with North African products in Europe, just as Soviet natural gas and 
oil had competed with North African gas and oil in Europe. The United States 
demands a free trade market or only limited protection for agricultural trade in 
Europe. This policy might affect the North African states because both the United 
States and the Maghreb states compete over the agricultural market in Europe. 
Second; there is also competition between the US and Europe for agricultural 
markets in the Maghreb e.g. cereals and livestock products. In February 1990, the 
EC countries protested to the US when the latter sold wheat to Thnisia at 8% less 
than the EC price. 
The Maghreb states try to have some kind of special status in their agricultural 
relations with the EC, and to avoid conflict over agricultural issues in the EC 
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market, and to strengthen their economic relations. The Maghreb states signed an 
agreement for co-operation with Southern European states, Italy, France, Spain 
and Portugal in Rome in October 1990, to strengthen their economic cooperation 
in the Western Mediterranean ( 4+5 group). Malta joined them in December 1991. 
Table 9:1 The United States aid and Credits to Maghreb 1988-1990 
States US economic aid US military aid US agricultural export credits 
Algeria 0 $2.2 million $2.1 billion 
Libya 0 0 0 
Morocco $268.8 million $14 7.4 million $495 million 
Tunisia $90.2 million $91.3 million $437.1 million 
Source: Joe Stork "North Africa Faces the 1990' Middle East Report, no.163, 
vol.20 no.2, March-April 1990, p5. 
The Maghreb states have recently encouraged foreign investment and have 
privatised much of their economic sectors to develop their economies and cope with 
the rise in unemployment and their heavy debts (Algeria $24.8 billion, Morocco 
$19.9 billion, Tunisia $ 6.6 billion in 1989).9 The United States' war against Iraq 
under the UN umbrella created anti-American feeling and support for Iraq in the 
Maghreb (on the public level) but the continuation of this feeling will depend on 
American behaviour towards the Palestinian problem and internal political change 
in the Maghreb. The struggle now in the Maghreb is between secular regimes 
and fundamentalist movements. The outcome of this struggle will shape Maghreb 
relations with Europe and the US. 
487 
Four factors still dominate EC economic relations with the Maghreb states: 
trade, investment, labour and financial aid. Political relations are still dominated 
by regimes which have good relations with the EC in general and France in par-
ticular. In the multipolar system in the 1990s, European economic relations with 
the Maghreb have penetrated all North African economic sectors, and the EC, 
particularly France, Germany and Italy is the dominant economic force in the 
Maghreb. 
The EC is the leading trading partner of Maghreb states. The EC accounts 
for about two thirds of the Maghreb states' foreign trade ( 60% of imports and 67% 
of exports), while the Maghreb states accounted for 3.8% of the EC's imports and 
3.3% of its exports in 1989.10 Obviously, the Maghreb states are a major market for 
European industrial products. On the other hand, preferential trade arrangements 
ensure free access for industrial products and tariff concessions for most of the 
Maghreb's agricultural exports to the EC. 
The EC is an important market for the Maghreb states' products, particu-
larly hydrocarbons: 96% of Algeria's and 95% of Libya's exports are to the EC. 
Moreover, more than 10% of the EC's gas requirements come from Algeria. The 
Maghreb states are desperate to build stronger economic relations with the EC.11 
The Maghreb states have encouraged European investment projects in the 
Maghreb. In 1989, 15% of Morocco's total investments were from foreign resources, 
71% of this from the EC. France, Germany and Italy are the leading investors in 
North Africa. The dependence of the Maghreb economies on the EC played a 
major role in strengthening the economic ties between the Maghreb states and the 
EC.l2 
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There are 1,840,346 North Africans in the EC, 76.9% of them are in France. 
Most of the North Africans are migrant workers, they came from Algeria, Morocco 
and Tunisia. Very few Libyans emigrate to the EC. It has been estimated that there 
are 819,000 Algerians in the EC, 747,000 Moroccans, and 238,000 Tunisians. The 
financial transfers these migrant workers make are an important part of the balance 
of payments of the Maghreb countries, particularly Morocco.13 The transfers are 
a prime source of foreign exchange for Morocco and exceed even phosphates and 
tourism, amounting to 22% of the current balance in 1987.14 
The North African migrant workers have become a political issue between the 
Maghreb states and the EC, particularly France. France has been trying to limit 
immigration or even to expel migrant workers. They have become a major issue 
in French domestic politics. 
Table 9:2 Net Transfers of funds by Maghreb workers($ million) 
States 1970 1987 
Algeria 178 434 
Morocco 27 1587 
Thnisia 20 486 
Source: Commission of the European Communities, The Countries of the 
Greater Arab Maghreb and the European Community, Europe Information, DE 68, 
January 1991, pll. 
The most important factor in economic co-operation between Europe and 
the Maghreb states is financial aid. Europe is still the Maghreb's biggest source 
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of official aid, providing almost half of its total world aid (an average of 47.3% 
between 1985-88). France provides the most aid, 40% of all bilateral aid from 
Europe to 'funisia and more than 90% to Algeria. Germany is also a major donor 
and it is followed by Italy and Belgium (Table 9:3). 
Table 9:3 Financial aid from EC members to Maghreb (average over 
1985-1988) 
States Algeria Morocco 'funisia 
France 91 69 39 
Germany 2 23 14 
Italy 3 4 41.5 
Belgium 3 2 3 
Member States total 100% 100% 100% 
Average ( $ million) 54 232 132 
Source: Commission of the European Communities, The Countries of the 
Greater Arab Maghreb and the European Community, op cit. 
Comparing American and French economic aid to the Maghreb, France is still 
the dominant influence over the Maghreb economy through trade, migrant workers, 
investment and financial aid. The most likely route for US penetration of Maghreb 
states is through political issues in a future struggle between secular and French ori-
entated elites and Islamic fundamentalists. France will simply not allow American 
companies to penetrate Maghreb states in the French sphere of influence and its 
geopolitical backyard. Pierre Marion, the former chief of French intelligence, who 
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headed the French intelligence agency DGSE in 1981-1982, admitted that French 
government has been spying on US corporations and their executives in France. 
French spies went further to follow American business travellers, particularly in 
Africa. Marion stated "in economic competition we're competitors". 15 
Future scenario of France-US relations in Maghreb: 
The United States might conduct a policy of competition with France and 
other EC countries to penetrate North Africa after the decline of US-USSR com-
petition because Europe is the only economic force which could compete with the 
US after Japan. There are a number of potential scenarios: 
1- Islamic Fundamentalist Scenario: Maghreb governments have been facing 
a challenge from Islamic fundamentalists. The failure of economic development, 
social problems, unemployment, poverty ( in 1985 40% of Moroccans lived below 
the poverty line, and in 1991 30% of the workforce is unemployed) and the po-
litical situation in North Africa has created a ripe environment for the Islamic 
Fundamentalists as an alternative to the failure of existing regimes.16 
In Thnisia, the al-Nahda party and the Islamic Liberation party (Hizb al-
Tahrir) are the main challengers to the Ben Ali regime. They have accused Ben Ali 
of being an American puppet. The al-Nahda party is more moderate in American 
eyes and an American congressional delegation met with al-Nahda in 1986. The 
French government has welcomed the Tunisian Islamic members in France but, 
under pressure from Ben Ali, France expelled their leaders. Rashid al-Ganoshi, 
the leader of al-N ahda, is living in exile in the United Kingdom, before that he 
was travelling with a Sudanese diplomatic passport. 
In Algeria, the Front Islamique du Salut {FIS) (Islamic Salvation Front) is the 
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strongest opposition group in Algeria and became legal in 1988 winning a majority 
in municipal elections in June 1991. But it has clashed with the Algerian govern-
ment. France threatened to intervene in Algeria if the Islamic Fundamentalists 
threatened the regime there. After the FIS major victory in the Algerian new 
general election, in December 1991, the Algerian government has become more 
aware of the Islamic threat. In January 1992, President Bendjedid resigned, and 
the military-controlled council cancelled the second round of national elections, 
banned the activities of the FIS and arrested its leaders. Morocco is less threat-
ened by Islamic fundamentalists because they have been outlawed. King Hassan 
claims that he is a descendant of the Prophet and the Commander of the Faith-
ful. The main group is al-Adl wal-Ihsan, its leader, Abdel Salam Yassin, is under 
house arrest. The militant group in Morocco is the Islamic Youth ( al-Shabiba al-
Islamiyya), its leader, Abd el-Karim al-Muti, is in exile in France.17 Nevertheless, 
the fundamentalists are still the potential threat to the North African regimes 
because of the failure of political parties in North Africa, e.g. FLN in Algeria. 
The North African migrant workers in France are a potential point of con-
frontation between France and Islamic fundamentalists. Islam is the second largest 
religion in France after Roman Catholicism. There are many public criticisms of 
migrant workers in France. The right wing describes the presence of Muslim North 
African people as an "invasion". The spread of Islamic fundamentalism disturbed 
France because they fear it will spread in the Maghreb community in France. In 
1989 and 1990 there were political battles over Muslim girls wearing veils (Hejjab) 
in French schools. This conflict over Islamic issues will be a potential route for the 
United States to compete with France.18 
An American option in the Maghreb is to develop links with these Islamic 
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forces and to try to encourage the replacement of the Islamic militant leaders with 
less radical "Rafsanjani style". The Americans might exploit this option through 
anti-French sentiments derived from French relations with existing regimes or the 
French colonial legacy of fighting Muslims in North Africa. The American ambas-
sadors have already built bridges with the leaders of Islamic groups, and the former 
US ambassador to Thnisia, Peter Sebastian, visited all North African capitals and 
met the leaders of these groups.19 The United States has a successful track-record 
of supporting China in 1940s to create a nationalist front against communist Rus-
sia and in 1970s, the US had used the China card against the USSR. The United 
States might adopt the political strategy of supporting moderate Islamic groups 
against radical militants to win allies and to protect interests with Islamic groups. 
The United States tried to contain Islamic fundamentalism in Iran through 
arms for hostages in 1985, while the US was condemning dealing with terrorists or 
conducting diplomacy with Islamic fundamentalists in Iran, the Reagan adminis-
tration was secretly dealing with the Iranian and the Islamic groups in Lebanon 
behind the back of its European allies. 
2- Conflict with Spain over Ceuta and Melilla: 
Another potential option for the United States to penetrate North Africa is 
by supporting Morocco in its demand to reclaim the Ceuta and Melilla enclaves. 
In this case it will win over Maghrebi public opinion. During the bipolar system, 
the United States used Europe as a counterweight to the USSR in the shape of the 
US presenting nuclear safeguards to its European allies against the Soviet threat. 
The situation now may eventually change markedly. After the end of the cold war, 
the situation in Europe may not be so desperate for the US to have military bases 
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in Spain or strategically important to NATO. In this case the United States might 
find it in its interest to support Morocco to gain economic advantage in the Arab 
Maghreb Union. 
The Spanish general staff identifies North Africa as the only likely source of 
an attack directed specifically at Spain. The most visible threat is an attempt to 
seize back Spain's North African enclaves. But despite the strong economic ties 
between Morocco and Spain, their future relations depend on the internal situation 
in Morocco after solving the Western Sahara conflict. King Hassan might turn 
Moroccan public attention towards Ceuta and Melilla to avoid internal problems. 
Historically, France and Spain divided Morocco between themselves. This scenario 
depends to what extent France might side with Spain in this potential conflict. 20 
3- Military coups : 
Historically, the United States supported the military as a means of replacing 
the European powers in the Middle East. For example, the US supported Hosni 
Aza'am's coup in Syria in 1949, and the military coup in Egypt in 1952. Also the 
United States tilted towards Mousadeq in Iran when he nationalised the oil com-
panies there. The Americans turned against Mousadeq after they had set a deal 
with the British over the Iranian oil. The United States might use this approach 
to overthrow regimes friendly to France in North Africa to penetrate these coun-
tries, and even to encourage the nationalisation of French economic investments 
there. More recently, during Algeria's political crisis the United States favored 
the Military-controlled Council more than the Algerian Islamic Fundamentalists 
in power.21 
4- French-US cooperation in North Africa: 
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Another option for the United States to penetrate North Africa is through 
co-operation with France in the Maghreb. The French have dominated the market 
there. It is very hard for the United States to challenge France in North Africa 
because France has much influence in political, cultural, and economic life. On the 
other hand, the Maghreb states have involvement with the EC in many economic 
agreements. For example, The Mediterranean Financial Club (MFC) was estab-
lished in April1991 to assist Southern Mediterranean countries through European 
financial institutions and the establishment of the Mediterrane~ Development 
Bank has similar objectives. Moreover, Algeria, Morocco and Spain signed agree-
ments in April 1991 to build a natural gas pipeline to carry Algerian natural gas 
via Morocco and the Straits of Gibraltar to Europe which will begin to operate in 
1995. Algeria has a pipeline to carry natural gas to Italy through Tunisia. 
In the multipolar system, the EC will have the upper hand over North Africa. 
The United States will have a hard time finding its place there except during con-
flicts between European states, as was the case before World War One. The United 
States has already begun major cultural cooperation with North African states. It 
established the American Centre for North African studies in Tunisia in 1986, as 
a basis for a potential American university in Tunisia in the near future. France 
reacted to the American presence by establishing a French centre for research in 
Tunisia in January 1992. The American Agency for International Development 
(AID) signed an agreement with Morocco in September 1991, according to this 
agreement the AID will offer $28 million to Morocco in the 1990s for transferring 
technology, training and language programme. The cooperation will include: 240 
postgraduate research students in American universities, 130 academic visits, and 
a short training programme for 240 Moroccans in the US. Moreover, the AID will 
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offer public administration courses to 5800 in Morocco, and offers English language 
courses to 2300 Moroccan employees. Through cultural programmes the United 
States tries to penetrate the Moroccan and Tunisian markets. The French language 
has dominated the business market in North Africa for many decades. 22 
After the disappearance of the Soviet Union, the struggle for influence in 
North Africa will be between the EC and the United States. France will struggle 
hard to keep its economic and cultural relations with the Maghreb, and American 
advanced technology will be an effective element in challenging France in North 
Africa. Geographically, Japan and China are too far away to challenge the Euro-
peans in their backyard, North Africa, and the coming struggle for influence will 
be among EC countries in the Maghreb and also between the EC and the US. 
The geopolitics of the Maghreb is still a major factor in political, economic and 
strategic relations with EC, US and CIS. 
In brief, this conclusion has outlined the contribution of the thesis to the lit-
erature on the superpower relations with the Maghreb, its relevance to superpower 
relations with the Third World countries, and its contribution to the themes of 
international relations theories. 
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don), June 11th 1992, p. 8. 
17. According to al-Nahda sources, the United States understands the Fundamen-
talists demands, but under pressure from Ben Ali the United States refused 
to offer a visa to the leader of al-Nahda party, Rashid al-Gunoshi in Novem-
ber 1991 to attend the annual conference of the Muslim Student Association. 
This does not necessarily mean that the United States cut its contact with al-
Nahda, Alsharq Al-Awsat, 28th November 1991, p. 1. See for more detail on 
Islamic Fundamentalists in North Africa; Thnisia, Al-Mansouri, W. Al-Etejah 
Al-Islami and Bourguiba ( Movement de la Tendence Islamique (MTI), (no 
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MTI relations with Bourguiba and Ben Ali by one of its members, (in Arabic). 
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position, vol.26, no.3, Summer 1991, pp. 328-344. Boulby, M. "The Islamic 
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April 1988. For Libya see Al-Ghuraba, vol.l27 no.1, January 1990, pp. 12-13. 
Also, Joffe, G. "Islamic opposition in Libya" Third World Quarterly, vol.10 
no.2 April 1988, but he cites Mohammed Nabatani as a founder of Islamic 
Liberation Party instead of Tuqiudine al-Nabahani, a Palestinian who died in 
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21. For American and French reaction to the political crisis in Algeria in January 
1992, and the military backed council see, International Herald Tribune, Jan-
uary 16, 1992, p. 3. An American political scientist and a former CIA agent, 
Graham Fuller, wrote in favor of an Islamic take over in Algeria "let's see 
How Islamic Politicians Cope and Learn" International Herald Tribune, Jan-
uary 14, 1992. p. 6. Despite cautious French reaction to the Algerian crisis, 
Claude Cheysson, a former socialist foreign Minister said "There is nothing 
that I feared more in the world than the proclamation of an Islamic state in 
Algeria" Independent (London), January 17, 1992, p. 12. 
22. To encourage cultural co-operation, the United States and Morocco estab-
lished Moroccan-American Commission for Educational and Cultural ex-
change in Rabat in Morocco. The US also signed a cultural agreement with 
Algeria in June 1987. See Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, June 6, 1987, p. 15. Also, 
the United States recently signed agreement with Tunisia. For more detail 
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